Kamer Kasim Kamer Kasim printable version send your friend

Wednesday, 7 February 2007

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia became an independent state, however, since its independence Georgia faced severe internal crisis and security problems, which were the great obstacle for the implementation of reforms and the success of the state-building process. Having border with Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia and access to the Black Sea make Georgia important transit routes to the Europe and Central Asia. Internal conflicts and lack of stability prevented Georgia to utilize its location in the Caucasus and delayed the possible regional cooperation, which would be beneficial for all the countries in the region. Given the fact that Georgia has lack of natural resources and weak economic structure, it is very difficult for Georgia to exploit its geographical location without support from the regional powers and the United States. In fact, Georgia is the one of the biggest beneficiary of the US aid in the world. Georgia has received approximately $ 800 million aid from the US. Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands are also important donors for Georgia. To analyze the roots of Georgia’s continuing problems and its difficulty to solve them despite the financial and political support from the outside world; we need to look at Georgia’s frozen conflicts and Russian role in the region.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has emerged with 60 percent of the population and 76 percent of the territory of the former Soviet Union and followed the policy of domination in the former Soviet territories. The Soviet Union was a multinational empire and its foreign policy agenda was designed accordingly. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation had to be different than the Soviet Union. Internal discussing about the direction of the Russian foreign policy produced the two main groups: Atlanticists and Eurasianists. Atlanticists considered Russia as a Western nation and according to them cooperation with the Western states would help Russia to absorb Western values, including democracy and human rights. Atlanticists believed that Russia must avoid assuming a leading role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russia’s active role in the CIS would slow down Russia’s integration with Western economic institutions. Until the end of 1992 Atlanticist view was dominant in Russian foreign policy and they aimed to liberate the Russian Federation from the burdens of the empire and to make Russia a part of community of democratic states. In that period, Russia’s administration was concerned with transforming of the Russian economy into a genuine market and to integrate Russia with the Western system. As a result, Russia showed a lack of interest in its relations with the new Caucasian and Central Asian republics. Eurasianists criticized Atlanticist view and they emphasized Russia’s distinctive identity from the West. The Eurasianist approach affected Russia’s foreign policy after 1992, and produced the policy of ‘Near Abroad’ (blizhneezarubezhe) promoting Russia’s relations with the CIS.

Eurasianists believed that the security of Russia and its “Near Abroad” was inseparable and Russia should not ignore the Caucasus and Central Asia. As an indication of the change in Russian foreign policy, the “foreign policy concept” was introduced in 1993, which emphasized actual and potential conflicts of interests with the West and envisaged a more active role for Russia in security and economic affairs in the “Near Abroad”. After that Russia used every tool to restore its dominance in the Caucasus and small states in the region were severely affected by that policy. Georgia was one of the worst affected states with the Russian policy in the region.

Georgia was rejected became a part of the CIS and Russian military presence in the country. Russia showed its ability to use internal dispute in regional states in order to exert its influence and to keep its military presence in newly independent states. Georgia was an easy target for the Russian foreign policy, since Georgia has diverse minority groups and fragile political and economic structures. As a result Georgia faced internal turmoil and conflict with Abkhazia and Ossetia. Abkhazia was an autonomous republic within Georgia and the conflict, erupted between Georgians and Abkhazians.

The Russian forces played a role in supplying arms, training and assisting Abkhazian units in direct combat. The main reason for the Russian support of Abkhazia was to put pressure on Georgia to enter the CIS and allow Russian troops to be deployed on the Turkish-Georgian border. Abkhazia’s strategic position along the Black Sea coast was probably another reason for the Russian support of Abkhazia. In fact, the conflict forced Georgia to enter the CIS. Russia got four military bases in Georgia. The Russian bases were in the most sensitive areas. One was in Abkhazia and was believed to be a support point for the Abkhazian separatists. Another was in the southwestern region of Adjara, which was also in rebel hands. A third one was at Akhalkalaki; the heart of a region populated mainly by Armenians. The fourth one was on the outskirts of Tbilisi where there is also an air base.

On April 4, 1994, the “Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict” was signed, even though the resumption of armed conflict remained a future possibility. According to this document, Abkhazia would have its own constitution, parliament and government and appropriate state symbols, such as an anthem, emblem and flag, and would maintain its own internal sovereignty. Georgian officials complained about the agreement and Deputy Prime Minister, Nadareishvili, said that “agreements signed between Georgia and Abkhazia had no legal basis and were harmful for Georgia”.

Georgia also faced Ossetia problem just after the independence. Some south Ossetians wanted to unite with North Ossetia and become part of Russia. Having used Abkhazians and Ossetians, Russia had the chance to meddle Georgia. After Ossetians’ declaration of sovereignty, Georgian Parliament abolished Ossetia’s autonomous status. 100,000 people became refugee as a result of the fighting in Ossetia. In 1992 a Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was created in South Ossetia. Crisis gave Russia a chance to intervene the internal affair of Georgia. It might be argued that unification of south and north Ossetia was not Russia’s interest. Therefore Russia benefited from the crisis, but it did not also want Ossetians to reach their final objective.

Dispute between Russia and Georgia continued about the Russian military bases in Georgia. In 1995, the treaty was signed between Georgia and Russia about permission to the Russian military bases in Georgia. The Treaty was in effect for 25 years, and automatically extent five years at a time if the parties did not agree otherwise. However, the treaty was not ratified. In 1999, Georgian Foreign Minister Menegarashvili stated that the reason for the non-ratification of the 1995 treaty was that it was in fact breaching the limits of the original Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. In March 2005 the Georgian parliament passed a resolution ordering Russia to withdraw from Georgia no later than 2006 and allowing Georgia to exercise its right to take measures against the bases before May 2005.12 According to the recent deal the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Georgia will be completed within 2008.

The developments after the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks have a great impact in the Caucasus. The US military presence in the region increased the US influence and in this aspect, together with Azerbaijan, Georgia became an important state to fight against terrorism. The stability in Georgia became more important for the US. First, Georgia provides air link for the US troops to Central Asia and important check point in the Caucasus. Second after 11 September and the War in Iraq in 2003 made crucial to the realization of the East-West energy corridor and particularly the transportation of Caspian oil to the world markets. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline became partly operational on 25th of May 2005.
Therefore, the US will not want any destabilization of Georgia, which might prevent the flow of oil from the pipeline. Despite the fact that Georgia was benefited from the international environment after the 11 September 2001, Russia also used this environment for its benefit, which to some extent put Georgia in a difficult situation. Russia imposed more assertive policy towards the Chechen conflict and blamed Georgia to provide shelter for terrorists in Pankisi Valley. Russia argued that Pankisi Valley became the area as a training ground and arms smuggling route for the Chechen rebels. The area also became home for approximately 7.000 Chechen refugees and full control of the region is beyond the Georgia’s capacity. Russia aimed to established anti-terror centers in Georgia. However, Georgia considered this suggestion as a Russian strategy to re-label its military bases in Georgia as anti-Terror centers.

Georgia faced also tension in Javakheti province and its capital Ahalkelek, where was home for Ahiska Turks and currently Armenian minority lives there. The return of the Ahiska Turks to Georgia was discussed in the Council of Europe within the framework of Georgian membership to the Council of Europe. Ahiska Turks’ return to Georgia has not been realized yet. The province is adjacent to Turkey and on the important transit route between Turkey and Georgia. Separatist tendencies of the Armenian minority of the province might destabilize Georgia and even the potential danger exists for the creation of second “Karabakh”. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenians in Javakheti aided to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and Nagorno-Karabakh problem is stimulated Armenian nationalism.13 After 11th September 2001 increased importance of Georgia in the region and the US military presence in Georgia reduced the risk of possible conflict in Javakheti province.

After the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cayhan pipeline Georgia became a key state for Turkey, Azerbaijan and the US. Georgia’s relations with Turkey improved on the political and economic front. The project to construct railway link between Turkish city Kars to Georgian city Ahalkelek would be important for improve the transportation in the region. However, Armenia objected the Kars-Ahalkelek railway link. Armenia argued that proposed railway line would contribute the isolation of Armenia. The construction of the Kars-Ahalkelek railway line and the rehabilitation of the existing Tbilisi-Ahalkelek line need approximately $ 400 million.

Georgia’s significance will grow in the region and the US and Turkey’s assistance will continue in the future. Political stability in the Caucasus will be very difficult to achieve in the near future. The increase of political and economic stability in Caucasus countries will contribute the regional stability. After the “velvet revolution”, the positive atmosphere emerged for the stability of Georgia and stability will create the suitable atmosphere for the solution of Georgia’s “Frozen Disputes”.