The likelihood of having Turkish troops in the expanded UN mission in Southern Lebanon seems precarious. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s statement over the weekend that Turkey had no gain in “guarding other nations’ interests” in Southern Lebanon raises fundamental questions on the possibility of sending troops to the war-torn Middle Eastern nation. Regardless of last week’s shuttle diplomacy by Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and the AKP government’s declaration this afternoon that it intended to seek permission from the Grand National Assembly, the President’s position deserves a careful eye, because his disposition affected the outcome of barring American troops from using Turkey as a staging ground in the offensive against Iraq three years ago.[1]
The former chief justice of the Constitutional Court, who normally enjoys a wide popularity among Turkish people for his general disengagement from day-to-day politics, called UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in want of good will and pointed out the paradox that while Turkey was single-handedly fighting the PKK, it (read, the AKP government) appeared more enthusiastic in sending troops than those nations whose interests dictated peace and tranquility in the region. That Turkey is being asked to contribute to the peacekeeping mission even though it is unable to get any cooperation from the international community in its fight against the PKK indeed seems counterintuitive.
Asked to comment on the question, the incoming Chief of General Staff General Yaşar Büyükanıt simply responded by saying that as soldiers, “they were the ones sent over there” and that they would go if told to go. That simple. To the casual observer, this may seem normal. In the context of Turkey’s uneasy experience in civil-military relations, however, Büyükanıt’s response has important underpinnings. In order to thwart a political crisis and avoid the appearance of insubordination to civilian authority, in the past few years, Turkish high command has preferred to shun endorsing any position when foreign and defense matters are discussed in public. It was precisely the case three years ago when General Hilmi Özkök, Büyükanıt’s predecessor, refrained from explicitly supporting the passage of U.S. troops into Northern Iraq.
It is not trivial to eulogize at this point a student of martial affairs who seems in oblivion in recent years; Carl von Clausewitz. The framer of the maxim, “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” the great Prussian military philosopher is less known by the abundant semi-informed analysts for his “trinity”: In order to successfully engage in war, any given nation must muster the support of its people, its government, and its army. Any half-hearted attempt lacking any of these essentials would be doomed to failure, according to Clausewitz.
To be sure, the times of nineteenth-century total war are long gone but it is critical to see the relevance of the Clausewitzian trinity for twenty-first-century Turkey. With a fragmented political standing and overwhelming public opposition, coupled with the military’s indifference (!), the AKP government’s attempt to allow passage to American troops in March 2003 ended with one of the biggest blunders in the history of Turkish foreign policy. Never since the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and the ensuing embargo were U.S.-Turkish relations hurt more. They are still trying to recover.
Once again, the AKP government is not only risking a failure to deliver another promise to several nations – the United States, Israel, and Lebanon – but even more importantly, it is putting Turkey’s credibility on the line vis-à-vis the international system. We do not know exactly what Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan pledged to his Lebanese and Israeli counterparts last week, but he should make sure that Turkish MPs have a good idea of what is being asked from Turkey. In fact, it will be wise on his part to consult with the Grand National Assembly first and then appear before the international community.
Only by getting the approval of its people, their elected representatives, and the consent of the armed forces can the Turkish government succeed in joining the international mission in Southern Lebanon. It is noteworthy that having an active role in the UN force, despite the risks, involves some opportunities. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has framed itself as a useful security partner. In justifying its EU bid, Turkey has correctly pointed out its proximity to the world’s numerous hotspots and how it can be an asset for the EU in meeting these threats. It is therefore sensible for the AKP government to iron out its differences with France, which is quite skeptical of Turkey’s bid, but is also in search of partners in Southern Lebanon, to gain a psychological prestige.
Whatever the outcome, Turkey should decide whether it wants to be an influential actor in regional and international politics. A desire to act accordingly would entail sending troops to Lebanon. However, an active foreign policy is hardly ever well-received at home and abroad and that is something for statesmen to grapple with.
Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to JTW.
E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu
