Recent events in Lebanon have cast a shadow over other important issues in the Middle East, especially on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s response to the P5+1 proposals of last June is to come anytime now and Iran’s approach to the question shall likely determine the viability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime that has been in place since 1968. For this reason, the brewing crisis requires close scrutiny.
“Nuclear proliferation is normally defined as the extension of ownership or control of nuclear weapons to additional sovereign states.”1 Accordingly, the NPT does several things: It asks nuclear weapon states to refrain from transferring weapons technology or actual weapons to non-nuclear weapon states (Art. I of the NPT) and it calls on non-nuclear weapon states not to receive nuclear weapons from the possessors (Art. II).
While granting the “inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” (Art. IV-1), the NPT also recognizes the possibility that “each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events [have] jeopardized the supreme interests of its country” (Art.X-1).2
Coupled with its robust missile program and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s not-so-well-articulated pleas to “wipe Israel off the map,” Iran appears to have some doubtful intentions with its nuclear program. In fact, its uranium enrichment program was not known by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until the exiled National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) blew the whistle on unaccounted facilities at Natanz and Arak.
Iranian officials vehemently deny that their objective is the bomb. President Ahmadinejad prudently contrasted his country’s position last year vis-à-vis Baathist Iraq and Israel (the former having used chemical weapons during its 8-year-war with Iran and the latter in possession of a sizable nuclear arsenal). At the General Assembly of the United Nations last year, the Iranian statesman also lambasted the United States for “blatantly [violating] [its] obligations under the NPT, refraining from signing the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty], and arming the Zionist occupation regime with WMDs,” while “prevent[ing] other countries from acquiring the technology to produce peaceful nuclear energy.”3
To many Western observers, Ahmadinejad is the “apostle of the apocalypse;” a man who wishes to destroy the world so that God’s Judgment can be delivered as soon as possible. “He’s bad” reported the Sunday Times Magazine a few weeks ago and added that “he may be mad.”4
It is too simplistic, however, to label Ahmadinejad as insane. The veteran American journalist Mike Wallace realized in his interview last week that regardless of his bombastic speeches, the Iranian chief executive was a “savvy, self-assured, and self-righteous” man. Ahmadinejad guaranteed Wallace that his country was not “working for the bomb.” “The problem,” he continued, was “that President Bush wants to solve everything with bombs” and “looks down on the Iranian people.” “The time of the bomb,” he claimed, “is in the past.” Throughout the meeting, he appeared quite calm, sincere, and in control of his body language – not quite the characteristics of a lunatic.5
It appears that Iranian policy-makers are motivated by rational calculations. But what are they really after? Why do they not assume a more cooperative stance vis-à-vis the international community? And what will be the implications of their moves?
The one-page proposal package relayed to Iran by the P5+1 in June envisaged guarantees for “an international facility in Russia to provide enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran’s nuclear reactors.”6 Moreover, the international community ensured that Iran would have access to “a buffer stock to hold a reserve of up to 5 years’ supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with participation and under supervision of the IAEA.”
The Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki declared in July that they would come up with an answer sometime in August. As a gesture of goodwill, Iran declared that it may suspend large-scale activities to ease tensions.7 Nonetheless, the rupture came about twenty days ago when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1696 demanding an immediate halt to uranium enrichment. A defiant Mottaki said that Iran attached no value to the said resolution.8
What Iranian policy-makers are not saying is what they may be really after: Forcing a debate about the non-proliferation regime itself. Recall that Ahmadinejad had blamed the United States and Israel for possessing WMDs in his UN speech; Israel is not a party to the NPT is believed to own a fairly large nuclear arsenal. Iran will be less, not more, secure if it is to acquire an atomic bomb. Neither the United States nor Israel would ever let that happen – even it means starting World War Three. However, by striking a fine balance between assurance and uncertainty, the Iranians might soon provoke a debate about the legitimacy of Israel’s atomic capabilities.
Iran may be posing a threat to the non-proliferation regime: On the one hand, it does not cooperate with the IAEA and does not deal with it in a transparent manner. Furthermore, its rhetoric to “wipe Israel off the map” borders on violating one of the basic principles of the UN: “States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State” (UN Charter, Art. 2).
Yet Iran really poses a challenge to the NPT regime in a subtle way: By pointing out the double standards and lack of sanctions against other countries that do not adhere to the treaty, such as Pakistan, India, and most importantly Israel, Iran will probably make the case that its allegedly peaceful program should be allowed to continue.
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Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to JTW.
E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu
