Israel is enveloped in a major paradox in the Middle East once again. It is fighting an unpopular guerilla war in southern Lebanon while causing a civilian tragedy on a biblical scale; its operation to break Hezbollah’s back has largely failed while it has managed to destroy every meaningful civilian infrastructure that Lebanon had built since the end of its civil war 16 years ago; all the while its sense of security is plummeting. According to The Jerusalem Post’s Uri Dan, Israel’s “national future hangs in the balance” and that it may never “get another chance to defend” itself.¹ In criticizing a lack of a master plan of finishing the war in a situation advantageous for Israel, Dan’s colleague Anshel Pfeffer correctly pinpoints some crucial questions that might demarcate catastrophe from peace not just for Israel, but for the whole region: What constitutes victory? Can Israel win? Why is it not winning yet? Could it be losing?² 

“War is a continuation of politics by other means,” said the great Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz. “Thus,” he continued, “it is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The wars that Israel fought with its Arab neighbors from 1948 until 1973 reveal the profundity of the present problem posed by von Clausewitz’s maxim: Israel has lost sight of, and worse, interest in, negotiating peace with its adversaries. 

There is a need to look at the past of the Arab-Israeli conflict and draw some useful lessons. Historically, even though Israel initiated the conflicts comprising the Arab-Israeli conflict more often than not, when doing that, Israeli leaders like David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Yitzhak Rabin had a clearly defined set of goals (and perhaps more respect for civilian lives) when they waged war. 

For example, Moshe Dayan’s account of the Suez Crisis of 1956 reveals in a nutshell that even though the Israeli-British-French alliance that prompted the war was a cynical one – with the two former imperial powers searching for some of their past glory – Israel had a clearly defined set of goals which it managed to obtain and preserve for a decade: freedom of shipping for Israeli vessels in the Gulf of Aqaba; an end to fedayeen attacks; and “a neutralization of the threat of attack on Israel by the joint Egypt-Syria-Jordan military command.”³ 

The Arab-Israeli War of 1967, which was prompted by Egyptian and Syrian provocations and escalated into a full-scale conflict by Israel, ended with a major Israeli victory. Later on, even though the war of October 1973 brought Israel close to the brink of defeat, it ultimately won that war as well. A few years later, Israel concluded a peace treaty with Egypt by relinquishing all of the Sinai Peninsula and secured its western borders. 

The Camp David Accords of 1978 that resulted in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and other instances of Arab-Israeli rapprochement bear several important lessons for Israeli statesmen: First of all, they need a clear set of political goals. Prime Minister Menachem Begin and his Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan had a fairly good idea of what they wanted from the negotiations: peace and security in exchange for land and an end to hostilities. 

Second, in order to reach political goals, Israel should be willing to sustain communication and cooperation with the opposing party in the face of adversity. When abandoning the Sinai to Egypt under the accords, Israel lost a good deal of oil and many settlers were forced to evacuate the region. It was not easy, but was done nonetheless. 

Most importantly, and again tying to the first point, when negotiating peace, Israel must be willing to come up with a consistent framework that can be implemented without further due. One of the primary reasons why the Oslo Accord between Israel and the PLO failed was that it was fairly open-ended and did not set realistic deadlines for the final solution. 

Looking at this picture, it is essential to understand that Israel needs to do several things simultaneously and immediately. The Palestinian question must be solved forthwith. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s proposition to create a fully sovereign Palestine by 2010 might be too little too late. Also, those plans must give back all of the West Bank to the Palestinians. Anything less would only give more credibility to factions like Hamas and Hezbollah. In a similar light, Israel should quickly search for avenues to commence negotiations with Beshar Assad’s Syria over the Golan Heights and with Lebanon over the Shebaa farms. Israel can only truly disarm Hamas and Hezbollah if it takes away their real sources of legitimacy. 

These points may seem irrational and irrelevant given the ongoing chaos in the region. When guns fall silent, nonetheless, they have to be resurrected if the Middle East, together with the rest of the world, is to have peace. In this sense, it is especially in Israel’s interest to realize that its future in the region lies in peace, not war. And peace only comes by firing less and talking more. 
 

Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia& JTW  

E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu

11 August 2006
JTW