It has been twenty odd days since the Greater Middle East Problem has gained a new dimension. What began as a confrontation between Palestine and Israel has reached very tragic proportions when the Lebanese Shiite fundamentalist organization Hezbollah attacked an Israeli convoy patrolling the border, abducting two Israeli soldiers, killing another eight.
The move initially suggested a calculated strike on the part of Hezbollah, one similar to the attack on a group of Israeli soldiers that led to a prisoner exchange in October 2000. Yet, Hezbollah’s simultaneous rocket barrage into northern Israel signaled that it was after something much bigger than a swap. With missiles falling into its lands, Israel launched its largest operation since “Grapes of Wrath” of April 1996.
In the ensuing tragedy, and reminiscent of Joseph Stalin’s maxim on “death, tragedy, and statistics,” nearly a thousand Lebanese and over twenty Israeli civilians have lost their lives. Israel has virtually destroyed every meaningful infrastructure that Lebanon had built since the end of its civil war in 1990 while Israelis living in the north of the country have sought refuge in their bomb shelters once again. Fear and loathing in the Middle East is now in Lebanon. The question presses itself more than ever: what to do? The solutions are neither simple nor easy and certainly not pleasant.
Israel and the United States have declared that they would like to have a more active peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon than the present UN mission to ensure that Hezbollah is disarmed and no longer a threat to Israel. That is perfectly understandable and is in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 1559 of September 2004, which calls for all foreign troops to leave Lebanon and all militia forces to relinquish every means of coercion to the Lebanese government.
Several problems arise from this proposal. A more vigorous peacekeeping force (to be formed mostly of NATO allies) is sensible but would any country in its right mind send its troops to a land where the fighting ability and resolve of the belligerents (Israel and Hezbollah) far exceed that of its troops? Such a force would need the authority to engage all parties in the area in order to protect itself and fulfill its mission, including Israeli troops, especially if they try to pull another “mistaken” attack like the one on the UN observation post on July 26. Similarly, Hezbollah is not going to happily surrender its weapons for what it will see a force to protect Israel and not Lebanon.
It is also highly unlikely for Hezbollah to lay down its arms when it is seen by an overwhelming majority of the Lebanese people as a legitimate resistance group. Lebanon has no real army, which is the reason why it cannot neutralize Hezbollah. In turn, Israel holds Lebanon responsible for failing to maintain order within its borders. Israel’s current operation, however, helps everything but the strengthening of the Lebanese government. With only Hezbollah at hand, the Lebanese are not likely to acquiesce to the destruction of what they see as their sole defense against Israel.
Let us imagine for a moment that there is actually a more forceful peacekeeping mission with a wider mandate to protect Lebanon’s borders and disarm Hezbollah. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert suggested last week that this force may comprise a 10,000-strong Turkish and Egyptian contingency.1 For one thing, having Turkish troops in a country like Lebanon where feelings run high against the Ottoman past is simply a bad idea.2 That would put the Turkish Armed Forces into a great predicament at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy. It also questionable to what degree any other Muslim and Arab country would like to be viewed as a protector of Israel.
In all frankness, the only country that can really handle a mission on that scale is the bastard child of the Lebanese conflict, Syria. It is the only country with the proper numbers, the political connections, the proximity, logistical capabilities, and knowledge of local affairs. The first paradox with this scenario is that Syria was virtually kicked out of Lebanon last year through the much celebrated “Cedar Revolution.” Calling them back a year later would be ludicrous. Second, Syria supports Hezbollah in varying degrees and a Syrian-led peacekeeping mission would be tantamount to a Hezbollah-led peacekeeping mission as far as Israel is concerned.
There is certainly a dire need for a peacekeeping mission, but it is very hard to gather one for the above-mentioned reasons. Meanwhile, Israel wants to continue its punitive strikes against Hezbollah and therefore refuses to heed cease-fire pleas.
This is a bad idea for several reasons. First, this is not the first time that Israel has carried out a major operation against Hezbollah. “Grapes of Wrath” was almost as vicious as the current operation yet ten years down road we can see that Hezbollah is anything but destroyed. Whatever the military success of the current Israeli campaign, it is almost certain that it will not yield the desired outcome in the long term.
The second reason why Israeli intransigence is not sensible is that whether one likes it or not, Hezbollah is a force that is to be reckoned with in Lebanese politics. It has fourteen deputies in Lebanon’s 128-seat parliament and holds three cabinet seats in a broad coalition government. It enjoys wide popularity among Lebanese people from a multitude of confessions; Shia, Sunni, Maronite, Orthodox. Resentment to Israel only consolidates these people’s resolve and Hezbollah’s base of support.
This brings the flow of logic to the last point: By disregarding civilian losses while fighting terrorism completely undermines what would otherwise be a legitimate Israeli action. Israel will always lose the moral side of these battles so long as it does not pay attention to being portrayed as the aggressor. Creating an image of ruggedness may help vis-à-vis one’s enemies in the short run, but it is counter-productive in the long run.
Should either party want to gain the upper hand in this conflict, the only alternative they have is to change their approach to the conflict by laying down their arms.
Barın Kayaoğlu is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia & JTW.
kayaoglu@virginia.edu
2 August 2006
JTW
