The declaration sets out a series of “visions” shared by the two countries: “Promoting peace and stability in the broader Middle East through democracy,” “supporting international efforts towards a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,” “supporting diplomatic efforts on Iran’s nuclear program, including the recent P5+1 initiative,” “supporting a just, lasting, comprehensive, and mutually-acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question under the auspices of the UN,” and “countering terrorism, including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates.”

In fact, the declaration comes at an opportune time as the relationship between the once-staunch allies has been at a nadir for the past three years.

The downturn began immediately before the Iraq War with the unexpected veto of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 1, 2003, for a bill to allow passage to some 60,000 American troops through Turkish territory into northern Iraq. A crisis of confidence emerged because the Americans had always seen the Turks as a reliable partner. The Turks, however, had felt that their sensitivities regarding the status of northern Iraq had not been properly addressed and failed to comply with their ally’s request.

Next came the notorious “Hood Incident” on July 4, 2003. Eleven Turkish Special Forces officers, on a surveillance mission in the northern Iraqi town of Sulaymaniyah, were arrested by American forces and taken to Baghdad. The affair attained a catastrophic symbolism when it was revealed that not only were the Turkish soldiers detained, but they received harsh treatment at the hands of the Americans, having had their heads covered with hoods. Even though they were eventually released, an unprecedented damage was done to Turkish national pride, which idolizes its military. No official apologies were extended from the American side except for a note of regret by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.[2]

In the summer of 2003, in order to heal the harmed bonds, Washington sent the senior diplomat Eric Edelman as ambassador to Ankara. Unfortunately, neither the setting was appropriate for an improvement, nor Edelman careful in how his statements were received.

Following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer decided to pay a visit to Damascus in the April of that year to encourage President Beshar Asad to cooperate with the international community. When asked by the Turkish press what he thought on Sezer’s upcoming visit, Ambassador Edelman stated that he hoped Turkey would join other nations to stand in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004), asking “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.”[3] Even though Edelman did not state a position on the visit directly, Turkish public opinion interpreted his words as an attempt to dictate terms to the president and as a suggestion that he should not go to Syria. Cries of “persona non grata” arose from the Turkish public, although Edelman had already resigned from the post in order to become Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

The final – and most publicized – rift came in early-2006 with the release of “Valley of the Wolves Iraq,” a remake of a series depicting the enigmatic world of the Turkish mafia. The story starts with a reference to the “Hood Incident.” According to the plot, one of the arrested Turkish officers commits suicide out of shame and leaves a note for his friend Polat Alemdar, the protagonist of the series, asking him to avenge the dishonor. Complying with the wishes of a comrade, Alemdar follows the Christian fundamentalist American commander (played by Billy Zane) who is responsible for the incident, together with the mass murdering of Iraqi civilians. The movie also stars Gary Busey as a Jewish-American doctor who harvests the organs of Iraqis to be sold in New York, London, and Tel Aviv.

As far as the Americans were concerned, the major problem with the movie was not its stereotypes – as Hollywood has negatively stereotyped Moslems for decades – but the way certain influential people in Turkey endorsed it. Prime Minister Erdogan’s wife Emine Erdogan, joined by Speaker of the Assembly Bulent Arinc called the movie “a cinematic masterpiece.” Even though many other Turkish viewers did not see the movie as particularly anti-American or anti-Semitic, further harm was already done.

In the light of all these factors, the Rice-Gul communiqué emerges as the first serious joint attempt by the United States and Turkey to resolve their differences and embark on a new direction in their dealings. In Rice’s words, there was a need “to step back from the day-to-day issues” and to look at the big picture.

Regionally, Turkey wishes for the creation of a Middle East that is conducive to commerce, industry, and tourism. Turkey is the only country that has relations with both Moslem countries and Israel. It is the only country in the region that can address the two sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and be heard. Peace in the Middle East is of utmost importance for Turkey. Only in a peaceful background can the Middle East – and Turkey – thrive.

The United States also wants a peaceful Middle East, although its presence in Iraq has complicated that aim. The example that Turkey sets for the Moslem world is perhaps even more important for the United States than its alliance with Turkey. A country can be democratic, secular, and be on par with Western nations while retaining its Moslem identity. Its greater vision for the region, therefore, is in congruence with that of Turkey.

In a greater scheme of things, the two countries have another common interest. Turkey seeks membership in the European Union. The United States publicly supports Turkey’s bid because it would send a strong message to the rest of the Moslem world: “We are not that different. Religion is not a barricade, but a bridge.” A Moslem country in the Western club will prove to the Moslem world that the West is not Islamophobic and to the West that Moslems are much like them.

Coming back to the document, the parties have agreed to augment channels of communication and “structure dialogue.” This structured dialogue is to involve consultations between the experts and the policy planning units of the two sides, high-level reviews between the under secretaries of the State Department and the Foreign Ministry, and perhaps most importantly, broader avenues of exchange between the U.S. Congress and the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Are Turkish-American relations improving? It is too early to tell, but that a declaratory statement has been made to frame the course of Turkish-American relations in the times ahead is fortunate and timely. In order to truly reach an understanding and solve their problems, the two partners need to invest more time, energy, and goodwill.

E-mail: kayaoglu@virginia.edu

JTW, 13 July 2006