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Friday, 10 February 2012
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Georgia: An Important State for the Stability in the Caucasus
Kamer Kasim
Kamer Kasim

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Friday, 9 September 2005

                                                                                  

 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union , became an independent state, however, since its independence faced severe internal crisis and security problems, which were the great obstacle for the implementation of reforms and the success of the state-building process. Having border with , , and and access to the Black Sea make important transit routes to the Europe and Central Asia . Internal conflicts and lack of stability prevented to utilize its location in the Caucasus and delayed the possible regional cooperation, which would be beneficial for all the countries in the region. Given the fact that has lack of natural resources and weak economic structure, it is very difficult for to exploit its geographical location without support from the regional powers and the . In fact, is the one of the biggest beneficiary of the aid in the world. has received approximately $ 800 million aid from the . , the , and the are also important donors for . To analyze the roots of ’s continuing problems and its difficulty to solve them despite the financial and political support from the outside world; we need to look at ’s frozen conflicts and Russian role in the region.

 

  After the collapse of the Soviet Union , the has emerged with 60 percent of the population and 76 percent of the territory of the former Soviet Union and followed the policy of domination in the former Soviet territories. The Soviet Union was a multinational empire and its foreign policy agenda was designed accordingly. The foreign policy of the had to be different than the Soviet Union . Internal discussing about the direction of the Russian foreign policy produced the two main groups: Atlanticists and Eurasianists. Atlanticists considered as a Western nation and according to them cooperation with the Western states would help to absorb Western values, including democracy and human rights. Atlanticists believed that must avoid assuming a leading role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). ’s active role in the CIS would slow down ’s integration with Western economic institutions.[1] Until the end of 1992 Atlanticist view was dominant in Russian foreign policy and they aimed to liberate the from the burdens of the empire and to make a part of community of democratic states. In that period, ’s administration was concerned with transforming of the Russian economy into a genuine market and to integrate with the Western system.  As a result, showed a lack of interest in its relations with the new Caucasian and Central Asian republics.[2] Eurasianists criticized Atlanticist view and they emphasized ’s distinctive identity from the West. The Eurasianist approach affected ’s foreign policy after 1992, and produced the policy of ‘Near Abroad’ (blizhneezarubezhe) promoting ’s relations with the CIS. Eurasianists believed that the security of and its “Near Abroad” was inseparable and should not ignore the Caucasus and Central Asia .[3]  As an indication of the change in Russian foreign policy, the “foreign policy concept” was introduced in 1993, which emphasized actual and potential conflicts of interests with the West and envisaged a more active role for in security and economic affairs in the “Near Abroad”.[4] After that used every tool to restore its dominance in the Caucasus and small states in the region were severely affected by that policy. was one of the worst affected states with the Russian policy in the region. was rejected became a part of the CIS and Russian military presence in the country. showed its ability to use internal dispute in regional states in order to exert its influence and to keep its military presence in newly independent states. was an easy target for the Russian foreign policy, since has diverse minority groups and fragile political and economic structures. As a result faced internal turmoil and conflict with Abkhazia and Ossetia .  Abkhazia was an autonomous republic within and the conflict, erupted between Georgians and Abkhazians.

 

The Russian forces played a role in supplying arms, training and assisting Abkhazian units in direct combat.[5] The main reason for the Russian support of Abkhazia was to put pressure on to enter the CIS and allow Russian troops to be deployed on the Turkish-Georgian border. Abkhazia’s strategic position along the Black Sea coast was probably another reason for the Russian support of Abkhazia.[6] In fact, the conflict forced to enter the CIS.[7] got four military bases in . The Russian bases were in the most sensitive areas. One was in Abkhazia and was believed to be a support point for the Abkhazian separatists. Another was in the southwestern region of Adjara, which was also in rebel hands. A third one was at Akhalkalaki; the heart of a region populated mainly by Armenians. The fourth one was on the outskirts of Tbilisi where there is also an air base.[8]

 

On April 4, 1994, the “Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict” was signed, even though the resumption of armed conflict remained a future possibility. According to this document, Abkhazia would have its own constitution, parliament and government and appropriate state symbols, such as an anthem, emblem and flag, and would maintain its own internal sovereignty.[9] Georgian officials complained about the agreement and Deputy Prime Minister, Nadareishvili, said that “agreements signed between and Abkhazia had no legal basis and were harmful for ”.[10] 

 

also faced Ossetia problem just after the independence. Some south Ossetians wanted to unite with North Ossetia and become part of . Having used Abkhazians and Ossetians, had the chance to meddle . After Ossetians’ declaration of sovereignty, Georgian Parliament abolished Ossetia ’s autonomous status. 100,000 people became refugee as a result of the fighting in Ossetia . In 1992 a Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was created in South Ossetia .[11] Crisis gave a chance to intervene the internal affair of . It might be argued that unification of south and north Ossetia was not ’s interest. Therefore benefited from the crisis, but it did not also want Ossetians to reach their final objective.

 

Dispute between and continued about the Russian military bases in . In 1995, the treaty was signed between and about permission to the Russian military bases in . The Treaty was in effect for 25 years, and automatically extent five years at a time if the parties did not agree otherwise. However, the treaty was not ratified. In 1999, Georgian Foreign Minister Menegarashvili stated that the reason for the non-ratification of the 1995 treaty was that it was in fact breaching the limits of the original Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. In March 2005 the Georgian parliament passed a resolution ordering to withdraw from no later than 2006 and allowing to exercise its right to take measures against the bases before May 2005.[12] According to the recent deal the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from will be completed within 2008.

 

The developments after the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks have a great impact in the Caucasus . The military presence in the region increased the influence and in this aspect, together with , became an important state to fight against terrorism. The stability in became more important for the . First, provides air link for the troops to Central Asia and important check point in the Caucasus . Second after 11 September and the War in in 2003 made crucial to the realization of the East-West energy corridor and particularly the transportation of Caspian oil to the world markets. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline became partly operational on 25th of May 2005. Therefore, the will not want any destabilization of , which might prevent the flow of oil from the pipeline. Despite the fact that was benefited from the international environment after the 11 September 2001, also used this environment for its benefit, which to some extent put in a difficult situation. imposed more assertive policy towards the Chechen conflict and blamed to provide shelter for terrorists in Pankisi Valley . argued that Pankisi Valley became the area as a training ground and arms smuggling route for the Chechen rebels. The area also became home for approximately 7.000 Chechen refugees and full control of the region is beyond the ’s capacity. aimed to established anti-terror centers in . However, considered this suggestion as a Russian strategy to re-label its military bases in as anti-Terror centers.

 

faced also tension in Javakheti province and its capital Ahalkelek, where was home for Ahiska Turks and currently Armenian minority lives there. The return of the Ahiska Turks to was discussed in the Council of Europe within the framework of Georgian membership to the Council of Europe. Ahiska Turks’ return to has not been realized yet. The province is adjacent to and on the important transit route between and . Separatist tendencies of the Armenian minority of the province might destabilize and even the potential danger exists for the creation of second “Karabakh”. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenians in Javakheti aided to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and Nagorno-Karabakh problem is stimulated Armenian nationalism.[13] After 11th September 2001 increased importance of in the region and the military presence in reduced the risk of possible conflict in Javakheti province.

 

After the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cayhan pipeline became a key state for , and the . ’s relations with improved on the political and economic front. The project to construct railway link between Turkish city Kars to Georgian city Ahalkelek would be important for improve the transportation in the region. However, objected the Kars-Ahalkelek railway link. argued that proposed railway line would contribute the isolation of . The construction of the Kars-Ahalkelek railway line and the rehabilitation of the existing Tbilisi-Ahalkelek line need approximately $ 400 million.

’s significance will grow in the region and the and ’s assistance will continue in the future. Political stability in the Caucasus will be very difficult to achieve in the near future. The increase of political and economic stability in Caucasus countries will contribute the regional stability. After the “velvet revolution”, the positive atmosphere emerged for the stability of and stability will create the suitable atmosphere for the solution of ’s “Frozen Disputes”.   

 



[1] Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy Of Russia Changing Systems and Enduring Interests, (London and New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 112-113.

[2] For example, Foreign Minister Kozyrev first visited Central Asia in April 1992, by which time Secretary of State James Baker had already been there three times on official visits. See, Graham E. Fuller, ‘ and Central Asia …’ pp. 125-127.

[3] Roy Allison, Millitary Forces in the Soviet Successor States, Adelphi Paper, 280, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 46. See also A. Kortunov, ‘, the ‘Near Abroad’, and the West’, G. Lapidus (ed.), The New Russia: Troubled Transformation, (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 157-160

[4] Neil Malcolm, ‘The New Russian…’, p. 31. See also Oleg Kovalev, Foreign Policy Belief Systems of Post Soviet Russian Elites, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University Of Delaware , Summer 1996, pp. 158-222.

[5]Although, generally, rejected the involvement of the Russian troops in the conflict, Russian warplanes bombed Georgian positions at the Gumsta front. It was argued by that they were provoked by the Georgian artillery shelling of the Russian military laboratory in Eshera. Ibid, p. 74 Elizabeth Fuller, RFE/RL, 1 October 1993

[6] Ali Fuat Borovali, ‘The Caucasus within a Historical-Strategic Matrix: , And ’, Dis Politika (Foreign Policy), Vol. 18, 1994, p. 33.

[7] Viacheslav A. Chirikba, ‘Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict and its Aftermath’, Mehmet Tutuncu (ed.), Caucasus : War and Peace, (The Netherlands: SOTA Haarlem, 1998), p. 75.

[8] Stephen Kinzer, ‘Defiant Satellite Nation Finds ’s Orbit Inescapable’, Sunday, 3 May 1998.

[9] Chirikba, ‘Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict…’, p. 79

[10] Interfax, 16 September 1996. After the series of talks, both sides reached another agreement at the end of October 1998. Abkhazian Newsletter, 5 December 1998.

[11] Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, (London and New Jersey: Zed books, 1994), pp. 105-107.

[12] See Johanna Popjanevski, “Russian Trop Withdrawal In Light of International Law”, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies

 

[13] Hasan Kanbolat ve Nazmi Gül, “The Geopolitics and Quest for Autonomy of the Armenians of Javakheti (Georgia) and Krasnodar (Russia) in the Caucasus”, Armenian Studies (Ermeni Araştırmaları), Issue 2,  June-July-August 2001, ss. 186-210. For the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, See Kamer Kasım, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caspian Oil and Regional Powers”, Bülent Gökay (ed.), The Politics of Caspian Oil, London: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 185-198. Kamer Kasım, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From Its Inception To The Peace Process”, Armenian Studies, Issue 2, June-July-August, 2001, pp. 170-185. Kamer Kasım, “The Transportation of Caspian Oil and Regional Stability”, Journal of Southern Europe and The Balkans, Volume: 4, Number 1,  May 2002, pp. 36-45.

 

 

 Kamer KASIM: Abant Izzet Baysal University, Department of International Relations

 


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