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Toughing it Out in Afghanistan |
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reviewed by Arzu Turgut |
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Author: Michael E. O'Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan |
ISBN:
978-0-8157-0409-6 |
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Publisher:
Brookings Institution Press |
Page:
164 |
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Type:
Paperback |
Price:
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Review: |
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan was not a very popular country. However, since the United States’ declaration of the War on Terror, Afghanistan has suddenly been placed at the top of the world’s media headlines. As things in Afghanistan change very rapidly, it has never been off the world agenda. Today, everything that is written about Afghanistan becomes dated within a period of one to two years due to this. As a result, an expanding industry of printed and visual media on Afghanistan has emerged and grown fast. That is why various books have been published and many new films have been made about Afghanistan since 2001.
Toughing It Out in Afghanistan, a book by Michael E. O’Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan, can be considered one of the latest products of this new industry. This book illustrates the current debates on the War in Afghanistan, the U.S.’s exit strategy, and reconciliation attempts with Taliban. In other words, it aims to “get up to date” in Afghanistan. By doing so, it tries to inform the American people as well as the international community about what the U.S. is currently doing in this impoverished country and when this wearisome war will end.
One of the authors, Michael O’Hanlon, is a senior fellow and Director of Research at the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Studies Program, where he holds the Sydney Stein Jr. Chair. He is the author of The Science of War and senior author of the Brookings Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan Indexes. The other author, Hassina Sherjan, is the president of Aid Afghanistan for Education, a nonprofit group. She also heads Boumi, a Kabul-based home decor company and has been living in Afghanistan since 2001.
This book consists of six main chapters. In the introduction, the authors do not only introduce the book, but also introduce the “enemy”, namely the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other insurgent groups. The close bonds among these terrorist organizations and Pakistani support for them is examined. This section gives the impression that the authors are well aware of the extent of the threat as well as the necessary measures to overcome it.
In the second chapter, the rise, fall, and resurgence of the Taliban are analyzed. The Taliban are described as an “adversary” of not only the U.S. and NATO, but also of the Afghan people and international community. According to the authors, more knowledge on the Taliban is a must to win the War in Afghanistan. In the following parts of this chapter, the evolution of U.S. policies and strategies towards terrorist groups are discussed. The initial years of War on Terror under the Bush administration and the period between 2005 and 2009 have been investigated in terms of the U.S. security considerations and policies implemented.
Under the third chapter, an important argument is stressed: the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. A need for a well-founded strategy in Afghanistan is an important debate today all around the world. As the authors say, the new U.S. strategy was launched in Afghanistan in early 2009 by Obama. It is said that nation-building in Afghanistan is not a primary goal anymore, although much of the emphasis should still be placed on state-building. The main goal in this new strategy is to encourage the Afghan people to take initiatives in their own affairs and increase the capacity of the Afghan state. According to O’Hanlon and Sherjan, Obama’s strategy can be summarized as follows: counterinsurgency (instead of counterterrorism), stabilization, and capacity-building.
In the fourth chapter, as a response to the eleven most common criticisms on Afghanistan and the U.S. policies/strategies there, the authors develop their own counter-arguments. Among them, there are useful statements which illustrate the Western/U.S. perspective. For instance, the authors do not see today’s U.S. presence in the region as an invasion but just an effort to help the Afghan population. The authors strongly believe that NATO and the Afghan government are much more popular than the Taliban, even in some Pashtun areas. They embrace the idea of negotiating with local affiliates of the Taliban in the future, but reject contact with the hardcore Taliban. However, neither common criticisms nor counter-arguments reflect the ideas of the Afghan people. Therefore, the main problem of this chapter is simple: the criticisms reflect a Western point of view, so do the responses.
In the fifth chapter, how to measure progress and figure out an exit plan are discussed. It expresses that assessing progress in counterinsurgency missions is always difficult and there is never a clear-cut result. The authors estimate that 2012-13 is a reasonable timeline for the beginning of a decrease in U.S. forces. In the last chapter, the authors suggest some security proposals such as enlarging and equipping the Afghan Security Forces, reforming the National Police and justice systems, launching a broader anti-corruption agenda, managing a reconciliation process, and aiding Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts. They also offer some economic proposals such as expanding resources for economic assistance, tightening aid and appointing a single, strong international coordinator with authority, and focusing on increasing trade in Afghanistan.
In this book, special importance is given to the Pakistani impact on the Afghan problem. Since it is accepted that this issue cannot be solved without the help of Pakistan, Pakistani-Afghan cooperation is encouraged and the need for cooperation with Pakistan’s government in both military and civilian aspects is stressed. The efforts to increase the Pakistani government’s capabilities in the fight against terrorism and to bolster economic cooperation with the Pakistani government are also accepted as important aspects of the American strategy.
This book gives crucial insight about the process of the War in Afghanistan and the changing U.S. policies and strategies. Although the security and economic proposals suggested in the last pages do not offer anything new, they are still important in terms of guiding the process. Furthermore, the use of the statistical data, opinion polls, and direct quotations help to strengthen the main arguments.
This book raises some questions and contradictions as well. At first glance, one who reads the profiles of these authors on the cover page may consider that this book reflects both Afghan and Western views. However, after reading further, anyone looking for objectivity and consistency might be disappointed. Throughout the book, U.S. is presented as “we” and whatever it has done is seen “ours”, while the others are perceived as the mere “Afghans”. Afghan people are presented as the passive subjects whose only concern is whether to support U.S. or not. For instance, about the U.S. presence and failures in Afghanistan, it stated: “NATO was very popular in the war’s early going, when it was seen as the agent that had driven the Taliban from power. Yes, we (Americans) squandered much of that good will, but by virtue of doing our job badly, not by virtue of our presence” (p. 63). Besides playing up the popularity of NATO forces, it claimed: “If we continue to fail in Afghanistan much longer, we may strengthen any and all forces opposing us. But the Afghan government and NATO remain much more popular than the Taliban, even in Pashtun regions, suggesting that we have one last chance to get this right” (p. 64). In addition, it suggests withdrawing U.S. forces: “(…) we should be able to begin to reduce U.S. and NATO troops more generally by 2012 or 2013” (p. 84).
As can be seen, all arguments and even criticisms in this book seem to be heavily Western-oriented. If the authors support the idea of closer cooperation with local leaders and demand change from the community level, it is expected that they pay more attention to what the Afghan people think. It seems more necessary to focus on Afghans and their preferences rather than the Taliban and other terrorist groups.
Secondly, the authors always compare and contrast the Afghan War with the Iraq War on the basis of the number of troops given, level of violence, and level of U.S. legitimacy in both of these wars, as well as the popularity of NATO forces. Moreover, they stated that “while the first order of business for the surge in Iraq was to reduce the rates of killing and ethnic displacement, in Afghanistan the lower level of violence means that the higher priority is probably state-building” (p.84). However, it still does not seem clear what the common denominator is that the authors use while comparing these two wars. On the other hand, it is still debatable whether these two wars can be compared or not. As such, much deeper analysis is needed.
Thirdly, U.S. concern about ensuring its own legitimacy in the eyes of the American people is highlighted in almost all the pages. This seems more like “confessing the sins” on the part of the U.S. for the costs and risks of its bloody war. However, for those who want to understand Afghans, how the Afghans perceive the American presence in their territories seems more important than how the U.S. see its own war.
Lastly, it is interesting to note that any successes the U.S. may have had seem to be exaggerated while any failures are minimized, if not neglected, throughout the book. The authors keep their optimism until the last pages. Relative to the current situation in Afghanistan, this is exactly what makes this book less persuasive.
Despite some weaknesses, Toughing It Out in Afghanistan can be advisable for researchers in area studies, policy makers, and students. It contains useful information about the Taliban, Afghan War, and U.S. strategies. It contributes to the current literature in terms of seeking responses for the ongoing war and suggesting some proposals to go one step forward towards a true, if not perfect solution for the Afghan issue.
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about book: |
"Michael O’Hanlon and Hassina Sherjan have written a superb analysis of the current strategy in Afghanistan. It is an insightful work by two authors with exceptional knowledge and experience. It is a must-read for those who want a clear understanding of the situation, the strategy, and the path ahead in this crucial conflict."
General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Retired)
In this unique collaboration between an American scholar and an Afghan-American entrepreneur, Toughing It Out in Afghanistan provides a succinct look at the current situation in Afghanistan with policy prescriptions for the future.
Drawing partly on personal experiences, O'Hanlon and Sherjan outline the tactics being used to protect the Afghan population and defeat the insurgents. They discuss the ongoing efforts to reform Afghan policy, run a better prison system for detainees, enlist the help of more of Afghanistan's tribes, and attack corruption. They also discuss the Afghan resistance, including an explanation of how the Taliban mounted a comeback and what it will take to defeat them.
The authors also seek to demolish common myths about Afghanistan, such as the notion that somehow its people hate foreigners. They also explain how to use metrics, such as those in the Brookings Afghanistan Index, to determine if the new strategy is succeeding in the course of 2010 and 2011. Included are policy suggestions to further increase the size and capabilities of the Afghan army and police, facilitate Afghan businesses' involvement in economic recovery, expand the role of other Muslim nations in the effort, and create strong international aid coordination as a civilian counterpart to NATO's military lead.
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