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Russia’s Foreign Policy Change and Continuity in National Identity |
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reviewed by Habibe Ozdal |
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Author: Andrei P. Tsygankov |
ISBN:
978-0-74-25-26-50-1 |
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Publisher:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers |
Page:
216 |
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Type:
Paperback |
Price:
$17.99 |
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Review: |
Russia’s foreign policy is said to have been shaped by the Western and European attitude towards international issues. Even though Europe and the West have significant influence on Russian foreign policy, particular features of historical terms have also shaped it. While the foreign policy of Russia was affected by external factors, it can be claimed that it has still pursued historical patterns. Regarding this, the book puts Russia’s foreign policy in context of a comparative study of leaders’ attitudes towards foreign policy and their understanding of national interests.
The book, entitled “Russia’s Foreign Policy Change and continuity in National Identity”, is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides a brief historical overview of Russia’s foreign policy and spells out the book’s approach to understanding Russia’s post-Soviet international behaviour. In other words it reviews Russia’s international behaviour across history and identifies several patterns of change and continuity in the country’s foreign policy. The author focuses on Russia’s relations with the outside world and views Russia as a Western nation. What often determines Moscow’s foreign policy choices is whether or not the West’s international actions are perceived by Russian officials as accepting Russia as an equal and legitimate member of the world.
The rest of the book can be said to be a detailed analysis of four distinct concepts of national interest that guided Russia’s international policies in the late-Soviet and post-Soviet years.
Since the book puts out Russia’s foreign policy, in chapter one, the author states that Winston Churchill famously observed that the key to understand Russia’s “enigma” is its national interest. As mentioned above, the author compares different approaches of leaders towards national interests and foreign policies. Regarding to this it can be said that President Boris Yeltsin and his first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, defined national interest as that of integration with Western economic and security institutions. However, the second foreign minister, Yevgeni Primakov, saw the need to restore Russia’s great power status and balance hegemonic aspirations of the United States. Finally, President Vladimir Putin adopted his own distinct vision of national interest, according to which Russia’s great power status was essential, but not at the expense of special relationships with the West and the United States.
In Chapter two, the author analyzes Gorbachev’s New Thinking philosophy and what it meant for the country’s foreign policy. The new atmosphere of the Cold War left little room for national interest as pursued independently of the interests of other members of the global society. Moreover, the new thinking abroad was based on an expectation of recognition from the West. Comparatively, Gorbachev’s foreign policy was distinctive, especially in terms of disarmament measures. Since his foreign policy agenda included far reaching disarmament measures from the territories in Eastern Europe and the third world, particularly in the area of Soviet American relations, Western leaders were not as cooperative as Gorbachev had hoped. Notwithstanding many of Gorbachev’s efforts were met with scepticism.
On the other hand, Gorbachev’s new policies appeared as two distinctive programs, ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’, which had key roles in the process of Soviet corruption. However, after 1998, the domestic situation took a sharp turn. As a result of the dramatic downturn of people’s living standards and political separatism of some of the Soviet republics, the general public was losing its faith in the country. Consequently, it can be said that Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ failed to achieve its aims both abroad and at home. However this was not because it chose the wrong vision for the world’s future, but because it chose the wrong course to implement that vision by divorcing itself from domestic and international power considerations. Western countries ignored Gorbachev’s initiatives on nuclear disarmament. However, these efforts were less convincing at home. From this standpoint, according to the author, the lessons that should be taken from Gorbachev’s foreign policy are that foreign policy requires reciprocity and that foreign policy must match domestic needs.
Chapters 3-5 each explore the formation and consequences of other distinct visions of national interest – integration with the West (early Yeltsin and Kozyrev), great power balancing (late Yeltsin and Primakov), and great power pragmatism (Putin).
After Gorbachev’s policies, which ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the most powerful vision that shaped the attitude of Russia’s leadership was the economic and political rise of the West. During the years of Yeltsin and Kozyrev, full attention was turned to the West, while remaining neglectful of the relationship with Middle East and Asia. Leaders of Russia were initially dismissive of the regions’ significance. As of Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’, Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s efforts for integration with the West failed as a foreign policy course. First, the course was again divorced from the domestic and international challenges. On economic matters, Russia built not a free market model of capitalism, but rather what is usually called ‘oligarchical capitalism’ in which the economy is largely controlled by and divided among those with business interests in the West. However, the foreign policy of Primakov once again has the features of a sharp ‘u’ turn that puts emphasis on statehood and great power status. Primakov’s strategy for dealing with the West had two distinctive characteristics, first taking the UN into account as the key agency for international issues, and second, having close relations with countries other than the West. Unlike the Westernizers, Primakov was a believer in special relations with Asian and Middle Eastern countries; this was also because of his long career as an expert in Middle Eastern countries. However, Primakov’s attitude toward having relations with countries other than the West was also a consequence of Primakov’s great power balancing policies, and also a response to NATO’s expansion.
As for Putin, according to the author, Russian foreign policy in his term took another turn. The events of 9/11 in particular provided an opportunity to articulate a new vision of Russia’s national interest. The changes in the foreign policy of Putin’s term must be explained by the consideration of global changes and also by the relative recovery of Russia’s economy. In short, Putin’s foreign policy can be said to have been more focused on European countries rather than the U.S. as a consequence of negative experiences with the U.S., such as missile systems in Europe and also the U.S.’ regime change strategy in former Soviet States. According to the author, the relationship between Russia and the European countries is suspicious, and it is not clear if it is sustainable since the relationship is mindful of the oil dependency. And it is not clear whether this relation can be long lasting.
Consequently, the book is concerned with Russia’s foreign policy in terms of the three schools of foreign policy and compares Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin’s attitudes towards Russian foreign policy regarding the changing global context and national interests of Russia. In other words, it helps to evaluate how the Kremlin’s policies were shaped under different leaders’ perceptions of Russia’s national interests. This book is required reading for those interested in Russia’s international behaviour.
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about book: |
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This clear and comprehensive text explores the past quarter-century of Soviet/Russian international relations, comparing foreign policy formation under Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin. Drawing on an impressive mastery of both Russian and Western sources, Andrei P. Tsygankov shows how Moscow's policies have shifted with each leader's vision of Russia's national interests. He evaluates the successes and failures of Russia's foreign policies, explaining its many turns as Russia's identity and interaction with the West have evolved. The author concludes with nuanced insights into Putin's distinctive course, which balances an enduring quest for great power status with the desire for a special relationship with Western nations. |
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