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Central Asia's Second Chance |
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reviewed by Izzet Ahmet BOZBEY |
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Author: Martha Brill OLCOTT |
ISBN:
978-0870032172 |
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Publisher:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |
Page:
395 |
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Type:
Paperback |
Price:
$24,95 |
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Review: |
Central Asia’s Second Chance is a book written by Martha Brill Olcott to give people who are interested in Central Asian political life since independence some useful information and in-depth analysis, especially in regards to the patterns that came to dominate the political realm since September 11th 2001. The book provides readers with easy-to-understand information on political and economic life in Central Asia in the post-Soviet era. It also offers us a better understanding of the actors and factors that blow or quell winds of change in the region. These actors are regional players as well as international forces. How they relate to each other, and their power to influence the others is central to the book.
The Central Asian states were unable to reform themselves into modern democracies with functioning markets and political institutions that respond to the needs and demands of their citizens in a satisfactory way. Instead, the ruling elites in these countries mustered authority in their hands at the expense of bourgeoning hopes of democracy in Central Asia, not unlike what it used to be during the Soviet period. This was facilitated by the decades-old network of patronage and resource allocation that ailed the Soviet economy and found its way into dominance in the newly independent states as well. The leaders of the Central Asian states were already apparatchiks, non-Russian members of the Soviet political system who functioned in their native countries for the benefit of the Soviet State. Therefore, nepotism and patronage was no new territory to the new presidents. Add to the mix the newly available control in full over vast resources; and the way to dictatorship is not much farther. Moreover, these leaders were quick to adapt themselves to the fortune-amassing activities of the capitalist world, where the ruling elite in each country quickly dominated the industrial and commercial theater. In order to make business or to navigate adeptly in the perilous waters of the bureaucracies of Central Asia, foreign businessmen were required to allot a lump sum for powerholders in these countries. This network, certainly, necessitated a feeble and cooperating media, parliaments that functioned rather as rubber stamps, opposition parties that did not really oppose under the aegis of the presidents of the Central Asian Republics, money-generating resources flowing to the world markets, and an international community that did not trouble itself with the plights of a remote part of the world. All these conditions played out quite favourably as far as the ruling elites were concerned. The Republics, particularly Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, possessed large deposits of oil, natural gas and gold, which generated enough money to sustain the above-mentioned network so far. NGOs and the media were repressed to utter silence, and were rendered to servants or allies. Political unrest in most of the region remained largely unvoiced or non-violent. The world, on the other hand, was too busy with other parts of the world to pay attention to the region except for energy-related concerns of the West. The future of democracy in the region, or lack thereof, remained in the margins. The draconian rulers of Central Asia skillfully shielded themselves from the meek demands of international community.
This book offers readers some insight into how Central Asian politicians were able to navigate through the shallow waters so far. The author’s real incentive in writing the book, however, is to shed light on the future of the region. The book, therefore, has a two-way perspective: while explaining the whats and whys of the past, it also extrapolates the possible changes and clashes that expect Central Asia. Olcott believes that, due to the ailments of the Central Asian Republics which were inherited from the Soviet period in part, these republics wasted their first chance to transform into modern democracies. The post-September 11th period, on the other hand, constitutes a second chance for them, hence the title of the book. The author, however, is pessimistic as to whether the Central Asian leaders were able to use their second “chance” so far.
The post-independence period was charachterized by highly pervasive corruption, repressive state institutions, a serious lack of desire for the leaders’ part to cooperate with the other Central Asian republics, and a loath to liberal economy. These characteristics constitute the basis why the region’s leaders were so averse to political, social and economic reforms. Elections everywhere in the region served only as a whitewash, to lull both the international community, and local opposition groups. The leaders manipulated the international affairs so that they made use of every opportunity that arose to their advantage, gaining support from foreign countries with the promises to continue reforms at home, but forgetting those promises once they settle back to their secure places. According to Olcott, in order to secure foreign support, these leaders constantly exaggerated radical Islamic threat, playing this card to position themselves as the defenders of moderate Islam. What de-stabilized Central Asia above all was the tumultuous situation in Afghanistan since the ascendence to power of Taliban. The radical Islamists in Afghanistan provided the Central Asian opposition groups with a safe haven. Human as well as drug trafficking became a serious security threat that came into existence between the unchecked borders of Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. Not surprisingly, Olcott enumerates human and drug trafficking as two risks on security in Central Asia, adding to them the frustrating lack of reforms and Central Asian leaders’ aversion to cooperation with neighbouring countries. These leaders erect insurmountable barriers between their states and their neighbours, in order to eliminate the ethnic and religious fluidity that they see as a threat to their power. They also prevent interregional economic activities, hindering development, amelioration of life standards throughout Central Asia and emergence of a regional market that will allow free flow of capital, goods, labour as well as ideologies. This in turn renders these countries merely an inch better than banana republics. If it not were for a great variety of natural resources these republics do have, the economic situation in Central Asia might have been worse. Olcott also notes that the ruling elite also uses the civil war in Tajikstan to back their claims that any reform toward democratization might easily got out of hand and soon turn into a civil war that would constitute an open invitation to Taliban-like regimes. The lack of international assistance and less than satisfactory interest in the region allowed Central Asian leaders to pursue their goals unabashed.
The terrorist attacks on New York in 2001 changed the U.S. foreign policy priorities regarding Central Asia. Prior to the attacks, Olcott says, American policy-makers viewed Central Asian Republics as energy-rich countries to be won over in order to secure future energy corridors. The internal affairs in the region did not occupy the agenda in Washington. However, once the U.S. set to topple down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the strategic importance of Central Asia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular, came into use. Olcott claims that, despite many views that intensifying American presence in Central Asia after 2001 has disturbed Russia, it was actually Russia which benefitted greatly from American military bases in the region. What Russia lacked in resources to quell Islamic disturbance in Afghanistan and Central Asia is abundant in the U.S., and the insurgents are being dealt by Americans. Furthermore, Americans, Olcott believes, are well aware that Central Asia is Russia’s turf, and any U.S. military presence there will be tolerated as long as it remains temporary. The Central Asian leaders, on the other hand, did not miss this chance to promote their own interest and reinforce their seats even further. These leaders cooperated with the U.S. and demands by Western NGOs of pressure on Central Asian Republics for political reforms fell on deaf ears once again. The American foreign policy makers did not heed the urgent need of political reform in the region, believing that, American interests stressed that the current leaders should, at least temporarily, remain in office as a consequence of their willingness to cooperate to fight against radical Islam, no matter how corrupt or oppressive they are. Olcott, however, insightfuly points out that the policy-makers are wrong to not consider American interests in the long-run, and sacrificing them to short-run gains that U.S., in time, will regret. The lack of reforms make people disgruntled, and even though use of violence is not a frequent venue for uneasiness, it certainly pushes people’s patience too much. However, the U.S. policy concerning Central Asia since September 11th has not changed much. Security is understood only through the window of War on Terror, but such issues as democracy, human rights, transparency and accountability do not seem urgent to the Western eyes. International aid which is invaluable to support NGOs and ameliorate life quality in Central Asia too has not been increased much since 2001. For these reasons, Olcott believes that the current setting in Central Asia and the international indifference to its plights do not bode well for the future. If the conditions do not change soon, people will raise their voices against them, and things may escalate, an unlikely possibility, though. However, she also holds that despite serious hindrances, the region nourishes internal dynamics that will facilitate a shift towards democratization far easier than many international observers maintain. Therefore, the future, according to Olcott, is not entirely bleak; after all the leaders will at least die off naturally, and their heirs will find it difficult to sustain the same networks that kept their predecessors in power for so long. Times change, and in the presence of increased means of communication that easily escape the censoring eyes and ears of the state, maintaining the old, oligarchic patronage system and oppressing the middle class will prove more difficult.
Olcott is an authority on political reform in Central Asia, and her book reflects her mastery in the affairs of the region. She does not focus her attention solely on the energy-politics that certainly occupy the minds of many Western policy makers. Democratization, fight against corruption, inter-regional and international cooperation and economic liberalization are her priorities. The author firmly believes in these values, and she is confident that should democracy and economic and political transparency find their way into Central Asia, the political setting will change for better, no matter how corrupt and oppressive the current political configuration has been in the region for decades. Olcott also deserves praise for her ability to discern near-sighted international interests in the region from far-sighted ones. Leaving the region to its own fate will certainly escalate security problems in Central Asia, for poverty-stricken people may turn, in the absence of freedom of express, to violent venues to express their discomfort. This, in turn, will de-stabilize Central Asian Republics, and turn them into a source of violence and disquitude, nothing short of the neighbouring Afghanistan. However, the Western policy towards Central Asia since 1991 has been but a shy encouragement of the Republics to reform, which did not produce the desired effects due to the the important place the region occupies in the energy deals of the future. Olcott, however, insists that Western interests in the long run lie in push for reforms and democracy. To persuade the ruling elite to have a change of mind is vital both for the region and for the rest of the world.. In addition, Olcott also believes that these transformations could and should spring from the internal dynamics in accordance with the demands of the people, not the minds of Western policy-makers who decide to ‘liberate’ the Central Asians overnight. Therefore, Olcott’s confidence in the abilities of people and their disposition to a modern state differ her from from various other area experts who do not give much credit to local dynamics and seek the source of future reforms in international community.
As for the shortcomings of Central Asia’s Second Chance, there is little to talk about, other than the fact that it was published in 2005 and is in need of serious updating. Since it does not include the developments after 2005, the consequences and the repercussions of the Kyrgyz Revolution, about which the author seems to have high hopes, should be appended to the next editions of the books. As a result of this significant shortcoming, Central Asia’s Second Chance is not for researchers who intend to delve into the study of Central Asia’s social, political and economic life in detail. Such researchers shall need expert analysis on recent developments in regards to the region, and can content themselves with the book as long as the pre-Kyrgyz Revolution developments are concerned. However, those readers who would like to read a decent analysis of Central Asia beyond what introduction-to-any-topic kind of books can offer them, should enjoy the author’s expertise and realistic approach.
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about book: |
Central Asia’s first decade of independence was disappointing for those who envisioned a transition from Soviet republics to independent states with market economies and democratic political systems. The region was given a "second chance" to address social and economic problems, but the Soviet-era leaders have been more interested in exploiting state resources and controlling their populations than in implementing democratic and regional reforms.
Central Asia, a critical battlefield in the war on terror, is vitally important and still unfamiliar even to many foreign policy specialists. Regional expert Martha Brill Olcott highlights the deep contradiction running through U.S. policy toward Central Asia. Partnerships with antidemocratic regimes have created long-term security risks and the international community has remained complicit in its lack of effective engagement. As recent events in Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan demonstrate, tensions in the region lie close to the surface: If we are to prevent these states from descending into chaos, the international community must identify solutions to the economic, political, and social challenges confronting them.
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