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After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic |
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reviewed by Arda Bilgen |
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Author: Anoushiravan Ehteshami |
ISBN:
0-415-10878-0 |
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Publisher:
Routledge |
Page:
221 |
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Type:
Paperback |
Price:
$59.95 |
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Place of Publication:
London |
Published in:
1995 |
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Review: |
Iranian Revolution was one of the most significant events ever witnessed. The revolution changed the regime of a big country and affected the region as it affected the whole world. The regional and global impact of Ayatollah Khomeini was so intense that the Islamic movements in Iran made particular regional countries and Western countries worry. The future of the alternating Iran was vague, it became vaguer after the death of Khomeini; everyone wondered how a leader could replace his charismatic leadership. The events after Khomeini, such as changes in foreign and regional policy of Iran, change in economy, security and defense strategy of the Second Republic should be examined carefully in order to understand the maneuvers Iran makes today. Hence, to be informed of this considerable event and able to interpret the stages Iran passed to reach the current status, revolution, Khomeini and post-Khomeini events and figures have to be learnt. After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic is the right book to read to inform readers on the topic.
The book opens with a preface noting that the information given in the book is invaluable for the reader aiming to find out the noticeable differences between “pre and post” Ayatollah Khomeini reign. The book consists of nine parts which are also divided into chapters in which the reader is mildly bombarded with detailed information on various issues. In the first part named as “political succession in republican Iran”, Ehteshami describes the administrative structure of Iran (highly clerical, theocratic and under the influence of the Fuqaha-Islamic Law experts) after 1979 Islamic Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini and names the era of “inevitable” changes after his deaths as “Second Republic”. Also, succession crisis that emerged in the aftermath of Khomeini and rivalry between republic supporters and monarchy supporters are analyzed, while the familiar names such as Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Rafsanjani are mentioned in interpreting the role of Council of Revolution.
The second chapter mainly focuses on the changes and amendments in the constitution and examines the positive and negative outcomes of them in, with Rafsanjani’s own words, “Iran at reconstruction phase”. The new power distribution and outcomes of general elections in the Second Republic are discussed in the next chapter, while the state’s need and search for new economic policies and system after the failure of Pahlavi’s policies (the growth rate had slowed sharply by 1978) during the reign of Moussavi government is presented in the fourth chapter.
Fifth chapter solely gives information supported by tables and statistics about the economic strategies, difficulties and achievements of Rafsanjani, who implicitly -later explicitly- welcomes liberalization and the foreign investors that are without malicious colonial intentions. The sixth chapter provides information about the regional policy of Iran, the impact of the state in the aftermath of the revolution and its maneuvers during the Iran-Iraq War. In the following two chapters, we are informed of the foreign policy of the Second Republic and its domestic-foreign security and defense strategy which is exalting the right to retaliation and giving the reader an idea about what kind of a policy Iran pursued. The last chapter including a conclusion part views Iranian revolution in a wider sense and scrutinizes the issue to present the various views on the characteristics of the revolution, whether it is progressive or retrogressive; social or political and views on the place of Iran in capitalist system.
The 1st chapter of the book is mainly about the succession problems arose after the revolution and also after the death of Khomeini. The author says that since the defeat of Mossadegh, the political continuity in Iran has been questioned and adds that even in Shah’s reign lasted for 26 years; his reign was challenged as well. In other words, in Iran, succession has been a blurry concept. After the revolution, the problem was solved when the clerical forces gained upper hand in coalition under the guidance of Khomeini. Later, Ehteshami argues that the emergence of a succession was natural because there were ambiguities and unclear points. In other words, change was inevitable and it was mentioned after Khomeini’s death in 1989. While the debates about the qualities of a leader were going on, the author says, there were also debates about the functionality of Velayet-i Faqih system which Khomeini was in favor of. It is hard to determine which change had bigger impacts on Iran, the revolution or period after Khomeini; in both cases citizens and administrators could not find a model to grasp. The author gives information about the supporters of republic and monarchs in this chapter and relates their stances with the succession problem. After the failure of the clergy to address economic issues and Khomeini’s death, elite groups of Iran confronted and deepened the crisis. Then, the relatively free conditions and the acceptance of the United Nations Security Council resolution ending Iraq war solved the conflict and Ali Khamanei became the supreme leader. Briefly, Ehteshami argues that in the first years of the republic and during the last times of Khomeini’s reign, there were succession problems, ambiguities and confusion that were solved by the passage of time after the death of Khomeini and the occurrence of domestic and international events.
In the 2nd chapter of the book, by giving reference from Richard Cottam, Ehteshami argues that Khomeini’s leadership style was unique and most of the times rigid, unwillingly making concessions and hardly allowing any individual or faction to gain preeminence within his government. His personal traits and the policy of the state were meant to be parallel by the world; however, this tough and inward image of the state slowly began to change after the acceptance of the truce which ended the Iraq-Iran War and was mediated by the UN, Security Council resolution 598 (SCR 598). Even if it might be impossible to assign an exact date of the foundation of the Second Republic, 1988-89, the short period after the acceptance of SCR 598 seems like the most appropriate foundation date in terms of the wind of changes in the state, as Rafsanjani declared that “this cease-fire will open a new chapter in our history”. The death of Khomeini in 1989 was also another factor giving courage to leaders, like Khamanei, to voice the need of review of the Islamic revolution due to the lack of a centralized and powerful executive administration. In the same year, as Khamanei became the supreme leader of Islamic Republic of Iran on 5th of June, he stated that it would be the suitable time to consider reviewing/reforming the 1979 constitution which was vaguely defining the roles and responsibilities of various centers of power in the republic. Moussavi, the head of judiciary of Islamic Republic of Iran between 1980 and 1989, also declared that the main problem of IRI was the lack of concentration or power in executive branch. Those inclinations for change resulted as the constitution change in 1988. The changes and amendments in constitution, especially Article 60, were a little bit radical; the office of the prime minister was abolished, the Faqih system had remained almost the same and kept its significance, judicial system was renewed as well to have a more legalistic and constitutional structure. In other words, after 1988, changes in domestic and foreign policy, and policies concerning economy and social issues began to change while the state’s Islamic nature, conduct of affairs by reference to vote republican regime, Islamic based laws and legal guardianship remained the same. Ehteshami believes that the Second Republic was a sharp departure for Islamic Republic from its past, as it as observed that Khomeini’s heirs were not spending their time on land reform or nationalization of foreign trade but spending time on privatization, business incentives, free-market mechanisms and productivity after 1988.
The changes in the positions and power allocation in the state had been mentioned before. In the 3rd chapter, the author points out that the significant point as, the clerics’, individually or collectively, continuation of domination the most crucial levers of power; their positions had a “make-up” rather than changing. Fuqaha’s authorities were vast, as well. Besides that, the order was still based on two crucial positions, the Leader and the President. The first executive president of the republic after changes was Rafsanjani; he was holding a fundamental position in Iran by chairing many bodies and having vast authorities. The other institutional bases of power helping the conduct of the state were council of guardians, majlis, expediency council, assembly of experts, national Security Council, cabinet. Ehteshami argues that Rafsanjani’s pragmatic Islamism and strives of marginalization of extremists were much more progressive than Khomeini’s Islamic totalitarianism. Significantly, Rafsanjani was in favor of the new adjustments and reconstruction policies in economic area; the technocratic de-ideologized cabinet containing a high proportion of engineers he formed indicated his openness and liberalization intentions. The state was taking steps to be more democratic as well, balance of power between the president and the faqih was attained and the oppression during Khomeini was abandoned. In other words, without the changes in constitution about centralization of power and Rafsanjani’s wish to renew the image of IRI, Iran would not experience stability and rapid growth, he notes.
In the 4th chapter, Iran is described as a state in search of an economic system by Ehteshami. During Pahlavi’s time, the state was in favor of capitalist development and deemed as a dependent capitalist, semi-periphery 3rd world country, which consumes goods and services supported by Western powers and in return sells relatively cheap oil to them. After the fall of Pahlavi, there was an intense competition for power amongst various bourgeois and petit-bourgeois factions, but the overthrow of the big bourgeois gave the emerging state opportunity to reshape the structure of economy. Khomeini chose to nationalize the productive units and workshops for the sake of preventing the collapse of economy; the state had the right to control %85 of units after the revolution. However, he stressed that their economy was not a socialist one but was a mixed economy with a profound social conscience. Article 44 of the 1979 constitution was dividing the economic sectors into three; state (controlling foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, postal services), co-operative and private (controlling supplementary for agriculture, industry, trade). The author says revolutionists were in favor of state control but Western-imposed embargo and post war period required Iran to secure the flow of hydrocarbons and expanding industrial and agricultural output. The private sector, however, despite its eagerness of providing necessary opportunities, could not succeed it at once, due to the mismanagement, lack or clear directions and goals during Moussavi government. In other words, the dependency for oil could not be reduced. Moreover, Ehteshami indicates that in 1986-7 oil crisis, the government had to impose new taxes and raise the existing tax rate to subsidize the dying external funds. Even comprehensive privatization and lifting restrictions could not manage to create an alternative economic system, even though Rafsanjani took concrete steps, the economy remained as medium 3rd world country economy depending on the West.
The author, in the 5th chapter, noted that Rafsanjani had alluded that Iran was going to pursue a Western model of economy when he welcomed the countries willing to invest in Iran without having colonial and expansionist powers. In 1989, when the Islamic model of development was quitted, the income had decreased by %45. His sole aim was to adjust economic policy to suit new circumstances and trends of economy by greater domestic and foreign participation, Ehteshami notes. To achieve this, in 1991 and 1992, denationalization of mines, stocks, factories, fishery, oil refining, and railway sectors gained momentum and to boost the industry and trade, free trade zones were formed. While banking sector was highly under the domination of state in 1979, they were privatized in 1991 and opened to foreign currency. In 1993, currency devaluation and tariff cut began hurting local industry, loans to be paid to World Bank, high inflation, and changes in the revenues of oil after Operation Desert Storm occasioned this painful period of time. Nevertheless, Rafsanjani was attempting to revise Iran’s position in the market and industry; neither nationalizations nor denationalizations were ideological but were based on the requirements.
It has been mentioned in the 6th chapter of the book by the author that the regional policy of Iran was pretty much shaped by Iraq war, after the post-revolution period. During Pahlavi’s time, while Iran was running smooth relations with the states, even with Israel, his designs for the Gulf region, the closeness of the relations between Iran and Israel and Iran’s powerful position in the region began to worry Arab states Iran was already in competition with Saudi Arabia, both in the fields of politics and economy, thus Pahlavi chose to collaborate with some Arab countries to balance this vulnerability resulted from the competition. Furthermore, to reinforce this positive, cooperative image, Iran established fruitful and pragmatic economic relations with non-Arab states like Pakistan and Turkey. Iran’s regional policy was based on “continuing war till victory” and retaliation during the early 80s, however, after accepting the truce mediated by UN and end of Iraq war, there appeared an inclination to upgrade the relations with various states, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, even with Western states. Still, for Ehteshami, it can be said that Islam played a major role in Iran’s regional policy before and after the revolution.
In the 7th chapter, the author talks about the dynamic foreign policy of Iran. Without a doubt, its policy shows progress, while the state was isolated from the West and in favor of non-alignment, supporting populism and anti-imperialist approach in 1979 right after the revolution, the liberal wing which ousted from the revolutionary coalition in 1988 considered minor changes in the policy of the state. Later, after 1988 Rafsanjani emphasized the importance of diplomacy and intended to normalize the relations with regional actors and the West, except the US. The primary aim was to regain its power and become the major actor again in the region. As it has been mentioned before, the year 1988 was the period when various kinds of changes Iran experienced. The same would be said about the foreign policy. The rise of Gorbachevism and the death of Khomeini had paved the way for changes; however the transition period to peaceful coexistence with other states was not so easy. Recovering the state’s debilitation of war and recovering economically and militarily were two of the objects Rafsanjani had, says Ehteshami. For the president, those two goals were the key points determining the foreign policy of the state and reasserting its influence in the region.
The conjuncture was also requiring Iran to take measurements about the loss of power in region. The US influence in Gulf region, riots against Iran in Arabic countries, its isolation from Arab world and international institutions, naval defeats forced Iran to run smooth relations based on conciliation with states. By the end of 1989, Iran was almost fully integrated in international order, but feared that Syria-Saudi Arabia-Egypt’s close contacts would decrease its recently regained influence and significance. In 1991, Iran was accused of supporting the Gulf War for its own interest, however it was not true. It was a fact that Iran had some benefits in case Iraq would be defeated but it seemed impossible for Iran to encourage the war just to weaken its stubborn and potentially dangerous neighbor, Ehteshami underlines. About five years later than the war, Iran again wanted to be the most powerful in the region, but it was hard while the doctrine of Clinton, the US president, was designed to squeeze Iran and Iraq in the region (dual-containment policy). Notwithstanding, Iran had succeeded good relations with non-Arab states, including Far-Eastern states that Iran had economical ties with and some Arab states. Also, the state reinforced the security relations with the US and increased its oil wealth. From the author’s point of view, Iran has three reasons to change its policy: firstly, the international system was highly interdependent and Iran was unable to function very effectively on its own. Secondly, the economic system had serious problems to be reformed and thirdly some of the problems were unable to be solved without the foreign assistance (lack of capital and skilled work force). Briefly, for the author, the orientation of the foreign policy of Iran was Islamic based, non-aligned and pro-South. Iranian authorities have declared that as long as there will be investment in their country, Iran will have the potential to be the major regional power.
In the 8th chapter, it has been argued that one of the second republic’s fundamental goals was to strengthen the defensive forces; even though the economy was kind of in decline and the amount of money spent on military was increasing. For Ehteshami, Iran cared about the military deterrence, moreover, many sectors such as energy and reconstruction inevitably interacted with each other to build up a strong, deterrent military. Iran, on the other hand, was reliant on the military hardware of the Western powers, Russia and China mainly. To break this vulnerability, Iran began modern arms production and made agreements on trading arms for oil with Ukraine. In other words, Iran has pursued a multi-layered arms procurement strategy not to be totally reliant on a few countries. Iran’s military preparations are watched carefully by the West because in the region, Libya, Syria and Iraq were weak and Iran was highly disliked by Israel. As the German company Siemens agreed on completing a semi-constructed nuclear power plant and as Russia and China helped Iran show development in nuclear power in terms of supplying qualified workers and equipment, US sanctions were slowly imposed and many countries were compelled to cancel or suspend cooperation with Iran due to security reasons. Clinton’s dual containment policy was also serving to balance Iran’s leap forward.
In the last chapter, the author argues the outcomes of the revolution. He asks whether the revolution fulfilled its agenda properly or not, and whether it presented an alternative model of development for 3rd world countries. The revolution would be perceived as an importance event because the balance of power was disrupted, a new unstable and hostile regime was established, Soviet Union had concerns about the new formation and the fear of the rise of Islam was highly common. There were nuances between time periods of Pahlavi, post-revolution and post-Khomeini, without a doubt. Islamic Republic of Iran generally pursued policies based on social justice, divine law, economic self-sufficiency, an independent foreign policy and non-alignment; however, it failed to reach the modest aims and was incapable of universalizing the revolution, from Ehteshami’s point of view. Maybe, that’s a natural outcome of pursuing a “neither East nor West” policy giving significance to South-South ties. The author believes that the revolution was unique in terms of its bottom; it was not a revolution of the oppressed class, as a result it could be perceived as a political revolution rather than a social one. He points out that although the regime may change, there is no guarantee that the society as a whole will be transformed to justify the label of social revolution. Weakness of any domestic bourgeois in the developing country has enabled elites which have to be said to have become a new class in Iran, but it is hard to state that the revolution is social by only focusing on this event. By 1993, in Iran, ulama were remaining as the dominant elite, Iran was known as a semi-industrialized periphery country, in which the economic regulations had to be done.
In terms of the content and the organization of the book, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic,, the only critic that can be done is about the excessive number of names and Persian terms that are needed to be explained in more details. A reader who is unfamiliar with Islam or Eastern languages might easily lose his concentration while reading terms like faqih, majlis, hojjatoleslam. Moreover, the reader is bombarded with the names of the Iranian persons from government or military, which becomes a hard task for the reader to remember; besides the many times mentioned names of the popular figures like Khomeini, Khamanei, Moussavi and Rafsanjani. Besides those, the quotations and their significance/relevance to the topics in chapters were satisfactory, as well as the intensity of the given information. The tables and statistics used to support the given information were making it easy for the reader to compare the aforementioned years of transition. It seems that Anoushiravan Ehteshami has successfully categorized the various topics and ordered them according to the relevancy and chronological order. His satisfactory mixing of analysis and historical background facilitates the reader’s endeavors both to grasp the picture as it is and also form his own point of view about the transformation period and the difference between different Irans in the course of time. Even though the book was first published in 1995, more than a decade ago, it is still capable of giving us the vision to evaluate the recent happenings in the region.
To conclude, it would be for the benefit of the reader who is eager to learn the transition period between three eras; time span before the revolution, during Khomeini’s unquestionable dominance and post-Khomeini period till 1993 to read this well-organized book. As the author gives the hint in the introduction, the book is invaluable for the reader in terms of its simply presentation of information and canalizing them to critically think about the events in historical context and bear that in mind while making an analysis of today’s Iran and regional tableau.
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about book: |
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This book offers a comprehensive study of post-Khomeini Iran, exploring the Rafsanjani administration from economic, political, international, and strategic perspectives. Anoush Ehteshami assesses the critical dilemmas of the regime both previous to and since the death of its first spiritual leader. |
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