Key Words: Crimean Tatars, Ukraine, Basic Human Needs Theory, Deportation, Crimea, conflict prevention, conflict resolution.

            1. INTRODUCTION

            Although it is not as well-known as the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, Kosova, and Chechnya currently there is an escalating conflict with a non-violence aspect on the Crimean peninsula between Russians, Ukrainians, and the repatriating Crimean Tatars. The Crimean Tatars, a "deported people” forced en masse to relocate from Crimea to remote parts of Central Asia in 1944, began to return their homeland in 1988.[1] In 1988, after more than thirty years of pressure, the Soviet Union gave the Crimean Tatars permission to return to Crimea. It is estimated that at least 250,000 Crimean Tatars have already returned, and it is expected that tens of thousand more will return in the 21 century.

            Together with the dispute between Russia and Ukraine about the political status of Crimea, the Crimean Tatars’ presence could spark a more fundamental political crisis. Thus, the multi-national peninsula with very sharp ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages is slowly turning into an area of conflict that might turn into violence any minute, if the international community does not pay enough attention to prevent it.

            The Crimean Tatars case provides a clear example of the conflictual relationship between the interest in nation-state building, which is perceived as vital by weak new states struggling to survive as independent entities, and the attempt by minorities to preserve and regain their identity. In the Crimean Tatars case, the ethnic identity is bound to the discourse of "homeland” and the surgun (deportation).

            This paper focuses on the explanation and understanding of the conflicts in the peninsula over the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. The case of repatriation of the Crimean Tatars has a number of basic features in common with other post-Cold War disputes in the Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) and former Soviet Union (FSU): the presence of minorities whose ethnicity is shared with neighboring states or kin states (Turkey) which are generally supportive of their kin, a situation of post-communist socio-political and economic transition, and the more or less smooth disintegration of multinational states (the FSU). However, the Crimean Tatars case has a certain characteristic that provides opportunities for assessing the same kind of conflicts in the ECE and the FSU countries. In this study, the author will focus on these characteristics in the analysis of the events and conflicts in the Crimea.  The study was undertaken in order to contribute to dealing with repatriated communities especially in FSU region such as Chechnya, Caucasus, the Balkans, and Central Asia   

            This paper will consist of the following sections. First, the historical background of the Crimean Tatars will be reviewed. In my opinion, in order to analyze the contemporary conflicts in Crimea today, one must get a clear understanding of historical developments.  Thus, the history of Crimean Tatars from 1700s up to today show that past historical grievances among Russians, Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars constitute one of the major root causes of the contemporary conflicts that exists in the peninsula today. We will examine the contemporary Tatar movement, the Gorbachev era and the resurgence of the Crimean Tatar movement from 1988-1998.

            After this historical overview, the basic human needs (BHN) theory will be applied to understand the sources of contemporary conflict issues faced by the Tatars in the Crimea today as well as the other causes of disputes with the local authorities. In this section, the author will probe into both the specific problems faced by the Crimean Tatars as well as the impact of the resettlement. Relations among the Crimean Tatars, ethnic Russians and Ukrainians are currently peaceful, but are potentially volatile. The danger of an ethnic conflict provoked within the peninsula or from outside, remains a serious concern. In the following section, the contemporary problems and issues of the Crimean Tatars in today’s Crimea will be reviewed. In conflict resolution section, the conflict prevention action model is applied to the Crimean Tatars case. The role of Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the High Commissioner of National Minorities (HCNM) will shed light on as the conflict prevention tools. Also, the problem-solving workshops (PSWs) and peace camps may be used to understand the root sources of the conflict as well as the possible resolution. In conclusion, the Crimean Tatar case is a unique that it can be an example of a successful conflict prevention regime. With the early warning and nonviolence nature of the Crimean Tatars movement, it is possible to find out a peaceful and non-violent solution on the problem of the Ukraine in general and the Crimean Tatars in particular.

2. THE CRIMEAN TATARS AND POST-SOVIET UNION ERA[2]

            With Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascendancy to the leadership of the Communist Party (CP) in 1985 new possibilities appeared for the realization of Tatar aspirations. Gorbachev’s liberalization policies rejuvenated the Tatar movement. A petition was drafted and signed by 30,000 Crimean Tatars and sent to President Gorbachev in March of 1987, appealing to him to review the Crimean Tatars’ national problem with seriousness[3]. In July 1987, a group of Tatars succeeded in demonstrating on Red Square. On July 29, 1987, a group of Crimean Tatar representatives met with Andrei Gromyko. It took the Gromyko commission eleven months to study the Crimean Tatar problem, and on July 9, 1988, it declared that due to the demographic changes in Crimea it was not possible for the Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea and have their autonomous republic reinstated[4].

            By the late 1980s it became widely apparent that even Crimean Tatars who had never seen Crimea had certainly not ``taken root’’ in Central Asia in any sense, in fact thousands of Crimean Tatars began to move to the Ukrainian provinces bordering Crimea to the north to position themselves closer to their cherished homeland.

            Significant concessions to the Crimean Tatars, who maintain their campaigns of demonstrations in Moscow, Central Asia, and when possible, in Crimea, only came after the first semi-democratic elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet in March 1989.  The Supreme Soviet formed a new commission under Genadii Yanaev on July 12, 1989 which on November 28, 1989 recommended that the Crimean Tatars should be returned to Crimea under a government sponsored plan, and have their autonomy restored. The decision ushered in the beginnings of mass Tatar return to Crimea (83,000 were living in the peninsula by May 1990, and 120,000 by October 1990, but before significant sums could be disbursed to aid the Tatars, the USSR had collapsed[5].

            The Crimean peninsula had been largely settled over the previous 50 years by Russians and, by the 1990s, there were 1,6 million Russians in Crimea and 620,000 largely Russified Ukrainians. Although as much as 90% of this population arrived in Crimea after the war, the Russian portion still considered Crimea to be part of the historical Russian Rodina (Motherland) despite its official inclusion in the newly independent Ukraine. The regional Communist party of Crimea was among the crumbling USSR’s most conservative and, while statues of Lenin were being toppled and Communist party assets seized elsewhere in the Soviet Union, Crimea was described as a ``storehouse of conservative forces’’ and an ``oasis of communism’’. The entrenched and unrepentant local communist bureaucracy that had ordered the brutal beating and deportation of Crimean Tatars attempting to resettle in Crimea in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s began stirring up the Crimea’s majority Russian population against the Crimean Tatars arrivals[6]. The main reason for this was, after the collapse of the USSR in late 1991, the Crimean Russian leaders changed course and undertook measures designed to isolate the peninsula so as to preserve Russian power there. Eventually a determined group of ethnic Russians began to agitate for Crimea’s return to Russia, and the issue became a cause celebre (famous lawsuit) in Moscow

            The Russian secessionist movement alarmed the Tatar community, which had little desire to continue to take orders from Moscow. Both to counter Russian separatism in Crimea and to provide better direction to overall repatriation effort, Tatar activists decided to formalize existing leadership arrangements. The Second Kurultai, or national assembly of the Crimean Tatar People, convened in the Crimean capital of Aqmesjit (Simferopol) in 26-30 June 1991 (the assembly was called the Second Kurultai in order to emphasize continuity with the body first established in December 1917). The Kurultai adopted a national flag (the symbol of the Giray dynasty on a light blue background) and hymn (Ant Etkenmen) for the Crimean Tatar people. It also passed the "Declaration of National Sovereignty of the Crimean Tatar People” which stated that ‘Crimea is the national territory of the Crimean Tatar people, on which they alone possess the right to self-determination’. Furthermore, it declared that ‘the political, economic, spiritual and cultural rebirth of the Crimean Tatar people is only possible in their own sovereign national state’. The Tatars also claimed control over all ‘the land and natural resources of Crimea’. However, the Declaration also stated that ‘relations between the Crimean Tatars and [other] national and ethnic groups living in Crimea must be based on mutual respect and the recognition of human and civic rights’.[7]

            Refat Chubarov, Vice Chairman of the Mejlis, stated at the Crimean Parliament in Simperopol, for the Crimean Tatar movement non-violence was a key, although not an absolute principle. On some occasions the Crimean Tatars could not adhere the principles of non-violence.  On this issue, Chubarov said:

recently the Crimean Tatars have been forced on several occasions to act inconsistently with the principle of non-violence, but these were instances of self-defense, including defending new settlements from pogroms.  When the Crimean government threateningly sent in the military or when buildings were being torn down, people would not simply look on without acting to prevent it from happening’[8]. 

            In July 1993, the second session of Kurultai supported the restoration of the Latin alphabet, which was forcibly changed first to Arabic and then to Cyrillic in the 1930s, for the Crimean Tatar language.

            The Kurultai also selected a standing body, known as the Mejlis, which was designed to operate as a shadow legislative body advocating Tatar issues. Mustafa Cemiloglu, the dissident leader, was elected as the Mejlis President. The Kurultai with the establishment of the Mejlis, the Tatars signaled their intention to become a permanent and immovable part of the Crimean political landscape[9]. Consequently, Crimean Tatars would create their own organizations and would develop their own political strategies.

            In the Summer of 1993 radical from the Mejlis, led by the head of Bakhcisarai Mejlis Ilmi Umerov, announced their intention to reestablish the Milli Firka (National Party), the radical Tatar party prominent in the events of 1917-18. According to Umerov, the Milli Firka struggle against both Russia and Ukraine as "occupying power” and against "the authorities in Crimea [who] are a colonial administration”. Moreover, Umerov has declared that "our aim is a national state of the Crimean Tatar people, on all territory of Crimea”, in which ethnic Crimean Tatars will receive priority treatment.[10] Similarly, an organizing committee for an Adalet (Justice) appeared in 1995 under Mejlis member Server Kerimov, as did a shadowy Islamic Party of Crimea.[11]

            Besides Milli Firka, there are other Crimean Tatar organizations currently active in Crimea. One of the main one is the National Movement of the Crimean Tatars (NMCT) that was established in 1967. The NMCT has largely continued the traditions of the protest movement of the 1950s and 1960s. In the late 1980s it supported the restoration of the Crimean ASSR rather than the creation (or recreation) of a Crimean Tatar national state, and since 1991 unlike the Mejlis and Organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement (OCNM), has challenged the Crimean authorities. NMCT  has favored cooperation with the Crimean Supreme Soviet.

            OCNM is the largest of the three Tatar groups. After a split with the moderate NMCT, it was formed in May 1989. The OCNM is a radical nationalist party, which although strictly nonviolent, has 600-800 members. Its guiding principle is "the return of [all] the Crimean Tatar people to their historic homeland and the restoration [vosstanovlenie] of their national statehood.”[12] The OCNM was largely responsible for organizing the elections to the Kurultai in 1991; half of the Mejlis’ ruling council of 33 are members of the OCNM.

            Since their mass return, the political situation of Crimean Tatars has had three characteristics. Although, their numbers reached at around 250,000-260,000 (10 percent of local population), there were too many Tatars to be ignored but to few seriously to challenge the power of the Russophone majority of Crimea. Second, there was a contradiction between the radical agenda about ‘sovereignty’ and ‘indigenous rights’ and the realities of the Tatars’ minority position in the 1990s. Third, Crimean Tatars pragmatically and practically aligned themselves with Ukraine and Kyiv, but they often had little support in return[13].

            Since 1991 the Tatar Mejlis has claimed the right of self-determination over the whole peninsula, in effect demanding the creation of an ethnic Crimean Tatar state.  However, they are not accepted by Russians and Ukrainians as an official organ.  Local authorities in Crimea are still insisting that the Crimean Tatars should be considered as one of the ``minority groups’’ which fails to do justice to the Crimean Tatars’ special historical claims and sense of rootedness in the peninsula. If the authorities continue to treat them as a marginal group, it can only encourage the process of the Tatars’ radicalization.

            Before 1994 Crimean Council election, The Mejlis demanded 24 seats in the 98-member chamber and the right of the Crimean Tatar people to a veto in a council. After mass demonstrations, they received 14 seats in the chamber plus four seat for the other deported peoplesthe tiny Qrymchag (Kirimcak) and Qaraim (Karaim) populations. During 1994, the Kurultai held considerable weight in the Crimean politics[14]. In October 1994, Ilmy Umerov became the first member of the Kurultai to be appointed to a major government post, deputy prime minister responsible for health, social security, and ethnic affairs. Moreover, Refat Chubarov became a head of the committee for nationalities policy and deported nations in the Crimean Council.

            The summer of 1996 was a particularly sensitive time for the Mejlis. The Third Kurultai convened in Aqmesjit (Simferopol) in June 1996. The primary responsibility of the Kurultai was electing a new Mejlis. Two-thirds of the Mejlis ended up changing, with radicals such as Umerov and Kerimov. The core leadership remains in place, meaning moderate policies are likely to continue in the near term.

3. BASIC HUMAN NEEDS THEORY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMEAN TATAR CASE

            According to scientists, social-psychological theories possess strength to explain the emergence of social orders. John Dollard assumed that frustration was both a necessary and a sufficient condition of aggression.[15] In his book, Abraham Maslow theorized human needs theory.[16] He asserted that human beings are motivated to satisfy their ontological needs. Maslow enumerated these needs in a hierarchy of basic and meta needs. He believed that the satisfaction of meta and physiological needs (hunger and identity) is very important for human survival and self-actualization.

            John Burton indirectly makes a relationship between Abraham Maslow’s basic needs theory and the frustration-aggression theory developed by John Dollard in the 1930s.[17] Today, in the field of conflict resolution, most scholars apply basic human needs (BHNs) theory in order to explain the ‘root causes’ of intra-state conflicts. According to BHNs theorists, conflicts often occur when the needs for physical security and well being; communal or cultural recognition, participation and control; and distributive justice are repeatedly denied and threatened especially over long periods of time.[18]

            As a one of the main theorists, John Burton recognizes that positions or issues may be only the manifest levels of some types of conflict and that the real conflict may reach deeper, to basic human needs.[19] These needs underlie interests, values, interests, and positions. Unlike positions, interests, or values, needs are ontological and non-negotiable. Individuals and groups of individuals pursue fulfillment of these BHNs.  Burton claims:

Human needs theory argues that there are certain ontological and genetic needs that will be pursued, and that socialization process, if not compatible with such human needs, far from socializing, will lead to frustrations, and to disturbed and anti-social personal and group behaviors. Individuals cannot socialized into behaviors that destroy their identity and other need goals and, therefore, must react against environment that do thisBehaviors that are a response to frustration of such human needs will often seem aggressive and counterproductive, but they are understandable in this context.[20]

            In the case of the Crimean Tatars, it is obvious that the systemwide political, economic, and cultural disintegration and the attempts at reintegration along ethnic lines are the principal sources for the emergence of an ethno-national conflict. The Crimean Tatars define their national identity in the realm of homeland discourse which connects the political, economic and cultural realms. Their homeland -Crimea- is an inseparable part of their national identity. Competition over political, economic and cultural issues aims to fulfill their return to homeland. Overall, the return to homeland is reproduced by the chosen traumas and chosen glories. For the Crimean Tatars the main chosen trauma is the deportation (surgun) and the main chosen glory is the establishment of the Crimean ASSR in 1921. 

            Most BHNs theorists distinguish needs, values, interests, and positions. Positions (or issues) comprise the surface layer. Underneath this layer are interests which are defined as "central to  thinking and action, forming the core of many attitudes, goals, and intentions”.[21] The layer below interests is made up of valuesand this where culture enters. Thus, culture is reasonably deep, but it is far from fundamental. The fundamental layer consists of basic human needs. Needs are ontologically given and essentially non-negotiable.[22] For Pruitt and Rubin, interests are virtually universal and perceived as the root of conflict. Overall, BHNs theory try to answer following questions: "What are the fears and concerns that are behind their claims or demands?” "Why is the other party advocating a given position?” "What do they consider to be their BHNs that are being denied, frustrated or threatened?” Answering these questions requires the parties to try to understand the historical and cultural perspective of the other side in order to better comprehend why it feels aggrieved.

            In the Crimean Tatars case, there are two positions. On the one hand, the Crimean Tatars demand the re-establishment of national autonomy and self-determination. On the other hand, for Russians, the return of Crimean Tatars means a deterioration of their own living standards. For Ukrainians, Tatars are allies in the struggle with Russia over possession of Crimea, but they are extremely sensitive to questions relating to the unity of independent Ukraine. The stability and inter-ethnic harmony in Crimea are in the interest of both sides. The greater the stability, the greater the economic growth, and the more jobs created. In other words, conflict-prone situation in Crimea costs both sides. Hence, to better understand the conflict situation in Crimea, we should focus on both sides needs. For Crimean Tatars, the basic human needs is the recognition of communal and cultural identity which is closely linked to ‘homeland’Crimea. On the other hand, both Russians and Ukrainians worry about their physical security and well-being.

            The best way to resolve deep-rooted conflicts is problem-solving approach. For this, one must dig out interests and needs buried beneath positions. In other words, one needs to get beneath the surface thingspersonalities, positions, and issuesto underlying causes. And solutions must fulfill the basic needs of all the parties. In this process, third party’s role as a facilitator is crucial in order to show both parties the effects and costs of conflict. Moreover, the parties avoid positional arguing and emotional outbursts and see a conflict as a problem requiring the parties to work together to find a creative and integrative solution. Consequently, both parties take the other side’s needs and concerns into account when structuring a solution.           

            There are some major limitations in the BHNs theory. First, it does not consider the cultural component of conflict. Second, it is difficult to prove empirically the existence of human needs and the link between these needs and actual behavior. Regardless of its limitations, in my opinion, BHNs theory is still the most effective framework in explaining this particular conflict. First, it attempts to explain interstate and ethnic conflicts that have been dominant after Cold War. Second, it introduces analytical approach and the relationship among needs, interests, values, and positions to conflict resolution. Third, a human needs approach allow us to examine the micro-macro problem by focusing on individuals, groups, structural relationships. Lastly, it has heuristic value for evaluating the extent to which social institutions and structures fulfill human needs. In short, it offers a realistic foundation for understanding the sources of individual behavior, a basis in which to analyze social change and continuity, and a standard by which to evaluate the progressiveness of changes occurring in world society.

4. PROBLEMS AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT ISSUES OF THE CRIMEAN TATARS

            In Crimea, we have a multi-ethnic state undergoing a painful socio-economic and political transition where the Crimean Tatars are struggling for their perceived rights such as to be a rightful citizen of Ukraine, able to use the social services for themselves and for their families, to be able let their voices heard in the Crimean political arena in their process of nation-state building. Since there are three major ethnic groups that share the peninsula, for obvious reasons, the nationalist card plays an important role in the hands of some politicians and the needs of the Crimean Tatar peoples runs in endless circles.

            Today, the returning Crimean Tatars face three major problems: The social conditions, the economic conditions, and Tatars’ constitutional and political position of the `Republic of Crimea’ since 1992[23]. 

            Under the social conditions the citizenship, language and land disputes questions are the three most important issues for the Crimean Tatars. In addition to these three main factors; chauvinism of ethnic Russians towards the Tatars,  religious differences between Ukrainians, Russians and Muslim Tatars, and the need for cultural and educational institutions; also place additional burden on the repatriates.

            Today Ukraine still does not grant the right of citizenship to repatriating Tatars and still treats them as one of the ``national minorities’’ causing enormous amount of economic, and social problems to returning masses. The ambiguity of Ukraine’s citizenship law regarding the acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship is a very important concern for the repatriates. Ukraine does not accept dual citizenship, thus repatriates first have to denounce their other citizenship (in case of most Crimean Tatars it is Uzbek citizenship). Persons born in Ukraine and living in Ukraine at the time of independence are considered citizens.  The non-citizens do not have a right to have a place of residence and accordingly they a not register at the workplace. If they are not registered at the work place and don’t have a place of residence, they are denied to have an access to free medical care and other social services guaranteed by the state. According to 1997 U.S. Department of States Human Rights Country Report, 100,000 of the 250,000 Tatars who have returned to Crimea are homeless, unable to find jobs, and illness and death rate, particularly among children and elderly people have increased sharply.

             In addition as non-citizens, repatriates are excluded from participation in elections and from right to take part in privatization of land and state assets.  The 1998 elections renewed the conflict between the Ukrainian state and the Crimean Tatars, because 90,000 of the repatriates were denied to right to have a vote based on their status as non-citizens. As a result they have almost no representation in the Crimean Parliament where they had fourteen (14) representatives prior to last election, elected by the Crimean Tatars themselves. One of the real reasons for this denial was the fear that all Crimean Tatars may vote for the Nationalist Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine) party[24]. 

            Ukraine seems to be wanting to help the Crimean Tatars to resettle in Crimea, by showing willingness to finance the repatriation, and trying to get the world community to help the Crimean Tatar’s return. But if one looks closely one can see that Ukraine’s position towards the Crimean Tatars is inconsistent in many ways. First of all, Ukraine’s government is ignoring and delaying a decision on the political and legal aspects of the problem. Under current law, more than one hundred thousand Crimean Tatars living in Crimea, forty percent of who have returned, can not receive Ukrainian citizenship.

            There is obviously a duality in the approach of Ukraine’s government towards the Crimean Tatars. Many Ukrainian politicians can not rid themselves of the stereotype of the Crimean Tatar that was for decades propagated in Soviet history and official propaganda. Soviet history books made sure that ``chosen glories’’ of the heroic Russ against Barbaric Tatars, as well as the ``chosen traumas’’ that caused horrific and painful memories in the hands of Turco-Tatar peoples in general.

            The Ministry for Nationalities and Migration that was established in Kyiv in April 1993, and their task is ``assisting the return of the deported peoples, supporting their linguistic and cultural rebirth, and defining their legal status[25]. Regardless on July 22, 1997 the Ukrainian government and the president’s office have submitted a bill to the Parliament under which Ukrainian would become the only official language in Ukraine. The bill proclaimed Ukrainian as the only official language in all social spheres throughout the country, including the autonomous region of Crimea. Furthermore, according to this bill all civil servants and other persons speaking languages other than Ukrainian in public offices could be fined[26]. This discriminatory ``Ukrainian language’’ requirement creates an obstacle for the repatriates. Almost all Crimean Tatars speak Russian fluently.  That is because they all were educated within the Soviet system. They also speak Uzbek, since it is a sister language to Tatar, and because the Crimean Tatars had lived in Uzbekistan after their deportation in 1944. Naturally, most of them (especially the elderly) speak Tatar. Thus, Ukrainian is literally a foreign language to them, and this creates another pressure on the Crimean Tatars and their relationship with the Ukrainian government. Currently, Crimean Tatars demand that the Mejlis parliament be recognized as the only representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, but so far it does not seem like this is going to become a reality in the near future. 

            In the mean time the Crimean Tatar people look at these political and social issues within their own realm. After forty-five years of exile, they are now finally returning to their homeland, their father’s lands (otechestvo) to resettle, and their only goal is rebirth as a nation. They all realize that they need to establish both legal and financial conditions necessary for their return and resettlement. They know that this rebirth is not going to be an easy one, but they return to their land regardless. Their land and property was taken from them in 1944, so most now live in makeshift accommodation as they try to construct new communities in the face of economic hardship and the obstructive attitude of local authorities. Although most Tatars are returning to their traditional homelands in central Crimea, severe restrictions are placed on their settlement in the more prosperous coastal strip, the Crimea’s key economic region[27]. Despite the limitations, they are trying to build houses in towns by carrying stones from the near by mountains, they live without water, without electricity, without any basic human needs. They are also trying to rebuild their social lives from zero in a new environment. Moreover, they are trying to build schools where they can educate their children in their native tongue, print textbooks, construct roads, telephones, water pipes, all of which require the support of a government under normal circumstances. The Crimean Tatars don’t have such support, and they take on the government’s role themselves. In each village a Mejlis is elected by the local population that takes upon a great responsibility. It tries to arbitrate personal and local conflicts, including between individuals from different ethnic communities that might otherwise grow into something larger. The local government is often connected to the Mafia and provokes conflicts that easily could end in bloodshed. Most of the local conflicts are caused by Mafia who wants to control everything. The criminal world at times purposefully instigates tensions, but The Russian mass media uses these local conflicts to foster ethnic conflict in a dangerous fashion. These kinds of twisted information inflict a lot of economic damage on all of Crimea, especially in tourism.

            There is no system of education for teaching in Crimean Tatar.  In Simferopol there is a School of the Crimean Tatar language, where about 30 students are accepted each year. Furthermore, there is Crimean Industrial Pedagogical Institute, where 65 percent of the students are Crimean Tatars. There are only four secondary schools with teaching in the Crimean Tatar language. In addition the Ministry of Education of Turkey hosts 25 to 30 students each year at various institutions of higher learning in Turkey[28].  This is definitely not enough for the children of repatriating Crimean Tatars.

            This kind of an educational necessity   inadvertently creates some other problems.  For example, there is a Turkish High School of Crimea in the city of Kerch that was established in 1993 by Fetullah Hoca (an Islamic sect/tariquat leader from Turkey). This high school is only for boys and enrolls over 200 students, about 70 % Crimean Tatars and 30% Ukranians and Russians. There are also plans to open a school for girls.  This school’s curriculum is mostly in English, with language courses offered in Turkish, Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean Tatar. The school has an excellent academic reputation having won several awards recently. The school is financed completely with Turkish funds.  Although this school seems like a good thing for the Crimean Tatar students, due to Fetullah Hoca’s hidden agenda, unintentionally it may also help Russian mass media’s claim of spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Crimea through finances and ideology that are imported from the kin state, Turkey.

            Under the economic conditions, first we can look into the unemployment rates among Crimean Tatars as well as in Ukraine in general. The United Nations Refugee Agency states that more than half of the working age population of the Crimean Tatars are unemployed. Actually the level of the registered unemployment rate of capable workforce in Crimea has increased by 0.7 per cent and on January 1 amounted to 1.8 per cent.  At the end of the 1997 for each vacant place of employment as many as 22 persons applied. During the last year 85 thousand people or 18 per cent of the workforce were sent to compulsory, unpaid for leaves.  The number of hidden unemployment in Crimea is 56 thousand[29]. For the Crimean Tatars, this problem is mainly connected with unresolved issue of Ukrainian citizenship for the returning Crimean Tatars. Today, 110,000 Crimean Tatars who have returned to their original homeland Crimea are without citizenship. As a result, they are deprived from access to social services to privatization and to land ownership, as well as to legitimate jobs and so on.  According to government statistics between 1992 and mid-1997, only 141 stateless Crimean Tatars acquired Ukrainian citizenship. In mid-1997 Ukraine amended its law making it simpler for repatriates to apply for citizenship.  However, it is also true that at the same time, there was an absence of mechanism for implementing the new law on citizenship. It is also certain that local authorities, having an extremely hostile attitude towards Tatars, created obstacles preventing them from obtaining citizenship.

            Furthermore, Crimean Tatars returning from Uzbekistan, find themselves in deplorable financial conditions. The crisis of housing deficit, tent cities and shanty towns, lack of drinking water, electricity, roads and social services create very difficult living conditions for the repatriates. For a long time Crimean Tatars demand the re-establishment of the Crimean ASSR that existed in 1920s, and request monetary compensation from the Ukraine and Russia as well as from Uzbekistan for their misfortunes after the deportation.  Crimean Tatars claim that since they worked very hard and paid taxes in Uzbekistan, now they deserve some re-settlement fees from Uzbekistan.

            Although Uzbeks are also Moslem peoples, it was not easy for Crimean Tatars to adjust into the life in Uzbekistan. There existed some hostility between the host Uzbeks and deported Crimean Tatars who were sent to Uzbekistan without their consent.  Initially, some of this antagonism was partially based on NKVD’s (Narodniy Komiseriat Vnutrinniy Del-precursor of KGB) anti-Tatar propoganda among Uzbeks during the years of deportation.  Furthermore, Crimean Tatars never saw Uzbekistan as their new homeland. They have always associated Crimea as their one and only "homeland” (vatan/ rodina). The one condition that separates the Crimean Tatars from other deported Turkic peoples is their territorial based identity with the Crimean peninsula.  In addition to this very important fact, having collective memory of surgun (mass deportation), re-learning how to live in the Uzbek deserts after being used to living in their green island (yesil ada), poor working conditions in Uzbek factories after being used to be farmers in the coastal vineyards in Crimea, kept the Crimean Tatars from assimilating into the Uzbek society. 

            After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars who continued to remain in their places of exile felt both the `push’ to leave Central Asia and the `pull’ of the Crimea. Some of these Tatars had to leave comfortable housing and successful carriers in Central Asia in order to be able to realize their dream of repatriation to Crimea. In addition to this `pull’ factor of repatriation, there were additional incentives for Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland such as the growing xenophobia on the part of the Uzbeks who have recently used the slogan `Ruskii doloi, Tatarskii Domoi’ (Down with the Russians, Tatars go home) that created a push factor for the Crimean Tatars.  According to one source, ``hundreds’’ of Crimean Tatar homes were burned and pillaged by Uzbek gangs who fought another exiled nation, Meshketian Turks, in the Fergana Valley in June of 1989[30]. The increasing lack of tolerance toward minorities in Uzbekistan and complete breakdown of civil society resulting from civil war in neighboring Tajikistan has certainly provided further incentive for Crimean Tatars to migrate to the Crimea despite the hostile reception they receive there from the Russian population and the sacrifices made in the quality of life by the returnees[31].

            Furthermore, Crimean Tatars argue that both Russia (Crimean was part of Russia in 1944, and Russia claims to be the legal successor of the USSR) and Ukraine as well as Uzbekistan (host to most of the Crimean Tatars after 1944) are morally responsible for their plight. But so far, Ukraine and Uzbekistan failed to reach an agreement on Tatars. At the meeting that took place in Kyiv on April 18, 1998, Uzbek Prime Minister Utkir Sultanov and his Ukrainian counterpart, Petro Lazerenko, failed to reach an agreement on the return of the Crimean Tatars to Crimea. Uzbekistan wants only those who were actually deported to be given deportee status, while Crimean Tatars and Ukraine insists that all their relatives and descendants be included[32]. To date only Ukrainians have provided some financial assistance to Crimean Tatars, although the former USSR authorities had begun to disperse some money before the collapse of the Union in 1991. However, the Crimean Tatars are deeply dissatisfied with the Ukrainian scheme as the money is disbursed by the local Crimean Cabinet of Ministers, and the Crimean Tatars have no direct control over when and where that money is spent. According to the Voice of America report of May 6, 1998, in Geneva, United Nations Aid Agencies have urgently appealed for international assistance to help reintegrate more than a quarter-million Crimean Tatars who are living in desperate conditions into Ukrainian society. According to the same report, Mr. Dolph Everts remarks that assisting people like the Crimean Tatars can help to prevent a conflict within a society.

            Thirdly, Crimean Tatars are concerned about political and constitutional position of the ‘Republic of Crimea’ since 1992. Although the peninsula remains a constituent part of Ukraine, its leaders, who tend to be pro-Russian and anti-Tatar, have been granted considerable autonomy, and have used it to deny the Tatar political representation[33].  Since 1991 the Tatars have claimed self determination over the whole peninsula, whereas Crimean authorities are only prepared to grant them certain `minority rights’. This clash between two totally different conceptions of the Tatars’ rightful place in the Crimea has led to growing political confrontations between two irreconcilable camps and the rise of extremist groups on both sides.

            The law on elections to the Supreme Council (Verhovna Rada) of Crimea that was adopted in October 1993 did not provide for any Crimean Tatar representation in parliament. After these elections, the Crimean Tatars undertook a campaign of civil disobedience in order to obtain representation, including closing down railways and blocking highways. As a result of this campaign, the law was amended to reserve fourteen out of ninety-eight seats for Crimean Tatars. In the last Ukranian election that took place on March 29, 1998, two Crimean Tatar deputies (Mustafa Cemiloglu and Refat Chubarov) were elected to be at Ukrainian Verhovna Rada (Upper house). This seems to be a fresh start for the time being, but one should also remember that in the same elections eighty thousand Crimean Tatars electorate were denied to right to vote[34]. Although they constitute more than fifty percent of the eligible Crimean Tatars, they were unable to cast their ballots in the elections because they were not considered as citizens of Ukraine.  As a result, they have almost no representation in the Crimean parliament where they had (14) representatives prior to last election, elected by Crimean Tatars themselves.

            There exist a few different explanations why Leonid Kuchma refused to sign an order that would have granted the right to vote in parliamentary elections to those resident Tatars who have not yet received citizenship. Above all, such an order would be contradictory to the Ukrainian constitution, which gives only citizens of Ukraine the right to vote. But according to Leonid Pilunskij, who heads the Crimean section of the National Movement of Ukraine (Rukh Party), "Tatars had those rights that were in accordance the Ukraine-Bishkek agreement”[35]. Some experts do not exclude the possibility that a particular role was played by (parliaments) balloted the present prime minister of Crimea, Anatolij Franchuk, and former vice-prime minister, Ilmi Umerov, a Crimean Tatar.  If those Tatars who were not eligible to vote were allowed to vote, Franchuk’s entrance to parliament would have been much more problematic. Furthermore, in the previous presidential elections, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people appealed to people to give their votes to Kuchma’s opponent, Leonid Kravchuk[36]. Just five days before these elections, on March 24, 1998 several thousands of Tatars clashed with police in the Crimean capital of Simferopol (Ak-Mesjit). The Tatars began their protest in the Central Lenin square and then blocked railway tracks and a key highway after the Ukrainian parliament took no action on their request for suffrage rights. Eight policemen were hospitalized and an unspecified number of Tatars were also injured in the confrontation.  This clash happened, because Crimean leaders and the peoples feared that they will not be properly represented in the local, regional, or national legislatures[37].   

            A Parliamentary district is made up of 110,000 residents.  Meanwhile, under Ukraine’s resettlement policy, the Crimean Tatars are not allowed to exceed 27 percent of the population in any single administrative unit[38].  Thus, Crimean Tatars will never be able to achieve a high enough proportion to win a district seat. This problem of representation naturally makes the Tatars feel powerless, and this powerlessness can cause some conflict escalation in the near future.

            The tension between Ukraine and Russia about the possession of the Crimean peninsula itself (the ownership and status of the Black Sea Fleet and the use of the port of Sevastopol) create another problem in Crimea. Kyiv and Moscow are both using the Crimean Tatar situation for their own ends. Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement on Black Sea Fleet on 28th of May, 1997. According to this agreement, Ukraine had agreed to allow Russia to keep its share of the fleet at Sevastopol for the next 20 years and agreed to lease their port facilities to Russia. Under the deal, Russia will compensate Ukraine for about $526 million worth of ships and will pay $100.000,000 a year for the next 20 years. However, the payments will be offset against Ukraine’s $3 billion debt to Russia rather than paid in cash. Russia will also forgive $200 million of the Ukrainian debt in exchange for the nuclear missiles removed from Ukraine in 1992[39]. These are strategic, economic or geopolitical interests on both sides seeking to manipulate the overall issue of Crimea. Furthermore, there are some strategic considerations connected with the Crimea’s location, speculating that Tatars could act as a ``fifth column’’ for Turkey. The Crimean Tatar problem is seen by the Russians and the Ukrainians as part of the danger of Turkish expansion in the region, because both Turks and the Crimean Tatars are Muslim and they share a similar ethnic and racial background. All this finds a certain resonance within Ukrainian society and among some politicians. The continued moderation of the Mejlis-the Crimean Tatars representative organ- can not be assured. The cohesiveness of the Tatar community and their commitment to nonviolence is breaking down. A full examination of the living standards of returning Tatars requires a look at the situation of other residents of Crimea, especially ethnic Russians.  The ethnic Russian community in Crimea-roughly 1.7 million people- feels traumatized by the events of the last seven years. Before 1989, Russians occupied a pre-eminent position in Crimea, comprising more than 70 percent of the population. They dominated the political, social, and economic life in the region. Today, inter-ethnic relations between Russians and Tatars in Crimea appear marked by deeply entrenched feelings of distrust, based on myths and misperception. Although Crimea is in Ukraine, only 20 percent of the Crimea’s population is Ukrainian, and their presence is hardly felt[40]. This inequality among the repatriates and the local Russian population creates another possible seedbed for a possible conflict in the future. 

            All of these above issues, demands from all three sides of the ethnic triangle in Crimea are connected to ‘identity’, security and well being, communal or cultural recognition, participation and control; and distributive justice. In other words, the root causes of all these conflicts can be explained by using the BHNs theory as a framework in their explanation. On the one hand, the Crimean Tatar side demand the self-determination and secession right in order to satisfy their ‘security’ and identity need, on the other hand the peninsula remains a constituent part of Ukraine as the pro-Russian and anti-Tatar tendency in peninsula try to destroy Ukrainian authority and Tatars’ existence in Crimea. One of the main reasons of this situation is that majority of peninsula (% 67) is Russian, and they feel like Crimea belongs to them. This creates a similar situation to Nagorno-Karabagh conflict between the Armenians and the Azeris in the Transcaucasus region of the FSU. 

            5. CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

            The classic debate over prevention has to do with balancing and proactive strategies.  Although any attempt at drawing typologies is kind of an oversimplification, identifying alternative paradigms for prevention is useful in order to organize a discussion of appropriate tools for intervention.

            In his article, Kalypso Nicolaidis differentiates four paradigms of international preventive action:[1] coercive diplomacy, institutional inducement, cooperative management, and systemic transformation.  Among these four paradigms, the best one that fits to the Crimean Tatar case is the cooperative management.

            5.1. Cooperative Management

            Cooperative management approach is similar to early prevention. It rejects the idea that conflict prevention requires coercive and inducive strategies. Instead, prevention is necessitated outside intervention in order to develop or strengthen alternative means for peaceful settlements and address the root causes of conflict.[2] Also, it is based on ad hoc actions in response to a specific event in the target country which is akin to malaria pills for the adventurous traveler. By definitions, these actions rely on the consent of the internal parties. It also addresses a specific dispute, between specific parties at a specific moment in time. Outside intervention provides the means for dispute resolution and reconciliation while persuading the parties to forego violent options.

            K. Nicolaidis defines it: "In its purest form, prevention of this sort does not rely on pressure but on persuasion; it relies on enhancing internal capacity rather than on bringing to bear external incentives. Individual governments routinely capitalize on their special relations with given countries to offer their services to mediate disputes. Actors in the international system, national or international organizations, and government or non-governmental organizations have made it their mission to promote dialogue, confidence, and cooperation among parties in the throes of protracted ethnic conflicts.” [3]

            Traditionally, international mediation intensifies as domestic disputes turn into conflicts and conflicts turn deadly.  At a minimum, the goal of an outside intervenor is to keep channels of communication open between disputants.  But this intervention should be done very carefully based on cultural and traditional subjectivity, historical grievances, and other variables between the disputing parties.  Actually, before any kind of international intervention, international relations scholars should carefully study the extent which mediation practice and negotiation theory  need to be adapted when the ultimate goal is preventing deadly intrastate conflicts.

            In later years, countries are increasingly turning to international organizations and other institutions (such as NGOs) for assistance in resolving disputes when attempts at direct negotiation fail.  One of the international preventive action cooperative management has following preventive tools: official good office and mediation, ‘third party insider’: High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE), unofficial or grassroots dialogue, promotion of cross-conflict learning, country-specific transition programs including institution buildings, elections, comprehensive peace plan, and United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). Here, we will use some of these cooperative management tools and analyze their applicability to the Crimean Tatars case. Thus, I will precisely  focus on the role of Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), specifically HCNM, and unofficial or grassroots dialogues such as problem solving workshops (PSWs) and peace camps.

            5.2. The OSCE: Insider Third Party, the HCNM and In-country missions

            In the last few years, the OSCE began to turn away from the "settlement-and-enforcement’ paradigm toward developing a new approach for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the Europe.[4] This paradigm shift includes an ‘insider third party’[5], the long-term presence of missions on the ground and the mandate, and the High Commissioner’s mediator role as a facilitator and an adviser over the longer run. Member states have an obligation to accept fact-finding missions for investigative purposes. The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is empowered to conduct on-site missions and to engage in preventive diplomacy among disputants at the earliest stages of tension. It has the authority to initiate conflict prevention activities without seeking prior political approval. The High Commissioner focuses on ‘satisfying the interests and alleviating the fears of all the parties involved’ rather than on determining or interpreting rights.[6] As the High Commissioner Max van der Stoel indicated he is not an advocate for minorities, an international ombudsman, or an OSCE human rights investigator.[7]

            In addition to obtaining first-hand information from the parties concerned, the High Commissioner seeks to promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation between them.[8] The High Commissioner consults with the Chairman-in-Office (CIO) of his plans to visit a participating state and reports confidentially upon completion of his visit. In fact, there has been a close and constructive collaboration between the High Commissioner and the Chairman-in-Office this crucial start-up period. Early warning follows a political decision authorizing and defining parameters of a mediatory effort, and the OSCE may authorize the High Commissioner to undertake a formal program of "early action”.[9]

            The High Commissioner preventive diplomacy has three important features: impartiality, confidentiality, and cooperation. Impartiality is to be interpreted as the High Commissioner is not being an instrument for the protection of minorities or international ombudsman who acts on their behalf. He/she listens to all parties concerned and also offers all of them his/her advice, and not just governments. Second, confidentiality is important because it leads to a situation where parties involved feel they can be more cooperative and are less inclined to maintain strong demands. Lastly, durable solutions are only possible if there is a sufficient measure of consent from the parties directly involved.[10]

             The in-country missions were developed by the OSCE to respond to the perceived needs of specific situations. There are currently nine local missions operating within the OSCE region. Four missions, operating in Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia, and Ukraine, have been characterized as preventive diplomacy missions.[11]  But it does have its limitations, especially to the extent that it relies in part on the implicit link between the acceptance of its activities and the hopes of accession by its target countries to institutions like the EU or the Council of Europe.  Most important, the OSCE has not been able to help establish institutions inside the countries where it has intervened that can sustain long-term dialogue and transform the conflicts or that could ultimately be taken by local actors.

            The HCNM and the missions do not possess or exercise any coercive authority. They focus on policy and politics, rather than rights, and their concern with the process by which parties are dealing with their conflict, rather than the substance of the legal, economic, and social issues regarding treatment of minorities. They focus on satisfying interests and alleviating the fears of all parties concerned.

            The consensus rule and the cooperative and dialogue-based approach have been the key to the OSCE’s success in preventive diplomacy. However, it also limits its ability and role the most intractable and violent conflicts in Europe because it depends heavily on political support from and good relations among the OSCE’s most influential members. Second, its lack of "teeth” is also another limitation.

            5.3. The Crimean Tatars and OSCE

            In 16^th February 1994, the High Commissioner Max van der Stoel began to get involved with Ukraine, in particular with the situation in Crimea. Generally, he stressed the issue of language and its impact on inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine. He suggested that the Ukrainian language obligation should not lead to fears of forced ‘Ukrainization’ among the Russians who constitute the 62% of the total population in Crimea who call for greater autonomy from Kyiv and stronger ties with Russia.  Furthermore, during his visit to Crimea, van Der Stoel noted that the question of repatriating Crimean Tatars, posed problems for inter-ethnic relations on the peninsula as long as their resettlement issues are not solved. For these reasons among others, the OSCE decided to send a team of experts to look into the constitutional and economic matters in Ukraine, accompanied by one of van der Stoel’s personal advisers. Extensive meetings and discussions were held with political and economic leaders in both Kiev and Simferopol (Akmescit).[12] Only in 1994, van der Stoel himself visited the region for four times.

            In 1995, van der Stoel visited the Ukraine between 17^th - 23^rd September. During this trip, he met with Ukraine’s President, Foreign Minister, and Supreme Council Chairman. He discussed the Ukrainian constitutional process with them as well as the problems connected with the drawing up of the Crimean constitution and its conformity to the norms and provisions of Ukraine’s future constitution. In these meetings, they have also discussed complications, which are emerging in the course of the return to Ukraine of the Crimean Tatars. Moreover, between 20^th-22^nd September a round table was held in Yalta where the discussants reviewed the issues of the repatriating nation once deported from the Crimea. Representatives of the central bodies of power of Ukraine, the republic of Crimea, as well as scholars and OSCE observers participated in this round table. The High Commissioner also stressed that one of his tasks while visiting Ukraine was to study the ways of increasing international aid to the Crimean Tatars.[13]

            On 25-29 August 1996, the High Commissioner visited Ukraine again and this time he met with deputy speaker of the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) Refat Chubarov, who is also the First Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars. Another meeting was also held with the Chairman of the Mejlis, Mr. Cemiloglu. After that, the High Commissioner visited Ukraine and Crimea regularly on 18-21 December 1996, 11-14 May 1997, 2-5 November 1997, and 18-22 May 1998. 

            In its 1997 annual report, OSCE mission in Ukraine indicated that the mission’s focus of activity has shifted towards the unresolved economic and social problems associated with the return of over 250,000 of the Crimean Tatars to the peninsula. In this effort, the Mission has worked very closely with the HCNM and some international organizations, including the UNDP, the UNCHR, and the IOM, in order to be able to request for increased contributions from the donor community to help with the re-integration of the former deportees. An international conference was held in early 1998 to realize this goal. The Mission has actively tried to draw attention to the recently eased citizenship regulations which can help approximately 100,000 Crimean Tatars to become Ukrainian citizens. In this effort the Mission is still closely working with the UNHCR to publicize the new citizenship law among the scattered deportee communities on the peninsula.[14]

            5.4. Problem Solving Workshops and Peace Camps

            One of the important parts of the grassroots dialogues’ are the problem-solving workshops (PSWs).  PSW is a process through which informal, powerless, and usually academic third parties can affect the course of protracted and deep-rooted conflict. A thhhhhhhhhird party has an unique resource of competence, credibility, and legitimacy. PSWs facilitate communication among the conflicting parties themselves so that mutually acceptable solutions can emerge out of their own interaction. As a conflict prevention tool, PSWs do not only aim to bring the parties together in order to communicate and to know each other as human beings with similar goals, fears, needs, and concerns. Their characteristics are the analysis of conflict, exploration of mutual perspectives, generations of new ideas, and joint problem-solving. Creative problem-solving redefine, fractionate, or transcend the conflict so that positive-sum, or win/win solutions, which leave both parties better off, can be discovered. In other words, PSWs have a dual purpose: to produce change in the participants themselves-to stimulate understandings, modifications in perceptions and attitudes, new ideas for conflict resolution; and to transfer these changes to the policy arena-to feed the new learnings into the political debate and the decision making process within each society.[15]

            Another conflict prevention tool is the establishment of peace camps for teenagers. Peace camps try to apply problem solving workshops and transformative approach techniques to the pre-conflict period. Intra-national conflicts present new challenges to peace and require new tools. Therefore, PSWs and peace camps approach submit new tools to peace makers. We have three assumptions. First, peace making is learned behavior. Second, the individual is peacemaker. The main assumption is that deep-rooted and protracted conflicts require the satisfaction of basic human needs that can be achieved by creating an environment that form new knowledge and ideas, alter perceptions and attitudes, and innovate proposals that can be fed into the policy process. In the peace camps, teenagers learn to remove their differences and become friends.

            Perhaps the greatest strength of peace camps is that they prepare tomorrow’s leaders to make a real and an enduring peace and contribute to the transformation of relationship between the conflicting parties. The basic principles in peace camps are equality and reciprocity where the participants encouraged learning about each other’s fears, needs, and constraints. Secondly, through the peace camps, sometimes the solution emerges out of the interaction between the conflicting parties. Learning comes from the participants themselves. The third party can facilitate the learning process, but it cannot provide the answers. The third party intervenes in the process, both to direct the discussion in constructive directions and to offer content and process observations, but can not dictate the end results to the participants. Thirdly, the main emphasis of peace camps are that they help the participants to acknowledge the other’s humanity, national identity, subjective view of history, authentic links to the land, their legitimate grievances, and commitment to peace. In peace camps, participants can develop increasing degree of emphaty, of sensitivity, and responsiveness to the other’s concerns, and of working trust, which are essential ingredients of the new relationship to which are conflict resolution efforts aspire. An analytic and interactive nature of the program is another strength. For the Russian participants the concept of the Crimean Tatar is totally negative, a symbol of everything they feared and hated. On the other hand, most of Russians want to expel the Crimean Tatars from peninsula entirely. Similarly, for the Crimean Tatar participants, Russian Crimea is a totally negative concept, whose meaning was the displacing and oppressing the Crimean Tatar people. If there were to be peace camps held between the members of the every level of the society among the Russians and the Tatars, through a series of corrective emotional experiences, Russians may be able to look at the Crimean Tatars from different perspective, and vice versa.. They can learn to differentiate negative symbol and to recognize that it had more than the single meaning. They can move from the zero-sum to win-win solution..

            Fourth, the peace camps attempt to change in the form of more differentiated images of enemy, a better understanding of the other’s perspective, and of their own priorities, greater insight into the dynamics of conflict and new ideas for resolving the conflict and overcoming the barriers to a negotiated solution. In other words, they promote antibias by discussing rather than ignoring the differences among teenagers, and by highlighting the value of diversity rather than focusing the children on sameness.

            Fifth, the continuing program allows an repetitive and cumulative process, based on feedback and correction. The participants have an opportunity to take the ideas developed in the course of the camp back to their communities. Next, after the camp period, existing network via Internet is enhanced and it generates a grassroots movement in this country.

            Both PSWs and peace camps can show both parties try to reach win-win solutions that are conducive to peace and reconciliation. They produce attitudinal change enabling the parties to accept each other, to live together in peace, and to engage in cooperative activities. However, they have some weaknesses. The first weakness is how we will measure the effect of PSWs and the peace camps into the policy process. Moreover, it is hard to diffuse their effect in the short-run. Second, there are some technical, political, and economical obstacles. For example, the funding is always problem. Third, PSWs and peace camps offer some solution for intrastate conflict. However, it avoids the intergroup conflict-such as the division between the Crimean Tatars from Uzbekistan and the Crimean Tatars from the diaspora. Therefore, there is a need of reconciliation and compromise within each society and group. Fourth, when these teenagers and workshops attendants return their country, they again take part and engage in usual interaction in their society. Also, it is hard to preserve their perception in deep-rooted conflicts. Therefore, it is difficult to continue diffusion process. Fifth, the transformation process should include the media, their environment, government, and culture.

            Currently, there is a UN project so called Participatory Local Planning Councils (PLPC) which aims to increase interaction between the Tatar and Russian communities and to ease prejudice and suspicion. UN officials have selected two Tatar settlements that are closely situated to more established Russian communities-one outside Simferopol, the other in the Sudak region-to serve as proving ground for program. In both areas Tatars and Russians will have to work together if development projects are to be successful. The hope is that once they work together, the two sides will find that stereotypes do not match reality and a spirit of cooperation takes root in both sides. In order to plan and implement UNCIDP (UN’s Crimea Integration and Development Program) projects, both communities elect a council. This council work with the UNCIDP on projects in these specific areas: school and housing construction, improving access to health care, increasing access to water, technical training, and small business assistance.

5. CONCLUSION

            There is no question that internal violence and ethno-national conflict present an increasing threat to stability in ECE and FSU region. The real danger today is not that the international community may intervene at all. However, sophisticated our warning systems, it is only when conflicts are "on the screen”; literally as well as figuratively, that they received attention. Often, that is when it is too late. We should thus strip prediction from prevention to the greatest extent possible. In the same vein as the distinction between "preventive” and "predictive” medicine, conflict prevention may be the most cost-effective strategy with regard to domestic and inter-ethnic conflicts. Rapid reaction capacities need to be enhanced and relied on automatically. Provided that they can be designed to minimize perverse effects, systemic transformative actions should progressively become part of the operational design of international institutions and NGOs. Priority should be granted to preventing the recurrence of conflicts through adequate reconstruction and reconciliation program. The early warning bell has been rung in Crimea. We should focus on whether the signals are being interpreted properly and how future responses may best be formulated.

            In the long run, developing infrastructure for peace requires an increasing degree of institutionalization and long-range planning.

            Justifiably, Crimean Tatars want to rectify the injustice done to them by the 1944 deportation. With or without outside help, their resettlement of Crimea will continue. However, poverty is widespread affecting many Tatars, but also plenty of Russians, Ukrainians, and others and a mood of desperation threatens to proliferate. Amid such conditions, irrationality can overpower common sense, sparking a chain-reaction of violence. Even if the influx of Tatars is not a direct cause of conflict, repatriation could be used as a pretext to initiate trouble (scapegoating). Keeping in this mind, Tatar figure to play a central role in determining how development will unfold in Crimea. The international community should therefore implement extensive conflict prevention measures.

            As it stands now, the Crimea’s problems are so extensive that they can not be completely alleviated by international aid.  But additional foreign assistance may ease the widespread feeling of hopelessness among the Crimean Tatars, as well as the frustrations and fears.  In my opinion fact finding missions, regional or international NGOs, and some other international organizations can help prevent an explosion of a conflict in Crimea. Conditions are now favorable for undertaking conflict-prevention initiatives. First, after the bloody war in Chechnya, radical tendencies in Crimea, both among Russians and Tatars decreased. Also, the low-grade nature of the Crimean territorial dispute facilitates the opening of a constructive inter-ethnic dialogue. Meanwhile, constitutional arrangements defining the Crimea’s status within Ukraine await finalization, meaning the remains some room for bargaining. Finally, the Mejlis remained in the hands of moderates following the Kurultai in June 1996, meaning Tatars will continue to show restraint for the foreseeable future. Changes in the existing set of circumstances might complicate the chances that conflict prevention measures would have desired effect. Moreover, the diaspora communities of the Crimean Tatars in Romania, Bulgaria, European Union, the United States, Uzbekistan and Turkey may play important and productive role to convince both Ukraine and their home government on the Crimean Tatar question. The economic, political, and lobbying contributions should be increased for the conflict prevention and resolution in Crimea.

            The window for effective action may not remain open forever long.  Feelings of frustrations in the Crimea are increasing.  After the signed agreement about the Black Sea Fleet, the relations between Ukraine and Russia seems to be cooling down, but under the surface there are still many unaddressed issues.  Furthermore, there appears to be a sharp division between the radicals and the other within the Crimean Tatar Mejlis. The time is now for effective international action.  Waiting heightens the risk of a conflict that could deal a mortal blow to the development of civil society not only in Crimea, but across much of the FSU.

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Homepages

Crimean Tatar home page http://www.euronet.nl/users/sota/krimtatar.html

Reports

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Reports

United States Department of State reports.

Yanaev Commission Report, Kırım-Kırım T�rkleri Aylık Dergisi, April 1990.