This
essay is divided into five sections. We begin by reflecting on civilizational
dialogue in the first epoch, the autochthonous epoch, before we move on to the
second epoch, the colonial epoch. The third epoch, which receives most
attention, is the contemporary epoch, which will focus on globalization and
civilizational dialogue. This will be followed by a discussion on the reaction
to certain patterns of power and dominance associated with globalization in the
contemporary epoch. The fifth and final section of the essay will explore the
alternative—meaning the alternative to the communal response to the identity
crisis in contemporary civilizations.
The
Autochthonous Epoch
The
autochthonous epoch is the epoch of indigenous, independent kingdoms and
empires, which spanned long centuries of Asian history. During this period,
there were both positive and negative elements in the interaction between
civilizations on the continent. Chinese scholars traveled to India to study
Buddhism, just as Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese literati journeyed to China
to imbibe Confucian ethics. Muslim rulers dialogued with Christian and Jewish
notables in parts of West Asia in the eighth and ninth centuries while Muslim
savants such as Ibn-a-Nadim and as-Shahrastani in the 10th and 11th centuries
wrote with much warmth about the exemplary qualities of the Buddhists living in
their midst in parts of what is today Iran and Afghanistan. [1]
An even more outstanding example of an Islamic scholar reaching out to the Other
was Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad Al-Biruni (973-1051 CE). He not only studied
Hinduism, Christianity, and Judaism but also developed principles for the
comparative analysis of religions. It is remarkable that he tried to be as
objective and unbiased as possible in examining the tenets and practices of
religions other than his own. Al-Biruni’s Kitab al-Hind, which probes
Hinduism and Hindu society is a brilliant testimony to this. By studying the
religion and civilization of the Hindus, Al-Biruni hoped it would be easier for
the Muslims to dialogue with them. As he put it, "The
flow of religious and cultural ideas across civilizational boundaries was part
and parcel of a larger flow involving ideas on science, technology,
architecture, and art.”
"We
think now that what we have related in this book (Kitab al-Hind) will be
sufficient for anyone who wants to converse with the Hindus, and to discuss with
them questions of religion, science, or literature on the very basis of their
own civilization.” [2]
Through the scientific study of other religions and civilizations, Al-Biruni, in
a sense, paved the way for the dialogue of civilizations. At a time when the
world is beginning to recognize the vital importance of civilizational
dialogue—as reflected in the United Nations’ proclamation of 2001 as the
year of the dialogue of civilizations—it behooves us to remember the
pioneering role of that celebrated interlocutor, Al-Biruni.
The flow of religious and cultural ideas across civilizational boundaries was
part and parcel of a larger flow involving ideas on science, technology,
architecture, and art. Between China and the Arab world, the Arab world and
India, and India and South-East Asia, there was an active exchange of knowledge
and information which, though restricted to a small elite, was nonetheless
significant. It was through such creative interaction that Islamic civilization,
which absorbed ideas in both the sciences and the humanities from every
conceivable source, became the storehouse of knowledge for the whole of
humankind between the 8th and 13th centuries (Kramer).
In this transmission and synthesis of ideas, trade between different states and
empires in Asia played a major role. The famous silk route, for instance, not
only facilitated the exchange of goods but also enabled illustrious cities to
flourish in what is today central Asia—cities such as Samarkand and Bokhara,
which became homes to great libraries and museums. Likewise, trade between China
and Southeast Asia brought with it ideas on public administration, town
planning, architecture, and aesthetics from the former to the latter. [3]
It should be emphasized, however, that while there was intellectual and cultural
exchange among an infinitesimal few at the apex of the different civilizations,
the vast majority of people lived within their own geographical and social
spheres, hardly interacting with outside elements. Needless to say, communities
in the distant past, bound by kinship ties and ethnic relationships, were much
more culturally homogenous and physically insulated than they are today. "The
cultural or religious Other” just did not exist in their thinking. To put it
in another way, communities of antiquity were simply oblivious of other cultures
and civilizations. This was understandable, given the nature of political
organizations, the type of economic activities, and the modes of communication
in what were largely agrarian societies.
Even when communities and cultures came into contact with one another, it was
not always peaceful. The history of Asia is littered with tales of wars and
conflicts, sometimes between adherents of different faiths and sects. The
underlying causes of these conflagrations might not have been linked to
religious doctrines or religious practices but they undoubtedly exacerbated
intercommunity relations (Muzaffar). The victor would be subjected to ethnic
stereotyping just as the vanquished would be the victim of communal prejudice.
Of course in some instances, after a generation or two, adverse sentiments about
the Other were gradually eradicated. This had happened in a number of Muslim
societies where the more all encompassing Muslim identity appears to have been
successful in at least minimizing communal consciousness. Even in their
treatment of non-Muslim communities, Muslim states often ensured that their
religious and cultural rights were protected, and that they had the freedom to
participate in the economic and social life of the larger society in which these
minorities were domiciled. [4]
Sources:
Kramer,
Martine. "Islam’s Sober Millennium,” Commentary in Petaling Jaya:
International Movement for a Just World, No. 43, New Series, December 2000.
Muzaffar,
Chandra. "Religious Conflict in Asia in Rights,” Religion & Reform,
London: Curzon, 2001.
Endnotes
[1]
For Shahrastani’s thinking see Bruce Lawrence Shahrastani on the Indian
Religions, Moulton, Moulton & Co. 1976
[2]
Quoted in Kamar Oniah Kamaruzaman "Early Muslim Scholarship in
Religionswissenschaft: A case study of the Works and Contributions of Abu
Rayhan,” Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Al-Biruni, Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, Kuala Lumpur, International Institute of Islamic Thought and
Civilisation (ISTAC), 1996 p 58.
[3]
For an analysis of trade between China and Southeast Asia see Wang Gungwu, Community
and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese, Kuala Lumpur/Hong
Kong: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia) Ltd., especially the chapters on Early
Ming Relations with Southeast Asia, China and Southeast Asia 1402-1424 and The
Opening of Relations between China and Malacca 1403-1405.
[4]
The philosophical and ideological basis of universalism and pluralism in Islam
is discussed in Farid Esack’s Quran Liberation and Pluralism, Oxford:
One World 1997, and Muddathir ‘Abd a-Rahim’s Islam and Non-Muslim
Minorities, Monograph, Penang: Just World Trust, 1997.
The
Colonial Epoch
Unlike
the autochthonous epoch, the second epoch, characterized by Western colonial
dominance over Asia, caused much more stress and strain to intercommunity and
intercultural relations. There is no need to repeat that whether it was the
British or the Dutch or the French, colonial policy invariably sought to
"divide and rule” the local population. Thus, Hindus were pitted against
Muslims in British India, the Javanese against the Sumatrans in Dutch Indonesia,
and the Khmers against the Vietnamese in French Indochina. Specific policies in
relation to land, agriculture, employment, the public services, and education
served to widen the chasm between the communities.
There was yet another dimension to colonial policy which also generated negative
consequences for ethnic ties. In Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and the Fijis, among other
countries, the British brought in immigrant labor to work in certain sectors of
the economy and thus created ethnic enclaves, which remained separate and
distinct from the indigenous communities. Because the economic and political
dichotomies which divided the immigrant and indigenous communities were so
severe, the communal problems associated with these two groups have often been
perpetuated into the postcolonial era. [1]
But more than the policy of divide and rule, the greatest disservice that
colonialism did to intercommunity, intercultural and intercivilizational
relations in Asia was to redirect the face of each and every Asian country away
from its neighbor towards the metropolitan power in the West. From the economy
to education, from administration to entertainment, the colonized state was
influenced by, and paid obeisance to the colonial overlord in London, the Hague,
Paris, or Washington. It was not just a question of dependence brought about by
the colonial exploitation of indigenous resources, or economic bondage created
by colonial hegemony. For the colonized, the colonizer became, through coercion
and persuasion, the exemplar par excellence. Laws, institutions of governance,
the mechanics of the market, the school curriculum, the health system, public
transportation, and indeed each and every facet of life derived its guidance and
inspiration from the colonial model. [2]
As a result, the colonized developed a vast corpus of knowledge and information
about the colonizer—his land and history, his culture and geography, his
politics and social mores. A student in colonial Malaysia, as a case in point,
would know much more about English poetry and British history than he would
about Thai music or Indonesian geography. Likewise, it was very likely that a
Filipino living under the aegis of American rule would empathize more readily
with American literature than with Vietnamese literature, even if it had been
translated into the English language. To extend the argument further, an English
educated Hindu in British India would have greater rapport with
Christianity—because it was perceived as Western—than with Islam, which had
millions and millions of adherents in the Indian subcontinent during the height
of colonial rule (compared to a few thousand Christians).
By altering relations between cultures and religions in the Asian neighborhood,
colonialism erected formidable barriers against civilizational dialogue. It
removed the objective conditions—the political, economic and social
imperatives—which would make dialogue a necessity. Since there was no real
relationship with one’s neighbors, there was no compelling need to engage and
interact with them.
Besides, colonialism developed the notion that Asian cultures and communities,
religions and civilizations had little to contribute towards human progress. [3]
It was a notion which became deeply entrenched in the psyche of many Asians,
partly because of the overwhelming power of colonial dominance. Asians began to
believe—as their colonial masters wanted them to—that their cultures and
civilizations had become inert and static. They lacked drive and dynamism.
Indeed, their cultures and civilizations, so they were told, only served to keep
the people in shackles. Asians had to be liberated from their serfdom by Western
civilization.
What this suggests is that the colonial experience created a deep sense of
cultural inferiority in a lot of Asians (Muzaffar). This inferiority complex
became an obstacle to cultural and civilizational dialogue; for if one’s
civilization is bereft of any greatness, how can one take any pride in it? What
is the point of talking to others about one’s civilization if it is devoid of
noble values and outstanding accomplishments? If dialogue is about exchanging
ideas, how can intellectually impoverished civilizations engage in dialogue?
It is significant that while Asians were assailed with doubts about their
cultures and civilizations in the colonial epoch, they seemed to be a little
more certain about the strength and viability of their religions. This is one of
the reasons why in spite of the power and potency of colonial rule in Asia, only
a small minority, in relative terms, embraced Christianity—the Christianity
that came with Western dominance. Apart from the Philippines, no other Asian
country adopted Christianity on a national scale in the colonial period. Only
small percentages of Chinese, Indians, Indonesians, Vietnamese, Thais, and other
Asians became Christians. The vast majority chose to remain Hindu or Buddhist or
Muslim. In fact, very, very few Muslims in particular converted to Christianity
anywhere in Asia.
It is an equally remarkable fact of history that when Asians began to organize
and mobilize the masses to throw off the colonial yoke, many of them turned to
religion to provide them with the inspiration and impetus for their nationalist
struggle. The Arya Samaj and Brahmo Samaj of India, the Sarikat Islam of
Indonesia and the Young Men’s Buddhist Association of Burma would be some
examples. Religion, in other words, was for many Asians the most meaningful
conduit for articulating the quest for freedom, justice, identity, and dignity.
Does this indicate that within Asian civilizations, religions have a special
role? In the dialogue of civilizations, will the religious dimension emerge as
the most significant factor in a continent whose unique attribute is that it is
the birthplace of all the world’s religions? These are some of the questions
we will try to answer in the latter part of the essay. For now, we shall turn to
the third epoch.
"It
is significant that while Asians were assailed with doubts about their cultures
and civilizations in the colonial epoch, they seemed to be a little more certain
about the strength and viability of their religions.”
Sources
Muzaffar,
Chandra. "Cultures Under Attack” ISIS Focus, Kuala Lumpur: Institute
of Strategic and International Studies, 1997, Issue no. 144 7/1997.
Endnotes
[1]
Some aspects of the communal problem in post-colonial societies are covered in
many of K.M. De Silva’s writings. See, for instance, his Reaping the
Whirlwind, India: Penguin Books, 1998.
[2]
For a study of the impact of Western colonial dominance upon Asia see K.M.
Panikkar’s Asia and Western Dominance, Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press,
1993.
[3]
The marginalization of non-Western cultures in the colonial epoch is analyzed in
Edward W. Said’s Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
The
Contemporary Epoch
The
third epoch, or the contemporary epoch, begins with the end of formal colonial
rule in 1946. That was the year Indonesia proclaimed its independence from the
Dutch. For the last four decades or so, most of Asia has been independent, in
the legal and constitutional sense. Has independence resulted in intercultural
and intercivilizational dialogue among Asian communities and religions? Is there
greater interest in, and commitment towards, developing better understanding
among the myriad religions and civilizations of Asia?
There is certainly much more interaction among Asian governments today than in
the colonial or the autochthonous epochs. This is a product of a growing
realization among the continent’s political elites that their nations’
destinies are closely intertwined and that they must endeavor to cultivate good,
neighborly relations, however immense the odds. It is out of this awareness that
a multicivilizational regional grouping like the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) has managed to sustain itself. [1] It comprises all the 10
states of Southeast Asia—Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore,
Brunei, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Burma. ASEAN, at least in terms of
its background, embodies 5 religious civilizations—Buddhist, Christian,
Confucian, Hindu and Muslim. There is also the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) consisting of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives and, in a sense, reflecting the religious
diversity of the region, with its Hindu, Muslim Buddhist, Christian and Sikh
populations. The former has been far more viable than the latter as a regional
organization.
If governmental ties have expanded within regions and between regions in the
Asian continent, it is largely because of trade and economics. There is much
more intra-ASEAN trade today, for instance, than 10 years ago. With increasing
business ties comes exchange in the technological and educational spheres, and
even in the cultural arena. Independent of this exchange, has been the
continuous interaction among Asians in the field of sports and, to a much lesser
extent, in the entertainment sector.
In spite of this upward trend in intra-Asian ties, it is undeniably true that
there have been very few attempts by Asian governments or entrepreneurs or
universities or cultural elites to consciously focus upon inter-civilizational
understanding. There are only a handful of universities within ASEAN, for
instance, that offer courses related to intercivilizational or even
intercultural and interreligious issues. [2] Religious and cultural
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may espouse causes connected with a
particular religious and cultural community but seldom engage in serious
interreligious or intercultural dialogue. Governments, even when they are
presiding over heterogeneous societies, may provide support to the religious or
cultural activities of a particular group but have not been known to be active,
enthusiastic patrons of intercivilizational dialogue—with one or two
exceptions which we shall discuss later.
Why is this so? Perhaps the most important reason is the global system that
prevails today and the process that is conterminous with it, namely,
globalization. Globalization is, in a sense, a process that has grown out of the
colonial epoch. If, as we have seen under colonialism, individual Western powers
dominated and controlled Asian societies, thus crippling the development of
their potential and circumscribing the scope for interstate, intercultural
exchange, today, there are global centers of power and global elites located
mainly in the West, exercising tremendous influence over the direction of the
global economy, global politics, and global culture. [3] Once again, their
overwhelming power has stifled and suffocated the capacity of Asian
civilizations to identify and articulate ideas and values from their own
heritage and to present them as the bases for dialogue and mutual understanding.
Unlike the colonial past, these new centers of power and new elites are not just
linked to nation-states like the United States of America—the world’s only
superpower—but are also connected to international institutions such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to
transnational corporations (TNCs) and money markets (Alexander).
It is the TNCs and the money markets that set the tone and tenor of the global
economy and indeed of most domestic economies. 500 corporations, for instance,
account for 70 per cent of world trade. Many small and middling economies in the
South are very dependent upon TNCs for investments, technology, skills, and,
most of all, market reach. If the WTO succeeds in pushing its investment agenda,
TNCs will be able to exercise even greater control over national economies,
since there would be hardly any restrictions on their right to expand domestic
operations or to repatriate profits (Korten). Likewise, currency trading now
dominates global financial transactions. Only two to three percent of
transactions are connected directly to real commerce and industry. Currency
trading, on the other hand, which is indistinguishable from sheer speculation,
runs to something like 1.5 trillion dollars a day. This is almost equivalent to
the total annual output of the German economy or to four times total world
expenditure on crude oil. [4] The volume and value of speculative capital has
become so huge that no economy today can insulate itself from money markets and
their operations.
What this means is that there is very little room for independent economic
initiatives. And yet scope for autonomous action and organization is important
for economic globalization carries with it practices, attitudes, and values that
are diametrically antithetical to some of the cardinal principles and precepts
contained in most religious philosophies. The incessant drive to produce and to
expand production, often stimulated by the constant titillation of the senses
through seductive advertisements—a feature of TNC operations—is at variance
with the Buddhist and Muslim ethic of restraint and self-control. Similarly, the
consumer culture, so much a part of contemporary capitalism, would not harmonize
with either Hinduism or Christianity or any of the other religions with their
emphasis upon limiting our wants and desires. Neither would religion approve of
the pronounced materialistic thrust of economic globalization. Since economic
globalization seeks to deregulate, liberalize. and privatize in order to allow
for the untrammeled flow of capital and the unbridled accumulation of wealth, it
would run contrary to the moral teachings of all great faiths, which have always
admonished those who are obsessed with the possession of riches. In Islam, as in
Judaism, it is the equitable distribution of wealth and the alleviation of
poverty that are regarded as acts of piety. Economic globalization, in contrast,
has resulted in both the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few and the
widening of disparities between rich and poor. [5]
There is yet another characteristic of economic globalization that would go
against the grain of religion. The preponderant power of speculative capital in
today’s economy—which had prompted an economist to describe the present
phase of capitalism as casino capitalism—[6]would be condemned by Islam and
Christianity on the one hand, and Hinduism and Buddhism on the other. In Islam,
for instance, money is a medium of exchange, not a commodity to speculate upon
or gamble with. [7]
By showing how economic globalization violates some of our most fundamental
moral and spiritual values, one is not denying that certain countries where the
rituals of Buddhism and Confucianism are widely practiced also tend to promote
and propagate casino capitalism. After all, East Asian and Southeast Asian
"Has the preoccupation with civil and political liberties served to sideline
economic, social, and cultural rights?”
countries
such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are acknowledged as important digits
in the global economy. And it is true that sections of the populace in other
parts of Asia have also benefited from economic globalization. But this has
happened only because they have adjusted to the demands and dictates of
globalization without any regard for some of the contrarian values and
principles in their religious and cultural philosophies.
How does political globalization fare in relation to spiritual and moral values
found in religion? The rapid spread of the democratic form of government with
the emphasis upon human rights, in particular civil and political liberties,
periodic elections, multi-party competition, and peaceful, orderly change has
been one of the most remarkable developments of our time. On the whole, the
triumph of democracy as a global phenomenon in the wake of the end of the cold
war, has been a boon to humankind, including the people of Asia.
Nonetheless, democracy as interpreted by the forces of globalization, has also
marginalized certain ideas and notions of governance associated with Asian
spiritual traditions. Has the preoccupation with civil and political liberties
served to sideline economic, social, and cultural rights?[8] Wouldn’t a more
holistic vision of rights make more sense, both from the standpoint of the
concept of the human being in some of our philosophies and from the perspective
of the realities in Asian societies, where economic rights such as the right to
food, social rights such as the right to education and cultural rights such as
the right to study one’s mother tongue are as basic as freedom of expression
and assembly? Equally vital, isn’t it true that in almost every Asian
philosophy, be it Confucianism or Hinduism, rights cannot be separated from
responsibilities? [9] Are responsibilities given any weight at all in
globalization’s democracy? In like manner, by making the individual and
individual freedom the foundation of a just and fair society, has political
globalization downplayed the communitarian dimension, which figures so
prominently in the value systems of various Asian societies? Does inter-party
competition and the significance attached to partisan politics transgress the
principle of unity in Islam and other religions, since unity within the
community is rooted in the concept of Divine Unity?
The gist of the matter is this: if it were not for globalization and its push
for partisan politics and elections, would Asian societies have evolved
alternative forms of governance? Would institutions have emerged that were more
representative of values such as consultation and consensus, harmony and
integration? Since these and other such values are shared by a number of
cultures—Thai, Javanese, and Malay to name a few—would they have provided a
basis for intercivilizational dialogue in a world that did not have to face the
challenge of globalization? There are, of course, other perhaps more important
issues that political globalization has brought to the fore, which are not
really within the purview of this essay. For instance, how can the advocates of
democracy espouse the cause of human rights and political freedoms within the
sphere of domestic politics and yet ignore the palpably undemocratic, unjust
global structures which deny representation and participation to the vast
majority of humankind, including the citizens of Asia? (Falk)
From political globalization we turn to cultural globalization. In a sense, the
impact of cultural globalization has been much more penetrative and much more
pervasive than either political globalization or economic globalization. Over
the last three or four decades in particular, television programs, films,
videos, comics, and cartoons, apart from music, drama, and dance forms mainly
from the United States have found eager ears and eyes in the remotest corners of
the earth. The international fame of top Hollywood and CNN personalities is
proof of how ubiquitous American culture is. Add to this Coca-Cola and
McDonalds, t-shirts, and Reebok shoes and one will get some idea of how America
has conquered the world. [10]
The preeminence of American culture it should, however, be emphasized, has not
resulted in the extermination or even the marginalization of other cultures.
Hindi movies, as a case in point, like their Hong Kong counterparts, remain as
popular as ever. Japanese, Chinese, and Indian cuisine are relished by American
and British palates. Women in the capital cities of Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Vietnam continue to don their traditional attire. In other words, American films
and fast foods may have a global reach but they are not the only fare in town.
The issue is not whether facets of other cultures will survive in the midst of
American driven globalization. The real question is whether underlying values
and norms are beginning to change as a consequence of the cumulative, continuous
impact of American television and media, in particular, and the popular
projection of an American way of life in general. Is stark American
individualism, for instance, beginning to take root in parts of urban Asia? Are
family relationships beginning to change, as the young in certain Asian cities
imitate American kids on television in their brusque behavior towards their
parents and elders? Is the increasing preoccupation with sensate pleasures
within segments of the urban middle-class in Asia also due to the influence of
the American media, specifically television? Or, are the changes that are
occurring the inevitable consequence of other more fundamental transformations
that are taking place in the economy and the social structure of various Asian
countries and not because of cultural globalization per se?
Whatever the real reasons, it is quite apparent that time-tested values
connected with individual, family, and community in Asian cultures and religions
are being challenged in the present epoch. Since values such as the primacy
accorded to family relationships are so central to Confucianism, Hinduism, and
Islam, among other religions, one wonders whether the changes that are happening
will erode yet another principle of living that could have provided a basis for
intercivilizational communication.
The political, economic, and cultural dimensions of globalization, which we have
analyzed, and other aspects of the process that we have not discussed, taken
together, represent an overwhelmingly powerful system. To reiterate, it is a
system which emerged from Western colonial dominance but whose impact, influence
and authority is much greater than the power exercised by individual colonial
powers. Modern communication technologies have undoubtedly played a big part in
facilitating this. It is a truism that without television, the computer, and the
Internet, globalization would not have become such a powerful phenomenon. Since
the computer revolution is a product of scientific and technological
advancements associated with the United States, one can understand why that
country is in the forefront of globalization.
But technology alone cannot explain the power of globalization. The ideas and
instruments of globalization—whether it is individual freedom or the
Internet—have an appeal of their own. Besides, as we have noted, it is a
process that has brought some benefits to sections of humanity.
This is why globalization, unlike colonialism, is not perceived as dominance and
oppression in some quarters. The centers of power and the elites in the West
have succeeded in making it appear as if it is integral to development and
progress. But not everyone is convinced. A lot of people in Asia, and elsewhere,
know that globalization has not only marginalized the poor and powerless but it
has also, as we have shown, subordinated non-Western civilizations, their ideas
and ideals, their values and visions (Falk). This has now provoked a reaction in
a number of Asian societies.
Sources
Alexander,
Titus. Unraveling Global Apartheid, Britain: Polity Press, 1996.
Falk,
Richard. Human Rights Horizons, New York/London: Routledge, 2000.
Predatory
Globalization, New York/London: Routledge, 2000.
Korten,
David C. When Corporations Rule the World, USA: Kumarian Press, 1995.
Endnotes
[1] ASEAN’s viability is examined in ASEAN Towards 2020: Strategic Goals
and Future Directions Stephen Leong, Ed. Kuala Lumpur: ISIS Malaysia, 1998.
[2]
The Center for Civilizational Dialogue at the University of Malaya is one of
them. Established in March 1997, the Center offers undergraduate and
postgraduate programs aimed at enhancing understanding of the primary issues
involved in civilizational dialogue in the age of globalization.
[3]
The dark side of globalization is brought to the fore in Richard Falk’s Predatory
Globalization: A Critique, USA: Polity Press, 1999.
[4]
See Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, The Global Trap : Globalization
and the Assault on Prosperity and Democracy, London: Zed Books, 1997.
[5]
See Chandra Muzaffar’s "Globalization and Religion: Some Reflections in
Globalization: the Perspectives and Experiences of the Religious Traditions of
Asia Pacific” Joseph A. Camilleri & Chandra Muzaffar, eds. Petaling
Jaya: International Movement for a Just World, 1998. See also Chandra
Muzaffar’s "The Global Rich and the Global Poor: Seeking the Middle
Path” Commentary in Petaling Jaya: International Movement for Just World,
No. 40, New Series, September 2000.
[6]
This is the term popularized by Susan Strange in Casino Capitalism,
Manchester: University Press, 1997.
[7]
This is discussed in Chandra Muzaffar’s The Economic Crisis’
Rights, Religion and Reform, London: Curzon 2001.
[8]
Asian perspectives on human rights are put forth in Debating Human Rights:
Critical Essays from the United States and Asia, Peter Van Ness, ed. London:
Routledge, 1999.
[9]
This point was lucidly articulated by Mahatma Gandhi decades ago. See his
comment in UNESCO, Human Rights: Comments and Interpretations, London:
Allan Wingate, 1949.
[10]
There is some discussion of this trend in Cess J. Hamelink’s Trends in
World Communication, Penang: Southbound/Third World Network, 1994.
Reaction
We
are concerned with a specific aspect of the reaction to globalization—namely,
the perception that it is a threat to civilizational identity and integrity. And
it is a particular type of reaction that we shall focus upon.
While there have been varied reactions to the challenge to civilizational
identity, it is those who have chosen to re-assert their own identity in an
exclusive manner that will be the subject of our analysis. This exclusive
reassertion of identity is taking place in a number of countries. In India it
has taken the form of Hindu revivalism; in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia,
there is Islamic revivalism; and in Sri Lanka there is Buddhist revivalism.
Let us clarify, at the outset, that revivalism in all these countries is not due
entirely to globalization or even to Western colonial dominance. The failure of
so-called secular elites and secular ideologies to overcome the challenge of
poverty and destitution among the masses; corruption and abuse of power at the
apex of society; political repression and authoritarianism; and latent or
manifest antagonism towards the Other within one’s milieu, have all
contributed towards religious revivalism.[1] Globalization is a factor insofar
as its dominant power—which mirrors Western hegemony—is seen as a formidable
obstacle to the revivalist desire to build an alternative culture and
civilization that is authentic, that is rooted in one’s own tradition and
patrimony.[2]
This explains why in India, the Hindu revivalists (together with other groups)
have been battling some of the symbols of globalization—Kentucky Fried Chicken
and McDonalds outlets, Kelloggs cereals firm, and Coca-Cola corporation. They
have also sought to protect Indian interests in the face of the WTO’s
intellectual property rights regime. Even the participation of Hindu girls in
beauty pageants, viewed as demeaning to the religion, was proof of the negative
side of globalization. For Islamic revivalists in Malaysia, on the other hand,
pornography on the Net and the propagation of "yellow culture” are among the
adverse consequences of globalization that have to be repelled and resisted.
They have also been critical of WTO’s investment rules, which are detrimental
to the interests of developing nations.
However, it is not on issues related to the economic and cultural dimensions of
globalization that revivalist thinking is a problem, it is in their
understanding of, and approach to their own tradition and how they should relate
to the Other that the revivalists seem to falter. The Hindu revivalists, for
instance, emphasize rituals and symbols connected with their religion. Building
a temple, resurrecting an ancient rite, or ensuring that a certain ritual is
meticulously observed, would be the essence of faith for the revivalists. At the
same time, they are determined to rewrite Indian history, purportedly to give
Hinduism its legitimate place. This is part of the attempt to right the wrongs
allegedly committed against the Hindus by Muslims, Christians, and other enemies
of the religion. Since the mainstay of the ruling coalition in India is a Hindu
revivalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the revivalists are in a
position to implement at least a part of their agenda.
Not unexpectedly, the activities of the BJP and the revivalists have generated
some apprehension among the large Muslim and small Christian minorities. The
destruction of India’s oldest mosque, the Babri mosque, in Delhi in 1992 was
an example of the zealotry that the revivalists had unleashed .[3] The religious
riots that followed the Babri incident, first in Delhi then in Bombay, which
claimed thousands of lives, revealed in all their ugliness the threat that
religious fanaticism posed to Indian society. Muslim fears about Hindu
communalism are shared to some extent by the Christians. A couple of dastardly
killings of Christians, allegedly by Hindus, have only aggravated their sense of
insecurity.
Religious revivalism of this sort with its pronounced antipathy towards the
Other, obviously does not help interfaith or intercivilizational dialogue. If
anything, it widens the gulf between the communities. Unfortunately, this is
what is also happening in Pakistan, where fanatical elements within the Muslim
majority have been utterly callous in their attitude towards the Christian and
Hindu minorities and in Sri Lanka, where a small group of Buddhist monks are in
the forefront of a chauvinistic movement to constrict further the rights of the
Tamil minority.
In Malaysia, the situation is somewhat different. The Islamic revivalists are,
on the whole, more accommodative in their approach to the non-Muslim minorities,
compared to most other countries in the region. But then the minorities
constitute almost 40 per cent of the population. The revivalists profess an
interest in dialoging with them though it appears from the meetings that have
taken place that they are only keen on propagating their version of an Islamic
state to the non-Muslims. They have yet to appreciate the simple fact that the
quintessence of dialogue is listening and learning. [4] Listening to the
other’s story and learning from their experience.
The track record of the revivalists in different Asian settings demonstrates
that when groups return to religion and re-assert their identity, it need not
lead to more amicable inter-community relations. On the contrary, it can even
make the situation much worse especially if there are other conditions present
that portend towards conflict.
Endnotes
[1]
Religious revivalism in the context of Islam in Malaysia is the subject of
Chandra Muzaffar’s book Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, Petaling Jaya:
Fajar Bakti, 1987.
[2]
The problem of identity in contemporary society is studied in Ziauddin
Sardar’s Postmodernism and the Other, London/Chicago/Illinois: Pluto
Press, 1998.
[3]
See several articles in Communique, Hong Kong: ARENA, 1993, Nos 19 &
20, November 1993, for a study of communal politics arising from the Babri
incident.
[4]
This is a view that has been well expressed by Leonard Swindler in "The Age of
Global Dialogue,” Prajna Vihara, Bangkok: Assumption University, The
Journal of Philosophy and Religion, Vol. no. 2 July-December 2001.
The
Alternative
While
there are religious groups that are exclusive and communal, there are others,
which we have alluded to, that are genuinely committed to interfaith,
intercivilizational dialogue. They may be few and far between, but because they
are inclusive and universal in outlook, they hold the key to intercivilizational
understanding and empathy in the future.
There are two important characteristics about these groups and the individuals
associated with them. Apart from their inclusive attitude, they also seek to
focus upon the substantive, as against the symbolic dimension of religion. For
them, justice and freedom, love and compassion, equality and integrity, modesty
and humility, restraint and discipline, and the efforts to translate these
fundamental values, into laws, policies, and institutions constitute the essence
of faith (Muzaffar). This does not mean that they do not appreciate the role of
forms and symbols, rituals and practices in religion, they do: but they realize
that the meaning and message behind a symbol or ritual is what endows it with
strength and vitality.
Because their approach is inclusive and the values they espouse are not only
universal but also identifiable with other religious communities, these groups
and individuals will be completely at ease with intercivilizational dialogue. In
almost every country in Asia, there are groups like this, though their influence
is limited. Among the leading lights of religious universalism—as against
religious revivalism—in Asia today would be Swami Agnivesh of India,
Ariyaratne of Sri Lanka, Nurcholis Madjid of Indonesia, and Bishop Labayan of
the Philippines. Though these four individuals come from different religious
backgrounds, they speak the same global language—of a God who belongs to all
and yet to none; of the human being as God’s trustee with the sacred
responsibility of advocating what is right and prohibiting what is wrong; of
universal, perennial values as the foundation of an ethical society; and of
rights, responsibilities, roles, and relationships shaped by these values that
provide human life with harmony and equilibrium.
The alternative visions [1] of these and other individuals resonate with the
outlook of a couple of Asian political leaders who realize the importance of
civilizational dialogue. The former deputy prime minister of Malaysia Anwar
Ibrahim, for instance, initiated a dialogue between Islam and Confucianism in
1995. No high-level government leader in Malaysia before him had undertaken such
a task[2]. Anwar argues eloquently that "The primary motive of civilizational
dialogue must be a global convivencia, a harmonious and enriching experience of
living together among people of diverse religions and cultures. To enter a more
meaningful stage of engagement between Asia and the West, it must be an
encounter between equals, between cherished ideals and values that will serve to
challenge our pride and end our prejudices” (Ibrahim).
The other Asian leader who has been in the forefront of intercivilizational
dialogue is, of course, the President of Iran Mohammed Khatami. It was he who
proposed that the UN declare 2001 as the year of the dialogue of civilizations.
Displaying an intimate grasp of the issues involved in civilizational dialogue,
he observed in a lecture to the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1997:
With
the terrible gap between the rich and the poor in various communities and
countries of the world, how can we naively call for peace and mutual
understanding? How can we call for dialogue if this inequality persists and
if no fundamental steps are taken to help the deprived peoples of the world?
On the threshold of the third millennium, the destiny of our world is common
for all. For this destiny to be a just and happy one, the only course of
action is a dialogue among various cultures and civilizations. We should
remember that although in the twentieth century the sword held sway, and
some people won and others lost with each sweep of its blade the next
century should revolve around dialogue. Otherwise, this sword will reemerge
as a two-edged weapon that will spare no one, and it is quite possible that
the mighty warmongers will be among its first victims. (Khatami)
At
the beginning of the third millennium. In the year of civilizational dialogue,
it is apparent that there are governments, NGOs, and individuals who are deeply
committed to the noble goal of bringing people of different religions, cultures,
and civilizations closer together on the basis of shared universal spiritual and
moral values. But there are impediments; the global system is one of them and
exclusive, communal attitudes within religious and cultural communities is
another.[3] However, the realities that challenge all of us—more and more
societies are becoming ethnically heterogeneous; nations everywhere are becoming
more and more interdependent—leave us with no choice. Either we dialogue with
one another or we die together. That is the promise and the peril.
Sources:
Ibrahim,
Anwar. The Asian Renaissance, Singapore/Kuala Lumpur: Times Books
International, 1996, p.45.
Khatami,
Mohammad. Islam, Dialogue, and Civil Society, Canberra: Centre for Arab
and Islamic Studies, The Australian National University, 2000, p 34.
Muzaffar,
Chandra. Religion in Asia Pacific Region: the Challenge Without; the Change
Within Religion and Culture in Asia Pacific: Violence or Healing? Joseph A.
Camilleri, ed. Melbourne: Vista Publications, 2001.
ENDNOTES
[1]
An incisive analysis of alternative spiritual visions of this sort can be found
in Fred Dallmayr’s Alternative Visions: Paths in the Global Village,
Lanhan/Boulder/New York/Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998.
[2]
Though Anwar initiated the dialogue, the government has not kept it going. This
is one of the consequences of his incarceration since September 1998. He was
convicted on two separate charges of sodomy and interference with the course of
justice in connection with allegations of sexual misconduct and is now serving a
15 year jail term. His imprisonment is regarded domestically and internationally
as a politically motivated act, aimed at persecuting a political leader who had
committed the mortal sin of challenging his chief, the long serving Prime
Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad.
[3]
The question of religion and globalization is examined in a comprehensive manner
in Richard Falk’s Religion and Humane Global Governance, New York:
Palgrave, 2001.
*This
paper was originally published on www.islam21.net.
**
Chandra
Muzaffar is the
President of the International Movement for a Just World, which seeks to raise
public awareness of the moral and intellectual basis of global justice. A
political scientist, he was the first Director of the Centre for Civilisational
Dialogue at the University of Malaya and has also written numerous books on
religion, human rights, Malaysian politics, and international relations,
including most recently, Rights, Religion, and Reform (Routledge Curzon, 2002.)
Additionally, he sits on the boards of several international non-governmental
organizations concerned with social justice and civilizational dialogue.
Source: IslamOnline.net, 5 July 2005
http://www.islamonline.net/English/artculture/2005/07/article01.shtml
Remembering The Orly Attack
