The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and its status has been one of the key issues in the Turkish-Greek relations since the Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923. Although the treaty itself provided in clear terms the status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, this ancient institution has continued to be a matter of concern for both Ankara and Athens. The Lausanne Agreement may have established a final territorial settlement between Turkey and Greece.[1] However, the problems stemming from the implementation of the exchange of populations and treatment of Turkish and Greek Orthodox minorities in Greece and Turkey respectively strained relations to the extent that even actual military clash could not be ruled out. This atmosphere of strained relations in the 1923-1930 period had its impact on the Patriarchate as well, especially over the election of patriarchs. Only after Turkey and Greece reconciled in the 1930s, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate ceased to be a major issue between the two countries.

The period under examination in this study is the interwar period. The interwar period in the Turkish-Greek relations provides a good case for understanding the direction of the relationship between the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the Turkish-Greek relations in general. Between 1923 and 1930, Ankara and Athens could not reconcile especially over the implementation of the exchange of populations. The main issue that could not be solved was the valuation of property that was left behind by the Turkish and Greek Orthodox exchanges. The negotiations over the just and acceptable valuation over such property continued for seven years. In this interval, the Turkish-Greek intransigence had its impact on the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, too. Only after Turkish and Greek governments signed two sets of treaties in June and October 1930 and ushered in a period of rapprochement between the two countries, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate could enjoy a relatively tranquil life.

The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in the 1923-1930 period

During the Lausanne negotiations, the Turkish delegation declared that the new Turkish regime did not want to see the Patriarchate in the country. It demanded that the Patriarchate be removed from Turkey.[2]  The Ankara government believed that the Patriarchate was a center of political agitation against the nationalist forces in Anatolia during 1919-1922. On 1 November 1922, the Turkish parliament in Ankara had abolished the sultanate. However, the caliphate was not terminated at that time. Though without political power, the caliphate was a symbolic religious institution. As a matter of fact, the Turkish delegation would remind representatives of other powers of this action in order to strengthen its bargaining position. The Turkish negotiators also attempted to link the matter of the Patriarchate with the fate of the Greek Orthodox population of Istanbul. If this community wanted to remain in the city, the Patriarchate should be removed somewhere else.[3]

After due deliberations, it was finally decided that the Patriarchate would remain in Istanbul with the stipulation that it would stay out of politics and engage itself with religious matters only.[4] This arrangement did not, however, "set the Cross and Crescent in Constantinople on an entirely harmonious basis.”[5] In fact, Meletios IV, the Patriarch, continued to be a source of conflict in Istanbul.[6] Eventually, on 10 July 1923, he left Istanbul. The ostensible reason was bad health, but, as an American military intelligence report suggested, he must have feared for his life, and the Greek government, especially Venizelos, wanted him to leave.[7] Also, it was reported that in June 1923 he was attacked by a group of Istanbul Greeks and narrowly escaped serious injury.[8] On the day following his departure, the governing body of the Patriarchate issued a statement of principles, stating that it abandoned its political and administrative activities and the privileges the clergy had enjoyed under the old regime.[9]

Gregorios VII succeeded Meletios IV on 13 December 1923, but his election was not without trouble. Papa Eftim, the head of the Turkish Orthodox Church,[10] staged a rather vociferous opposition to the election of Gregorios VII.[11] In the first months of his term in office, Gregorios had to deal with Papa Eftim, who occupied the Phanar and called on Gregorios to resign.[12] Eventually upon the orders from Ankara, Turkish authorities in Istanbul expelled Papa Eftim from the Phanar and restored it to its normal occupants.[13]

In the meantime, the Turkish government abolished the caliphate in March 1924. Therefore, some segments of the Turkish press demanded that the Patriarchate should be suppressed as well.[14] Nonetheless, the Turkish government left Gregorios alone and the Patriarch "achieved the feat, equaled by few of his predecessors in his holy office, of dying in harness”[15] on 16 November 1924. On 17 December, Constantine Arapoglou succeeded him.[16]

Meanwhile, the etablis question was not resolved, yet. The etablis question was one of the most serious problems that the Mixed Exchange Commission[17] had faced since the beginning of the implementation of the exchange. Article 2 of the exchange convention of 30 January 1923 stated that the Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace and Greek Orthodox residents of Istanbul would be considered as etablis, and these persons would not be subject to the exchange.

The difference between the Turkish and Greek interpretations of etablis brought about a very serious crisis between Ankara and Athens, and the issue was resolved completely only in June 1930. The Turkish delegates on the Mixed Commission maintained that etablis implied that this status would be determined according to Turkish domestic law. For those who had come to Istanbul after the Mudros armistice to be considered as etablis, they should have registered with the Istanbul authorities.  But the Greek delegates rejoined that there was no reference to Turkish laws whatsoever in the exchange convention.[18] Basically, the Greek argument was that those Greek Orthodox persons had come to Istanbul with the purpose of establishing themselves there. The fact that they did not register with the Istanbul authorities should not damage their status as etablis. The matter was discussed at length in the Mixed Commission, which finally referred it to the legal committee of the commission in September 1924. Yet, no agreement was reached.[19] Therefore the Mixed Commission referred the matter to the League of Nations, which on 13 December 1924 asked the PCIJ to provide for an advisory opinion.[20] The PCIJ was to issue its opinion in February 1925.

On 16 December 1924, Constantine Arapoglou and two other candidates for the patriarchate were warned by the Turkish police that they were exchangeable subjects under the exchange convention, and were taken to the mixed sub-commission, which was requested to issue the necessary documents for them to leave Istanbul.[21]

The Turkish authorities argued that Constantine had been the Metropolitan of Derkos at the time of his election as Patriarch. He was born in Sigi, Anatolia, and resided in Erdek when the Mudros armistice was signed. It was not until 1924 that he had gone to Istanbul. The Greek Orthodox residents of Erdek were obviously subject to the exchange. Therefore he was an exchangeable, too. The Greek side countered that first of all the question of birthplace was irrelevant. Secondly, Constantine had actually been established in Istanbul since 1902 and his residence in Erdek was temporary. Finally, he was an official of the Patriarchate and therefore established in Istanbul.[22]  Macartney argued that "[t]he crux of the matter lay, however, in the fact that similar objections could be raised against all except three of the Greek Metropolitans; whereas Canonical law demanded that the Patriarch be elected by the Holy Synod of twelve Metropolitans. If, therefore, Turkey proposed to expel all Metropolitans who were exchangeable subjects, this would be tantamount in fact, if not in theory, to abolishing the Patriarchate.”[23]

The Istanbul sub-commission declined to give a decision on this matter on 16 December. It referred the matter to the Mixed Commission and requested the governor of Istanbul to leave the Patriarch at liberty.[24] As Admiral Bristol wrote to Washington:

Judging by past experience, neither side expects that the Commission of the League of Nations will make a clear-cut decision on such a controversial issue. In a probable effort to force the Commission’s hands, the Turkish authorities have announced that if the Patriarch has not been exchanged with a reasonable time, steps will be taken for his expulsion. The Greeks, who are in a less satisfactory strategic position, are trying to have this problem submitted to the Court of Arbitration at the Hague.[25]

The Mixed Commission delivered its decision on 28 January 1925 in the absence of its Greek members, which in effect endorsed the Turkish position:

The Mixed Commission, while noting the facts contained in the report of the Sixth Sub-Committee, No. 2360, dated December 17^th, 1924, in regard to the possibility of exchanging Mgr. Constantine Arapoglou, former Metropolitan of Dercos, according to which Mgr. Constantine Arapoglou, having been born in Asia Minor and having gone to Constantinople after October 30^th, 1918, fulfilled in his person all the conditions necessary for the purpose of the exchange, holds that it is beyond its competence to take a decision in regard to the case of this ecclesiastic in view of the fact that he is a Metropolitan.[26]

On 30 January, the Turkish authorities expelled the Patriarch from Turkey.[27] He arrived in Salonica on 1 February. The frustration in Athens was very deep and was shared by the religious communities of the other Orthodox countries, as well as by the Anglican Church.[28] George Exindaris, one of the Greek members of the Mixed Commission, resigned.[29] The archbishop of Athens telegraphed the heads of all the religious communities in Europe and America and requested their intervention.[30]

An exchange of notes and declarations between the Turkish and Greek governments began.[31] The Turkish case was simply that the Patriarch was exchangeable and therefore he had to be exchanged. The Turkish government was carrying out a decision taken by the Mixed Commission by expelling Arapoglou.[32] The Greek government claimed that the Lausanne treaty provided that the Patriarchate would remain in Istanbul, and it consisted of the Patriarch himself and other religious dignitaries. Therefore, by expelling the Patriarch, the Turkish government violated the Lausanne treaty.[33]

The details of the rest of the exchange of notes between the Turkish and Greek governments will not be discussed here.[34] What is significant here is that the Turkish insistence on legitimizing the expulsion of Constantine Arapoglou on the grounds that he was exchangeable seems to be related with its stand on the etablis question which was still unresolved. If an exchangeable metropolitan was elected Patriarch and the Turkish government did not prevent, or at least protest this action, it could set a precedent for other members of the Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul whose status as etablis was not decided, yet. As a matter of fact, Ankara had demanded for the expulsion of other members of the Holy Synod whom it argued to be exchangeables as well.[35] Therefore, Turkish maneuver of approaching the members of the Holy Synod and telling them that if they chose a non-exchangeable Patriarch it would grant them the non-exchangeable status appears to be consistent with its policy on the whole etablis question.[36] Although initially the Holy Synod and the Greek government did not respond favorably to the Turkish overtures, finally both gave in and on 19 May Constantine Arapoglou announced his abdication.[37] On 13 July, Vasil Georgiadis was elected as the new Patriarch, and the Patriarchate resumed its normal functions.[38]

Alexis Alexandris argued that Turkish action was a compromise and he attributed this to several factors, such as Ankara’s occupation with the Sheikh Said revolt in Eastern Anatolia, and foreign policy concerns like Mosul and Alexandretta.[39] However, as he himself admits it was also a gain for Ankara because it delivered a severe blow to the prestige of the Patriarchate.[40] Besides, Ankara did not let a person whom it saw as exchangeable occupy the Patriarchate seat.

Turkish-Greek Reconciliation of 1930 and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate

In this section, the effect of the Turkish-Greek rapprochement over the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate will be examined. First, the immediate effect just after the treaties were signed in June and October 1930 will be discussed. Then, two cases in the post-1930 period will be analyzed as to show how the favorable atmosphere that was created by the reconciliation could prevent the Turkish and Greek governments from letting the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate strain their relations. The first case is the Turkish ban on the costumes of clergy of all religious denominations. And the second case is a patriarchal election in 1936. It will be argued that these two events might have easily troubled relations between Turkey and Greece in the pre-rapprochement years. However, once the two neighbors reconciled, they did not let Patriarchate-related problems spoil their friendly relations.  Especially the Greek political circles took up a cautious stance and refrained from inflammatory political discourses that could jeopardize Greece’s friendly relations with Turkey.

Turkey and Greece had signed the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. However, this did not put an end to the Turkish-Greek disagreements. Especially differences over the implementation of the exchange convention strained the bilateral relations to a great extent. Turkey and Greece continued to negotiate over the exchange-related matters for seven more years, and eventually in June 1930 they signed the Ankara Agreement which established a final and definite settlement between Ankara and Athens on the whole exchange episode. In October 1930, Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek champion of the Turkish-Greek rapprochement, paid an official visit to the Turkish capital in order to sign treaties on political and economic cooperation. The treaties were signed on 30 October 1930, and a new page in the history of Turkish-Greek relations had been opened.

During Venizelos’ visit to Ankara in October 1930, the Patriarchate had come to the fore again. Even before the visit took place, Venizelos had faced a rather delicate situation about whether he should visit the Phanar or not during his stay in Turkey.[41] Venizelos before his departure announced that he could not traverse Istanbul without calling on the Patriarch, and if he did so he feared that some misunderstanding could have arisen, which he intended to prevent by not going to Istanbul at all.[42] Upon this, the Turkish government sent him a friendly communication saying that a visit to the Patriarch would be acceptable to Ankara and that there was no need of remaining away from Istanbul on that account. So it was arranged that on the Greek Prime Minister’s return from Ankara, he would stop by at Istanbul and pay a visit to the Phanar.[43]

Venizelos came to Ankara in October 1930 and signed with Turkish leaders very important treaties that heralded a new page in the Turkish-Greek relations. This visit also gave Turkish and Greek leaders an opportunity to discuss the future of the Patriarchate. Ifigenia Anastasiadou argued that Venizelos in fact believed that the question of the Patriarchate was but one of the issues in Turkish-Greek relations, and when these relations got better, the Patriarchate question would disappear automatically as a thorn in the relations between Turkey and his country.[44] Mustafa Kemal’s reply to the Patriarch Fotios’ letter congratulating the Turkish President for the seventh anniversary of the promulgation of the republic in Turkey provides some evidence to support Venizelos’ beliefs: Mustafa Kemal addressed the Patriarch as "Mr. Fotios, Patriarch of Orthodox in Phanar”.[45] Previously, the patriarch was dubbed as "Başpapas.”[46]

On 1 November, on his way back from Ankara to Athens Venizelos stopped by at Istanbul and called on Fotios II, the Patriarch as it was previously arranged.[47] This was the first time that a Greek Prime Minister visited the Phanar. Alexandris observed that "with the prevalence of détente, however, a meeting in the Phanar between the head of the Greek Orthodox Church and the leader of the Greek state no longer carried an ominous significance.”[48]

Fotios II benefited to a great extent from the Turkish-Greek rapprochement. He was committed to drawing the various Orthodox churches into a closer spiritual union and did much to reestablish the dignity of his throne.[49] Thus in 1930 he convened a Pan-Orthodox conference at Mt. Athos, Greece, in which all churches except for the Russian and Bulgarian participated.[50] The Patriarch also sought closer relations with the Anglican Church. Together with the Archbishop of Canterbury they initiated two Orthodox-Anglican theological conferences in Lambeth in 1930 and 1931.[51]

Fotios II died in December 1935. His reign passed with relative tranquility in terms of the Turkish-Greek relations. Finding a successor favorable to both Turkey and Greece, however, proved a rather difficult task.[52]

Turkish Ban on the Costumes of Clergymen

The first Patriarchate-related case that tested the Turkish-Greek rapprochement was the Turkish ban on costumes of clergymen. On 3 December 1934, the Turkish parliament banned the wearing of religious garments by the clergy of all religious denominations except during rituals in temple.[53] Only heads of religious denominations would be allowed to wear religious garments outside the temple. This secular measure by the Turkish government had its effects on the Turkish-Greek relations as well.

Aldridge, the American Charge d’Affaires in Athens, reported to the State Department that the legislation aimed against the ecclesiastical costumes of clergymen of all denominations in Turkey took the Greek government as well as the Greek public by surprise.[54] "The shock attending the realization that the Greek Patriarch and the Greek priests in Istanbul would no longer be permitted to wear their time-honored, flowing black robes was quickly followed by burning resentment that Turkey of all countries should take such a step against Greek national dignity and prestige,” Aldridge continued.[55] The Turkish bill in fact permitted heads of religious denominations to keep their religious garments outside the temple, but Aldridge’s report is important in the sense that it reflected the mood in Greece on the recent Turkish legislation. "The thought that this was engineered as a surprise move, with no attempt at friendly consultation or exploration on the part of Greece’s professed ally, was the final straw,” Aldridge maintained.[56]

The Greek press expressed its indignation rather violently. In addition, dramatic resolutions were passed, mass meetings of protest were planned, and the Vice-President of the Turkish-Greek League of Amity resigned. The Greek government, reflecting the state of general confusion, rushed into various cabinet meetings, drafted representations in the name of Turkish-Greek friendship and announced that it would call a meeting of political party leaders to deliberate over the situation. Aldridge wrote that Maximos resented the fact that he was not informed about the Turkish government’s intentions on this matter when he was in Turkey recently. If he was briefed, he could have prepared Greek public opinion appropriately. Maximos did not go to his office for a few days, which in Athens led to rumors that he considered resignation.[57]

In connection with why the Turkish government did not provide the Greek government with any advance information regarding the law forbidding all ecclesiastical garments, MacVeagh, the American Ambassador in Athens, reported to Washington that he had a talk with the Turkish minister in Athens, who told him that there was none to provide.[58] The Turkish minister explained to MacVeagh that the measure was rushed through the Turkish parliament so that there would be no obstruction to its passage.[59] MacVeagh did not report whether the Turkish minister meant a domestic or external obstruction that might arise. The Turkish minister also commented on the reaction in Greece over this matter. MacVeagh wrote that the Turkish minister confirmed his own impression that it was largely confined to that element in the public and the press that spoke first and thought afterwards.[60]

In the meantime, when it was reported that the government would call a meeting of the political party leaders, Venizelos announced that he would communicate his opinion to the government in the form of a written memorandum.[61] However, the meeting of the party leaders did not take place and Venizelos did not express his opinion with a written memorandum as he said.[62]  A few days later, Venizelos sent a statement to the Greek press advising acceptance of the Turkish position. He argued that the Turkish government was not inspired by any animosity towards Greek clergy. It was merely carrying out its policy of a secular state.[63] Furthermore, Turkey had retreated as far as it could by exempting the Patriarch. Also he added that Greek Orthodox costume was a matter of ecclesiastical administration, which did not in any way involve the doctrine of the Church itself.[64] Finally Venizelos believed that an issue of this kind should not be allowed to lead to a rupture in the friendship of the two countries.[65]

Aldridge reported to Washington that this statement had the "soothing effect of a cold application to a feverish head.”[66] Especially the Venizelist press hailed Venizelos’ statement as worthy of a great statesman.[67] Tsaldaris, the then Prime Minister of Greece, expressed his satisfaction that the leader of the opposition approved the government’s handling of the matter.[68] Aldridge wrote that the Greek Foreign Minister was also pleased. The Pan-Refugee Organization of Greece, which was planning a vociferous mass meeting, sought advice from Venizelos as to whether the meeting should be held or not, and upon Venizelos’ advice it decided not to hold the meeting.[69] Aldridge concluded his report with an interesting comment on the whole episode:

In all fairness to Turkey, it must be added that there are many people in Greece, even members of the Orthodox Church, who felt rather gratified at the action of the Turkish Government and deprecated the fact that the Greek Government had not itself been able to bring about this reform. These people feel that the costume of Greek priests is a useless anachronism, which compromises the intelligence and the civilization of this 20^th century Greece. But as long as the Greek peasant finds it impossible to conceive of a priest without the long, black robe, preferably a soled one, a ‘vote-minded’ Government will hardly have the courage to emulate Mustapha Kemal Atat�rk. As for Greek public opinion at large, it seems a fairly safe prediction that the disillusionment it has recently suffered at the hands of its trusted friend and ally across the Aegean will not soon be forgotten.[70]

The Election of Benjamin I

The second Patriarchate-related case that tested the Turkish-Greek rapprochement was the Patriarchal election in 1936. Fotios II had died in December 1935 and new elections were held for the patriarchal throne.

On 16 January 1936, the Metropolitan of Heraclea was elected Patriarch of Istanbul under the name of Benjamin I.[71] Howland Shaw, the American Charge d’Affaires in Turkey, reported to Washington that for nearly ten years the Patriarchate had been enjoying a period of relative quiet when compared to the agitation characteristic of the period from the end of the war until about 1926.[72] However, the election of Benjamin I was reminiscent of older times, as it was accompanied by considerable agitation.

The day following the death of Fotios II, the Chief of Police of Istanbul visited the Phanar and inquired who the candidates for the vacant position were. He was told that there were thirteen Metropolitans, all members of the Holy Synod, anyone of whom might be elected.[73] In the meantime, the Greek press began to refer to the inevitability of the election of the Metropolitan of Chalcedon, who was favored by the Greek government.[74] The metropolitan, a protégé of Fotios II, was known to have support of seven of the other members of the Holy Synod. The remaining five each considered himself a candidate.[75]

In Turkish government circles the candidacy of the Metropolitan of Chalcedon was not regarded with favor. He was one of the most active protestors against the bill prohibiting the wearing of ecclesiastical garments.[76] It is understood from the correspondence between the American legation in Turkey and the State Department that Ankara would like to see either the Metropolitan of Imbros, or of Kirom, or of Heliopolis to be elected for the patriarchal throne.[77] This demand by Ankara was also communicated to the Holy Synod which was still deliberating on who should be the new patriarch.[78]

At this instance, a telegram was sent to the Holy Synod from the Greek government suggesting that the Metropolitan of Imbros be elected. The Greek government had not originally favored the Metropolitan of Imbros, and this telegram created a tremendous confusion in the Holy Synod.[79] The Metropolitan of Chalcedon, supported by his seven followers, contended that neither the Turkish nor the Greek governments should interfere and that the Patriarchate should take an independent stand. They considered the Metropolitan of Imbros to be too weak to be a suitable Patriarch and too much amenable to the wishes of the Turkish government. On the other hand, the five remaining members of the Holy Synod, though they failed to unite behind the Metropolitan of Imbros, were apparently more inclined toward the inauguration of a regime of greater cooperation with the Ankara government. Hence they opposed the Metropolitan of Chalcedon. A large portion of the Greek Orthodox minority seemed to have agreed with the latter opinion.[80]

On the day of the election a considerable crowd gathered outside the Phanar vociferously demanding the election of the Metropolitan of Imbros. While the crowd grew more restive, the announcement was made that the Metropolitan of Heraclea got most of the votes and was elected as the new Patriarch.[81] Neither the metropolitan that was initially favored by the Greek government nor one of those implied by Ankara was chosen. It seems that a middle-way through solution was adopted. As a matter of fact, the Turkish officials paid courtesy calls and sent the usual messages of congratulations to the new Patriarch.[82]

The Turkish and Greek governments’ attitude during the crises of Turkish ban on costumes of clergymen in 1934 and patriarchal elections in 1936 reveal that the governments did not want to risk their newly achieved good-neighborly relations for the patriarchate-related matters. Especially the Greek government faced a difficult task in persuading the Greek public opinion that friendly relations with Turkey were more dear to Greece than costumes of Greek clergy or who would be the next Patriarch. Yet, eventually Athens and Ankara did not let the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate spoil the rapprochement they had accomplished.

Conclusion

Until Turkey and Greece resolved their differences in 1930, the Patriarchate suffered from the tense atmosphere between Ankara and Athens. Especially as long as the etablis question remained unresolved, the Holy Synod faced the possibility of not convening because there would be almost no metropolitans to convene. Secondly, Athens tried hard to rally international public opinion against Turkey in order to strengthen its hand during the negotiations with Ankara over bilateral matters like the implementation of the exchange of populations and treatment of minorities. In this attempt, Athens also used the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate as leverage against Turkey. For instance, if Greece could have succeeded in having an exchangeable Metropolitan elected as Patriarch in 1924-1925, it would have made its stance firmer vis-à-vis the whole etablis matter. More Greek Orthodox persons would have remained in Turkey, and more property confiscated by the Turkish authorities as abandoned property would have been restored to the previous owners.

When Turkey and Greece reached a détente in 1930 and established good-neighborly relations, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate began to enjoy a more tranquil life. Moreover, if there were troubles that had arisen in the post-1930 period, these were settled peacefully without upsetting the friendly relations between the two countries. The Turkish-Greek rapprochement provided a better atmosphere for the activities of the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate remained in its historical seat in Istanbul. Furthermore, the Turkish government’s demand that the Patriarch keep away from any political activity was confirmed. As long as the friendly relations between Turkey and Greece continued, the Patriarchate was allowed to carry out its normal functions freely.[83]