BASMACHI MOVEMENT FROM WITHIN:
ACCOUNT OF ZEKI VELIDI TOGAN
H. B. Paksoy
Published in NATIONALITIES PAPERS
Vol. 23, No 2. June 1995. Pp. 373-399.
J. V. Stalin, in his denunciation of Sultan Galiev,
formerly Stalin's own assistant in Narkomnats, stated:
....I accused him (Sultan Galiev) of creating an
organization of the Validov type... despite
that, a week later, he sent... a secret
letter... to establish contact with the Basmachi
and with their leader Validov...1
Ahmet Zeki (Validov) Velidi Togan (1890-1970), a
Bashkurt Turk,2 published his own comprehensive account of
the Basmachi movement3 on two separate occasions.
According to Togan, these were based on the field diaries
he kept during his involvement in the movement. The said
diary was smuggled out of Turkistan in segments, via
various persons and routes, before and after Togan's own
departure from Turkistan in 1923.4 Both accounts
complement each other and contain ample material to aid
the reader in reconstructing the events surrounding
Stalin's references and putting all in historical
perspective.5
In completing the final versions of these works for
publication, Togan indicates, in addition to his own field
notes, he had also utilized secondary sources to refresh
his memory. These included the materials deposited with
the Hoover Institution Library, which he consulted during
1958, as well as the newspaper collections pertaining to
the time period which he chronicles. Togan recalled:
Kerensky (1881-1970) and I sat down at the
microfilm machine and together read the
newspapers dating back to the times when we knew
each other.
Togan also cites various histories written in the
Soviet union after his departure, containing references to
his own activities. The first section of this study
contains Togan's brief biography, educational and personal
background. The second, the events leading to his
Basmachi period, due to space limitations, in a highly
compressed form.6 The last section is largely translated
directly from his pen, both from Turkili and Hatiralar.
At the outset, two points must be made. The first
one pertains to the term Basmachi, as described by Togan:
Basmachi is derived from "baskinji," meaning
attacker, and was first applied to bands of
brigands. During the tsarist times, these
brigands existed when (Turkistan) independence
was lost and Russian occupation began in
Turkmenistan, Bashkurdistan and Crimea.
Bashkurts (in Russian language sources: Bashkir)
called the ayyar, by the Khorasan term. In
Crimea (and, borrowed from there, in Ukraine)
haydamak was used. Among Bashkurts such heroes
as Buranbay; in Crimea, Halim; in Samarkand,
Namaz became famous. These did not bother the
local indigenous population but sacked the
Russians and the Russian flour-mills,
distributing their booty to the population. In
Ferghana, these elements were also active during
the tsarist times.... After the proliferation of
cotton planting in Ferghana [with the forced the
tsarist policy of replacing grain production]
the economic conditions deteriorated. This
increased the brigandage. Among earlier
Basmachi, as was the case among the Western
Turks, the spiritual leader of the Ozbek and
Turkmen bands was Koroglu.7 Basmachi of
Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh and Turkmen gathered
at nights to read Koroglu and other dastans.
What has the external appearance of brigandage
is actually a reflection and representation of
the thoughts and spirit of a wide segment of the
populace. Akchuraoglu Yusuf Bey8 reminds us
that during the independence movements of the
Serbians, the Hoduk; the Kleft and Palikarya of
the Greeks comprised half nationalist
revolutionaries and half brigands... The
majority and the most influential of the
Basmachi groups founded after 1918 did not
follow the Koroglu tradition; they were composed
of serious village leadership and sometimes the
educated. Despite that, all were labelled
Basmachi. Consequently, in Turkistan, these
groups were regarded as 'partisans;' more
especially representing the guerilla groups
fighting against the colonial power. Nowadays,
in Ozbek and Kazakh press, one reads about
Chinese, Algerian and Indian Basmachi.9
Second is the language issue. Togan was fluent in
quite a number of dialects used in Turkistan; historical
and modern. At times he writes in an amalgam of those,
not only while he is quoting from manuscripts, but also
when he mentally travels to a particular location,
recalling an incident. Togan gives the impression that
the memory was etched in his mind in that particular
dialect. He was sufficiently concerned about his
propensities in that regard, and the readability of his
writing dialect to ask a scholar-poet friend to review the
manuscript of at least one of his books.
Togan was very sensitive to the matter and details
his own views of the "language and dialects" issue (i.e.
Bolshevik claims that the dialects of Central Asia are
"languages"), as well as the Bolshevik political stance.
He even confronted the Bolshevik leadership on the matter,
with a letter, which is translated below. Togan supplies
additional observations on the politics of language in a
special section of his Turkili. It must be noted that
Togan's references to Turk is in accordance with the
normal usage in all dialects of Turke; Turki, Turkistani.
The terms "Turkic" and "Turkish" are only introduced into
non-Turk languages in much more recent times10 and do not
reflect the actual, native usage.
Togan's own writing style also has to be considered
separately. It is not always an easy task to unpack his
highly elaborate, detailed, information-laden and lengthy
sentences. At times it has been necessary to break his
paragraph-long statements into a number of smaller ones.
Furthermore, he sometimes provides the consequences of an
event he is narrating before fully recounting the event
itself. Thus he may interrupt his narrative to report an
eventual outcome in a single sentence or page and then
continue with the remaining sequence of the event.11
That might be one reason holding back potential
translators and publishers of Togan's works. Indeed,
several attempts have been made to translate his Turkili
into English and German over the past decades. Almost all
of those remain in manuscript form, some complete. Togan
reports that one draft English translation of Turkili was
distilled by Olaf Caroe and incorporated into one of his
books.12
I. TOGAN's UPBRINGING, EDUCATION, EARLY YEARS
Togan was born 10 December 1890, in Bashkurt-Eli, the
Kuzen aul near Isterlitamak.13 His family, like their
ancestors, was involved most aspects of agriculture, most
prominently apiculture and animal husbandry. Togan
observes that in areas surrounding his ancestral lands,
there were localities named "Uris Olgen" (Russian died)
and "Uris Kirilgan" (Russian was "broken") indicating
previous battles, since the 17th century, when the
Russians first invaded the Bashkurt lands.
Togan received his elementary education from his
parents, both of whom were literate in several languages
in addition to the Bashkurt dialect and well-read in
related literatures. Togan also studied in the village
medrese14 of his own father and of his maternal uncle at
Utek, a few miles away from his home. Consequently, by
age 18, Togan had a command of his native Bashkurt,
Chaghatay, Persian, Arabic and Russian. He accompanied
his father on travels, on yearly extended social calls, to
Troitsk and neighboring cities, and became familiar with a
wide geographic region. This was to prove beneficial
after 1916, when he became the Chairman of the Bashkurt
Autonomous Region.
During the summer of 1908, he unceremoniously left
his home to further his education and to gain a wider
world perspective. At Kazan, he met several prominent
Orientalists including N. Katanov (1862-1922) and N.
Ashmarin,15 and attended lectures at the Kazan university
and the Kasimiye Medrese. He notes that in Kazan,
Merjani's (1818-1889) circle was very much alive.16 By
1911, Togan published in Kazan his Turk ve Tatar Tarihi
(Turk and Tatar History), meant to be a textbook for the
course he began teaching at Kas miye.
During the summer months of ensuing years Togan
returned to Utek, on the way stopping at various cities,
such as Orenburg, Astrakhan, Kemelik to visit historical
sights and meet with individuals with whom he was
corresponding. He began learning German and French, and
Latin. His aim was to sit for the necessary examinations
to qualify as a teacher in higher institutions of learning
within the Russian empire. He was reading voraciously,
both Eastern and Western authors, especially works on the
history of the Turks.
His Turk ve Tatar Tarihi was well received, and he
was therefore elected a member of the Kazan university
Historical and Archeological Society. He also received
invitations from a number of medreses to teach, with
offers of "satisfactory stipends." In 1913, the Kazan
university Historical and Archeological Society officially
charged him with the task of collecting primary documents
pertaining to the indigenous history, language and
literature from the Ferghana region. Once in Tashkent, he
was invited to join the Turkistan Military Governor's
administration. He declined.
The following year, the Imperial Academy of Sciences
(St. Petersburg) and the International Central Asian
Historical Society, with the recommendation of Katanov and
Bartold (1869-1930), jointly sponsored Togan to conduct a
similar study and collection tour in the Bukhara Khanate.
Upon his return to St. Petersburg with Bartold's urging he
began publishing the results of these missions in related
journals.
Bartold also introduced Togan to General Pisarev, the
director of School of Oriental Languages. The Tsarina was
the patron of this institution and Bartold was attempting
to secure a position for Togan as an instructor. Again on
the advice of Bartold, Togan went to Kazan, sat for the
examinations to qualify as a Russian language teacher at
the "non-Russian Seminaries." Although he passed the
test, the schedule of which was expedited by Ashmarin,
Togan dryly notes that "since I did not have an
appointment, the diploma was useless." He continues:
Bartold did not approve of the war efforts of
the Tsardom. He told me: 'to be cannon fodder
is unsuitable for you.' But the efforts of
Bartold, who had lost a number of his students
at the front during the first months of the war,
and of Samaylovich,17 bore no fruit. I was
inducted into the Army. Fifteen days after I
settled into the barracks as a soldier, a law
was passed to exempt the teachers of the non-
Russian schools. I returned to Ufa.
At the end of 1914, Togan started teaching at Ufa.
During 1915, he was elected a deputy from that city to the
St. Petersburg Duma. Togan continued his scholarly
endeavors in St. Petersburg and helped Bartold with the
preparation and publication of Ulugh Bey.18 He became a
member of Radloff's (1837-1918)19 Circle, worked on the
corrections of Bartold's Timur's Indian Expedition and
worked with Samaylovich at the Imperial Geographic
Society. Asiatic Museum there. He continued publishing and
began meeting political figures, especially those belonging to
Socialist Revolutionaries (SR's). Kerensky was one such
individual. He had grown up in Tashkent as the son of
an "Education Inspector." With the aid of Kerensky, Togan and
Mustafa Chokay visited the front to observe the conditions of
the laborers conscripted from Turkistan.20
During this period, Togan also met Maxim Gorkii
(1868-1936) and the writers working at the Russkii
Letopisets:
Gorkii had decided to publish the Sbornik of the
'nations imprisoned by the Russians.' to stress
their cultures. Histories of Ukrainian,
Finnish, Armenian and Georgian literatures were
being written. Gorkii asked me to write the
Sbornik of the Russian Moslems. During the
winter of 1916, I devoted much time to this
project. I read all pertinent publications
printed in Russia, such as those written by
Gasp ral (1854-1914)21, Azerbaijan's Hasan Bey
Melikov (Zerdabi; 1842-1907), Fettah Akhundov
(Mirza Fath Ali Akhunzade; 1812-1878)22; also
those Russian works printed in Turkistan. Old
Professor V. D. Smirnov, who was the Director of
the Oriental Section of the St. Petersburg
General Library, rendered spacious help. I
evaluated those works written by Russian Moslems
but have not been published. Smirnov was very
interested in the topic, from the Russian point
of view. I finished the draft of this large
volume during winter of 1916, in Russian, and
gave it to Gorkii. He gave it to Ukrainian
Gurevich, to read. Then the Revolution took
place. The volume was left in the hands of
Gurevich, who was killed after he became
Minister of Education in Ukraine.
Togan returned to full-time academic life during
1925. Invited to the Turkish Republic by the Ministry of
Education, he was given citizenship in six weeks and began
teaching at Istanbul university the same year. After a
disagreement on historiography in the First Turkish
History Conference, he resigned and went to University of
Vienna (1932), where he earned his doctorate (1935).
Togan taught at Bonn and Goettingen Universities (1935-
1939) before returning to his earlier post at Istanbul
University (1939).
Togan was jailed for 17 months 10 days (1944) by the
Turkish government "for acts against the Soviets,"
released and later returned (1948) to his post; organized
and convened the XXI International Congress of
Orientalists (1951); appointed Director of the Islamic
Institute at Istanbul University (1953); became a visiting
professor at Columbia University (1958); was awarded an
honorary doctorate from Manchester University (1967);
remaining an historian until his death (1970) in Istanbul.
His life-time publications, in various languages, approach
400 in number.23
II. PREPARATORY YEARS
The February Revolution of 1917 found Togan living
across from the Preobrazhenskaia Military Barracks. He
immediately plunged into the organization of the
forthcoming political meetings, "called to discuss the
legal and social status of the Turk population of Russia
under new developments." These endeavors took him to
Tashkent, where he had to oppose the largely Russian
Tashkent Soviet. He joined the Tashkent SR party, but
resigned in disgust, within a month, upon discovering the
complicity of that party in inequitable food distribution.
Further, Togan notes, the majority of the educated
Russians in Tashkent were members of the Kadets, headed by
the mayor of the city, Malletskii. The Kadets planned to
establish two categories of municipal districts (one for
the local people, the other for the Russians), with the
Russian side ultimately wielding all power. Togan,
"having read the related publications for the past few
years" vehemently and publicly objected, exposing the
hidden purposes behind it in a series of meetings:
I knew that the structure proposed was
translated into Russian and published, from the
(British) Indian Government laws. The aim was
to have the minority rule over the majority
Turkistanis. I brought the books to the
meeting.
At that point, the SR's were supporting Togan.
Turkestanskaia Vedemost (published in Tashkent) carried
related speeches and meeting notes.
Togan prepared for the Moscow congress of "Moslems of
Russia, everywhere demanding that the Turk populations
should have territorial autonomy, thus forming a
federative system within the new regime." He was in favor
of "including all Turk regions of the Russian Empire into
this autonomous Turkistan." He faced opposition, not only
from the Bolsheviks, but also from some "unitarists" among
his own people who rejected Togan's federation idea and
instead favored a single Russian state. Also, the
kadimist ulama (the orthodox clergy), in some regions a
part of the salaried Russian bureaucracy,24 objected to
the territorial autonomy or the formation of a Turkistan
as a part of the federated Russian state.
Since both the Moscow and the Tashkent Soviets were
opposing anything but "Russianism," especially the demands
of the majority population of Turkistan, Togan continued
his efforts among Bashkurts. He met with success, as
Bashkurt autonomy was declared, after several Kurultays
(congresses), under the Presidency of Yunus Bekov. Togan
was appointed Minister of Interior and Defense.
Concomitantly, Bashkurt Government affairs began to be
formalized, the Bashkurt Army was reestablished.25
On 18 January 1918 (new style) Bolsheviks occupied
Orenburg, where the autonomous Bashkurt Government was
headquartered. For the first few days, the Bolsheviks
were solicitous towards the Bashkurt Government, but on 3
February arrested and jailed its prominent members,
including Togan. It appears that Togan's rivals,
including the unitarists, may have contributed to this
event. In the ensuing uncertainty among Bolsheviks, he
could easily have been executed, save for the uprising
staged by his followers to free him. During the night of
3-4 April he was freed. Quickly organizing his friends,
Togan began a guerilla movement for the purpose of
protecting Bashkurt population and property.
On 27 May 1918 the Czech Legions revolted against the
Bolsheviks, joining with the Whites. Togan and his
Bashkurt organization established contact with the Czechs.
The Bashkurt government was reestablished in Cheliabinsk
on 7 June and Bashkurt regiments were mobilized.26
Furthering cooperation with Western Siberia and the
Kazakh Alash Orda27 Governments, Togan and his Bashkurt
army units began engaging Red forces and succeeded in
driving them out of Orenburg and traditional Bashkurt
lands. An intelligence department, in collaboration with
the Samara government, Ural Cossacks and the Kazakhs, was
also established with representatives and contacts in
various cities around Turkistan. One member of this
organization and one time secretary to Togan was OOzbek
Abdlhamid Suleyman, whose pen name is Cholpan, 28 often
touted in Soviet historiography as a loyal Bolshevik.
Red units began exploiting the differences between
Kadets and the Whites. At that time, a French unit, under
the command of General Janin joined the fighting against
the Reds. Reportedly, Gen. Janin simultaneously addressed
the Russians with "You are all Russians; one side Red, the
other White. Why are you fighting? Would it not be
better for you to make-up and be reconciled?"
On 21 November Kolchak declared himself Supreme Ruler
and began preparations to disband Bashkurt-Kazakh armies.
Samara, a principal supply point of munitions to the
Bashkurt army, having capitulated to Kolchak, logically
ended the chances of Togan's forces to resist the Reds.
After intercepting and reading the communications between
Generals Janin, Dutov and Admiral Kolchak, the conditions
became more clear. Having been left facing four different
hostile forces from Samara and Aktbe Reds, Dutov and
Kolchak, without supplies, it became obvious to Togan and
his friends that they had to come to terms with Moscow in
order to save their native population from further losses.
Upon announcement of the Western Allies' cease fire
with Central Powers, Bashkurts and Kazakhs sent
representatives to Bolsheviks to negotiate terms. Togan
asked the aid of his old friends, Chaliapin (Feodor
Ivanovitch, 1873-1938) and Gorkii, to establish contacts
for the purpose with the Bolsheviks leadership, on the way
to collaboration.
"Affiliation" with the Bolsheviks, especially after
vigorously fighting them, demanded special care, secrecy
and discipline. During the ensuing negotiations with the
Bolsheviks, Mirsaid Sultangaliev29 was dispatched from
Moscow to Ufa, in order to expedite the matters.
Sultangaliev secured conditions favorable to the Bashkurt-
Kazakh forces and their leadership. Finally on 18
February 1919, Togan officially entered into cooperation
with Lenin and Stalin. This forced friendship was to last
15 months.
Lenin, Trotskii, Stalin and the rest of the Bolshevik
leadership sorely needed the propaganda afforded them by
this event, Bashkurts "joining" the Bolsheviks. In fact,
Lenin immediately wrote an article on the "developments of
the Eastern Question," published in the 2 March 1919 issue
of Pravda. Hence Togan and his colleagues were relatively
safe in Moscow and did not need to fear for their lives --
yet. The Bashkurt army was reconstituted under its
previous leadership and some of its units were sent to the
Western Front. However, differences of opinion among
prominent Bolsheviks had already become open competition.
Lenin ordered arms and ammunition to be provided to the
Bashkurt Army. Stalin reversed the directive. Trotskii
overruled Stalin's orders and provided the Bashkurt Army
with ample war materiel.
The ensuing events concerning Togan's "collaboration"
with Moscow constitutes a separate chapter. What is
certain is that Togan, if he had not had prior
reservations, quickly became disillusioned. More and more
it became clear to Togan that the ethnic Russians did not
intend to share power, despite all the promises. Talks
with Trotskii, Plekhanov, Lenin, Stalin, Preobrazhinskii,
Artium and a score of others did not produce a resolution
in the direction of maintaining the union and autonomy of
Bashkurt-Kazakh lands and populations. Instead, a Russian
province was inserted between the Kazakhs and the
Bashkurts.
On 25 February 1920, Bashkurt RevKom elected Togan
Chairman, when the previous President of the same body,
Haris Yumagulov was "called to Moscow." Shortly
afterward, Togan, too, was called to Moscow. According to
both Lenin and Stalin, he was to undertake "Soviet State-
wide affairs" as opposed to "looking after such a small
tribal matter as the Bashkurts." In Moscow, toward the
end of May 1920, Togan came into contact with Jemal and
Halil Pashas (of the Committee of Union and Progress),30
who were in Moscow. During a dinner given in honor of
these individuals at the "Bashkurt House"31 in Moscow and
probably to force the hand of the Russians, Togan
suggested a Congress of the Peoples of the East of
"Russia." Togan repeated that idea to Stalin and to the
Party Secretariat. It was also relayed to Lenin and
Stalin by Jemal and Halil Pashas.
Lenin personally entreated Togan to sit down with him
to discuss the issues pertaining the Eastern Question and
the "de-colonization" policies. Lenin insisted on
receiving Togan's comments in writing. In this last
meeting, Lenin rejected the requests and demands contained
in the joint resolutions of the Turkistan leadership,
submitted to him through Togan. Seemingly, this was the
last of many incidents that caused Togan to break with the
Bolsheviks and redouble his earlier efforts to devote
himself to the affairs of the "Secret Organization."
The Break with the Bolsheviks
During March 1919, just after Bashkurt-Bolshevik
alliance, Togan and the rest of the Turkistan leadership
proposed to establish the Erk Party32 for the Central
Asians. This party was intended to become a member of the
Comintern directly [rather than through RKP(b)], to
prevent Turkistan from coming under the total domination
of the Russian Communist Party. The idea was vetoed by
Stalin. Togan and the rest of the leadership then
concentrated on introducing their members into the upper
levels of the Communist Parties already being established
in Central Asia. Most probably, the Intelligence
Department of the Bashkurt Government was heavily involved
in this effort. This amalgam must be the "Secret
Organization" Togan references from that point on.
Following the last rebuff of the national aspirations at
the hands of Lenin in Spring 1920, Togan moved to
implement his plans and to join the Basmachi movement
already in progress in Central Asia. On 29 June 1920 he
left Moscow.
Togan spent the summer months on the Central Asian
bozkir (literally, pale pasture; the prairie), planning
the next phase of his group's activities. Between 1-5
September 1920, he "attended" the Congress of the Toilers
of the East in Baku. Though his presence was carefully
concealed from the organizers and majority of the
attendees, Togan was kept fully informed of the
proceedings through carefully chosen intermediaries. He
"participated" through motions and resolutions he wrote
and relayed via the same channels.
During the Conference, a resolution of the Comintern,
meeting after Togan had left Moscow, reached him. It was
prepared by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs under the
guidance of Middle Eastern Specialist of the Comintern,
Pavlovich. Intended for the Bolshevik operatives
designated to work in the Middle East and Central Asia, it
was not distributed to the representatives of the
indigenous populations. The copy in question was handed
to Togan's Organization by a sympathetic Polish
delegate.33 In summary, the resolution stated:
Since class differentiation among the Arab,
Turk, Iranian and Afghan populations of the Near
East are almost non-existent, as is the case
also with capitalism, it is necessary to exploit
other cleavages already in place. It will be
useful to keep alive tarikat and sectarian
differences, competition among rival commercial
interests and merchants, even after elimination
of those among their brethren. These rivalries
ought to be supplemented through the use of
differentiated languages, as the educated strata
among the target populations is a thin one and
that it would not be difficult to break the
population free of their influence.
This was significant, because: a) it was being
addressing the Russian Bolsheviks, behind the backs of the
indigenous delegates; b) outlined the same tactics
already used against the tsarists c) presumed control of
Turkistan and now planning to expand policies toward that
end. Togan arrived in Petrovsk and sent the following
letter to Lenin, Stalin, Trotskii and Rykov, dated 12
September 1920:
It is apparent from the policies of the Central
Committee of RKP(b), which is currently being
implemented, you, like Artium and his friends,
have accepted the Russian national chauvinist
thoughts as the basis of your policy towards
Eastern nationalities. Actually comrade
Trotskii elaborated on this while he was
investigating these matters in Ufa, he
pronounced the activities of aforementioned as a
provocation sequence. Undoubtedly, he also made
the same statement to the CC. Despite that, the
Russian imperialism remained as the policy. In
the same session held after I and Ryskulov had
departed, comrades Frunze and Kubyshev --like
Trotskii-- stressed that this policy of the CC
was nothing but hypocrisy and deceit. In the
same Turkkomisia (Turkistan Komisia) sessions,
those members of the party who wish to
perpetuate Russian imperialism behind a mask,
openly stated their objectives; that of fanning
the fires of artificial class distinctions among
the Turkistan populations; to declare such
nationalists as Ryskulov and Validov as the
enemies of the laborers; to create loyal
servants among the local educated under the
category of "Octoberists," to crush us with
their help. On the other hand, you must know
that we cannot become the artificial class
enemies of the local farmers and cannot allow
ourselves to become the target of general
mocking. You can find the required sacrificial
lambs. But we cannot be those victims. The
Congress of the Toilers of the East has clearly
shown our fellow-countrymen in attendance that
the attacks on the rights of Turkistanis is not
simply the machinations of the local Russian
communists, but consists of the policies of the
CC. The attitude of the CC representatives,
towards the Easterners in attendance, is the
same as those commissars at the beginning of the
1917 revolution toward the peasant congresses,
whose members were regarded ignorant. The CC
Representatives not only prevented, by shouting
down, those resolutions prepared by the
delegates at their homelands, but also utilized
the Red Guard soldiers in silencing them. The
delegates were forced to accept only those
resolutions written in Moscow and sent for the
purpose. The fact that the CC regards the
Eastern Nationality issues principally as a
matter of land disputes, a peasant problem,
indicates that the CC has taken a wrong turn.
The CC can keep alive this artificial class
differentiation among the Eastern peasants only
by the force of terror. Our comments written in
relation to these theses of comrade Lenin,
before he addressed the Comintern on the
colonialism issues, stressed that the social
revolution in the East could not be confined to
stratification (rassloenie); that this is a more
complex matter. Since the European capitalist
and laborers of the East are going to act
jointly as the rulers of the colony, then the
Eastern peasant will have to join forces with
the wealthy Easterner. When you determine that
the stratification is not taking place among the
indigenous population, you will blame the local
educated and declare a portion of the latter
"class enemy petty bourgeois" and the remainder
as left Octoberists "class enemy," and liquidate
them. In their stead, you will conjure new left
Octoberists. Finally, you will be left solely
with the illiterate peasant who is only familiar
with his donkey, ox and spade. I do not believe
that you can alter your distrust toward the
native educated of Turkistan. You can at least
allow the educated Turkistan elite the
opportunity to renovate and populate the Soviet
Bukhara, whose Emir has fled.
Togan sent another letter from Petrovsk, this time to
Kretinskii and Preobrazhinskii, both secretaries of the CC
and members of the Politburo:
Though you and I had our differences in our
understanding of socialism and nationalism, we
cannot reconcile our positions with regard to
the application of socialism in the development
of great nations; as a person wishing to remain
honorable, I have been honest with you two and
many other Party members. I did not deceive you
while I took the path of fighting against the
Soviets and Communism. Those I have deceived
are the likes of Stalin and other state
officials who have deceived me. Those friends
complaining of the masked Dictator's ridiculing
the dignity and the self- determination of
humans, inform me of the severe terror that is
yet to come within the party. Like them, I fear
that one day your heads may fly. I did not wait
for my head to fall. Even if I were to die, I
must do so while engaged in open struggle.
Togan adds, as a post script, that Kretinskii and
Preobrazhinskii were tortured and after making
"confessions" executed, during 1937.
Between 12 September and 31 December 1920, Togan
traversed the lands separating Petrovks and Bukhara.
Along the way, travelling incognito, he investigated
historical sites, made contacts with local leadership and
further studied the terrain and its inhabitants. He notes
that up to a certain location in Karakorum, he was also
reading the memoirs of Babur34 and Marx's Das Kapital
which he carried along with his field glasses. Prior to
his arrival in Kongrat, he finally had to give up those
items in order not to attract attention.
III. BASNACHI TOGAN
Upon arriving in Bukhara,35 Togan met with other
members of the Society as previously been arranged. Their
first task was to establish a Bukhara National Army, to
bring the representatives from Khiva, Turkmenistan and
Kazakistan to establish the Turkistan National Union. The
educated Kazakhs and individuals from other Turkistan
locations who have been sent to contact all groups in
Kazakistan, returned to join Togan after establishing
channels with the Japanese and the prominent Basmachi
leaders operating in Ferghana. A number of the officers
from the Bashkurt Army were appointed to command garrisons
in Karshi, Shehrisebz, Nur, Guzar, Kermin. Their
objective was to accomplish what the Russians were
preventing; i.e. autonomy.
In addition to these "undercover" efforts, there were
other officers working openly in "legal" positions known
to the Bolsheviks. Although a Bukhara government was in
existence in name, most affairs of state were in the hands
of the Revolutionary Committee (presumably comprising the
Russians) a portion of it operating as the Central
Committee. Togan describes the complexity of political
spectrum during the last stages of the Bukhara Emirate:
There were three types of Basmachi: "Emirists;"
"somewhat Emirists;" and "anti-Emirists." The
political spectrum of the Basmachi did not end
there. Jemal Pasha wished to manage the
problems of Turkistan and the Basmachi from
Kabul. Enver Pasha, on the other hand was
conducting pro-Bolshevik "Union of Islam"
propaganda from Moscow. This had some effect.
There were also others who tried to insinuate
themselves, seemingly eager to join us.....
Further, there was necessity to establish
contacts with the Russian parties who were
struggling against the Bolsheviks. In Bukhara
and Khiva the government was passing into the
hands of those nationalist friends whose
administration, though temporary, was moving
away from "communism" toward "populism." It was
necessary to formulate the economic and social
theories of all. The political spectrum had
earlier stratified as a) Kadimists36 b)
Jadids c) Socialists, and showed a propensity
to crystallize around Jadids and Socialists
after the disappearance of the Emir. However,
thoughts were scrambled. During the first week
of January 1921, the matter of the programs were
debated. Primarily, individuals from "Islamic
Unionists" and the Bukharan Jadids were
involved. Populist socialism was represented by
Abdulhamid Arif37 and myself. Since there was
no previously prepared program before the
general assembly, the Socialist Party Program
was presented. It was first read in
Bashkurdistan during 1919, then in Moscow during
1920 and finally in the 1920 Baku Congress. Few
of those in attendance were prepared to accept
it. A few days later, Mirza Abdulkadir
Muheddinoglu, representing the majority among
those present, proposed a program comprising 19
statutes. These pertained to the retention of
the women's veil, continuation of the Sharia
kad s, reverence for religion, application to
the League of Nations.38 However, these were
not acceptable to the other side.
Both groups only agreed upon: 1. The necessity of
the Secret Organization, 2. Elimination of the Emir
absolutely and establishing the machinery of national
government 3. Establishment of central ministry of
defense, local defense commissariats and the formation of
a national army, 4. The necessity of modern education.
As a result of their discussions, the two sides were able
to agree upon the seven point platform listed below.
Subsequently, the two parties engaged in these talks
developed their own party platforms. The contents of this
seven-point program was further discussed and refined at
the 2921 September-October Samarkand and September 1922
Tashkent Congresses. These seven items are as follows:
1. The Society's aim is to have a free Turkistan, and
that the Turkistanis to take charge of their own destiny.
2. Free Turkistan's form of government is a
democratic republic.
3. Freedom can only be obtained through a national
army. National government can only be based on a national
army.
4. Turkistan's freedom is dependent on economic
freedom. Turkistanis must have control over the decisions
concerning: the general outlines of the economic policy;
deciding the balance of vocational and agricultural
training and the level of importance to be accorded to
each; designating the locations and the directions of
future railroads and irrigation channels.
5. Contemporary and professional education must
prevail. The acquaintance with the European civilization
should be undertaken directly and not through Russians.
6. Nationality issues and the exploitation of the
nation's natural resources will be organized according to
census and prevailing proportions.
7. There will be freedom of religion. There will be
no mixing of religious and state affairs.
As it can be noted, this program is primarily non-
religious in character, and demonstrates religious
tolerance. Shortly afterwards, the effort was expanded.
According to Togan, the aim was to accommodate a full
spectrum of political views then prevailing in Turkistan
under a single umbrella, which, in today's terms, would be
akin to a Popular Front. During this period, the
Sosyalist Tde (party) was formed39, later changing its
name to Erk Party, and its program was shortened from 27
statutes to 9:
Erk Party Program
1. On the economic plane: In order to accomplish
socialism; land, water and mineral wealth must be
nationalized and village life collectivized.
2. To adapt, in a planned manner, the labor
organizations of industrial countries to Turkistan. The
farmers must also be regarded, from an organizational
point, as laborers.
3. Turkistan must free itself from colonizers and
become self-governing. This is the first and fundamental
step for stratification and the acquisition by the farmers
of means to fight for their own rights.
4. The government in free Turkistan will be the
democratic system supporting the farmers and those
supporting self-renewal without barriers. Turkistan
parliament, provincial and city councils will be
established and elected by the general population
directly.
5. Establishment of the national army will aid the
governance and the application of socialism.
6. In Turkistan, the nationality and minority affairs
are governed according to census figures and in
representative proportions.
7. On the educational plane: Affairs are to be
arranged such that, the native population will have direct
control of the country's governance; the national
government will undertake all contemporary governmental
services, modern transportation, railroads, post and
telegraph, agricultural and industrial organization.
Cultural affairs must be organized to reflect the strong
national local culture, to remove foreign, meaning Russian
influences. To establish business and trade schools,
effect general education are among the principal
objectives of education.
8. Religious affairs are kept totally separate from
the affairs of the government.
9. Turkistan Socialist Party can participate in an
"International," provided that such a gathering is
composed, in principle, of parties like itself, for the
purpose of fighting for the freedom of oppressed
nations.40
Counterbalancing the socialists, there were also
"modernists" in Central Asia. The origins of those can be
traced to the movement known as "Jadidizm," from
Shihabaddin Marjani (1815-1889)41 and Kayyum Nasiri (1825-
1902),42 to Gaspirali Ismail Bey (1854-1914). Gaspirali
supported and spread the movement through the newspaper he
published, and the schools he had established.43
Jadid Terakkiperver Party Program44
1. To live as an independent nation, based on native
culture, is the principle precept of life. This is the
ideal of all nations. We aim to have an independent
Turkistan with a national government. Nationality is based
on the unity of language, religion, tradition, literature
and custom.
2. The nature of government in free Turkistan is
republic. Sovereignty is in the hands of the national
assembly, councils for the provinces and cities, elected
according to democratic precepts.
3. Members of the central government are appointed by
the President, with the approval of the national assembly.
Governors of the provinces are appointed by the central
government. Chairmen of the provincial and city councils
are elected by the members of those assemblies. The
regulations governing the election of the members of the
provincial councils are established by the first kurultay
(congress) of independent Turkistan.
4. In Turkistan, non-Turk minority communities will
have full civil rights. Turk elements must work rigorously
and collectively to preserve the Turkistan culture.
5. Turkistan national government will depend on its
national soldiers. Military service is mandatory.
6. Provincial governments will establish local police
forces, which will be under the jurisdiction of the
national defense organization.
7. There will be freedom of religion in the country.
The State guarantees the freedom of the performance of
religious rights. Foreign (religious) missions will not be
permitted to operate in the country.
8. Freedom of the press and publication and the
personal freedoms will be secured through the constitution.
9. Taxes will be proportional to income. So will the
inheritance taxes. In Turkistan, taxes that are the
remnants of medieval times will be abolished.
10. Principles of land ownership will be based on the
fact that water, land and the mineral wealth under and on
the land, and the forests belong to the state. Land will
be given to villagers as private property.
11. Private persons cannot engage in directly buying
and selling of water and land with each other. These
transactions can only be enacted through the state. Laws
pertaining to ownership are determined by local custom and
jurisprudence.
12. Turkistan's freedom can only be ensured with
economic independence. In this vein, Turkistan will strive
to establish and develop modern economic relations with
neighboring countries.
13. The principal issue of land in Turkistan requires
that the whole nation work with all its might to irrigate
and expand cultivation. Water management must be handled
with great care.
14. In Turkistan, especially Kazak, Kirgiz, and
Turkmen provinces, the most important issue is the
transition from nomadic to settled life. This problem can
be solved by irrigating regions alongside large rivers. No
immigrants can be brought to Turkistan other than ethnic
Turks and Moslems.
15. The solution to the problem of workers in
Turkistan is dependent on the development of industry.
Working conditions of the workers, working hours, rights
of child and women laborers are determined according to
methods prevailing in developed countries.
16. Equal justice for everyone shall prevail. This
will be accomplished, without regard to differences in
religion and sect, by accepting and applying modern laws.
17. General free education is to be striven for.
Citizens can establish private educational institutions,
provided that they are not against the interests of the
state.
18. Importance shall be attached especially to the
establishment of trade schools and to sending students to
Europe.
19. Turkistan being the hearth of an ancient
civilization, those monuments of civilization accumulated
throughout centuries will be preserved, organized to serve
the development of the national civilization.
Togan observed:
It must be categorically stated that the
proposed future administration of Turkistan by
two parties, one radical national and other
socialist, was not influenced by any outside
thought. This developed due to local conditions
and in 1921 through consultations with the
educated leadership representing the local
population of Turkistan. The Alash Orda was
added to others to form a three party system.
At the time, during deliberations, Turkistan
nationals were not aware of the existence of the
two party systems in England and in the USA.
The Society and the Basmachi
Until the establishment of the Society, and
while the Emirate of Bukhara was still in
existence, the educated Turkistani were not in
contact with the Basmachi. Basmachi units
(parties) were largely based on the Kadimist
ulama and the elements of the fanatic Ozbek
bourgeoisie. During the 1917 Representative
Council elections, the educated were on List
Number Four. The ulama, opposing the educated,
thus labelled them dorduncu (4th) and engaged in
violent anti-Dorduncu propaganda. As a result,
the majority of the younger generation did not
trust the Drdnc during 1918-1919,
particularly since the educated were siding with
the soviets.45 As the hopes of the educated
were dashed by the Bolsheviks during 1920, they
joined the ranks of the Society. The abolition
of the Bukhara Emirate eliminated the reasons
preventing the youth from any action.
Collectively, these developments diminished the
influence of the ulama on the Basmachi. The
Society established contacts without any
hesitation with the Basmachi in Samarkand, Khiva
and Ferghana. The objective was to shape it
into a real national movement infused with
spirit, coupled with modern organization, to
form military units under the command of
educated individuals. To this end, educated
advisors and some instructor officers were sent
to them. The Emir of Bukhara regarded the
Bolsheviks as "Russia" until his last days and
attempted to remain "loyal." The Emir had
disarmed Osipov's military unit in Shehrisebz,
where it had sought protection within his
domains. When Shirmehmet and his friends of
Ferghana sent an embassy seeking a united front
with the Bukhara Emirate, the Bashvezir (Chief
Minister) Nizamettin Kushbeghi had responded
with : Are you not aware of our friendship with
the Russians," and tearing up Shirmehmet's
letter, trampled upon it. The members of the
embassy were jailed, only to be released seven
months later upon intervention of the Afghans.
Shirmehmet relates these events in his memoirs,
regarding the incident as a manifestation of the
Emir's extraordinary ignorance and heedlessness.
For that reason, a portion of the Basmachi were
not at al affected by the lapse of the Emirate.
Even some Basmachi, such as Mahkem Haji and
Toychi Korbashi,46 made peace with the
Bolsheviks, participating in the occupation of
Bukhara alongside the Bolshevik forces. After
the Fall of Bukhara, they returned to the ranks
of Basmachi, but were killed by Shirmehmet.
Shirmehmet and Rahmankul themselves sought to
establish contacts with the Society. Shirmehmet sent two
of his men, who were working within the Bolshevik
apparatus, to the Baku Congress. Through them, Togan
wrote:
A very interesting rumor pertaining to the
Bolshevik policies concerning the East began to
spread. Shirmehmet relates: "The information
arriving from Baku suggested that the Russians
wished to kill fourteen and a half million of
the inhabitants, only to retain two million
under their rule. In the Baku Congress, the
Turkistani decided not to lay down their arms
and sent word to intensify the struggle. At the
end of the Baku Congress, Basmachi Movement
caught fire."47
Togan also points to the Red Army's use of the
Russians living in Turkistan:
On 12 September Bolsheviks began serious attacks
from all directions. This was an
extraordinarily difficult time. Bolsheviks
inducted into the Red Army those Russians from
Central Russia who were starving, in order for
them to loot the population for bread (in
Turkistan). Hence, volunteer Russian numbers
swelled. These were fighting seriously, since
they would have died of starvation if discharged
from the army.
The atrocities of the Russians were increasing the resolve
of the Society and the Basmachi:
In the village of Sufiyan, near Dushanbe,
Russians found a Russian soldier with burns on
his face. Because of that, Russians killed all
OOzbek villagers they found in the vicinity.
Meanwhile, Bolsheviks, instigated by a communist
woman in their army, tied up seven OOzbek
soldiers, mutilating them with knives and swords
so as not to kill them. Afterwards, placing
these soldiers in the wheat heaps, set fire and
burnt them alive. A Basmachi, Mustafa Shahkul
observed: "This communist woman was so ugly and
despicable that any man swearing off all women
because of her would not have been
unjustified."48
Togan includes his discussions of the relationships
between Enver and Jemal Pashas and the Society:
Even before I became the Chairman of the Central
Committee of the Turkistan National Unity (The
Society), I was a member of that body.
Therefore, it is necessary to delve into the
relations between Enver and Jemal Pashas and the
Society. They sought to join forces with the
Bolsheviks by forming the "Islamic Revolutionary
Society," for the purpose of liberating the
Islamic world from European imperialism. First
Halil and Jemal, later Enver Pashas arrived in
Moscow with this aim and began their propaganda.
We49 spoke with Halil and Jemal during June 1920
in Moscow. Jemal Pasha explained his ideas and
urged us to work with him, but we left Moscow.
On 20 August, Jemal Pasha arrived in Tashkent.
His aim was to secure the environs of Punjab and
to establish an Islamic state there. He was
going to prepare in Afghanistan. With 15-20
Ottoman officers in his retinue, he left for
Afghanistan. In the meantime, Halil Pasha and
Haji Sami50 thought of establishing a truce with
the Bolsheviks, to cross over to Eastern
Turkistan via Yedisu and Narin (rivers). But
neither could they trust the Bolsheviks, nor
could the Bolsheviks trust them. Finally, they
returned to Moscow. Jemal Pasha told the
Bolsheviks that he could use the Basmachi for a
campaign to overthrow the British regime in
India. But the Bolsheviks did not believe him
in the least. We knew all this and the real
intentions of the Russians through our friends
working within the Communist Central Committees
of Moscow and Tashkent. The Russians thought
that Jemal Pasha was actually preparing an
organization to control Turkistan, and wanted to
keep the Pasha between the Indian and
Afghanistan borders as a last resort for their
own policies.
The personal representatives of Jemal Pasha, sent to
enter into discussions with various Basmachi groups, were
arrested by the Bolsheviks. This event, notes Togan:
Showed that Jemal Pasha did not have influence
among the Bolsheviks.... Jemal Pasha's advice
to the Basmachi was rather strange: "make peace
with the Bolsheviks, without giving up your
arms, or dissolving your organizations."
Although the Bolsheviks had previously tried
that method on many occasions, we were now
strictly against it.
On 25 January 1921, Central Committee of the
Turkistan National Unity (TNU) sent a letter to Jemal
Pasha, then at Kabul, via a courier of the Bukhara Foreign
Ministry. The said letter summarized the objectives (as
noted above) of the Organization, and continued:
....We ask that your Middle East policies be
drawn so as not to sacrifice the future of this
old Turkistan to plans in preparation for the
deliverance of the Islamic world. It is to the
benefit of all concerned, that all initiatives
concerning Turkistan be entered into via the
(TNU) Central Committee, including contacts with
the Basmachi. Likewise, no aid should be
extended to the Emir of Bukhara, currently in
Eastern Bukhara. Any support given to the Emir
(by the Afghan government) will be taken as
enmity towards our Committee. Even if we were
to accept, for a moment, that the Bolsheviks
remain sincere to their avowed position of
liberating the colonies from European
imperialists, Turkistan cannot subsume its
future to the as yet unknown outcome of
forthcoming struggle between capitalism and
socialism. Thus, policies pertaining to
Turkistan must be based on these principles.
Togan comments on this letter:
With these words, it was requested from Jemal
Pasha that he not seek to utilize the political
and military resources of Turkistan for the
dreamed of purpose of liberating India from the
English. The Pasha did not like this.
[Meanwhile] the Society steadily worked towards
its goals, despite the paucity of politically
experienced personnel among its ranks. Active
elements of the Moslem communists were channeled
into the activities of the Society. In all of
these provinces, members of the Society entered
into the Soviet Congresses, Communist Party
meetings. Everywhere, the police (militsia)
organizations and administrative organs were
under the influence of the Society. The labor
organizations of Bukhara, Tashkent, Samarkand
and Kokand were under the influence of the
members of the Socialist Tde (the Erk Party?)
branch of the Society. This was a monumental
success and promise for the future of Turkistan
and her inhabitants, who were relatively
inexperienced in such matters. Although the
individuals working within the government and
party machinery of Khiva, Tashkent and Orenburg
were not members of the Society, they were
completely cooperating. For that matter, they
were not aware of the details. Such success of
the Secret Organization could not have been
dreamed, for example, during 1917.
Togan relates details of other matters weighing on
the minds of the Central Committee members:
The national Flag was decided upon, having been
earlier debated and reconstructed from
historical elements, emblems and colors, at the
Samarkand sessions... teachers were sent in the
retinue of each Korbashi... ten mounted troops
were requested from in each Korbashi in
Ferghana, Samarkand; to be sent to the Ferghana
and Samarkand Commands. The purpose was to
conduct preliminary preparations for the
formation of a Turkistan-wide unified military
command; experiment with military operations...
All existing disagreements between tribal units
were resolved... those battalions in the
barracks of the Bolsheviks were arriving the
order to emerge as the units of the Turkistan
forces. The Society was in constant contact
with those high-level Russians who were against
the Bolsheviks, supplying the Society with
critical intelligence, thus preventing Bolshevik
surprise attacks. In sum, the Central Committee
of the Turkistan National Unity was taking all
precautions for a Turkistan-wide general and
final assault. The final stage would have been
accomplished by establishing military
superiority, through disrupting traffic and
communications of the opposition with their
center. The Moslem reactionaries (mrteci-
recidivist),51 as usual, were those Emirists and
the ulama that have not yet lost complete
credibility. These were still propagandizing
against all our efforts. The hope was to reform
them in a year or two. The arrival of Enver
Pasha in Turkistan at year's end and the
attitude of the Emirists recidivists toward him
turned all precautions upside-down.
Togan and Enver Pasha 52
Enver Pasha arrived in Bukhara and sent word
that he wished to speak with me. On 2 October
1921, I met him for the first time, and upon his
request provided him with the details of the
circumstances in Turkistan, especially the
status of the Society. Since he was
particularly concerned with the conditions in
Eastern Bukhara, I related to him the
difficulties we were facing there, and the lack
of progress due to the remnants of the Emirists.
He indicated that he was aware of those
conditions, that it would take an inordinate
time to standardize the general organization
through the Society, and this would be a waste
of time. He stated that he was directly going
to Eastern Bukhara and then to Ferghana with the
intention of giving a different form to the
Basmachi movement; he had made preparations to
that end, had obtained horses and equipment, and
had brought officers with him for the purpose;
he would be leaving Bukhara on the pretext of a
hunting expedition. Enver Pasha's arrival in
Bukhara, especially his plans, were a totally
unexpected development for us. A few months ago
this person was engaged in propaganda through
the pamphlets of "Union of Islam" and others, in
connection with Jemal Pasha, advocating
cooperation with the Bolsheviks against
imperialism. He was now not only taking a
position against the Bolsheviks, but actually
had brought plans to attack them... Enver Pasha
told me that he had been in Soviet Russia for
over a year now; [he had seen] that the
Bolsheviks were despicable people and he had
come to the conclusion that it was necessary to
liberate the Moslems from Red Imperialism before
any other Imperialism.... But his joining the
Basmachi or even his going to Eastern Bukhara
was not acceptable. I stressed that point
during our first meeting. He asked me what he
could do to be of service to Turkistan.
Truthfully, he appeared bewildered. We could
not meet every day, since he was under Bolshevik
surveillance. I wrote down 14 reasons why he
should not join the Basmachi, and sent it to
him. Main points were: The Russians are about
to wash their hands of external matters.
Henceforth they can concentrate all their
resources in Turkistan. Our organization, in
proportion to its duties, is very weak. This
year Turkistan is suffering from a great famine.
Ferghana is experiencing a crisis in its
attempts to feed the Basmachi . After joining
the Basmachi, you would want to fight with
regular fronts. At present, it is not feasible
to keep a standing army larger than five-six
thousand strong. It is only possible to conduct
guerilla warfare. As for the Basmachi in
Eastern Bukhara, it is not possible to cooperate
with them unless agreements are entered into
with the Afghans and the Emir will not allow you
to be recognized (as a leader). Hence, they
(Eastern Bukhara Basmachi) will not accept you
as such. Until today, the Turkistan question,
Basmachi movement and the secret political
activity has remained an internal issue of
Russia... If you join this struggle, the
Turkistan movement may assume a Pan-Islamist
character... This can cause the Russians
resident in Turkistan to unite with the
Bolsheviks, for their national objectives,
against us. The best course of action available
for you to cross over to Afghanistan and aid the
Turkistan movement from there... Pasha was
consulting with others on the topic. Some
individuals, whose names it would not be prudent
to reveal as yet, received Pasha's joining the
Basmachi with a positive attitude. Haji Sami
was another who was advocating this course.
Togan describes Enver's consultations and vacillation
over many days, and finally his decision (possibly on 28
October):
On the night of the following day, he sent word
asking me to meet him. He indicated that he was
going to Eastern Bukhara, to convene a congress
of the Basmachi and the educated. He asked me
to send men to Khiva, the Kazakhs, Ferghana,
Turkmen for the purpose of relaying his
decisions in the name of the Society and invite
representatives. I again objected and reminded
him that his crossing over to Afghanistan would
be the most suitable path. He was most annoyed.
I gathered that Enver Pasha was not at all fond
of objections. Apparently he was not going to
change his mind. The next night five or ten of
us met in someone's home. Enver Pasha related
his decision in careful phrases. Tears were
streaming down his face. Others were somber as
well... He was wearing German-made sports
boots. He was giving the impression of a
sportsman ready to jump into competition. He
related his most sincere thoughts... That day I
learned that this person was a great idealist,
who had not squared himself with events and
life, and he had not equipped himself with the
geography and the statistics of Turkistan even
from the Russian and the European
publications... Ten days later a special
courier brought a verbal message from Enver
Pasha in Bukhara: "Decided to go to Eastern
Bukhara. we will be Ghazi if we win, martyr if
we do not. Let the Turkmens (of Burdal k) not
await our arrival."
Togan records Enver's imprisonment by the
"frighteningly bigoted" Ibrahim53 of the Emirist Lakay
clan. The hasty attack induced by Ibrahim of the Lakays
upset carefully laid plans by the Society. Further, Enver
caused the premature emergence of a Turkistan army unit,
an orderly force of 600 rifles, that has been under
"Bolshevik" cover. The skirmish was lost to the
Bolsheviks, who were openly aided by the Emirist Lakays.
Enver Pasha and a few of his followers crossed over to
Afghanistan. By May, Enver Pasha had 7000 troops.
Volunteers from Afghanistan had turned the tide. But, he
was not without opposition. Togan relates an assessment
meeting after the latest event:
Enver Pasha was a fait accompli to the Society.
The Central Committee met in the vicinity of
Samarkand, discussing the state of affairs. It
was decided to regard this development as
specific to Bukhara border regions, not to
change the rest of the plans, not to declare
uprising in the name of the Society, to continue
guerilla warfare as before, to provide support
for Enver Pasha. But the early failures of
Enver's each initiative had a negative effect.
This was also true of Enver's propaganda.
Togan proceeds with the details of his war
preparations, listing the units, commands, commanders,
troop strengths, armaments under the Society auspices. He
quotes from the memoirs of other combatants, members of
the Society and participants in compiling this section.54
Togan also states that between April and July of the same
year he participated in the battles against the
Bolsheviks:
Between April-June, people and combatants of
Turkistan were cheerful and the Bolsheviks were
unable to leave the railroad lines. Comrades of
Stalin, Ilvaya and Ordzhonikidze, arrived from
Moscow in May. They could visit the Ulugh Bey
observatory55, two kilometers from Samarkand,
only in the company of a strong Bolshevik
military detachment. For that matter, if they
had not taken extreme precautions, they could
have been thrashed by the Basmachi who were
waiting in ambush.
The Beginning of the End
During mid-March, Feyzullah Hoja brought a
secret order from Moscow Communist Party
headquarters, consisting of a few articles,
about "serious struggle against Enver Pasha and
Validov (Togan) Group." Stalin himself
published an article in Pravda, under the title
of "Validovshchina," seeking to mobilize the
nationalist youth against us. The Red Army's
first action, after settling in Bukhara, was to
employ the Emirists. The Red Army charged a
high level official of the Emir, one Nusreddin
Aghal k, who had killed Mahmud Hoja Behbubi on
25 March 1919, with the administration of the
Karshi province. Since this man was also in
contact with the Emirist rebels, he was in a
position competently to quash all our
undertakings. As soon as he arrived in Karshi,
Aghal k detained some individuals who would have
been instrumental in carrying out the rebellion
of Shehrisebz, Guzar and Karshi garrisons.
These preparations were set and prepared for 23
March, by War Commissar Abdlmamid Arif. Those
of our essentially lax Jadid friends of Bukhara,
who were in contact with the military
organization in Karshi, became needlessly
frightened and stated: Nureddin Aghal k has
heard of our intentions... I personally
travelled for two weeks between Karshi,
Shehrisebz, Katta Kurgan, but was unable to
break the "Nureddin Aghal k" bands. In Kashan
and other regions, some troops, fourteen
educated Tatars and officers, Kashanl Behram
Bek, Jure Ishan and others were able to join the
Basmachi, but they could not carry with them the
stockpiled rifles and the ammunition. Molla
Mushtak, a chieftain under Molla Kahhar,
approached the Bashkurt army officers who were
under the direction of Heybetullah Suyunduk.
Disguised as Basmachi, Mushtak killed twelve men
during a rest period on 10 April.
Togan proceeds to answer a question oft misunderstood
both in and out of the region:
Now, let me illustrate the complexity of the
Turkistan question and the impossibility of
conducting these affairs only on the basis of
Turkism or of Islam, as Enver sought to, by way
of an incident in Samarkand: A group of
Russians, SR's, working in the cooperatives and
food distribution administration, and some
officers under their influence, were in contact
with the society, providing us with ammunition.
One individual, occupying the highest positions
in the General Staff (in the Turkistan Military
District) rendering us help. On 10 May, I met
with an officer representing this group in Bag-i
Bala of Samarkand. This group was seriously
frightened of Enver Pasha's operations. A
friend accompanying me stressed that Enver Pasha
was in Turkistan temporarily, but the officer
could not be persuaded. On that day I spoke
with an educated local Turk who had arrived from
Tashkent, in a garden near Ab- Rahmet.
Although an intellectually committed communist,
he was rendering important aid to the national
movement through the agency in which he was
employed. He and his friends were frightened by
the documents reaching their hands, signed by
Enver Pasha as "Deputy of Bukhara Emir, Son-in-
Law of the Caliph of Moslems, Seyyid Enver" and
the news that Enver was cooperating with the
Emir. I told this man: "Enver Pasha cannot
serve the Emir. He is not a monarchist either.
No one in the Society will be permitted to lean
towards monarchy. You can relay this to your
friends. The same day, Yusuf Ziya Bey of
Azerbaijan arrived from the side of Enver Pasha
with the title of "Commander-in-Chief of the
Northwest Front." He further claimed to bring a
verbal order from Enver Pasha, to the effect
that: "The Society should not be involved in
military affairs, but ought to confine its
efforts to propaganda. Yusuf had the seeming
intention of derailing the Zarafshan Basmachi
movement, which had been reorganized only by the
efforts of the Society. The next day, the young
man from Tashkent (I referred to above) saw
Yusuf Ziya Bey in Kanigul. Though Yusuf Ziya
Bey continued at length on the necessity of
having an autocrat for the martially inclined
Turks and that it would be very beneficial for
such a person also to be a "seyyid." Next, he
related that he had heard from Enver Pasha that
there were 30 million Turks in Western Turkistan
and another 25 million in Eastern Turkistan. On
the issue of Kazakistan, Yusuf Ziya Bey rejected
the proposals we put before him, which were done
in cooperation with the young man. Yusuf Ziya's
words and behavior entirely negated the
guarantees I gave to this young man the day
before. The young man was seriously grieved.
In the letters we received from Enver Pasha
after that incident, we found no confirmation of
the words spoken by Yusuf Ziya. Nonetheless, it
was clear that the statement of Yusuf Ziya, who
had no idea of the spirit of this generation
educated in the colonial psychology of Russian
schools, was going to leave a negative
impression on this young man and his cohorts.
And so it was.
Those of us noting the actions of the Emirists
and their intentions thought that the Society
was in a difficult position. Two days later, we
convened the Central Committee at a location
outside the city to discuss the developments in
detail. We regretfully observed that some
Basmachi groups were attempting to enter into
separate peace agreements with the Bolsheviks
due to the crisis at hand. To prevent the
united front from dissolving and to preserve the
Society, we decided to take immediate action.
In our opinion, the only solution to save the
national armies from being routed and
exterminated was to gather those Basmachi
leaders in difficulty and Enver Pasha in
Bukhara, to have them cross over to Afghanistan
freely. Troops were to give their arms to those
going to Afghanistan and they were to be sent
back to their villages. To this end, we decided
to write two letters: one to Enver Pasha, to
persuade him to cross over to Afghanistan and to
facilitate his opening communications with the
Russian Commander-in-Chief, general Kamenev, who
was expected to arrive in Bukhara. The other
was to be signed by me, as Chairman of the
Central Committee, to the Moscow Soviet
government, containing the conditions of peace,
on 12 May. Both were to be sent via special
couriers. The letter we sent to Moscow was
delayed due to the mistakes of our friends in
Tashkent. Enver Pasha, rather than accepting
our suggestion (perhaps before our courier
arrived), sent an ultimatum to the Russians
demanding that they withdraw from Turkistan,
Bukhara and Khiva. He signed it "Commander-in-
Chief of Turkistan, Bukhara and Khiva National
Armies."
A disciple of Enver Pasha arrives, visiting Togan's
at the headquarters of Achil Bey:
The Akhund was a Shii theologian. He liked to
talk on that topic. Akhund lectured the new
arrivals on the necessity of fortifying the
national movement from the religious aspect, and
that they must provide information to the troops
on the politics of Islam. He also looked
around, on the way to preparing for namaz, as if
to imply that everyone should be following him.
But, only some individuals regularly performed
namaz in the retinue of Achil Bey, and none
could pressure the others to do so. After the
event, I told the Akhund: "Among Samarkand
Ozbeks, the traditions of Timur is still
dominant. Beys will not consult with the ulama
and the sheyks, even those they greatly respect,
on affairs of religion and military. The hoja
and the sheyks do not even think of requesting
such. Beys will go to namaz once a week, on
Fridays. If I and my Bashkurt officers feel
like it, we will perform namaz If we do not,
nobody will question us. Therefore, while you
are in Samarkand, in the retinue of Achil Bey,
it would be very commendable for you to be
attentive to these matters." Akhund Yusuf
Talibzade, who had the objective of uniting the
Turks with other Moslems on the basis of Islamic
political plane, did not like my words. On
another occasion, my friend Kaari Kamil brought
kimiz.56 It was plentiful. The spirit of the
ensuing conversations were based on the dastans
of Koroglu and Yusuf Ahmet. In the afternoon,
an Ozbek played the ney (a wood-wind
instrument), I recited a couplet in Persian.
Kaari Kamil and other friends repeated in Ozbek.
Akhund said: "There is ney but no mey (wine)"
and I responded "In this land of ours, kimiz is
consumed during summer. Your not being
satisfied with kimiz and asking for wine, though
you are an educated Islamic scholar, will not be
received well in this society, because we do not
prefer wine to kimiz. Akhund asked: "Do you not
drink wine?" I said: "Why not? But that is not
the issue. Since you are a representative of
Enver Pasha, there may be those in these yaylaks
(summer pastures) who might disapprove of your
drinking wine instead of kimiz. Kaari Kamil
added: "We know you as a religious scholar, a
Koranic Commentator," and prevented wine being
offered to the Akhund.
After these events, Togan chronicles the battles in
which he took part. He provides political and military
repercussions of each, as well as details. He was
receiving intelligence from Moscow to the effect that
large formations of Bolshevik troops from the Western
front were on their way to Turkistan. There were attempts
on his life. After numerous meetings of the Central
Committee, a decision was made to fall back and regroup.
The "above ground" members of the Society were being
pursued by Russian military formations. They dispersed,
preparing to cross the Russian unit lines incognito, to
meet in Tashkent. Togan, along with two of his friends
chose a mountainous route. After much difficulty, they
arrived in Tashkent. According to the decisions taken in
a series of further meetings, Togan was to leave
Turkistan. He left, after sending a final letter to
Lenin:
20 February 1923
Dear Vladimir Ilich,
Due to your illness, it is possible that you
might have been prevented from reading this
letter or it might not have reached you. But
since I sent copies of it to some other friends,
it is now a historical document. Comrade Stalin
ostensibly stated that under Comrade Rudzutak's
auspices I could return to the Party. In other
words they (Party) would disregard the letter I
sent to the Central Committee from Baku in 1920,
outlining my opposition to and initiatives
against Moscow by joining the Rebellion.
However, who can believe that and return?
Especially since you have abrogated the 20 March
1919 agreement which was signed by you, Stalin,
myself and my friends; by your order of 19 May
1920 signed only by you and Stalin? When I
personally protested that latter order, you had
characterized our 20 March 1919 agreement "only
a piece of paper." However, that agreement
announced that Bashkurts would retain the right
of maintaining their own army and that army was
going to be under the command of Soviet
Headquarters without intermediary stages. With
your 19 May 1920 order, you have deprived the
Bashkurt army of those provisions, assigning it
to the trans-Volga army, disbursing the Bashkurt
units as the trans-Volga Headquarters saw fit
among its formations. Indeed, that is what
happened and today there is no physical Bashkurt
army. Similarly, in the same order what was
deceivingly termed "attaching Ufa to
Bashkurdistan" turned out to be the reverse,
attaching Bashkurdistan to the Ufa province.
Consequently, what was conceded to the "Russian
moslems" on 20 December 1917, "the right to
secede from Russia," should they choose, has
been destroyed from its foundations by your
order of May 1920. From now on, following the
defeat of Bashkurts, Kazakhs and the Turkistanis
in the South-West and my departure from Soviet
Russia as of tomorrow, a ne era shall begin in
their history; that is, rather than seeking
their legal equality with the Russians (in the
Russian context), that experimentation having
failed, the transition to the international
arena (for seeking those rights) is being made.
My task will be to familiarize the world with
the history of those struggles.57 The
Veklikiirus nation has already decided on the
specific policy to be applied to the captive
nations and tribes they are holding, not only in
economic and social matters, but also in
cultural affairs. The "Eastern University"
which you established last year is operating as
a center for these policies. A specialized
"eastern affairs" group, comprised of Velikiirus
personnel around the Central Committee has also
been formed. The CC has brought in certain
individuals of the eastern nationalities of the
Soviet domains, charged with the specific duty
of preparing material for these "eastern
specialists." Those eastern nationals even
published certain books and pamphlets. But, the
topics they are to work on are assigned by your
Velikiirus. These non-Russian intellectuals are
not even being admitted into the debates on the
"constitutions" which are being prepared to
govern them. Today, the main task on which the
CC Eastern Affairs Specialists are working is to
prepare separate alphabets and literary
languages for each nationality and tribe, based
on the extant local "phonetic" differences
between them. In principle, the non_russian
communists are said to be serving only as
consultants in this endeavor. In the latest
issue of the journal Kizil Shark, published by
the members of the Eastern University, contained
a commentary by one mer Aliyev of Daghestan.
According to him, should the Cyrillic alphabet
be accepted for the Northern Caucasus Turkish
dialects, this would lead to Christianization.
Further, he has reportedly said, it would be
necessary to borrow the Latin alphabet in use in
Azerbaijan (sic).58 It is imperative that the
issues of Alphabet and literary language
(according to Aliyev) not require Russian help,
but the aid of those governments formed on the
basis of national political freedom, and should
be accomplished by native scholars. These
writings and efforts of the Azerbaijanis to
gather the intellectual communist of the Turk
tribes around Kizil Shark and one literary
language is said to be making the Velikiirus
specialists nervous, angry. When Shahtahtinskii
and Jelal Guliev of Azerbaijan defended a single
alphabet based on Latin, Prof. Polivanov and
other Russians are said to have stated that even
if the Latin alphabet is accepted, this would be
replaced by the cyrillic and a special sub-set
will be created for Turkish dialects, whose
number was approaching forty. Shahtahtinskii
retorted that the aim of Russians was not to
allow standard literary language to live. It is
now understood that, when you Velikiirus friends
begin playing with the language and the syntax
of a people, you will not let their collars free
until they, too, become complete Russians. It
is not possible not to be surprised to observe
the differences between your current policies
and your writings in "Against the Tide" and in
your other writings, where you state that
ideally, the rights of nations should be placed
in their hands. Your representative comrade
Zeretskii gave numerous conferences to our
people, during the summer of 1919 while we were
refurbishing our army in Saransk, to the effect
that the Soviet government was the first in
history to base the freedoms of captive nations
on their own national armies. I myself
published an article in Pravda in the same vein.
It has not been four years since those events
and it appears that your policies will be
developing in the opposite direction. RKP may
continue to claim, in Asia and the countries far
away from Russia, such as Africa, that it will
liberate them. The truth is, your Velikiirus
become angry when people such as Gregori Safarov
display the colonial policies of the tsar in
Turkistan. Those Velikiirus enjoy hearing the
native communists liken themselves to small fish
being eaten by the whale, better if that
argument were presented as a proverb. When
comrade Artium was visiting us, he used to state
his belief that except for China and India, the
Soviet Russian culture would become dominant in
all of Asia. Those native languages and
cultures attempting to prevent this would not be
worth dwelling upon, since they are only going
to be used to spread communism. These and
similar words were repeated elsewhere. Without
a doubt, this will be carried-out and as a
result all those nations who wish to retain
their independence but have become your
prisoners will view Soviet Russia as their
foremost enemy. I mentioned these matters to
you while you and I were discussing your theses
on "Colonialism and the Nationality Question."
Later, I read your aforementioned theses in
Kommunisticheskii Internatsional journal (No.
11) once more. You have suggested that even
after the establishment of the worldwide
dictatorship of the proletariat, "it would be
obligatory for the vanguard nationalities to
actively participate in the establishment of
socialist regimes in the less developed
countries." This translates into perpetuating
the colonial regimes in India by the British, in
Turkistan by Russia, in Africa by French and the
Belgium through their labor organizations. When
I spoke with you and your friends in Ufa during
1919, never was there a mention of the use of
terror to destroy the human self-determination.
What happened? Wa that the object of those
revolutions? Piatokov was correct when he
directed this question to you while debating the
"labor unions" issues. You were beseeched not
to take away those revolutions from the labor
unions whose sweat and blood were spilled for
it. It is said that even Rosa Luxembourg was of
the opinion that no good would come of
socialism, should it become a prisoner of
imperialist traditions serving great nations.
If Russia has not descended into the lows of
becoming the prisoner of imperial traditions,
what business did it have concocting literary
languages and alphabets from the regional
vernaculars? If you are alive, perhaps you can
personally correct some of these errors. I have
but one request: I ask that permission be given
to my wife Nefise to meet me in Germany; she
could not accompany me tomorrow on the way to
Iran, due to her pregnancy.
Ahmet Zeki Validov.
NOTES:
1. Speech at the Fourth Conference of the Central
Committee of the RKP(b) with the responsible Workers of the
National Republics and Regions, 10 June 1923. "The Sultan
Galiev Case." J. V. Stalin, Works. (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1953). Vol. 5, 1921-1923. Pp. 308-319. For
a reprint of this speech, see A. Bennigsen and S. E. Wimbush,
Moslem National Communism (Chicago, 1979).
2. As he refers to himself in his writings.
3. H. B. Paksoy, "Basmachi" Modern Encyclopedia of
Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union (FL: Academic
International Press, 1991). Vol 4, Pp. 5-20.
4. Z. V. Togan, Hatiralar. (Istanbul, 1969).
Introduction.
5. Z. V. Togan's Turkili Turkistan was first printed
in Cairo 1928-1939, although it was not widely distributed due
to the prevailing conditions. The first Latin alphabet printing
was effected during 1947 in Istanbul. It was reprinted,
effectively the third time, in Istanbul, in 1981 (696 Pp.),
although it carries the designation of 2nd Edition. Turkili is
primarily a history text. Togan's Hatiralar, on the other hand,
contains more personal observations on his involvement.
6. Most of the quotations are taken from Pp. 399-474
of Turkili (1981 edition) and Pp. 365-463 of Hatiralar.
Biographical material is primarily from the earlier pages of the
latter work. Therefore, extensive page references shall not be
given.
7. See H. B. Paksoy, Central Asian Monuments.
(Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992). Introduction, for a bibliography of
readily accessible versions. According to Ottoman archival
material (in Bashbakanlik Arshivi), it appears that Kro lu was a
real person living in the c. 16th century, around Bolu province
in Asia Minor.
8. See the short biography of Akchura by David S.
Thomas in H. B. Paksoy, Central Asian Monuments.
9. Given the date of original writing, these
references are to the respective liberation movements.
10. Turkili, Pp. 486-526.
11. Although Togan's Memoirs cover the period up to
and including the year 1925, as a consummate professional
historian, he often provides information on the resolution of
many an event, down to the days during which he was writing the
memoirs themselves. On the other hand, Togan does not introduce
new issues after 1925.
12. Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire and the Turks of Central
Asia (London, 1953). Indeed, Caroe acknowledges his indebtedness
to Togan.
13. Togan's spellings.
14. For discussion of religious terms, see M. G. S.
Hodgson, The Venture of Islam (Chicago, 1974). 3 Vols.
15. Despite their names, neither was Russian, but both
had been Baptized. Togan calls Katanov a Sagay-Turk from the
Altai region and Ashmarin, a Chuvash-Turk.
16. See Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar
Historical Consciousness: Shihabeddin Marcani and the Image of
the Golden Horde" Central Asian Survey. Vol. 9, No. 2; 1990. Pp.
39-49.
17. Another prominent Orientalist of the era.
18. It was translated into English: V. V. Barthold,
Four Studies on the History of Central Asia (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1963). Volume II, Ulugh-Beg.
19. A German born and trained compiler of Turkish
materials.
20. See H. B. Paksoy, "Basmachi" Modern Encyclopedia
of Religions in Russia and Soviet Union (FL: Academic
International Press, 1991). Vol. 4, Pp. 5-20.
21. See Edward J. Lazzerini, "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's
Perevodchik/Tercman: A Clarion of Modernism. H. B. Paksoy,
Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul, Isis Press, 1992) and
the sources quoted.
22. For the last two, see Audrey L. Altstadt, The
Azerbaijani Turks (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992).
23. See Fen-Edebiyat Fakultesi Arastirma Dergisi,
Ataturk Universitesi, Erzurum. Say 13, 1985. This source
contains some biographical material, especially on the post 1925
period, not found in Turkili or Hatiralar.
24. Ulama in the khanates of Bukhara or Khiva were not
part of this official structure, The Spiritual Board. As Togan
describes however, the Kadimist/Emirist ulama in these khanates
were also siding with the Russians. The ulama hoped to eliminate
the challenge to their own authority, presented by the reformist
Jadids, by liquidating the latter with the aid of the Russians.
25. According to the handlist of his papers, Togan
also completed a history of the Bashkurts and the Bashkurt Army.
This work remains unpublished. In Hatiralar there are extended
references to the past of the Bashkurt Army and its operations.
R. Baumann, in his "Subject Nationalities in the Military Service
of Imperial Russia: The Case of Bashkirs" Slavic Review
Fall/Winter 1987, argues that "...Bashkirs have parallels among
Apache Scouts in the US, the Gurkhas in India, the Philippine
Scouts, or the Natal Native Contingent in Africa." Baumann's
account ends at 1914.
26. Togan relates that secret agents of Bolsheviks,
trying to win over the Bashkurt troops, were being killed by the
latter on the spot. As a result, he reports "such elements
stopped coming even near the barracks."
27. See Society for Central Asian Studies, Programmnie
dokumenti musulmanskih politicheskih partii 1917-1920 gg. Reprint
Series, No. 2. (Oxford, 1985).
28. A biography is published: Naim Karimov, Cholpan
(Tashkent: Fan, 1991). Cf. Naim Karimov, "Exposing the Murderer
of Alpamysh;" translated by Shawn T. Lyons, from Shark Yulduzi
(Tashkent) 12:1992, in H. B. Paksoy, Ed., Central Asia Reader
(NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994).
29. In Russian language Sources "Sultan Galiev." For
his and other Central Asians referenced by Togan, see Moslem
National Communism. For a more recent treatment, see Masayuki
YAMAUCHI, The Dream of Sultangaliev (Tokyo, 1986), in Japanese.
Also the sources cited by YAMAUCHI in his "One Aspect of
Democratization in Tatarstan: The Dream of Sultangaliev
Revisited" presented to the Conference on Islam and
Democratization in Central Asia, held at the University of
Massachusetts-Amherst, 26-27 September 1992.
30. For the two personages and the organization, See
S. Shaw & E. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 1977).
31. Provided to the Bashkurt RevKom by the Bolsheviks,
along with several automobiles; confiscated from foreign
missions.
32. Translation of its platform is below.
33. Togan notes that a copy of this letter was later
brought to Berlin in 1923.
34. Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Padishah Ghazi was a
direct descendant of Timur (d. 1405), and the founder of the
Moghul dynasty in India. Babur's memoirs were widely known.
They were published in facsimile under the title Babar-Nama by
Anette S. Beveridge (Leiden-London, 1905). An English
translation was also made by Beveridge (London, 1922); reprinted
at least once, in 1969.
35. For the Russian/Bolshevik period, see Seymour
Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and
Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, MA., 1968). For the earlier period,
see R. N. Frye, The History of Bukhara (Cambridge, MA., 1954).
36. See the Kadimist ulama above.
37. Who was the first Minister of Interior, and later,
of Defense. Earlier, Arif was Togan's military aide in the
Bashkurt Movement.
38. Togan provides the details of intellectual
currents "that might have effected the thoughts of the
individuals preparing this program" in Turkili Pp. 415-416.
39. Program in Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 410-411.
40. Togan notes that this program was expanded and
republished in Prague during 1926 in a bilingual edition. See
Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 411-414.
41. Uli Schamiloglu, "The Formation of a Tatar
Historical Consciousness: Shihabeddin Marcani and the Image of
the Golden Horde" Central Asian Survey (London) Vol. 9, No. 2,
1990.
42. Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "Abdul Kayum
Al-Nasyri: A Tatar Reformer of the 19th Century" Central Asian
Survey (Oxford) Vol. 1, No. 4, 1983.
43. See Edward J. Lazzerini, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's
Perevodchik/Tercuman: A Clarion of Modernism" H. B. Paksoy,
Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1992) and
the sources cited therein.
44. Togan, Turkili Turkistan, Pp. 416-418.
45. A particular perspective on the Drdnc, from the
Kirghiz side, can be found in H. B. Paksoy, "Observations Among
Kirghiz Refugees from the Pamirs of Afghanistan Settled in the
Turkish Republic" Journal of the Anthropological Society of
Oxford Vol. XVI, No. 1, Hilary, 1985.
46. Korbashi is the title of preference of the
Basmachi leaders, origins of which explained as "Commander of
Defense Troops" in Mahmut Kashgarli's 11th c. work Compendium of
Turkic Dialects.
47. Togan, Turkili, Pp. 419-421.
48. Togan, Turkili P. 427.
49. The Bashkurt Movement leadership. See above.
50. Glenda Fraser, in her "Haci Sami and the Turkestan
Federation 1922-3" Asian Affairs (London). Vol. XVII (Old Series
Vol. 74) Part I, February 1987, follows Haji Sami tied to Enver's
path.
51. It must be remembered that Murteci has a much
stronger meaning than just "reactionary." Togan is remarkably
restrained in his reference.
52. See S. S. Aydemir for a biography of Enver,
Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Pa a (Istanbul, 1972) 3 Vols.
Aydemir himself was one of the early students at KUTVA, in
Moscow. He met Enver in the Caucasus during the First World War,
and later in Moscow. Aydemir subsequently worked to propagate
Bolshevism in the newly established Turkish Republic (which had
waged a similar and successful war of independence, 1919-1924, in
Asia Minor), was jailed. After his release, Aydemir entered the
Turkish Republic government service. See also Azade-Ayse
Rorlich, "Fellow Travelers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik
Government 1918-1920)" Asian Affairs (London) Vol. XIII (old
Series Vol. 69) Part III. October 1982).
53. Togan knew this individual well, having met him
during his earlier trip sponsored by the Imperial Academy of
Sciences.
54. It appears that the referenced memoirs were kept
very much in the tradition of the bitikchi of earlier eras. It
is well known that military units of the Turks always employed
such recorders on the battlefields for the purpose of keeping
tabs on the performance of individual troops. After the
termination of fighting, rewards and promotions or punishment and
demotions were dispensed accordingly.
55. See Kevin Krisciunas, "Legacy of Ulugh Beg." H.
B. Paksoy, Editor, Central Asian Monuments (Istanbul: Isis Press,
1992).
56. See H. B. Paksoy, "Sun is also Fire" Central Asian
Monuments, footnote 106.
57. The text in the rest of this paragraph is garbled
at the typesetter, Hatiralar, P. 461.
58. See Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks for the
alphabet issues in Azerbaijan.
Information Societies, new Terrorism: its impact on International Politics 
