Introduction
Building a new government machine in Iraq is really an enormous endeavor because of the challenges, biases and absence of "one fit for all” type of democracy and institution building.
In this paper, after touching the circumstantial factors challenging the institution building in general, and democracy building in particular, in Iraq, I will analyze the four options of democracy building for Iraq: Partition, ethnic democracy, liberal democracy and consociational democracy.
Challenges and Biases in the Institution Building in Iraq
There are many factors challenging the institution design in Iraq. I will touch five of them within the scope of this paper.
First, the Iraqi population comprises several deeply divided cleavages, and sub-cleavages. There are three major and two minor cleavages in Iraq: Kurds, Sunni Arabs, Shiites, Turkomens and Assyrians. Shiites comprises the largest part of the population, then Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. Turkomens and Assyrians comprise the smallest portion of the entire population. Moreover, there are deep divisions within those cleavages. For example, Kurds have been divided into two major tribal factions: one has been leading by Barzani family, and another has been leading by Jallal Talabani. These two groups were in fight occasionally, in the last decades. In mid 1990s, Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) invited Saddam’s forces to attack against Talabani, and killed many Kurds from Talabani side. Similarly, there are several factions within the Shiite community that have irreconcilably different ideologies. For example, there are radical differences in terms of expectations from a democratic Iraq, and use of violent power to resolve the conflicts between the Shiite factions led by Al Sadr, and Chalabi.
The differences between the cleavages can be explained by primordial views, as there are primordial differences (i.e. language, territory, and religious interpretations) between the cleavages. However, the conflicts within the same cleavage can be explained predominantly by instrumentalist view. For example, elites’ competing for expanding power and providing better socioeconomic conditions for the members of their tribe is an instrumental factor.
The second challenge in Iraq is the militia groups currently controlled by the local leaders. For example, there were about 55,000 active militias controlled by four different cleavages, according to the report from GAO in 2004. The Barzani’s KDP has controlled about 31,000 of these active militias (Government, 2004, 13). Such amount of force out of government control constitutes a potential threat to any regime in Iraq.
The third challenge is the competition among the cleavages to take the control of oil revenues particularly in Kirkuk region. Kirkuk is one of the two richest oil regions in Iraq. Currently the population of Kirkuk is almost equally comprises Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Turkomens. Such demographic arrangement implies absence of clear majority in the region; therefore, these cleavages compete to take the control of the oil revenue. Indeed, the Kirkuk situation is worse than that. The current demographic arrangement was artificially created by Saddam. Saddam forced the indigenous Turkomens and Kurds to migrate from Kirkuk, and replace Sunni Arabs in the Kirkuk region. The forced immigrants have been attempting to return back their home. However, these people do not have proof of their properties in Kirkuk because the property title deed archives were looted and fired after the American occupation of Kirkuk. In brief, the oil, forced migration and looting of property title deed archives makes Kirkuk one of the problematic regions of Iraq.
The fourth challenge is controlling oil revenue in entire Iraq. The cleavages, as well as the foreign countries compete to take the control of oil revenue. The US is trying to reimburse the war and reconstruction costs of Iraq by using the oil revenue. I believe that US attempts to take portion from oil revenue for reimbursing the cost of the reconstruction alienate the indigenous people.
The fifth challenge is that the role of religion in the new Constitution. In my understanding from the transitional law is that the new approach to Constitution attempts at combining secular and Islamic law tradition which may cause conflicts.
As well as the challenges enumerated, there are internal and external biases in the democracy building in Iraq. The internal biases contain Iraq’s primordial ties such as culture, customs, history, etc. For example the status of women in culture affects the status of women in the new Constitution. The external biases contain the pressures from the US and UN which assumes responsibility for establishing a stable and democratic government in Iraq, and the countries attempting at taking portion from oil revenue of Iraq.
The Options for the New Iraq
Acknowledging the challenges and biases, the new Iraqi Constitution has to provide civil and political rights for the entire population of Iraq; thereby, it provides a peaceful and effective trajectory for the institutions of the new Iraq. The trajectory that Constitution should provide can be designed after answering the following major questions. First, is Iraq going to have a federal structure in favoring of decentralized power, or unitary structure with centralized power? Second, is Iraq going to have a presidential or parliamentary system? Third, is the government going to have plurality elections or proportional representation? Fourth what will be the role of religion in the design of the institutions (Horowitz, 2004; Lijphart, 1993)? The first three are intertwined issues. For example, presidential system paves way for the two party systems as the presidency is a big price that can be obtained by the member of a big party.
The answers to these questions are strongly associated with the options for accommodation of the inter-cleavage conflicts in Iraq. Smooha and Hanf (1994, 329-333) identify these options as follows: partition, ethnic democracy, consociational democracy and liberal democracy. After elaborating the pros and cons of these four options in this section, I will answer the four questions for the option that I choose as the best one for Iraq.
Option I - Partition
There are two basic premises of the partition. First, it provides stability to the regime by preventing subordinated minority from internationalizing its predicament and thereby destabilizing the relevant regime and international order. Second, it addresses the minority grievances by assigning self-determination to the groups.
Partition reduces incentives and opportunities for conflict. It may be effective solution for the countries with a history of intense conflict (Smooha et al., 1994, 330). To Kauffman (1996, 137), partition is the best solution for the ethnic civil wars, as it is the only solution to prevent the large scale grievances such as genocide and mass killings.
Given the fact that the current groups in Iraq have potential to initiate a civil war, partition is an option for the new Iraq. In fact, in Kauffman’s view, partition should be done as soon as possible to avoid of genocide as in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo after the collapse of former Yugoslavia.
Both Kaufmann (1996, 137), and McGarry and O’learry (1994, 334) contends that demographic and territorial separation between the conflicted groups is one of the prerequisites for the partition option.
I think that partition is not an effective option for Iraq for (at least) five reasons. First of all territorial separation is not possible particularly in the regions where both the stake and conflict is at high level, such as Kirkuk. In other words, the territorial separation is potentially disputable in the oil regions (i.e. Kirkuk and Mosoul), despite it is less ambiguous at the other parts. Even if the partition is taken place, it produces population movement a potential grievance, and it leaves significant minorities behind in the disputable territories.
Second, the demographic separation is not possible as the intermarriage between Kurds and Arab Sunnis are high.
The third reason for the partition option is the intra-cleavage conflicts. For example, Kurds are divided at least into two groups, and Shiites are divided at least into five political factions. Taking Kurds, KDP leaded by Barzani, and PUK leaded by Talabani are more than political parties. They have their territorial autonomy, militia, social institutions such as schools. Moreover, there has been a long dispute including a war between KDP and PUK. In such circumstances, the partition is more likely to produce domino effect to cause further partitions within the ethnic cleavages.
Fourth, partition is not good for the economy since the duplication of the governing machine is costly and present world economic system is in favor of large states (Smooha, 1994, 330).
The last challenge is peculiar to the Kurds. The new president of Iraq is Talabani, a very prominent Kurdish (i.e. PUK) leader. Talabani’s position may ensure at least the PUK faction of Kurds that they are well represented in the big Iraq state.
Option - II Liberal Democracy
One of the basic premises of liberal democracy is to maximize individual rights while minimizing the collective rights. In liberal democracies, all citizens irrespective of their identities are considered equal in all respects. Liberal democracies do not consider the collective identities such as ethnicity, nationalism, etc. In that sense, liberal democracy has favors assimilation of collective identities (Smooha, et al., 1994, 332). By assimilating the collective identities, liberal democracies focuses on individuals and pushes decision making mechanism at a level closest to the citizens. For instance, public polls and interest groups are influential in decision making in liberal democracies.
I think liberal democracy is not an effective option for three reasons. First, liberal democracy can be a preferable option for Iraq as it theoretically solves the inter-group conflicts by eradicating the groups. However, this is not likely to be happened in Iraq where collective identities are dominant. Furthermore, it is more likely that the groups, in spite of their non-deprived socioeconomic conditions may claim state recognition of their identities, and territorial autonomy (Smooha, et al., 1992, 332). Such claim destabilizes the established government.
Second, collective identities in Iraq can always be used to mobilize the individuals to maintain the democratic order after its establishment. Hence, eradicating collective identities is not always an acceptable option for maintaining the democracy in Iraq.
Third, the liberal democracies that have been implemented for long time have shown that liberal democracy does not guarantee liberty of ethnic minorities (McGarry, et al, 1993, 340).
Option III - Ethnic Democracy
One of the basic premises of ethnic democracy is to institutionalize the dominance of one ethnic group to sustain effective, stable, and productive government with clear accountability and without repressing the population (Quade, 1993, 170). Since Shiites are the majority in Iraq, I expect that ethnic democracy in Iraq means giving governance of the country to the Shiites.
Ethnic democracy brings majoritarian government. It remains at the power during the mandated term; subsequently it has more opportunity to implement the policies. Therefore, it provides stability and efficiency (Lardeyret, 1993, 160).
I think ethnic democracy is not an effective option for Iraq for three reasons. First, it excludes the citizens who do not belong to the major ethnic group from the governance. This contradicts to the essence of democracy providing equal rights for all. Excluding from the governance is likely to lead to inter group conflicts, and secession. Kurds, for instance, may prefer secession in case of the ethnic democracy excluding them from the governance of Iraq. Second, ethnic democracy has no incentive to produce a homogenous national identity by moderating the extreme ethnic differences. Third, ethnic democracy in Iraq may provide opportunity for the long tenures in offices for fixed group of politicians. For example, the leaders of Iraqi groups such as Barzani, al-Sistani, and others have been the life tenure leaders of their community. In case of ethnic democracy, it is more likely to have a kind of monarchy in Iraq as the same persons govern the country until they die.
Option IV - Consociational Democracy
One of the basic premises of consociational democracy is to paving a way for the minority representation through mechanisms of power sharing, group autonomy as well as proportionality and mutual veto (Lijphart, 1993, 151). In fact, to Lijphart (2002, 39), these four mechanism (i.e. power sharing, autonomy, proportionality and mutual veto) are the major ingredients of consociational democracy. Sharing executive power entails representation of different groups in political decision making. The groups are represented at the highest government positions proportional to the demographics. And, minorities have veto power, as well as territorial and institutional autonomy to run their cultural and internal affairs
Consociational democracy focuses on maximizing the representation of all cleavages. This leads to producing many minority parties in Iraq. In the light of rational choice theory, it is expected that those minority parties build coalition to maximize their election possibility. Hence, consociational democracy leads to multiparty coalitions. Multiparty coalitions along with the assumption that Iraqi party leaders have control over their constituents leads to increase inter-cleavage interactions, an essential ingredient of unity and peace in the society.
There are seven major critiques of consociational democracy. Lijphart (2002, 40-45) reports six of them, and answers accordingly. The critiques adopted for the Iraqi case are follows:
First, it is claimed that consociational democracy is not sufficiently democratic. But, as discussed in the previous sections, ethnic and liberal democracies do not give hope for peace as much as consociational democracy for Iraq. Besides, Lijphart (2002, 40-41) notes that consociational democracy does not provide democracy less than majoritarian democracy which is claimed to be more democratic by the critiques.
Second, it is claimed that consociational democracy is not practical as it assumes one leader for each divided group, while there are multiple leaders for the groups, in reality. Furthermore, the critiques claim that coalition government in Iraq as a likely result of the consociational practice is always problematic in terms of quick decision making and efficient policy implementations. I think that this critique confuses the ethnic divisions and political divisions. There are multiple leaders within each ethnic group in Iraq, but there seems to be no competition for the leader of the political groups. For example, there is no competition fro being a leader of KDP, or PUK, or INA, etc. The consociational democracy, subsequently, accept the political group, - but not ethnic groups- as the autonomous entities within the democracy.
Third, consociational democracy does not provide adequate incentives for the majority groups which may have the potential to have all political power in a majoritarian democracy (Horowitz, 2002, 20). However, Lijphart (2002, 43-44) notes that it provides incentive for the minority groups to build coalition, and to make the democracy work.
Fourth the regional autonomy ingredient leads to partition and secession, because the consociational system may produce grand canyons in the legislative body by reproducing the divided legislature (Lardeyret, 1993, 164; Quade, 1993, 166). Lijphart (2002, 44) notes that recent historical record shows that this is not true. In addition, it is hard to accept that centralized structure prevent secession in a country where separatist sentiment is strong.
Fifth, consociational democracy exacerbates the conflictual differences between the groups by inviting extremists to the government (Lardeyret, 1993, 164; Quade, 1993, 169). For example, Muqtada Al-Sadr’s faction, an extremist group, is going to be represented in the government. Existence of such extremist groups in the government may exacerbate the conflicts. The exacerbation problem of the differences getting worse when the leaders of the cleavages are not as tolerable to the other groups as it is assumed at the foundation of the consociational democracy (Horowitz, 2002, 20). On the other hand, to Lijphart (2002, 45), recognizing ethnic groups plays constructive role in conflict resolution. I think exclusion of some groups may exacerbate the conflicts more than inclusion of them. On the other hand, exclusion of violent extremist may be necessary to protect the government system. Electoral system with threshold voting hinders the representation of marginal extremists in the government. Such electoral system can be accommodated within the moderate version of consociational democracy.
Sixth, sharing/autonomy model is designed for the Western world and it is not applicable to Iraq. Lijphart (2002, 45) reports that historical evidence in Malaysia, and Lebanon disprove this claim.
Seventh, once a consociational democracy is established, it is relatively difficult to get rid of it as no party is willing to share their power. The critiques also argue that transition from ethnic or liberal democracy to the consociational democracy is relatively less painful. I think that this criticism is not credible as the majoritarian power does not want to share its power in a consociational structure while transition from majoritarian to consociational democracy.
Conclusion
Regarding challenges and biases mentioned earlier in this paper, consociational democracy is the best for Iraq in terms of political and civil rights. In other words, the Iraqi society with relatively fewer deeply divided cleavages controlled by strong leaders, and Iraq with rich oil revenues and authoritarian past; a democratic arrangement providing greatest inclusion for all the cleavages in the decision making process including control of oil revenue is the best for Iraq. Such arrangement can be provided by consociational democracy calling for easier power sharing than the ethnic and liberal democracies.
I believe that consociational democracy maximizes the equal opportunity among the different groups in terms of political power and socioeconomic conditions through federal, parliamentary system with proportional representation. I argue that the federal system matches the consociational democracy better for Iraq than unitary system as the regional autonomy requires decentralized executive power. I also argue that parliamentary system is better than presidential one for Iraq because a powerful executive who necessarily belong to one cleavage of the Iraqi society promotes attacks from the other cleavages. I also argue that the proportional system is better than the others in terms of meeting such democratic norms as participation, representativeness, equality, and accountability (Lijphart, 1993, 149). However, the proportional system should be moderate by putting threshold votes for being represented in the government as in Germany and Sweden. For example, putting 5 % threshold -as in Germany- eliminates the marginal groups to be represented in the government; thereby it eliminates the marginal extremist in the government.
The parliamentary proportional option is supported by Lijphart (1992, 151-156). Lijphart reports that parliamentary systems with proportional representations is more successful than both presidential and parliamentary systems with plurality representation in terms of women’s legislative representation (i.e. 16. 4 % to 4 and 4.1 %), voting turnout (i.e. 84 % to 75 and 54 % respectively), unemployment rate, and protection of minority interests. He also finds that there is no significant difference between the countries governed by proportional or plurality systems in terms of political violence, public order, and peace.
Groupings around the religious leaders and prevalent religious identities (i.e. Sunni, Shiite) in describing the Iraqi cleavages indicate that religion is very crucial for Iraqis. Given this fact, the democracy builders in Iraq has to consider that Iraqi people wants to have some religious tone in the institutions even if they don’t have any religious attachment in their personal lives.
Regarding the question of how Islam, the majority religion in Iraq, and democratic norms can be mixed, I argue that there is no conflict between Islam and democracy, at least in theory. In fact, the first Islamic state founded by the Prophet had the structure and norms existed in democracy. Huntington in discussing the compatibility of Islam and democracy (1993, 18-20) contends that Islam with the central themes of "egalitarianism” and "voluntarism” is compatible with democracy. My conclusion from the evidence of the structure of the first Islamic state and Huntington’s idea is that there is no fundamental conflict between Islam and structure of democratic institutions. Consequently, the new institutions do not need to isolate the religion from the institutions, if that alienates the public. Furthermore, borrowing from Sachedina (2000, 3) I argue that persistence to isolate religion from public arena in Iraq constitutes an obstacle in understanding the Iraqi society where religion is a key element in managing social problems and sustanining a sense of community which are crucial to maintain democracy in Iraq. In other words, the best democratic and institutional arrangements do not guarantee success without sense of community including trust among the people, and civic community. Besides, the secularist persistence may push people toward militancy, aggression and separatism against the structure and representatives of regime.
Acknowledging all the obstacles and biases, I finally argue that consociational democracy in Iraq has to be built as soon and effective as possible in order to avoid of the adverse consequences of the absence of four cornered government.
Ali Ozdogan, aliozdogan@american.edu
American University - Washington, DC, USA
Remembering The Orly Attack
