From the early days of the Atlantic alliance Turkey has been both an important and loyal ally.  Its geographic position made it one of the very first targets of Stalin’s post-war attempts to expand Soviet influence beyond occupied Eastern Europe into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.  Turkey was, therefore, together with Greece, one of the first countries to benefit from the United States' strategic protection and it was only natural to invite it to become a member of the Atlantic Alliance.  Thus Turkey became its eastern cornerstone, and later an important link with the defence systems which were established in the fifties in the Middle East and which reached well into Southeast Asia. 

            Since then, there has never been any doubt about Turkey’s importance to the alliance and to its increasingly vulnerable and volatile south-eastern flank.  With its strong and highly disciplined armed forces, Turkey could be relied upon as a serious counterweight to her powerful Soviet neighbour.  Turkish territory provided indispensable bases on land and sea for strategic intelligence and communication facilities as well as for air cover and naval bases, which have since become ever scarcer in the Mediterranean.  Most importantly, Turkey remained the guardian Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, the narrow straits linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.  This function became even more important when the Soviet Union set out to establish, in the mid-sixties, a permanent presence in the Mediterranean.  Moscow was clearly aware of Turkey’s key position[3]. 

            The rule of the Democratic Party lasted until 1960, and up to this time Turkey was a reliable ally of NATO.  The new military government declared that their foreign policy towards NATO would not change from their predecessors' ("that the Turkish government had faith in NATO and was bound to it”).  The leader of the revolution, afterwards, President of Turkey, General G�rsel categorically rejected the invitation of the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to neutrality. 

            In 1962, during the Cuba crisis Khrushchev sent a letter to the White House on 27 October.  He sought to draw a parallel between Cuba and Turkey: missiles in Cuba would be withdrawn in return for the withdrawal of American missiles in Turkey; furthermore, the Soviet Union would pledge not to invade Turkey if the United States would make a similar pledge about Cuba[4].  This demand was based more on politics than on security or military grounds.  The US had already suggested to Turkey in 1961 that she withdraw the Jupiter missiles.  The Americans thought the missiles in Turkey old and useless[5].  The Turkish military leaders did not agree with this plan and they argued that these missiles were important for the defence and security of Turkey.  The British Embassy explained economic reasons for the Turkish objection, 

            ...Gradually people’s attention has began to focus on the question of bases.  Little has been said that is at all profound, largely because the Turks are essentially slow moving and pragmatic.  They are not greatly given to speculation or penetrating analysis.  ... To some extent too, the Turks may be interested in the economic effects of the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles.  The majority of American servicemen stationed in the country will not, of course, be affected, but the invisible earnings which arise through the presence of American bases may be expected to diminish, at least slightly.  It is difficult to say what exactly the Turkish services feel about all this.  ... the economic implications of the changes was the first to come to the surface[6].  ...a reduction in Western interest in Turkey would make more difficult the achievement of a high rate of economic growth.  [7]

            The President of the US was faced with the dilemma deciding of what to do with these missiles under the Soviet threat (without, for lack of time, being able to consult NATO or Turkey) or with destroying the Soviet missiles in Cuba from the air, in which case the Soviets would attack Turkey.  All NATO - actually all mankind - would be involved.  In Ankara the Soviet ambassador Ryzhov told members of the Turkish government that the nuclear war was on Turkey’s doorstep[8].  President Kennedy eventually refused in public to trade Turkish missiles for Cuban missiles.  On the other hand the American Justice Department mentioned to the Soviet ambassador that the Jupiter missiles would be removed from Turkey later[9], but not under the threat from the Soviets.  Kennedy's response was conciliatory.  He praised the Soviet leader’s ‘statesmanlike decision’ but would not help him to save face by making public the US promise to remove the American missiles from Turkey[10]. 

            The Cuban missile crisis was solved without an outbreak of open war in the end of October 1962.  On 24 January 1963 President Kennedy confirmed the withdrawing of the Jupiters from both Turkey and Italy and promised to replace them by American Polaris submarines, deployed in the Mediterranean.  But he denied that situation was concerned with the discussion with the Soviets during the Cuba crisis[11]. The 15 Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkish soil in March 1963.  This crisis revealed the interdependence of American security with that of her NATO allies; but it also made Turkey realise that a decision by Washington might jeopardise her safety and even existence.  In the second half of the 1960s this situation and the Cyprus issue also exacerbated the anti-American anti-NATO feeling amongst the intellectual elite in Turkey[12]. 

            The issue of withdrawing the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy also joined the agenda of NATO.  According to the despatch from the British Permanent NATO delegation, the US representative Finlitter explained that the question of the withdrawal of was still being discussed through bilateral meetings with the Turkish and Italian governments.  He emphasised that the liquid fuelled Jupiters were obsolescent and extremely vulnerable on their fixed sites; the intention was to replace them by American submarines, deployed in the Mediterranean, which would meet SACEUR’s targeting requirements for NATO based in that area.  At the same time the Turkish representative Birgi stressed that the withdrawal of Jupiters had nothing to do with the "barter” offer made by the Russians at the time of the Cuban crisis. He welcomed the American reaffirmation that there was no intention of withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from Europe;  he said it should be never forgotten that without the security offered by the United States Forces, Europe would have no effective defence[13].  During NATO’s Delegation meetings on 23 February 1963 the withdrawal the Jupiter missiles was discussed.  The Americans made a statement on behalf of the Turkish and Italian governments as well as themselves about the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles and their replacement by Polaris submarines.  The Turkish and Italian representatives contented themselves with endorsing the American statement[14]. 

            The Turkish government believed that they were loyal in all their responsibilities as an ally according to the NATO Charter and bilateral alliance with the United States according to the agreements; Turkey had supported the US policy during the Cuba crisis, in which the Turkish ships had boycotted as a destination.  In these circumstances the Turkish government did not believe the US would not play any game with the Soviets over Turkey.  They were satisfied with the US response to the Soviets. 

            Turkey’s collaboration with Britain in NATO was not always harmonious.  The British predilection for ‘flexible deterrence’ instead of ‘massive retaliation’ did not quite coincide with Turkish strategic concepts.  In the Turkish view, Britain’s insular position distant and immune from a conventional Soviet threat, was incommensurate with Turkey’s strategic needs in an exposed location.  Turkey has to rely on a large army whereas Britain, partly for financial reasons had gradually abandoned the mobilisation strategy[15].  Nevertheless Britain always tried to maintain close relations with Turkey.  She considered that the overflying rights over Turkey were necessary for her Middle East policy.  British policy followed coincidentally the same direction as the Turkish policy over Cyprus.  The regional peace in the Near and Middle East and in the Eastern Mediterranean was important for both countries.  Britain also feared instability or weakness in NATO’s south-eastern flank due to Greco-Turkish relations especially over Cyprus.  Thus Britain concentrated on keeping  the peace between the two NATO member countries.  The British also realised that Turkey’s Soviet Policy was taking a new direction.  They reckoned that any neutral or pro-eastern policy on the part of Turkey would affect British interests in Turkey, Cyprus and the Middle East. 

            The Turkish government demanded economic and military aid from her NATO allies.  Most of them responded positively.  The British FO however, was reluctant to commit Britain to any specific aid, at the end of 1963 and during 1964.  The Turkish Foreign Minister asked through the  diplomatic Counsellor what the British attitude towards her plea for aid was; This was first discussed at Turkey's request in the NATO Council on 17 December 1963.  W.N. Hugh-Jones, Assistant head of the Western Organisation and Coordination Department in the Foreign Office, responded with his personal views.  He thought Britain would first want to know precisely what Turkey’s requirements were  and second to have NATO consider them.  He also said that in his opinion Britain's resources were now stretched to the limit in world-wide commitments- in Cyprus, Malaysia, East Africa, Aden, British Guinea, Swaziland, Germany and at home.  He pointed out that although Britain was a participant in the Allied Forces Southern Europe of NATO, Britain's contribution was now limited.  In short he thought that the British attitude should be one of sympathy and of caution about their capacity to make a contribution[16].  This question was distributed to other departments.  Almost all the departments views were in harmony about their policy towards Turkey concerning aid.  They predominantly did not support the idea of more military aid to Turkey.  They thought that if they were to give more aid they would prefer it to be in the economic rather than the military field[17].  M. Brown, assistant head of Central department, explained the situation in Turkey and advised how the FO could respond to the Turkish demand for aid, 

...,Turkey is a strong candidate for economic and military aid, both on the ground of and because of her contribution to NATO and CENTO.  Her uncovered foreign exchange gap is of the order of $400 million a year, and it looks as if the Turkish consortium of O.E.C.D. will fall a long way short of filling this gap.

On the military side, Turkey provides a large number of cheap troops to the Western alliances.  ...American aid is now being reduced, and although Germans seem prepared to make a sizeable contribution, it seems likely that contributions from other countries will be necessary if the forces are to be kept in a reasonable state of efficiency.  If insufficient military aid is available, Turkey’s military to NATO will be weakened.   Moreover, discontent might be caused within the Turkish army which has an important role in preserving stability within Turkey.  For these reasons and because of Cyprus situation our line should be consider the Turkish request for military aid with sympathy.  However, I think it is perfectly defensible for us to say that while we are carrying such a heavy burden Cyprus and elsewhere, we cannot make any commitment for the time being.  Our Canberra’s in Cyprus make a direct contribution to the defence of Turkey.  ...I agree that because of the Canberra’s and because of our military commitments in Cyprus we would have a right to participate in a discussion of the defence of the south eastern region of NATO, without necessarily promising additional defence aid to Turkey.  If the Greeks settle the bonded debt question satisfactorily, We are committed to making a contribution probably £1 million.  The immediate prospects of this are not very bright.  However, if the bonded debt is settled and we announce some defence aid to Greece, I agree that it would be more difficult to resist giving some defence aid to Turkey[18]. 

            The number of troops which Turkey provided for NATO was large. The cost of one American soldier was 6500 dollars while one Turkish soldier cost Americans 235 dollars only[19].  This minute, dated 4 march 1964, shows clearly that the FO wanted to participate in negotiations for aid to Turkey but that they thought that there should not be any from official commitment.  There are two reasons for this: Britain's commitments to other states such Cyprus, Aden..., and the fact that Britain already contributed directly to Turkey’s security through their bases in Cyprus. 

            In another strongly worded minute which was written by Arthur from (P.U.S.D).  contrasted present British policy towards Turkey with that after Second World War. 

What with the CENTO committed Canberra’s and on forces in Cyprus, we are doing the Turks handsomely.  I can find no justification for further defence aid.  We should not reopen a door we closed in 1947.  ...I agree with Lord Hood that we ought to be able to participate in the NATO working group without making a contribution[20]. 

            If we compare these two minutes, it shows that, the Central Department minute was more realistic than Western Organisation and Planning Department.  It explains that the Central Department had responsibility for Turkey and they were following closely the internal and regional situation in Turkey, so they realised the strategic and military importance of Turkey for British policy and NATO’s south eastern flank. 

            On 9 June 1964 the bond debt agreement was signed between Britain and Greece.  Britain accepted that it should make a contribution of £1 million.  At the same time the interdepartmental discussion concluded that the Turks should receive the same contribution as Greece.  The Central Department of the FO, thought they might contribute some aid to Turkey, but they did not mention this to the Turks.  As a pretext, they thought,

If the Turks accuse us of being unfriendly by giving defence aid to Greece and not Turkey, when Greece is likely to attack Turkey, we can point out that our defence aid is given in a NATO context on the basis that Greek and Turkish defences are complementary parts of the NATO south eastern flank defences[21]. 

            The Cyprus conflict affected British policy towards Turkey considerably under the NATO framework.  The internal situation had become worse towards the end of 1963 since the establishment of the Cyprus Republic according to the Zurich London and Nicosia agreements between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus and the guarantor states Britain, Greece and Turkey.  Turkey tried to solve this conflict in every possible way, such as consulting with the other guarantor states to bring their objection to NATO's agenda but all of them failed.  Finally Turkey intended landing troops on Cyprus in 1964 according to the guarantor right.  But NATO members, especially the US, persuaded Turkey not to invade Cyprus.  In particular, President Johnson's letter to Inön� was one of the effective influences on Turkey’s decision not to invade.  But Turkey was dissatisfied by the attitude of her British and American NATO allies.

            This situation created a new direction for Turkish Foreign policy which was to work for as rapprochement with the Soviets.  This was prompted by both the Johnson letter and the other NATO members' negative attitudes towards Turkey’s movement towards Cyprus.  This rapprochement was especially supported by the leftist intellectuals in Turkey.  They emphasised that Turkish national pride was badly wounded and that Turkey should change her direction towards her own national interest and should improve her relations with eastern bloc countries, non-aligned countries and her Balkan and Middle Eastern Arab neighbours.  The Secretary General of NATO, Brosio, also expressed his fears for Cyprus and Turkey, as follows on the subject of Cyprus, Brosio said that what most concerned him at present was the danger of the Turks turning neutral, or even going over to the other side, as a result of dissatisfaction with the support received from their allies[22]. 

But a in reply from the FO to Paris it was emphasised that Turkey would not be able to change her direction for the following reasons,

Logic suggests that this is the last thing the Turks would do.  Their country is heavily dependent on the NATO guarantee for its defence against the traditional enemy, the Soviet Union, and equally dependent on the Alliance for military and economic aid.  The Turkish economy scarcely stand alone and, given the background of history, it is hard to see Turkey turning to Russia or joining the soviet block.  General G�rsel decisively rejected a Russian offer of aid when he first came to power. 

Similarly it is difficult in present circumstances to envisage Turkey in a position of neutralism.  Her relations with the Arabs are traditionally bad and she would have no natural friends among her neighbours.  Moreover, as a neutral she would be fully exposed to Russian pressure. 

These consideration lead to the conclusion that Turkey has no "better hole” to go to if she were to decide to leave NATO and would therefore be very foolish to do so[23]. 

The British assessment was accurate.  Turkey did not follow policy in contradiction to her western allies at this time.  The Soviets (Russians) were seen as natural and historical enemies of the Turks[24].  On the other hand W.N. Hugh-Jones emphasised the importance of Turkish public or national feeling ,

On the other hand our pundits feel it would be unwise to press this line of argument too far.  If Turkish national pride were too badly wounded, they considered it is by no means impossible that the Turks might engage in a nationalist revolution on the Egyptian or Iraqi model, leading to the seizure of power by a group of hot-headed officers ready to seek aid from the East as well as the West.  If this happened it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would stand idly by. 

Whether one rates the chances of this high or low, however, we see no reason to challenge to Secretary General’s fears.  With the Turks on the losing side in Cyprus, it is no bad thing that he should encourage members of NATO to feel that it would be unwise to let the Turks be pushed to the point of no return[25]. 

This analysis was significant as he highlighted the importance of Turkish national feeling in the calculation of Turkey's conduct of foreign policy.  He was right in that the Turkish public were extremely wounded by both Johnson letter's and the ineffective attitudes of her alliance in feeling to stop the inter-community violence in Cyprus.  He had just miscalculated the manner of this policy.  He mentioned the military revolutions in Egypt and Iraq but emphasised that Turkey's change of direction would take place through the agency of the civilian governments.  The Turkish Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin did pay a visit to Moscow on 30 October 1964 and in January 1965 Soviet President Nicole Podgorny visited Ankara.  Visits continued after this dates.  But Turkey maintained her NATO membership and her ties with the western countries at the same time as improving her relations with the Soviets and other countries.

Conclusion 

            1959-65, In this period NATO was important organisation both Britain and Turkey being common allies.  Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952 mainly because of her geostrategic location.  During the cold war, Turkey was an important ally for the western NATO countries.  As we have noted, the cost of keeping one American soldier in the area was 27 times more than it cost to maintain one Turkish soldier.  It meant helping the Turkish army was therefore directly helping American and NATO military interests and thus the American economy and that of the other NATO members. 

            Britain saw Turkey as a loyal and important ally in NATO’s south-eastern flank.  On the other hand they were reluctant to assist Turkey economically and militarily.  The British side was willing to improve relations with Turkey under CENTO, but the Turkish side considered NATO more important seeing CENTO as a channel to gain more aid from the non-regional powers and to improve co-operation between her regional allies.

            Britain also consider that the Cyprus question should not increase tension between NATO’s south-eastern members, Greece and Turkey.  Britain engaged in close consultation with the US, administration to prevent war between these countries over Cyprus.  They were keen that the south-eastern flank should not be weak.  It could be dangerous for the British interests in the Mediterranean, which meant she might lose her bases in Cyprus, if the Soviets were involved in this region through the small island.  Burrows explained clearly the importance of Turkey in his despatch,

Its[Turkey] importance to United States for our Middle Eastern policy, in Cyprus and for the strategic facilities, mainly in terms of over-flying, which we now enjoy[26].

            As a result the British government pursued close relations with Turkey, to protect her Middle East and Mediterranean interests through utilising the military and economic organisations such as CENTO and NATO in that period.