Joseph A. McKinney, Baylor University printable version send your friend

The North American free trade agreement (NAFTA), which includes the United States, Canada and Mexico as member countries, was signed by the participating countries in 1992 and went into effect on 1 January 1994.  The agreement built upon and expanded a 1989 free trade agreement between the United States and Canada.  Elements of the United States-Canada free trade agreement and NAFTA provided a template for progress on new issues, such as services trade, intellectual property and trade-related investment, in the multilateral trading system.  This paper provides a brief description of NAFTA’s institutional structure, and considers to what degree, if any, these institutions might serve as a pattern for the World Trade Organization.
            The NAFTA agreement involved much more than simple elimination of import tariffs.  The agreement went beyond previous trade agreements in placing limits on investment regulation and enhancing intellectual property protection.  It substantially liberalized trade in services, including telecommunications, financial and transportation services. It removed many import quotas and other restrictions on agricultural trade. Its dispute settlement procedures (patterned on the earlier United States-Canada free trade agreement) were a decided improvement over those existing in the multilateral regime at the time.  The supplementary agreements on labor and environmental issues for the first time linked these issues to an international trade agreement.  The NAFTA agreement also brought together in an economic integration scheme countries of widely disparate levels of economic development. 
            From the beginning, citizens in each of the North American countries had apprehensions about eliminating trade barriers among the countries.  Labor organizations in Canada had objected strenuously to the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement, arguing that companies would flee to the United States where the tax burden was lower and, consequently, that Canada would no longer be able to afford its more generous social programs.  Likewise, labor and environmental groups in the United States objected to NAFTA, arguing that lower labor costs in Mexico and less rigidly enforced environmental regulations would be an irresistible magnet to United States firms, causing a “race to the bottom” with regard to labor and environmental standards.  Mexican industries feared being overwhelmed by the more efficient producers of the United States and Canada.
            In order to facilitate implementation of the NAFTA agreement and to allay some of the fears concerning the possible effects of economic integration of countries having different economic and social systems, both trilateral and bilateral institutions were created. 

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTIONS

Free Trade Commission
            The Free Trade Commission, as the governing body of NAFTA, supervises the implementation of the free trade agreement.  It consists of the cabinet-level trade officials of the three countries.  The Free Trade Commission does not have a permanent location or staff.  Each member country has a NAFTA Secretariat located in its capital city.  A NAFTA Coordinating Secretariat to be located in Mexico City has been proposed, which would act as a clearinghouse and serve as a repository for NAFTA documents and data.  However, the Coordinating Secretariat has not been established. 
Free Trade Commission meetings, which are to be held at least once a year, are rotated among the member countries and are sometimes held in conjunction with meetings in other parts of the world.  A major function of the Free Trade Commission is to oversee the resolution of disputes that arise concerning the application or interpretation of the NAFTA agreement.  Each member country has a NAFTA Coordinator, and through a process of frequent consultation they work to avoid disputes by dealing with issues at a very early stage.
In addition to supervising the work of the NAFTA Secretariat, the Free Trade Commission oversees the work of a large number of trinational Committees
and Working Groups that have been organized to facilitate NAFTA’s implementation by focusing on specific issues such as regulation of pesticide use, food safety issues, and transportation issues.  Deputy Ministers meet twice a year to provide oversight of the NAFTA work program.  The NAFTA agreement empowers the Free Trade Commission to establish new committees or working groups as new issues require attention and investigation.

Commission on Labor Cooperation

The North American Commission on Labor Cooperation (CLC) is composed of a ministerial-level Council, and a Secretariat located in Washington, D.C. which has a staff of about 15 persons and operates with an annual $1.8 million budget.  The Council oversees implementation of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, promotes trinational cooperative activities on a wide range of labor issues, and oversees the work of the Secretariat.  The Secretariat serves as the general administrative agency of the Commission.  It also works with National Administrative Offices located in the labor ministries of the member countries to establish trilateral programs aimed at improving labor conditions in North America.  The Secretariat has issued reports on North American labor markets and labor conditions, and has held workshops and conferences on various labor issues of concern to the member countries. 
Dispute resolution under the terms of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation begins with the National Administrative Offices (NAOs) of each country.  An NAO can initiate consultations with its counterparts in the other member countries on a wide range of labor issues.  NAOs also receive submissions from individuals or from non-governmental organizations charging that a member country is failing to enforce its own labor laws.  If the submission is judged to have merit, it can lead to consultation with the accused nation’s NAO or to ministerial consultations.  If the matter remains unresolved, for some issues it can be referred to an Evaluation Committee of Experts for their analysis.   For matters dealing with occupational health and safety, child labor, or minimum wages, submission to an arbitral panel is possible, with monetary fines or trade sanctions available as the ultimate enforcement measures.  No case has yet been taken to this level, nor is one likely to be.

Commission on Environmental Cooperation

            The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) is headquartered in Montreal, Canada.  This commission, which operates with an annual budget of around $15 million and a staff of about 50 people, comprises three parts: a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee. 
            The Council is the governing body of the CEC.  It is composed of the top environment minister of each country and their representatives.  The Council is to meet at least once a year, and has responsibility to oversee all of the activities of the CEC.
The Secretariat is the administrative organ of the CEC and provides technical advice and expertise on environmental issues to the Council and to the public, as appropriate.  It is directed to act independently of the member governments.  The Secretariat provides information about environmental conditions in each of the member countries, and assessments of how well each of the countries is enforcing its environmental regulations.
The Secretariat is also authorized to study environmental issues that are of particular importance to North America.  It has issued reports on subjects such as air quality conditions, the effects of water pollution on migratory waterfowl, and the environmental effects of the NAFTA agreement on corn production in Mexico, feedlot production of cattle in the United States, and electricity generation in Canada.  Studies of environmental issues published by the Commission have heightened awareness of problems, or potential problems, of concern to the three countries.  In some instances, scientific and technical expertise of the United States and Canada has been made available to Mexico to help address environmental problems there. 
Several dispute resolution measures exist for dealing with environmental issues.  The Secretariat may initiate investigations and make recommendations on controversial environmental matters that have regional significance.  Individuals and non-governmental organizations can file submissions with the Secretariat charging that a member country is failing to enforce its own environmental regulations.  If the submission is judged to have merit, the Secretariat (with the approval of two of the three Council representatives) may issue a “factual record” that sets forth the facts related to the case.  Finally, a member government can initiate consultations with another member government if it considers that the other government has demonstrated a “persistent pattern” of failing to enforce its environmental laws.  In this case, after a long and involved process, the matter may be submitted to an arbitral panel for decision, with the possibility of monetary fines and trade sanctions as ultimate means of enforcement.
A Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) is comprised of 15 members, 5 from each of the member countries.  Representatives from both the business and environmental communities are included.  The JPAC advises the Council on a wide range of matters, including its budget and its work program, and can provide scientific and technical input on relevant issues.

Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

            The NAFTA agreement contains several dispute settlement mechanisms.  For general disputes over interpretation of the agreement or its implementation, the agreement provides first for consultation among the parties.  If that is not sufficient to settle the dispute, then a meeting of the Free Trade Commission, which is composed of the trade ministers of the member countries, is called.  Should the dispute not be resolved there, the complaining party can request that the matter be heard by a panel of five arbitrators.  The arbitrators render a decision that is made public, and the parties are expected to settle the dispute along the lines suggested by the arbitrators.  Should the offending party refuse to settle the dispute in this way, then the complaining party is authorized to suspend NAFTA benefits roughly equivalent to the cost suffered from violation of the agreement. 
            Disputes relating to financial matters are settled in essentially the way described above, except that the arbitrators are those with expertise in financial matters.  Disputes relating to violation of the investment provisions of the agreement can be taken to binding arbitration with the offending government required to pay compensation for damages to the complaining party for having violated the investment provisions of the agreement.
            Disputes relating to the application of antidumping or countervailing duty laws can also be taken to binding arbitration.  A panel of arbitrators reviews the decisions and procedures of the administrative agencies having responsibility for implementing antidumping and countervailing duty laws.  If the panel determines that the administrative agencies have erred in the way in which they have applied these statutes, their decisions are remanded to them for further consideration.  The decisions of the arbitrators are binding on the parties involved, except that there is an extraordinary challenge procedure for extreme cases such as when fraud or other irregularities were involved. 

Bilateral Institutions

            While the Free Trade Commission, the Commission on Environmental Cooperation and the Commission on Labor Cooperation are trilateral institutions, bilateral institutions also were established to address environmental problems along the United States-Mexico border.  A Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) evaluates and certifies environmental infrastructure projects in the border region for financing by the North American Development Bank and/or other sources.  The BECC is headquartered in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico.  The United States and Mexico equally fund it, and its 10-person Board of Directors consists of 5 members from each country.  Thus far the BECC has certified 105 water, wastewater and municipal solid waste projects.  These projects represent a total investment of $2.41 billion, and should benefit eight million persons in the border region.  The BECC has also provided $31 million of technical assistance to communities as they are planning and implementing infrastructure projects.  Projects must be located within 300 kilometers of the shared United States-Mexico border.[2]
            The North American Development Bank (NADB), which is headquartered in San Antonio, Texas, helps to structure loan packages to finance environmental infrastructure projects, taking advantage of funding from both public and private sources as well as using its own funds.  The NADB can provide financing in a variety of ways, such as: direct loans of up to 25 years in length, interim financing, participation in bond issues, or loan guaranties of up to 50% of the capital costs of projects.
The NADB is a very small organization in comparison to other regional development banks, having a staff of only 30 people.  Its authorized capital stock is $3 billion (only 15% of which is paid-in capital), equally subscribed by the United States and Mexico.   The NADB is currently helping to fund 92 infrastructure projects in the border region, having authorized $690 million in resources to partially finance projects that represent a total investment of $2.33 billion.  While this is only a small step toward addressing the environmental problems in the border region, the projects will make a great difference to the communities that will have their water supplies upgraded and proper treatment of sewage.[3] 
            The charter of the NADB provides that ten percent of the bank’s capital be set aside for a Community Adjustment and Investment Program (CAIP) to assist communities that have experienced significant job losses due to NAFTA trade flows.  The program helps to provide financing for new or expanding businesses in NAFTA-impacted communities, which do not have to be located in the border region.  In its inspiration this program is much like traditional trade adjustment assistance. 

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
            The institutions created by NAFTA have been functional for only a few years, so any assessment of their effectiveness or significance must at this stage be considered preliminary.  Compared to the institutions of the European Union, those of NAFTA are minimalist institutions.  They were intentionally established to be small and to have little in the way of supranational elements.  Several factors explain this.  First, each of the countries of North America is quite sensitive about ceding sovereignty to international or regional institutions.  Second, NAFTA aimed toward a lower level of economic integration than did the European Union, with each nation retaining control of its own external trade barriers as opposed to forming a customs union.  No attempt was made to harmonize economic or social policies, therefore a less elaborate institutional structure was required.  Third, a strong desire existed to avoid what is perceived to be an overly bureaucratized institutional framework in Western Europe.
            The Free Trade Commission, with the various Committees and Working Groups under its supervision, was viewed as essential for trade facilitation purposes.  As its name indicates, this institution was established to deal with trade issues, or at most trade-related issues, rather than the broader economic issues that inevitably arise from the economic integration process.
Implementation of the NAFTA agreement has proceeded smoothly (with a few exceptions such as long delay by the United States in allowing access to Mexican trucks as agreed) and tariff elimination has been accelerated for a variety of industries. The more than 50 Committees, Subcommittees and Working Groups that have been established to address specific issues arising from the economic integration process have generally been constructively and actively engaged.  A high degree of trinational consultation and cooperation is now common in areas where previously almost none existed.  In only a few areas have insurmountable obstacles been encountered.
For the most part the dispute resolution measures have functioned well.  Often consultation at an early stage has served to avoid disputes which otherwise would have gone to arbitration.  Trade officials have generally been satisfied with the arbitration panels, and use of the extraordinary challenge procedures has been minimal.[4]  However, dispute settlement concerning investment provisions of NAFTA has raised sovereignty issues as described below that may require some changes in the agreement eventually.   
The NAFTA-related institutions dealing with labor and environmental issues were created out of political necessity to gain legislative approval in the United States for the NAFTA agreement.  They were by design given limited power, and thus far have been given meager resources with which to work.  They were quite slow in being organized, and even now are only beginning to realize their potential. 
            The Commission for Environmental Cooperation was the first of these institutions to be staffed, and its work program has been quite ambitious.  Important studies of the North American environment, and of the effects of increased trade flows upon the environment, have been conducted.  Cooperation among the three North American countries on important environmental issues has been enhanced by the existence of the CEC.  While the sanctions against countries for not enforcing their environmental laws are by design convoluted to apply, the fact that they possibly could be applied causes enhanced awareness of the need to enforce standards and regulations.  The main leverage that the CEC has in the area of enforcement has been, and will remain, the ability to bring the glare of public attention to situations that might otherwise be ignored.
            The Commission for Labor Cooperation is an even smaller institution than the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, and has similar limitations upon its powers.  Labor issues in the North American context are extremely sensitive politically.  The effects of the CLC in improving labor conditions and practices through regional cooperation are less apparent than the effects of the CEC have been in the environmental area.  With regard to labor disputes, the filing of cases with the CLC has publicized some questionable labor practices.  However, most labor issues cannot be taken to the level of arbitration and do not allow for the possibility of sanctions being applied. 
            The BECC and the NADBank have been very slow getting started, and their effectiveness has been greatly hindered by the constraints under which they operate.  More projects have been approved for funding by the BECC than have actually been funded.  Many of the communities along the United States-Mexico border which so desperately need environmental infrastructure are extremely poor, and have trouble meeting the commercial terms for loans under which the NADB is supposed to operate.  Recognizing the seriousness of this problem, in 1997 the United States Environmental Protection Agency made an initial contribution of $170 million to establish a Border Environment Investment Fund at the NADB to help finance water and wastewater projects.  These funds can be used to help communities adjust to higher user fees over time, or to help with construction costs not funded from other sources.  The funds may be used for projects in either the United States or Mexico.  The grant component of this program is making possible infrastructure improvements in poverty-stricken areas where they would be otherwise impossible.
           
NAFTA INSTITUTIONS AS A PATTERN FOR THE WTO?
           As the disruption of the World Trade Organization meetings by demonstrators in recent years has vividly shown, the concerns that led to the establishment of regional institutions in North America are very much in evidence at the multilateral level as well.  Just as the creation of regional institutions was necessary in order to gain approval of the U.S. Congress for the NAFTA agreement, some changes in the multilateral institutional structure may be necessary for the multilateral trading system to realize its full potential for trade liberalization.  To what degree could the institutions created by NAFTA serve as a pattern for the World Trade Organization?
            In fact, the NAFTA agreement has already served as a pattern for the multilateral system in various ways.  NAFTA provisions relating to investment regulation, intellectual property protection, and dispute settlement were emulated in the Uruguay Round agreement which established the World Trade Organization.  Likewise, liberalization of trade in services largely followed the precedent set earlier in NAFTA.
            The World Trade Organization structure for trade facilitation is more highly developed than that of NAFTA.  Its Ministerial Council oversees a Dispute Settlement Body, a Trade Policy Review Body, and a General Council. The General Council in turn oversees a Council for Trade in Goods, a Council for Trade in Services, and a Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.  Committees and Working Parties are continually at work on a wide variety of issues.  
Dispute settlement with regard to antidumping and countervailing duty actions in the WTO is considered by many to be superior to that in NAFTA.  In the NAFTA agreement the dispute settlement panels must make their judgements based on the domestic laws of each of the three countries.  In WTO dispute settlement, judgments on trade remedies are based on the Antidumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures that have been agreed at the multilateral level and are binding in their terms on all member countries. 
            With regard to dispute settlement concerning investment issues, the NAFTA agreement went far beyond what has been done at the multilateral level.  Under the terms of the NAFTA agreement, a foreign investor claiming violation of investor rights can file a case against the government of the host country, and through the binding decisions of arbitration panels can collect damages caused by the denial of those rights.  A particularly controversial aspect of this portion of the NAFTA agreement is the possibility of collecting damages from the “indirect expropriation” of property.  This concept can refer to the loss of expected profits caused by the change of an environmental regulation or, in one case thus far, caused by the verdict of a state court.  Because of these provisions of NAFTA, governments have been faced with the prospect of having to compensate foreign investors should they consider it necessary, for example, to change an environmental regulation.
            The prospect that governments would have to compensate polluting industries for tightening environmental regulations, or that the decision of a state court could effectively be set aside by the NAFTA investment provisions, has raised serious sovereignty issues.  The controversy over this part of the NAFTA agreement threatens to cause a backlash against efforts to liberalize investment and trade.  The sensitivity of this issue can be seen in the fact that the Organization and Economic Development abandoned an already-negotiated Multilateral Investment Agreement because of opposition to it.  This part of the institutional structure of NAFTA will not likely provide the pattern for an expanded investment agreement in the WTO, and probably will have to be modified even in the NAFTA context. 
            Where the NAFTA institutional structure could possibly provide a pattern for the World Trade Organization is in environmental and labor matters.  Countries such as the United States and France are intent upon having environmental and labor issues addressed in the multilateral context. Countries such as India and Brazil are just as intent on preventing the use of trade sanctions to enforce labor and environmental standards.  As in the NAFTA debate, some middle ground must be found.   The comfort level of those in industrially advanced countries concerning the effects of globalization must be raised. At the same time, the fears of less developed countries that the use of trade sanctions to enforce environmental and labor standards is merely “veiled protectionism” must be allayed.
            A major purpose of the environmental and labor institutions of NAFTA was to provide some assurances that environmental and labor standards in the three countries of North America would not be eroded by free trade.  Both economic analysis and empirical work cast serious doubt on whether there is any tendency for such erosion as a byproduct of regional economic integration.[5]  Nevertheless, those who fear that there is can take comfort in the fact that as a result of the NAFTA side agreements environmental and labor conditions in North America are being monitored by independent secretariats, with mechanisms in place to assure input from civil society as well. 
            In the same way, some institutional framework may need to be established at the mulitlateral level to provide monitoring of environmental and labor conditions, transparency concerning policies and practices in these areas, and an opportunity for civil society to voice opinions and concerns about these issues.  The institutions created by the environmental and labor side agreements of the NAFTA could possibly provide a pattern in this regard.
            In NAFTA, no attempt was made to harmonize either the environmental or the labor regulations of the North American countries.  Instead, each country is held accountable for enforcing its own regulations.  A citizen of any country can “blow the whistle” on any of the countries for failing to enforce their environmental or labor regulations.  A country accused of doing so must respond to the accusation.  If the dispute is not settled, it can be taken to an arbitration panel. After a very long and convoluted process with multiple opportunities to settle the dispute through compromise, the matter conceivably could go to an arbitration panel. If the accused party does not agree to abide by the panel’s decision, for certain types of issues trade sanctions could be imposed. 
            A question naturally arises concerning how an institutional arrangement that merely provides for a country to enforce whatever labor or environmental standards it desires to set could have any salutary effect on environmental or labor conditions.  The answer to the question is that nations have international reputations that are important to them.  They feel pressure to adopt the terms of international environmental agreements or the conventions of the International Labor Organization.  If after doing so they fail to live up to the terms of these agreements, the glare of international publicity from cases filed against them, or even the possibility of such cases, can improve the level of enforcement. 
            In the NAFTA agreement, the procedures for applying trade sanctions are so involved and convoluted that the chance of their ever being imposed is remote.  Nevertheless, the mere possibility that they could be imposed provides an incentive for the accused country to reach some negotiated settlement to resolve the issue.  The existence of the NAFTA institutions that deal with labor and environmental issues also raises the profile of these issues and focuses added attention on them.  Similar institutions at the multilateral level could serve the same function. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

         In the area of trade facilitation, the NAFTA institutions have nothing to offer the WTO in view of the fact that the institutional structure of the WTO in this area is more highly developed than that of NAFTA.  Also in the area of dispute settlement of antidumping and countervailing duty cases, the WTO mechanisms are considered superior to those of NAFTA.  In the area of general trade disputes the NAFTA and the WTO dispute settlement procedures are about equally well-developed.
            In the area of dispute settlement concerning investment disputes, the NAFTA agreement has gone farther than the WTO.  However, protections afforded investors in the NAFTA agreement go so far that they raise troublesome sovereignty issues.  Because of this, if these provisions of the NAFTA agreement are not modified they run the risk of causing a backlash against both multilateral trade liberalization and further regional economic integration efforts.  Consequently, the NAFTA institution pertaining to investment disputes, as currently structured, does not provide a suitable pattern for the development of a similar mulitlateral institution.
            With regard to NAFTA’s labor-related and environment-related institutions, there are some real possibilities for emulation at the multilateral level.  The existence of these institutions has raised awareness concerning labor and environmental issues in North America.  The studies and assessments by the staffs of the institutions concerning North American labor markets and practices, and of environmental conditions in the region and the impact of trade on those conditions, have provided useful information to both scholars and to policymakers.   The institutions have been structured in such a way as to provide almost no threat to national sovereignty of the member countries.  At the same time the mere possibility, however remote, of trade sanctions being imposed upon countries that are not enforcing their labor or environmental regulations has made member countries more careful about living up to commitments made concerning labor and environmental matters.  Institutions similarly structured could have comparable salutary effects in the multilateral arena.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Appendi, Kirsten and Sven Bislev, eds.  1999.  Economic Integration in NAFTA and the EU: Deficient Institutionality, London: Macmillan Press LTD.

Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 1999.  Assessing Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): An Analytic Framework (Phase II) and Issue Studies, (Montreal: Commission for Environmental Cooperation).

Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 1997.  NAFTA’s Institutions: The Environmental  Potential and Performance of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission and Related Bodies, CEC Environment and Trade Series, No. 5.  (Montreal: Commission for Environmental Cooperation).

Cosby, Aaron.  2002.  NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: A Briefing Paper for the CEC’s Joint Public Advisory Committee.  International Institute for Sustainable Development (June)

Graham, Edward M.  2002.  Economic Issues Raised by Treatment of Takings under NAFTA Chapter 11.  Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Jeffrey Schott.  2003.  NAFTA Dispute Settlement Systems.  Washington: Institute for International Economics.  Accessed at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/nafta-dispute.pdf  on 29 October 2004.

Kahler, Miles.  1995.  International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Keohane, Robert.  1984.  After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
_____________.  1989.  International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Lopez, David.  1997.  “Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience,”  Texas International Law Journal, 32, 2 (Spring), 163-208.

Martin, Lisa L. and Beth A. Simmons.  1998.  “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions,” International Organization, 52, 4 (Autumn), 729-757.

McCrory, Patrick.  2002.  NAFTA Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment in International Trade Dispute Resolution.  C.D. Howe Institute Commentary (September)

McFayden, Jacqueline, 1998.  “NAFTA Supplemental Agreements: Four Year Review,” Working Paper 1998-4, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics).

McKinney, Joseph A., 2000.  Created by NAFTA: The Structure, Functions and Significance of the Treaty’s Related Institutions,  New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

McKinney, Joseph A., 1999.  “Harmonization Issues in North American Economic Integration,” unpublished manuscript available from the author.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 1994.  North American Free Trade Agreement: Structure and Status of Implementing Organizations. October. Washington, D.C.

Joseph A. McKinney[1]

[1] The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Embassy of Canada, Washington, D.C., and the Hankamer School of Business of Baylor University that made possible field work at the various NAFTA-related institutions.

[2] Data accessed from the Border Economic Cooperation Commission web site (www.cocef.org) on 29 October 2004.

[3] Data accessed from the North American Development Bank web site (www.nadbank.org) on 29 October 2004.

[4] For an excellent survey of dispute resolution under NAFTA, see (Hufbauer and Schott).

[5] See (McKinney, 1999).