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Friday, 10 February 2012
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Recent Developments and Prospect for Settlement of the Aegean Disputes Through Dialogue
Dr. Yucel ACER

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Introduction
What introduced the Greeks and the Turks to each other for the first time was in fact a war in the 11th century.[1] The resulting victory of Turks over the Byzantines opened the door to the conquer of whole the Anatolian peninsula and then all the territories of the contemporary Greece by 1460. The beginning of the 19th century witnessed backward movements for the Turks as the Greeks initiated their struggle to gain independence from the Ottoman Turks’ rule. They succeeded eventually in 1829 and established an independent Greece.[2]
The relations between Greeks and Turks in the following years is dominated by the Greece’s attempts to fulfil its national goal of regaining what they lost to Turks since the 11th century. This has been termed as ‘megalo idea’[3] and become widely known as Greeks continued such efforts between 1830 and 1920 to gain more territories of the collapsing Ottoman Empire. Before it was defeated and subdued as a direct result of the World War I, the Ottoman Empire lost more territories both in the Balkans and the Aegean Sea to Greece as a result of every regional wars.[4] The efforts to achieve megalo idea intensified significantly following the Ottoman defeat in the World War I. Greeks afterwards managed to make significant gains even in the western Anatolia including the region’s largest city of Izmir (Smyrna).
Turks managed eventually to stop Greeks and push them out of the whole Anatolian soil by the end of 1922. Greeks had no choice, without the ever-present British support during the whole war until that time, but to sit around the negotiating table just like the other triumphant countries of the World War I to make peace with newly established Turkish State which was represented during the Greco-Turkish war by a national assembly. The negotiations took place at Lausanne, Switzerland between December 1922 and March 1923. The Conference proceeded with really hard talks and took a long time to succeed as very difficult issues such as all the territorial problems and the future of ethnic Greeks and Turks who were left in each other’s countries were in the agenda.
The result was that all the major territorial and related issues between Greece and Turkey were settled by the resulting treaties such as the Lausanne Peace Treaty and the Lausanne Convention on the Straits. All the contemporary borders between the two countries and the sovereignty over the Aegean islands were settled except status of the Dodecanese which were then under the Italian rule and would stay so until when the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 awarded them to Greece. The only major issue which was left unsettled between them at the Lausanne Conference was the future status of the ethnic Greeks and Turks. It created a real source of friction between the two countries before it was eventually settled in 1930.
One could easily develop an expectation from what have just been summarized concerning the history of relations between Greeks and Turks until 1920s that the two nations should have put an end to their centuries-old confrontation and start friendship and cooperation as they settled the major issues. However such an expectation was justified only for a relatively short period of time. From 1930 when the two States settled the problem of ‘eatables’ until the 1950s when the notorious Cyprus problem started to emerge, the relations were really ‘normal’ as it was a mixture of more cooperation and less confrontation on the relatively significant bilateral matters.[5] In 1950s, the relations between the two countries could not any more be seen as normal since they are started to be signified by more controversies and less cooperation. It could be said that this pattern of relationship has been the most significant characteristic of the relations between the two countries until today.[6]
Why the relations turned out to be problematic despite the comprehensive international regulations on the major territorial and other issues need to be known. The first reason to come across should be predictable. There is a clear lack of confidence between the two nations. This is fundamentally related to the history of relations which has been summarized in the preceding paragraphs. There are two specific reasons why the history causes inconfidence between Greece and Turkey.
Firstly, the relations between the two peoples started with a war and continued mostly in the same path. The two nations once had to fight against each other to stay as independent nations. During all these wars and confrontations, many disappointing events have taken place between them.[7] Secondly and related to the first, the two nations are mostly susceptible about the actual intensions of each other. Turks seem to believe that Greeks are not satisfied with the present situation in terms of territorial sovereignty and try to capture the actual Turkish territories which Greeks think belong to Greece. Greeks on the other hand believe that Turks have an intention to capture some Greek territories especially in the Aegean Sea as they consider it a legacy of the Ottoman Empire.[8]
Accordingly, these elements that flow from the history consequently cause inconfidence to a significant extent between the two peoples. They are also the elements sometimes behind the feelings of hatred and animosity against each other. Under the shadow of such feelings, the relations are destined to be determined by more confrontation and less cooperation.
However it would be fundamentally misleading to concentrate only on such feelings in reviewing why the relations are not still at a desired level of friendship despite the previous comprehensive international regulations. It is unavoidable to see that beyond the mere feelings, there have afterwards emerged many essentially self-oriented disputes between the two sides which drive the two sides quite apart inevitably and effect the relations adversely. Such disputes have emerged due to two related matters. One is that one or both sides are not really satisfied with the settlements that the Lausanne treaties brought concerning the sovereignty over the continental and maritime territories including the Aegean islands. Secondly, newly emerging rules especially in the realm of international law have created needs to undertake new regulations which eventually keeps the tension between the two sides alive. It is to say therefore that that the two people have unfriendly relations not only because they do not historically like each other but also because they have actually real disputes which also increase the hostility.
The next fundamental question therefore should be why the contemporary disputes between Greece and Turkey could not be settled for a long time and cannot still be resolved. The answer will lead us to comprehend how on what conditions the disputes between Greece and Turkey can be settled.
One part of the answer is firstly related to the elements that are reviewed above. There is a lack of confidence between the two sides which is signified by unfriendly and sometimes hostile relations and created by the history. This is further enhanced by the contemporary disputes which are in fact fed by the lack of confidence. Such an element leads to many specific obstacles, as will be seen below, which have hindered the settlement of these disputes so far.
One of the reflections of the above observations is that as long as the Greek-Turkish disputes in general and the Aegean disputes in particular are concerned, it will be misleading to separate the ‘reasons’ and ‘consequences’ in commenting on the conditions for the settlement of them. Reasons and results within the framework of the relationship between the two countries are all interrelated and effect each other so as to cause a situation reminiscent of a stalemate. Accordingly, the relationship is dominated by the lack of confidence not only because what happened in the past but also there are actual and major disputes between the two countries. The element of adverse feelings is further enhanced by the existence of these disputes However, the existing disputes are not only some of the reasons why the relations are dented with animosity but also the consequences of such a relationship. Settlement of these disputes is inevitably rendered even more difficult by the worsening relations.
What flows from such a situation is that any possible positive developments in the bilateral relations in general would be a major breakthrough for the break of this stalemate and consequently the settlement of the Aegean disputes. it is therefore not surprising to see a belief emerging recently among many people at least in Turkey that the disputes that are related to the Aegean Sea could really be solved within a reasonable time through a process of dialogue, as the gloomy picture of the relations between Turkey and Greece has recently been turning bright. According to this belief, the developments in the relations between Turkey and Greece in recent two years are so significant towards the removal of the animosity that a real prospect for the settlement of the disputes through dialogue now exits.
However, as long as the settlement of the Greek-Turkish disputes is concerned, even such a complex approach is destined to be too superficial to explain the matter properly. The disputes concerned are not in any sense easy disputes in their own right to be settled, as there are, as will be explained below, peculiar difficulties associated with them. An approach that would concentrate only on feelings and exclude the nature of the disputes altogether from the picture would simply be superficial.
Consequently an attempt to find out whether there recently exists a real prospect for the settlement of the Aegean disputes, which the present study is aimed at trying, should establish certain factors at the least. Firstly, despite the fact that the relations have really been improving, it should not necessarily mean that the relations have sufficiently improved so as to suggest that the present situation of the Greek-Turkish relations does not any more constitute an obstacle for the settlement of the disputes. It is yet to be established whether the recent developments have managed to remove sufficiently the elements of adverse feelings so as to establish a prospect for the settlement.
Secondly, as the obstacles for the settlement of the Greek-Turkish disputes in general and the Aegean disputes in particular do not only flow from the nature of the relationship, it should also be established whether there have been any recent prospecting developments as to the difficulties associated with the nature of the disputes.
In accordance with the general observations above as to both the nature of the Greek-Turkish relations and conditions for the settlement of the Aegean disputes, the present study will in the first section identify firstly all the major obstacles to the settlement of the Aegean disputes that specifically emerge as a result of the historic dislike and distrust between the two States. Secondly, it will deal with the obstacles to the settlement that come from the difficulties that are associated with the disputes themselves. In the second section, the present study explores the recent positive developments to find out what have really been happening between the two countries within last two years. In the final section, the real characteristics of such developments will be explored to identify the reflections of these developments on the removal of the identified obstacles for the settlement. It is after all going to be possible to comprehend whether the improvements are such to suggest a real prospect for the settlement of the Aegean disputes through dialogue.
A. Major Obstacles to the Settlement of the Aegean Disputes
1. Obstacles that Come from the Unfriendly Relations


The fact that the relations between Greece and Turkey is daunted by what happened in the past has some many specific implications on the Aegean disputes. Implications emerge due to the fact that history and some ensuing events create a crisis of confidence between the two sides and eventually cause many obstacles the possible settlement. The conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis is a quite illustrative example to explain the situation between the Greeks and the Turks. There was so great hatred between the two nations that they did not until recently accept even the legal existence of each other in the region let alone to accept any settlement to share the territories concerned. Thus even a desire to start a process of direct talks did not exist. In such a situation, any desire to compromise from their respective stances could not be imaginable even if they came together to solve the conflict. Being aware of the fact, the peace process which have been reinitiated towards the end of 1991 in Madrid and continued with the Oslo Agreement in August 1993 has concentrated also on the confidence building measures to be able to yield a settlement to the conflict.[9]
The first ensuing obstacle from the lack of confidence between Greeks and Turks is that there does not similarly exist a favourable atmosphere between the two States for a process of dialogue to be started and conducted. A friendly atmosphere is certainly needed for any two countries to start and continue talks as there would otherwise be no desire to compromise on the disputed matters.[10]
Secondly, the two countries are in disagreement over a very fundamental matter. They are in disagreement on the determination of what issues constitute disputes in the Aegean Sea. One issue that is regarded by one country as dispute is not considered as a dispute by the other. The suspicion inevitably makes the one side refuse to accept even the existence of one dispute as a move to take its rights by the other. The situation is reminiscent of the total refusal that still exist between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Turkey argues that there are many disputes in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey that need to be solved in one way or another. According to the Turkish view, the major issues that need to be settled are as follows: the Greek intention to extend its territorial sea from 6 miles to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea; delimitation of the respective continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea, 10 miles Greek national airspace while its territorial sea is 6 miles; the need to determine the sovereignty over certain Aegean islands or islets; and militarisation of the eastern Aegean islands by Greece in contradiction with certain relevant international agreements.
Greece however purports that there is only one dispute in the Aegean Sea. This is, according to Greece, the delimitation of the continental shelf areas between the two States. It refuses to accept that any other dispute exists in the Aegean Sea. According to the Greek view, issues other than the delimitation of the continental shelf which are regarded as disputes by Turkey are raised unilaterally by Turkey in order to capture unlawfully the Greek rights in the Aegean Sea. Thus, the issues other than the delimitation of the respective continental shelf areas are not really disputes but only unilateral claims that Turkey puts forward to capture more Greek rights.
It is reasonable to expect the continental shelf dispute to change its nature in future relations of the two countries. Assuming that one or both sides declare exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Aegean Sea, the delimitation of the continental shelf will most probably become the delimitation of the EEZ. In the contemporary international law, the concept of the EEZ and the continental shelf attributes in legal terms identical rights and jurisdiction to coastal States.[11] Moreover, in many geographical areas where the continental margin does not extend beyond 200 miles, the outer limit of the two maritime areas coincide as the relevant legal rules give the two areas 200 miles extent from the baselines.[12] Generally speaking, the EEZ supersede the continental shelf in such a region where it is declared.
Accordingly many international judgments have established a single delimitation line for both areas in cases where these two areas were to be delimited within the same process, even when the parties to the cases did not specifically request such a single delimitation line.[13] This would be the same should Greece and Turkey declare the EEZ in the Aegean Sea due to both these legal facts and the peculiar characteristics of the Aegean Sea.[14]
One particular aspect of the Turkish views has to be pointed out here. Beyond mere sentiments against Greece, Turkey seems to emphasis on certain facts in order to support its position in this context. Turkey points to the developing rules and principles of international law to consider some matters as those that need to be regulated accordingly. Moreover, the application of some previous relevant regulations by Greece is disputed by Turkey such as in the case of the regulations over the demilitarization of eastern Aegean islands and the determination of sovereignty over some Aegean islands.[15]
Another obstacle in terms of settling the Aegean disputes is again related to a fundamental mater. The two countries also differ on the determination of appropriate means of settling the Aegean issues. Turkey points out that the two States should first come together and try to settle the disputes through a process of negotiation.[16] The two States should, according to Turkey, try to find a comprehensive settlement for all the Aegean disputes through bilateral negotiations. Turkey does not however disregard altogether a third party settlement that would be based on the relevant rules and principles of international law. Turkey rather argues that, if there is still dispute or disputes left unresolved after a process of negotiations, such disputes could be settled through a means which is more appropriate for the nature of such disputes, including a judicial body such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[17]
Turkey explains why it gives the priority to negotiation could be explained on the basis of many elements. Turkey believes firstly that, as any means of settlement necessitates the existence of a friendly atmosphere between the contesting States, dialogues is the way that could sufficiently establish the needed friendly relations between Greece and Turkey.[18] Secondly, Turkey considers that dialogue would mean that both States would be able to first remove the disagreement on the definition of the Aegean disputes. Beyond that, dialogue is the only way to determine the appropriate means of settling every single Aegean dispute.[19] Moreover, Turkey seems to believe that dialogue is the best way to protect the ‘Lausanne Balance’, meaning the balance between the rights and interests of the two countries in the Aegean Sea through a ‘package deal’ or ‘comprehensive solution’ for all the Aegean disputes.[20]
On the other hand, Greece refuses to accept negotiations with Turkey as a means of settlement for the issues that are regarded as disputes by Turkey. Greece points out that the only dispute, namely the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf, should not be settled through dialogue. It should, according to Greece, be submitted to the ICJ in order to find a juridical settlement.[21] Ever since it unilaterally submitted the Aegean continental shelf dispute to the ICJ in 1976,[22] it has not changed its such choice.
Why Greece refuses dialogue as a means of settlement can firstly be explained on the basis of the disagreement on the definition of the Aegean disputes. Since a process of dialogue on the Aegean Sea could mean to accept the existence of disputes other than the dispute over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, it is not appropriate for Greece to initiate a dialogue with Turkey on such issues. Secondly, in case of a process of dialogue, Greece could find itself in a position not only to accept the existence of them but also to compromise on the rights that, as it argues, already belong to Greece.[23]
Here, lack of confidence is again a paramount reason for lack of an agreement on the means and basis of settling the Aegean disputes. Lack of confidence results with lack of desire to compromise. This makes one side to categorically refuse one specific means of settlement preferred by the other.
The above review indicates that adverse feelings that exist between the peoples and the governments of the two States cause some concrete obstacles to the settlement of the Aegean disputes especially through dialogue. The atmosphere between the two countries is not sufficiently good enough for the initiation of a process of dialogue. The two States disagree on the definition of the disputes in the Aegean Sea so as to demolish a possibility of recourse to any means of settlement. They moreover disagree on the means which will be used to settle the disputes due to basically the lack of confidence or sympathy between them.
Dismantling the inconfidence will obviously be a major breakthrough towards the settlement of the Aegean disputes. The fact that the Palestinians have with the Oslo Agreement of 1993, officially accepted the existence of the State of Israel has been seen as a major breakthrough towards settlement. This has been one of the many significant elements of failing confidence between the two sides that hindered the start of direct dialogue between the two sides. As seen, there have always been many such elements that emerge from the lack of confidence between Greece and Turkey that need to be eliminated initially for a settlement to the disputes.

The fact that the relations between Greece and Turkey is daunted by what happened in the past has some many specific implications on the Aegean disputes. Implications emerge due to the fact that history and some ensuing events create a crisis of confidence between the two sides and eventually cause many obstacles the possible settlement. The conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis is a quite illustrative example to explain the situation between the Greeks and the Turks. There was so great hatred between the two nations that they did not until recently accept even the legal existence of each other in the region let alone to accept any settlement to share the territories concerned. Thus even a desire to start a process of direct talks did not exist. In such a situation, any desire to compromise from their respective stances could not be imaginable even if they came together to solve the conflict. Being aware of the fact, the peace process which have been reinitiated towards the end of 1991 in Madrid and continued with the Oslo Agreement in August 1993 has concentrated also on the confidence building measures to be able to yield a settlement to the conflict.The first ensuing obstacle from the lack of confidence between Greeks and Turks is that there does not similarly exist a favourable atmosphere between the two States for a process of dialogue to be started and conducted. A friendly atmosphere is certainly needed for any two countries to start and continue talks as there would otherwise be no desire to compromise on the disputed matters. Secondly, the two countries are in disagreement over a very fundamental matter. They are in disagreement on the determination of what issues constitute disputes in the Aegean Sea. One issue that is regarded by one country as dispute is not considered as a dispute by the other. The suspicion inevitably makes the one side refuse to accept even the existence of one dispute as a move to take its rights by the other. The situation is reminiscent of the total refusal that still exist between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Turkey argues that there are many disputes in the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey that need to be solved in one way or another. According to the Turkish view, the major issues that need to be settled are as follows: the Greek intention to extend its territorial sea from 6 miles to 12 miles in the Aegean Sea; delimitation of the respective continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea, 10 miles Greek national airspace while its territorial sea is 6 miles; the need to determine the sovereignty over certain Aegean islands or islets; and militarisation of the eastern Aegean islands by Greece in contradiction with certain relevant international agreements.Greece however purports that there is only one dispute in the Aegean Sea. This is, according to Greece, the delimitation of the continental shelf areas between the two States. It refuses to accept that any other dispute exists in the Aegean Sea. According to the Greek view, issues other than the delimitation of the continental shelf which are regarded as disputes by Turkey are raised unilaterally by Turkey in order to capture unlawfully the Greek rights in the Aegean Sea. Thus, the issues other than the delimitation of the respective continental shelf areas are not really disputes but only unilateral claims that Turkey puts forward to capture more Greek rights.It is reasonable to expect the continental shelf dispute to change its nature in future relations of the two countries. Assuming that one or both sides declare exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Aegean Sea, the delimitation of the continental shelf will most probably become the delimitation of the EEZ. In the contemporary international law, the concept of the EEZ and the continental shelf attributes in legal terms identical rights and jurisdiction to coastal States. Moreover, in many geographical areas where the continental margin does not extend beyond 200 miles, the outer limit of the two maritime areas coincide as the relevant legal rules give the two areas 200 miles extent from the baselines. Generally speaking, the EEZ supersede the continental shelf in such a region where it is declared. Accordingly many international judgments have established a single delimitation line for both areas in cases where these two areas were to be delimited within the same process, even when the parties to the cases did not specifically request such a single delimitation line. This would be the same should Greece and Turkey declare the EEZ in the Aegean Sea due to both these legal facts and the peculiar characteristics of the Aegean Sea.One particular aspect of the Turkish views has to be pointed out here. Beyond mere sentiments against Greece, Turkey seems to emphasis on certain facts in order to support its position in this context. Turkey points to the developing rules and principles of international law to consider some matters as those that need to be regulated accordingly. Moreover, the application of some previous relevant regulations by Greece is disputed by Turkey such as in the case of the regulations over the demilitarization of eastern Aegean islands and the determination of sovereignty over some Aegean islands.Another obstacle in terms of settling the Aegean disputes is again related to a fundamental mater. The two countries also differ on the determination of appropriate means of settling the Aegean issues. Turkey points out that the two States should first come together and try to settle the disputes through a process of negotiation. The two States should, according to Turkey, try to find a comprehensive settlement for all the Aegean disputes through bilateral negotiations. Turkey does not however disregard altogether a third party settlement that would be based on the relevant rules and principles of international law. Turkey rather argues that, if there is still dispute or disputes left unresolved after a process of negotiations, such disputes could be settled through a means which is more appropriate for the nature of such disputes, including a judicial body such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).Turkey explains why it gives the priority to negotiation could be explained on the basis of many elements. Turkey believes firstly that, as any means of settlement necessitates the existence of a friendly atmosphere between the contesting States, dialogues is the way that could sufficiently establish the needed friendly relations between Greece and Turkey. Secondly, Turkey considers that dialogue would mean that both States would be able to first remove the disagreement on the definition of the Aegean disputes. Beyond that, dialogue is the only way to determine the appropriate means of settling every single Aegean dispute. Moreover, Turkey seems to believe that dialogue is the best way to protect the ‘Lausanne Balance’, meaning the balance between the rights and interests of the two countries in the Aegean Sea through a ‘package deal’ or ‘comprehensive solution’ for all the Aegean disputes.On the other hand, Greece refuses to accept negotiations with Turkey as a means of settlement for the issues that are regarded as disputes by Turkey. Greece points out that the only dispute, namely the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf, should not be settled through dialogue. It should, according to Greece, be submitted to the ICJ in order to find a juridical settlement. Ever since it unilaterally submitted the Aegean continental shelf dispute to the ICJ in 1976, it has not changed its such choice.Why Greece refuses dialogue as a means of settlement can firstly be explained on the basis of the disagreement on the definition of the Aegean disputes. Since a process of dialogue on the Aegean Sea could mean to accept the existence of disputes other than the dispute over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, it is not appropriate for Greece to initiate a dialogue with Turkey on such issues. Secondly, in case of a process of dialogue, Greece could find itself in a position not only to accept the existence of them but also to compromise on the rights that, as it argues, already belong to Greece.Here, lack of confidence is again a paramount reason for lack of an agreement on the means and basis of settling the Aegean disputes. Lack of confidence results with lack of desire to compromise. This makes one side to categorically refuse one specific means of settlement preferred by the other.The above review indicates that adverse feelings that exist between the peoples and the governments of the two States cause some concrete obstacles to the settlement of the Aegean disputes especially through dialogue. The atmosphere between the two countries is not sufficiently good enough for the initiation of a process of dialogue. The two States disagree on the definition of the disputes in the Aegean Sea so as to demolish a possibility of recourse to any means of settlement. They moreover disagree on the means which will be used to settle the disputes due to basically the lack of confidence or sympathy between them. Dismantling the inconfidence will obviously be a major breakthrough towards the settlement of the Aegean disputes. The fact that the Palestinians have with the Oslo Agreement of 1993, officially accepted the existence of the State of Israel has been seen as a major breakthrough towards settlement. This has been one of the many significant elements of failing confidence between the two sides that hindered the start of direct dialogue between the two sides. As seen, there have always been many such elements that emerge from the lack of confidence between Greece and Turkey that need to be eliminated initially for a settlement to the disputes.
2. Obstacles that Stem from the Nature of the Disputes

The ‘feelings’ could not be expected to fully explain why the disputes stayed unsettled for many decades. Having set aside the basic obstacles reviewed above, the two States sometimes managed to conduct talks on the disputes with a view to settle them.[24] However, no significant progress have been possible so far. Thus, the attention needs to be turned also to some other obstacles along with those which emerge from the crisis of confidence.
All the Aegean disputes which are related to territorial matters are in fact not simple disputes in their own nature. They involve quite complex issues. The complexity reflects on the respective stances of the two sides in a way that there exist huge discrepancies between the arguments of the two States over the settlement of the disputes.
Delimitation of the maritime rights which are the most controversial disputes in the Aegean involves a set of quite complex legal and political points. Quite diverse considerations such as geographical, social, and economical elements are all related to the disputes. Even the relevant law does not provide a clear-cut set of principles other than a requirement that such disputes should be solved on the basis of ‘equitable principles’ in order to reach an ‘equitable result’. Such an open-ended rule is a natural result of the complexity of a delimitation issue in a given area which are mostly tainted with complex peculiar characteristics.
The Aegean Sea demonstrates a particularly difficult case with thousands of islands located all over the sea, most of which including those located a few miles off the Turkish coast belong to Greece. If one or both sides declare EEZ in the Aegean the interests at stake will be even higher and thus the delimitation disputes will be even heavier, as has been noted above.
Consequently the delimitation is the subject of quite diverse legal arguments of Greece and Turkey. Generally speaking, Turkey argues that, according to relevant rules and principles of international law, the delimitation in the Aegean Sea should be conducted between the mainlands of the two countries allowing the islands in the Aegean Sea very limited or no effect on the basis of equity. On the other hand, Greece argues that, according to the relevant rules and principles of international law, the continental shelf areas in the Aegean Sea should be delimited with an equidistance line between the Greek islands and the Turkish mainland. Thus Greece allows its islands full effect within a delimitation process. The reflections of the different arguments and suggestions of the two States should be obvious. The areas to be allocated to one side change radically form the views of one side to those of the other.[25]
It is similarly a fact that the respective arguments of the two States on the possible extent of Greece’s territorial sea limit seem quite difficult to be reconciled. Greece argues that it has an ‘inalienable’ right, in accordance with the relevant rules of international law, to a limit of 12 miles territorial sea in the Aegean Sea. Turkey, quite contrarily, argues that in a sea like the Aegean that is a semi-enclosed sea with many peculiar circumstances, any territorial sea limit wider than the present 6 miles will be in contradiction with the relevant rules of international law.[26]

The dispute over the demilitarised status of the Aegean Sea is also marked with difficulties and diverse arguments. The difficulty is obvious in the fact that although it is a matter of disagreement and subject of Turkey’s categorical opposition, Greece has already militarised the islands concerned. Greece argues that it is justified in militarising its eastern Aegean islands on the basis of certain legal rules and principles such as the principles of fundamental changes in the situation (rebus sic standibus), self defence, and the existences of certain consequent regulations abolishing the demilitarised status of the islands concerned. Turkey on the other hand, emphasized that the islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea have been demilitarised by certain international regulations and should still accordingly be kept so. Therefore, any act to militarise these islands are openly in contradiction with international law.[27]

Another major dispute concerns the sovereignty over certain islands in the Aegean Sea and is similarly characterized by the hugely contradicting arguments. When it is again pointed out in general terms, Greece argues that all the islands and islets which are outside the three-mile zone around the Turkish mainland coast are left to Greece by certain international accords. In other words, only the islands or islets which are situated within the three-mile zone around the Turkish mainland coast belong to Turkey. Therefore, there is no island over which sovereignty could be disputed. Turkey however argues that apart from the islands which are specifically named by the relevant international accords, all other islands or islets should be considered as belonging to Turkey or at least should be negotiated over to decide who has the title.[28]

These observations prove that that settlement of the Aegean disputes do not only depend on any improvement in the feelings of two nations against each other. It also depends on the developments in the respective arguments of the two States as to the disputes. This is to say that, for a bright prospect for settlement, it is also necessary to see concrete improvements in the arguments beyond any developments in mere feelings. B. The Recent Developments and the

Implications


The recent developments that are reflecting on the settlement of the Aegean disputes have taken place in two different areas. Some of these developments have happened within the relations between the peoples of the two countries. On the other hand, the rest of the developments have taken place within the framework of the relations between the governments of the two States on the one hand and between the two States and the European Union (EU) on the other.
1. The Developments between the two Peoples
Recent positive developments between Turkey and Greece have started between the peoples of the two countries. Following a major earthquake that hit Turkey in August 1999, the Greek people and Greek private organizations started to send sincere help to the Turkish people who were badly effected by the earthquake. In the following month, this time Greece was hit by an earthquake which was relatively quite minor. But still, some Greek people were effected badly. And this time, Turkish people and some Turkish organizations initiated a technical help to contribute to the rescue efforts in Greece.
In fact, the mutual help during the earthquakes alone could not do much. Fortunately, the positive relations that so started between the two peoples did not stay there. Within the following one year, the relations have increased in various areas. One significant development has been the improving relations between the journalists of the two countries. They have established an organization which is named as “the Turkish-Greek Press Council” and started to convene regularly. They have convened for the first time between 5-6 February 2000 in Athens and for the second time between 8-10 October 2000 in İstanbul with the participation of 63 Greek and 78 Turkish journalists. The journalists emphasized in the announcements made after these meetings that the journalists of the two countries should set themselves free from the influence of the politicians and contribute more to the development of the relations between the two countries.[29]
The relations have also increased between the intellectuals of the two countries. Mutual visits and joint concerts have become almost a familiar events in the last one year,[30] and producers from the two countries started to make joint productions.[31] The relations in the areas of both economy and tourism have also increased considerably.[32] It is now an actual effort that the two countries are trying to make cooperation for international sport activities.[33] Such organizations, from preparation and application would certainly necessitate a great cooperation between the peoples and governments of the two countries.
All these developments demonstrate that noticeable steps have been taken to establish a trust and friendship between the peoples of the two States. Especially when it is considered that the cooperation has been taking place between the peoples of the two countries, it is obvious that the developments are quite significant for the settlement of the Aegean disputes. Journalists could make quite significant contributions to the improvement of the relations. On the other hand, the fact that the relations among the artists, businessmen, and the ordinary people of the two countries are increasing is another sign that some significant improvements have been happening for the establishment of trust and friendship among the peoples. Thus the inevitable repercussion could be the removal of the major obstacles for a negotiated settlement that come form adverse feelings and misconception against each other.
2. The Developments Between the Governments
Some other positive developments have been taking place between the governments of the two States. In fact it is possible to consider the developments between the governments as natural results of the friendship that has started between the peoples in August 1999. But, as will be seen below, they have, at least in later stages, gained an independent dynamic of their own.
According to some Turkish and Greek officials, the cooperation between the governments of the two States started earlier than the two peoples started to help each other during the earthquakes. According to these views, the representatives of the two governments started to cooperate during the NATO’s attack on Serbia in early months of 1999. So started cooperation seems to have led consequently to the commencement of a “dialogue” or a “process of negotiation”.[34]
Clearly, the two sides have started to conduct negotiations since mid-1999. The Foreign Ministers of the two governments met in New York on 30 June 1999 and established a common approach according to which the high-ranking officials from both sides would have talks on trade, regional cooperation, tourism, culture, environment, organized crimes, drug smuggling, illegal migration and terrorism.[35] Accordingly, it was decided that the issues of tourism, environment and trade would be taken up in Ankara between 26-27 July 1999 and the rest would be taken up in Athens between 29-30 July 1999.
As planned, the representatives from both sides met in Ankara on 26 July 1999. The pre-determined issues were discussed in this meeting.[36] The following meeting was held in Athens in early September and the pre-determined issues, as noted above, were discussed. Some high-ranking officials from the foreign ministries of the two sides met in Ankara for the third time between 15-16 September. In this meeting, all of the above motioned subjects were further discussed.[37] 
Another significant development that took place between the governments was the Greek support to the Turkey’s candidacy for the full membership of the EU during the Helsinki Summit held between 10-11 December 1999 where Turkey’s candidacy was viewed and accepted.[38] Thus, the already started friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Greece gained a further impetus with the Greek support in such a significant issue.
In the following month, the Foreign Minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou, paid a visit to Turkey between 19-22 January 2000. As a result of the talks that were held during the visit, the two States signed several agreements of cooperation on the issues which are mentioned above.[39] Moreover, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. Cem, returned the visit to Greece at the beginning of February. As a result of the mutual visits of the foreign ministers and the talks held during these visits, ten separate cooperation agreements on the pre-determined issues of trade, tourism, culture, environment, organized crimes, drug smuggling, illegal migration, and terrorism have been signed.
Another positive consequence of the talks is that a common intention has emerged to apply the confidence building measures (CBMs) between Turkey and Greece. As a matter of fact, the two States had already undertaken to apply a set of CBMs that was prepared mainly according to the proposals of Turkey.[40] But, since Greece was restrained and did not really show the necessary will to apply the agreed measures in practice, the CBMs could not be applied.[41] Within the talks held during this latest period, the two States considered again the application of such measures.
It seems that Greece is this time moving more seriously towards the application of the CBMs.[42] As a result, some military staff of both countries have unprecedentedly started to visit each other’s countries. They have even deployed their solders in each other’s country during some NATO military manoeuvres.[43] Moreover the relevant legal bodies of Greece, for example, decided unlike previously that it is not enough for a Kurdish person just to say that he or she is a Kurd and from Turkey to be accepted as a refugee.[44] This is a significant step for the establishment of mutual confidence as the previous Greek attitude against the “Kurdish issue” in Turkey is considered quite adversely by Turkey and its people.[45]
But, following the visits that the two Foreign Ministers paid to each other’s country, it seemed that the period of talks and cooperation slowed down a bit. Despite the fact that the positive developments continued to take place between the peoples of the two countries, the officials of the two States did not come together and meet each other for some time. Fortunately, this period of recession did not persist too long and has been replaced again by bilateral talks. The Foreign Ministers of the two Governments met on 18 September 2000 during the United Nations General Assembly’s 55th Session in New York. The most significant result of the meeting was that the two Foreign Ministers declared a sincere will to continue dialogue.[46]
Another significant result of the meeting is that the Foreign Minister of Greece, Mr. Papandreou clearly supported the set of CBMs proposed by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Cem. Moreover, it was declared that the officials of the two countries would meet in Ankara at the end of September to discuss the issue. The set of CBMs contained measures such as military flights without weapons over the Aegean Sea, joint military manoeuvres in the Aegean and the Mediterranean, the reduction of number, area and extent of the military manoeuvres of Turkey and Greece, and mutual visits by the military personnel of the two States. Apart from these measures, joint exploration and exploitation of the possible oil reserves in the Aegean Sea was also proposed.[47]
Despite some adverse developments that took place during a joint NATO manoeuvre,[48] top officials of the two countries continued to meet each other afterwards. Recently, the prime ministers[49] and the foreign ministers[50] of the two countries met each other on the occasions of some international meetings. Although these meetings have not been planed in advance to discuss the mutual issues, they clearly show that there has been a continuing will to promote cooperation and dialogue between the two countries.[51]
This has been shown clearly with the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister Mr. Papandreou to Turkey in May 2001. A concrete result that has emerged out of the meetings between the two Foreign Ministers during the visit has been some decisions to increase the confidence between the two countries. In this context, the two States decided to become party to the Ottawa Agreement which banns anti-personnel mines.[52] This would eventually necessitate the removal of anti-personnel mines in the land border between Greece and Turkey in the Thrace.
Recent significant developments have been experienced during the visit that the Turkish Foreign Minister paid to Greece in November 2001. The talks between the two Foreign Ministers were noted as quite warm. It has in fact been really evident from the fact that they have agreed on both three protocols and there measures to promote confidence between the two countries. The protocols concerned returning the illegal migrants, exchange of young diplomats and establishment of a joint action against natural disasters. The confidence building measures include the acceptance of military staff from both sides to the major military manoeuvres as observers, establishments of a higher level of communication between the general commands of the chief of general staff of the two countries, and joint action to apply a project to prevent the pollution of the Martisa (Meriç) River that constitutes the land border in the Thrace.[53]
The above review demonstrates that the developments that have been taking place within last two years have a potential to ease the tense relations between the peoples and governments. The possible contribution that these improvements could make to the settlement of the Aegean disputes should be obvious in the light of what has been said above about why the settlement has not been possible so far. Although the agreements of cooperation that have been signed concerned only some relatively less important issues such as trade, tourism and cultural cooperation, these developments have a potential to establish a sense of confidence that would eventually lead to the initiation of a process of dialogue on the Aegean maritime disputes.
3. The Decision at the Helsinki Summit and the Ensuing Developments
The EU Council at its Helsinki Summit officially accepted Turkey as one of the candidate States for full membership. It is certainly a turning point for the Turkey’s bid for membership. It is however equally significant for the Greek-Turkish relations in general and for the settlement of the Aegean disputes in particular. After noting that “the candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing”, the Council pointed out in its decision at Helsinki that:
“They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the disputes to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.[54]
The provision is likely to cause controversy as regards some obligations flowing from the passage. It seems to be unclear what would be the situation in terms of full membership if the ICJ is not resorted to in case negotiations fail. There are however some clear points that undoubtedly flow from the decision and demonstrate that the decision of the Council has been a significant development as to the settlement of the Aegean disputes.
The Council made a specific emphasis on “any outstanding border and related issues”. Obviously, the emphasis has a clear bearing on all the major Aegean disputes including the determination of the maritime boundaries, as they should be considered as boundary issues or issues related to the boundary matters.
Secondly, as far as the settlement of such disputes is concerned, the decision repeats the well-known principle which is embodied into Article 2 (3) of the UN Charter that all the disputes between the States must be solved through peaceful means.[55] The candidate States including Turkey should resolve their differences with the member States through any of the enumerated means in order to become a full member of the EU.
Finally, the provision specifies clearly that if the disputing States fail to solve such disputes “within a reasonable time” through negotiations or any other peaceful means, they should submit them to the ICJ. The “reasonable time” is specified by the provision as the end of 2004 when the European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes in order to promote their settlement through the ICJ. Clearly, according to the EU decision, Turkey would try to solve its major differences with Greece until the end of year 2004 initially through dialogue. If the disputes could not be solved within this period, the Council will review the situation and promote recourse to the ICJ for the settlement.
As a result of the Helsinki decision, the EU has prepared a Document on Accession Partnership with Turkey in March 2001, which has categorically listed the conditions for Turkey’s participation.[56] The document in its section named ‘principles’ repeats what has been said in the Helsinki decision. However, the Document is clearer as it uses a clear expression by providing that the disputes ‘should be taken to the ICJ’ if the disputes could cot be settled within a ‘reasonable time’.
The EU decision thus gives the priority to dialogue as a means of settlement. This should at least potentially encourage Greece, the side reluctant to go to negotiating table, to start sincere dialogue on major issues of the Aegean Sea, if not to settle them altogether. The decision of the EU Council at Helsinki may accordingly prove to be a significant development for the possibility of settlement of the Aegean disputes through dialogue.[57] On the other hand, if the negotiations fail, Turkey would be in a position to accept to go to the ICJ, which is still less favoured by Turkey, although the sanction if Turkey does not act in this way. Considering that becoming a full member of the EU is a major priority of the Turkish foreign policy and Greece, as a full member of the EU could use the condition as a tool of pressure on Turkey, settlement of the Aegean disputes will clearly be in the agenda at least in 2004 and afterwards.

The recent developments that are reflecting on the settlement of the Aegean disputes have taken place in two different areas. Some of these developments have happened within the relations between the peoples of the two countries. On the other hand, the rest of the developments have taken place within the framework of the relations between the governments of the two States on the one hand and between the two States and the European Union (EU) on the other. Recent positive developments between Turkey and Greece have started between the peoples of the two countries. Following a major earthquake that hit Turkey in August 1999, the Greek people and Greek private organizations started to send sincere help to the Turkish people who were badly effected by the earthquake. In the following month, this time Greece was hit by an earthquake which was relatively quite minor. But still, some Greek people were effected badly. And this time, Turkish people and some Turkish organizations initiated a technical help to contribute to the rescue efforts in Greece.In fact, the mutual help during the earthquakes alone could not do much. Fortunately, the positive relations that so started between the two peoples did not stay there. Within the following one year, the relations have increased in various areas. One significant development has been the improving relations between the journalists of the two countries. They have established an organization which is named as “the Turkish-Greek Press Council” and started to convene regularly. They have convened for the first time between 5-6 February 2000 in Athens and for the second time between 8-10 October 2000 in İstanbul with the participation of 63 Greek and 78 Turkish journalists. The journalists emphasized in the announcements made after these meetings that the journalists of the two countries should set themselves free from the influence of the politicians and contribute more to the development of the relations between the two countries. The relations have also increased between the intellectuals of the two countries. Mutual visits and joint concerts have become almost a familiar events in the last one year, and producers from the two countries started to make joint productions. The relations in the areas of both economy and tourism have also increased considerably. It is now an actual effort that the two countries are trying to make cooperation for international sport activities. Such organizations, from preparation and application would certainly necessitate a great cooperation between the peoples and governments of the two countries. All these developments demonstrate that noticeable steps have been taken to establish a trust and friendship between the peoples of the two States. Especially when it is considered that the cooperation has been taking place between the peoples of the two countries, it is obvious that the developments are quite significant for the settlement of the Aegean disputes. Journalists could make quite significant contributions to the improvement of the relations. On the other hand, the fact that the relations among the artists, businessmen, and the ordinary people of the two countries are increasing is another sign that some significant improvements have been happening for the establishment of trust and friendship among the peoples. Thus the inevitable repercussion could be the removal of the major obstacles for a negotiated settlement that come form adverse feelings and misconception against each other. Some other positive developments have been taking place between the governments of the two States. In fact it is possible to consider the developments between the governments as natural results of the friendship that has started between the peoples in August 1999. But, as will be seen below, they have, at least in later stages, gained an independent dynamic of their own.According to some Turkish and Greek officials, the cooperation between the governments of the two States started earlier than the two peoples started to help each other during the earthquakes. According to these views, the representatives of the two governments started to cooperate during the NATO’s attack on Serbia in early months of 1999. So started cooperation seems to have led consequently to the commencement of a “dialogue” or a “process of negotiation”.Clearly, the two sides have started to conduct negotiations since mid-1999. The Foreign Ministers of the two governments met in New York on 30 June 1999 and established a common approach according to which the high-ranking officials from both sides would have talks on trade, regional cooperation, tourism, culture, environment, organized crimes, drug smuggling, illegal migration and terrorism. Accordingly, it was decided that the issues of tourism, environment and trade would be taken up in Ankara between 26-27 July 1999 and the rest would be taken up in Athens between 29-30 July 1999. As planned, the representatives from both sides met in Ankara on 26 July 1999. The pre-determined issues were discussed in this meeting. The following meeting was held in Athens in early September and the pre-determined issues, as noted above, were discussed. Some high-ranking officials from the foreign ministries of the two sides met in Ankara for the third time between 15-16 September. In this meeting, all of the above motioned subjects were further discussed.  Another significant development that took place between the governments was the Greek support to the Turkey’s candidacy for the full membership of the EU during the Helsinki Summit held between 10-11 December 1999 where Turkey’s candidacy was viewed and accepted. Thus, the already started friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Greece gained a further impetus with the Greek support in such a significant issue.In the following month, the Foreign Minister of Greece, Mr. , paid a visit to Turkey between 19-22 January 2000. As a result of the talks that were held during the visit, the two States signed several agreements of cooperation on the issues which are mentioned above. Moreover, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. , returned the visit to Greece at the beginning of February. As a result of the mutual visits of the foreign ministers and the talks held during these visits, ten separate cooperation agreements on the pre-determined issues of trade, tourism, culture, environment, organized crimes, drug smuggling, illegal migration, and terrorism have been signed.Another positive consequence of the talks is that a common intention has emerged to apply the confidence building measures (CBMs) between Turkey and Greece. As a matter of fact, the two States had already undertaken to apply a set of CBMs that was prepared mainly according to the proposals of Turkey. But, since Greece was restrained and did not really show the necessary will to apply the agreed measures in practice, the CBMs could not be applied. Within the talks held during this latest period, the two States considered again the application of such measures.It seems that Greece is this time moving more seriously towards the application of the CBMs. As a result, some military staff of both countries have unprecedentedly started to visit each other’s countries. They have even deployed their solders in each other’s country during some NATO military manoeuvres. Moreover the relevant legal bodies of Greece, for example, decided unlike previously that it is not enough for a Kurdish person just to say that he or she is a Kurd and from Turkey to be accepted as a refugee. This is a significant step for the establishment of mutual confidence as the previous Greek attitude against the “Kurdish issue” in Turkey is considered quite adversely by Turkey and its people.But, following the visits that the two Foreign Ministers paid to each other’s country, it seemed that the period of talks and cooperation slowed down a bit. Despite the fact that the positive developments continued to take place between the peoples of the two countries, the officials of the two States did not come together and meet each other for some time. Fortunately, this period of recession did not persist too long and has been replaced again by bilateral talks. The Foreign Ministers of the two Governments met on 18 September 2000 during the United Nations General Assembly’s 55 Session in New York. The most significant result of the meeting was that the two Foreign Ministers declared a sincere will to continue dialogue.Another significant result of the meeting is that the Foreign Minister of Greece, Mr. clearly supported the set of CBMs proposed by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. . Moreover, it was declared that the officials of the two countries would meet in Ankara at the end of September to discuss the issue. The set of CBMs contained measures such as military flights without weapons over the Aegean Sea, joint military manoeuvres in the Aegean and the Mediterranean, the reduction of number, area and extent of the military manoeuvres of Turkey and Greece, and mutual visits by the military personnel of the two States. Apart from these measures, joint exploration and exploitation of the possible oil reserves in the Aegean Sea was also proposed.Despite some adverse developments that took place during a joint NATO manoeuvre, top officials of the two countries continued to meet each other afterwards. Recently, the prime ministers and the foreign ministers of the two countries met each other on the occasions of some international meetings. Although these meetings have not been planed in advance to discuss the mutual issues, they clearly show that there has been a continuing will to promote cooperation and dialogue between the two countries. This has been shown clearly with the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister Mr. to Turkey in May 2001. A concrete result that has emerged out of the meetings between the two Foreign Ministers during the visit has been some decisions to increase the confidence between the two countries. In this context, the two States decided to become party to the Ottawa Agreement which banns anti-personnel mines. This would eventually necessitate the removal of anti-personnel mines in the land border between Greece and Turkey in the Thrace. Recent significant developments have been experienced during the visit that the Turkish Foreign Minister paid to Greece in November 2001. The talks between the two Foreign Ministers were noted as quite warm. It has in fact been really evident from the fact that they have agreed on both three protocols and there measures to promote confidence between the two countries. The protocols concerned returning the illegal migrants, exchange of young diplomats and establishment of a joint action against natural disasters. The confidence building measures include the acceptance of military staff from both sides to the major military manoeuvres as observers, establishments of a higher level of communication between the general commands of the chief of general staff of the two countries, and joint action to apply a project to prevent the pollution of the Martisa () River that constitutes the land border in the Thrace. The above review demonstrates that the developments that have been taking place within last two years have a potential to ease the tense relations between the peoples and governments. The possible contribution that these improvements could make to the settlement of the Aegean disputes should be obvious in the light of what has been said above about why the settlement has not been possible so far. Although the agreements of cooperation that have been signed concerned only some relatively less important issues such as trade, tourism and cultural cooperation, these developments have a potential to establish a sense of confidence that would eventually lead to the initiation of a process of dialogue on the Aegean maritime disputes.The EU Council at its Helsinki Summit officially accepted Turkey as one of the candidate States for full membership. It is certainly a turning point for the Turkey’s bid for membership. It is however equally significant for the Greek-Turkish relations in general and for the settlement of the Aegean disputes in particular. After noting that “”, the Council pointed out in its decision at that:”The provision is likely to cause controversy as regards some obligations flowing from the passage. It seems to be unclear what would be the situation in terms of full membership if the ICJ is not resorted to in case negotiations fail. There are however some clear points that undoubtedly flow from the decision and demonstrate that the decision of the Council has been a significant development as to the settlement of the Aegean disputes.The Council made a specific emphasis on “any outstanding border and related issues”. Obviously, the emphasis has a clear bearing on all the major Aegean disputes including the determination of the maritime boundaries, as they should be considered as boundary issues or issues related to the boundary matters.Secondly, as far as the settlement of such disputes is concerned, the decision repeats the well-known principle which is embodied into Article 2 (3) of the UN Charter that all the disputes between the States must be solved through peaceful means. The candidate States including Turkey should resolve their differences with the member States through any of the enumerated means in order to become a full member of the EU. Finally, the provision specifies clearly that if the disputing States fail to solve such disputes “within a reasonable time” through negotiations or any other peaceful means, they should submit them to the ICJ. The “reasonable time” is specified by the provision as the end of 2004 when the European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes in order to promote their settlement through the ICJ. Clearly, according to the EU decision, Turkey would try to solve its major differences with Greece until the end of year 2004 initially through dialogue. If the disputes could not be solved within this period, the Council will review the situation and promote recourse to the ICJ for the settlement. As a result of the Helsinki decision, the EU has prepared a Document on Accession Partnership with Turkey in March 2001, which has categorically listed the conditions for Turkey’s participation. The document in its section named ‘principles’ repeats what has been said in the Helsinki decision. However, the Document is clearer as it uses a clear expression by providing that the disputes ‘should be taken to the ICJ’ if the disputes could cot be settled within a ‘reasonable time’.The EU decision thus gives the priority to dialogue as a means of settlement. This should at least potentially encourage Greece, the side reluctant to go to negotiating table, to start sincere dialogue on major issues of the Aegean Sea, if not to settle them altogether. The decision of the EU Council at Helsinki may accordingly prove to be a significant development for the possibility of settlement of the Aegean disputes through dialogue. On the other hand, if the negotiations fail, Turkey would be in a position to accept to go to the ICJ, which is still less favoured by Turkey, although the sanction if Turkey does not act in this way. Considering that becoming a full member of the EU is a major priority of the Turkish foreign policy and Greece, as a full member of the EU could use the condition as a tool of pressure on Turkey, settlement of the Aegean disputes will clearly be in the agenda at least in 2004 and afterwards.

C. The Possibility of a Rapid Solution of the Aegean Disputes
It has been made clear above that the developments that have happened within last two years have a potential to revert this situation. It is now time to find out whether these developments have been sufficient to remove the major obstacles or at least have an imminent potential to remove these factors. So, it will be possible to find out whether the Aegean disputes could really soon be settled especially through dialogue.
1. The Developments and Feelings
The first question to be answered in this context is quite a significant one. One could easily wonder what these developments could do as the developments similar to those mentioned above between the governments took place in the previous years but not much have been achieved. The two countries had several meetings in the past[58] and even agreed on establishing a group of experts in April 1997, the so called ‘Group of Wisemen’ which would examine all the differences between the two countries to make suggestions to the Parties for settlement.[59] The two States have moreover established a framework, known as the Madrid Declaration, in order to establish a process to be followed for the settlement of the differences.[60]
However, as far as the establishment of friendship and a process of settling the Aegean disputes is concerned, recent developments have some significant peculiarities. Firstly, the actual process of talks seems to have been depended on more real basis as it has, unlike the previous talks, initiated between the peoples of the two countries by mutual helps during the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August 1999. Secondly, the present process of dialogue seems to be more realistic as it has initially aims at establishing confidence through addressing some preliminary issues such as tourism, cultural cooperation, and cooperation on the international crimes and terrorism.[61]
Still however, there are some concrete reasons to think that even these positive elements do not suggest a bright future in terms of settlement through dialogue.
a. The inadequate atmosphere between the two countries
In terms of creation of a favourable atmosphere for the settlement of the Aegean disputes through dialogue, it is firstly obvious that not enough time have elapsed to be able to purport that many centuries-old animosity between the two nations has been removed sufficiently. Obviously, a period of two years is too short to say that such a long-lasting animosity has sufficiently been reduced so as to start settling the major disputes in the Aegean Sea. It is reasonable to expect such developments to continue much longer for this purpose.
Some behaviours and announcements from the both sides also suggest so. First to mention in this context is the Greek attitude against the number-one enemy of Turkey, the violent separatist organization of the Kurdistan Workers Party, better known as the PKK. Despite the fact that the two States have declared to have agreed on a joint action against terrorism and signed an agreement of cooperation, the Greek officials do not seem to include the PKK within their definition of terrorism.[62] It is inevitable that Turkey could take and in fact takes such inaction as a sign of continuing Greek animosity against Turkey.
The most serious event that have happened to show the still existing distrust between the two sides has started to take place during a NATO exercise the ‘Destined Glory’.[63] Contrary to the NATO’s plan and despite the strong objections of Turkey, Greece used air corridors over the islands of Limnos and Ikaria for military flights during the exercises. Upon the further objections, Greece declared that it cancelled its participation in the exercises.[64]
So started confrontation between Greece and Turkey has shown its repercussions on the relations very soon. During the ‘Nikiforos-Toksotis 2000’, a military exercise that is regularly done jointly by Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, some military confrontations that were similar to those in previous years have taken place between the military aircrafts of Greece and Turkey.[65] As a result, the Defence Minister of Greece, Mr. Cohacopoulos declared a set of new measures according to which they would get serious against Turkey and fly with weapons over the Aegean Sea and would not participate any more in the joint NATO exercises.[66]
As a matter of fact, certain measures which were proposed by Turkey to increase the confidence and accepted by Greece[67] have not still been applied properly.[68] Despite the fact that Turkey has been taking some gestures in this respect,[69] Greece has so far seemed to be trying to avoid undertakings.[70]
Apart from the above military confrontations and lack of concrete actions, there have been some political statements which could again be viewed as an indication of continuing suspicion. The Greek political parties which have members in the Greek Parliament once announced that they would not endorse the nine agreements of cooperation that have been, as mentioned above, signed by Greece and Turkey.
Also as a result of all these negative developments, the two States have confronted each other on the European Union platform. The confrontations have taken place especially when the EU Commission has been preparing the Accession Partnership Document on Turkey. Greece tried to secure the inclusion of some preconditions into the document such as the settlement of the Aegean issues and the Cyprus problem.[71] Turkey has strongly been against an idea of setting the settlement of these disputes as a precondition for the Turkey’s prospective full membership. Moreover, Greece has also been trying to exclude Turkey from decision-making process within Europe Union on the European Security and Defence Identity.[72]
All these statements and events show clearly that between the two States, especially at the governmental level, the element of distrust is still a matter of fact. Most of these statements and attitudes are in nature of reactions that could stem from a feeling of animosity. This is to say that a simple confrontation easily leads to more serious and hostile reaction from at least one side. This is nothing but a clear indication of the fact that two sides do not still approach to each other with sufficient friendship.[73]
b. The disagreements over the definition of the ‘Aegean Disputes’
During the latest period of dialogue, there has been no convincing sign that Greece would later accept the existence of disputes such as the extent of the Greek territorial sea and the national airspace, and the issues of sovereignty and demilitarised status of some Aegean islands, which are considered by Turkey only as disputes. Quite contrary, there have been clear statements from some Greek officials that the existence of a dialogue between the two countries on certain issues would not mean that Greece will consider the above Aegean issues as disputes.[74] Greek officials particularly emphasized that the issues which concern the sovereignty matters in the Aegean Sea could not possibly be negotiated with Turkey however the relations between Greece and Turkey might be.[75]
The most certain statement to this effect has been made by the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Simitis. At a press conference after the meeting among the Southeast European Countries on 24 October 2000, he pointed out that there is only one dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea and it is the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two States.[76] During the same meeting, this view of Greece was also repeated to the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit who has participated in the meeting.[77]
On the other hand, it is no less certain that Turkey would not accept a proposition that there is only one dispute in the Aegean Sea. All the official statements made by the Turkish officials in the recent year have not shown a glimpse of a possibility that Turkey could change its position so as to accept that there are not many but only one dispute in the Aegean Sea to be delimited between the two countries.
Consequently, it is obvious that the recent positive developments in the Turkish-Greek relations could not be able to change the positions of Turkey and Greece on the definition of the disputes in the Aegean Sea. Still, Greece refuses to accept any dispute other than the delimitation of the continental shelf while Turkey argues that there are some other disputes which concern the extent of sea and air areas and the status of some islands.
c. Means of settlement
A process of dialogue between Turkey and Greece which has been initiated on certain issues in recent two years[78] could well indicate a custom of or trend towards a dialogue also on the Aegean disputes. This has been true even for Greece, as its Foreign Minister has explained clearly that negotiation is preferable[79] and the already started talks may soon cover the issues in the Aegean Sea.[80] Moreover, as noted above, the EU Council emphasized the need to settle such disputes through dialogue until the end of year 2004. In addition to its previous efforts in this context,[81] Turkey has accordingly been pressing even stronger on Greece to persuade it to engage in negotiations on the Aegean issues.[82]
However, the developments between the two countries do not seem to have changed the deep-rooted fact that Turkey and Greece still disagree on the means of settling the Aegean disputes.
First of all, the process of dialogue that has been started recently has not covered the Aegean issues. It has covered relatively minor issues like tourism, cultural, and commercial cooperation. Moreover, there is no concrete indication other than mere statements that the dialogue would also cover the major Aegean disputes. As explained in the preceding paragraphs, since Greece still refuses to accept any dispute other than the continental shelf delimitation, it is not possible that Greece could accept a process of dialogue that would cover the issues other than the continental shelf. According to Greece, the only dispute, that is the delimitation of the continental shelf, should be submitted to the ICJ for a settlement.[83] Therefore, the possibility that could happen at best is that the two sides could negotiate only on the continental shelf issue or take it to the ICJ.
On the other hand, even if the two sides agreed on the definition of the Aegean disputes and accepted the same issues as bilateral disputes, the disagreement on the means of settlement would still persist. Greece seems to be determined not to be in a situation to make compromises on the Aegean issues even if it accepted them as disputes. This is why Greece rather prefers, unlike Turkey, a third party involvement, the ICJ, in settling the delimitation of the continental shelf.
The EU Council’s emphasis on the need to settle the disputes through dialogue until year 2004 does not similarly mean that Greece sees the situation in the same way. The Greek action to support the Turkey’s candidacy could be seen as tactical rather than substantial. It seems that Greece has supported Turkey’s candidacy mainly because it wants to use EU as a tool of pressure on Turkey by virtue of its full membership status.[84] By this way, Greece believes to be able to put pressure on Turkey to persuade it to go to the ICJ for the settlement of the only dispute on the continental shelf in the Aegean.
On the other hand,  there is no indication in the Turkish National Programme that has been prepared as a reply to the conditions provided in the EU’s accession partnership, seen above, that Turkey would take the disputes to the International Court should negotiations fail to settle them. In the document, Turkey still insists on dialogue as the means of settling the Aegean disputes.[85]
Consequently, the developments demonstrate that the disagreement over the means of settlement continues to exist as the already started dialogue seems to be limited to the relatively minor issues such as tourism, cultural, and commercial cooperation. There is no clear indication that the already started process of dialogue would be elevated into a substantial stage. There are on the contrary clear announcements from Greece that such a dialogue would not cover the major issues of the Aegean Sea at least in a foreseeable future. Even for the settlement of the continental shelf delimitation that is accepted by both sides as dispute, there seems no near prospect for settlement through dialogue.
2. The Difficulties Stemming from the Nature of the Disputes
Even if the two sides sit around a negotiating table with a view to settle the Aegean disputes, it is still difficult to expect an easy and prompt solution. The reason behind such a pessimistic view about the possibility of an untroubled settlement through negotiation is, as has been already hinted, the fact that following its initiation, negotiations would certainly require compromises from the existing positions of both countries on the issues.

The recent developments that have happened within last two years between the two sides have not been able to change the fundamentally conflicting stances of the two sides. The latest statements made by the two sides indicate that they have not changed at all their positions in their arguments and views as to the solutions to the Aegean disputes. The Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit, for example, made a statement after he met with his Greek counterpart during the Summit of the Southeast European Countries in Üsküp, and emphasized that the fundamental differences between the two countries on the major issues, particularly on the Aegean disputes still continue.[86]

Another indication of continuing difficulties in this context is the link that is established between the Aegean disputes and the Cyprus problem. Greece has declared and emphasized several times that any possible development as to settlement of the Aegean issues is strictly linked to the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Greece would not contribute to any improvement in the Aegean unless the Cyprus problem is solved to the satisfaction of Greece.[87] Following the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece in New York, the Spokesman of the Greek Government, Mr. Reppas stated that Greece still sees the settlement of the Cyprus problem as a precondition to any improvement as to the Aegean issues.[88]

If the two States overcome the major obstacles and start a process of dialogue on the settlement of the Aegean issues, it will still be too early to think that the result would be a solution very soon. On the contrary, such a process could well take quite long time and enormous efforts to reach a solution, as the arguments and suggestions of the two States are still too diverse to be reconciled easily.
Conclusions
Our review in this study has shown that there are some major obstacles which have so far prevented the settlement of the Aegean disputes. These are the lack of confidence and the ensuing factors like the lack of appropriate atmosphere and the existence of the disagreements on the definition of the Aegean disputes and the ways to settle them. There are moreover difficulties stemming from the nature of the Aegean disputes.
These obstacles are and fundamental to the settlement of the Aegean disputes especially through a process of dialogue and all interrelated to each other. Any development could not therefore yield a real prospect for settling the Aegean disputes unless they remove every one of these obstacles to a satisfactory level.
The recent positive developments between the peoples and the governments of Turkey and Greece have established an initial stage in healing the animosity between the two States and even started a cooperation on certain matters like trade, tourism, culture, environment, and prevention of some international crimes. These are the results of the developments between both the two peoples and the governments of the two States including those between the two States and the EU.
However, these developments do not seem to have made sufficient improvements in removing the above obstacles. The developments are harmed by various moves of unfriendly nature which eventually demonstrate that the two sides still have a significant degree of suspicion and dislike against each other. On the other hand, there is no statement from both sides that they are close to agree on both definition of the Aegean disputes and means of settling them. Moreover, many clear statements have been made by both sides that they are not ready to compromise from the respective arguments as to the disputes.
Recent expectations for the settlement of the Aegean disputes therefore lack a proper base to be justified. It is justified to conclude on these observations that there is no real prospect for the settlement of the Aegean disputes through dialogue within a near term.


* Assistant Professor Dr. Yücel ACER, Onsekiz Mart University, Turkey.

[1] This was the Malazgirt War that took place between the Seljuk Turks commanded by Alparslan and the Byzantine Empire commanded by Romanos Diogenes IV on 26 August 1071 in the Eastern Anatolia.

[2] As a matter of fact, Greece emerged as an independent state with the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne) of 14 September 1829 with which the Ottoman Empire was obliged by Russia to recognise independent Greece. See generally, Davis, (1923), pp. 2-15.

As a matter of fact, Greece emerged as an independent state with the Treaty of of 14 September 1829 with which the Ottoman Empire was obliged by Russia to recognise independent Greece. See generally, , (1923), pp. 2-15.As a matter of fact, Greece emerged as an independent state with the Treaty of of 14 September 1829 with which the Ottoman Empire was obliged by Russia to recognise independent Greece. See generally, , (1923), pp. 2-15.

[3] A. S. Bilge, Ankara-Atina-Lefkoşe Üçgeni (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 1996). p. 11, 12; A. G. Platias, Greece’s Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence. In, D. Constas, (ed), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, Domestic and External Influences”. (Macmillan, 1991), p. 91-108, at 92; R. Clogg, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Post-1974 Period”. in, D. Constas, (Ed.). op. cit. p. 12; S. Yerasimos, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri: Mitler ve Gerçekler. in, S. Vaner, (ed), Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı. (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1989), p. 37-43, at 38; A. Kazancıgil, Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Bir Yaklaşım Seçeneği Arayışı. in, S. Vaner, op. cit., p. 61-76, at 71; A. S. Bilge, op. cit., p. 13-18. See moreover, ‘A Statement from the Government Spokesman of Greece E. Venizelos on 22 January 1994’, in, BBC SWB EE/2030 B/9, 24 January 1994.

[4] These were the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 between the Ottoman Empire and the newly independent Balkan States including Greece. See, P. Renouvis, Birinci Dünya Savaşı, (Altın Kitaplar, 1982)

[5] See, H. Akalın, Ege’de Bahar, Gül mü Diken mi, (Ankara: Ümit, 2000), pp. 101-105. As the Peace Treaty of Lausanne settled all the major issues and determined most of the present borders between Greece and Turkey, the relations between the two countries entered into a period of friendship.  As a result of closer relations which were led by the President of Turkey, Atatürk and the Prime Minister of Greece Venizelos,  Venizelos paid a visit to Turkey in October 1930 which resulted with a treaty of friendship.  The Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. İnönü returned the visit one year later. This friendship could be said to have continued until the emergence of the Cyprus problem in the mid-1950s. The only other period of friendship was established by the Turkish Prime Minister, Özal and the Prime Minister of Greece Mr. A. Papandreou in mid-1980s which in fact lasted for a short time.

[6] The only other period of friendship was established by the Turkish Prime Minister, Özal and the Prime Minister of Greece Mr. A. Papandreou in mid-1980s which in fact lasted for a short time. A. S. Bilge, Büyük Düş, Türk Yunan Siyasi İlişkileri. (Ankara, 21. Yüzyıl Yay., 2000); Ş. Gürel. Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993) (Ankara, Ümit Yay., 1993); İ. Türkmen, “Türk-Yunan İlişkileri” 1 Dış Politika (1971), p. 5.; G. Sibay, “Turkish-Greek Relations.” 9 Foreign Policy (1981), p. 23.

[7] For such events that took place especially during the Turkish independence war and in Cyprus, see, H. Akalın, op. cit., pp. 105-143.

[8] Ş. Gürel, op. cit., p. 10-20; H. Kramer, “Turkey’s Relations with Greece: Motives and Interests”. in, D. Constas, op. cit., p. 57-72, p. 59-66.

[9] See generally, N. Chomsky, World Orders Old and New, (Cairo: American University, 1994).

[10] See, generally, J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, third edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-120.

[11] According to international law, EEZ covers all the continental shelf rights over the sea-bed as well as all the rights of the same kind in the superjacent waters and airspace over the water area. The relevant articles of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, namely 56, 57, 76, 77 and 78 which are widely accepted as reflecting the customary law on the subject  indicates that the two sea areas are incorporated in the legal meaning.

[12] See,  Articles 57 and 76(1) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

[13] See, for instance, the Gulf of Maine case, ICJ Rep. 1984, p. 246; the Guinea-Guinea-Bissau arbitration, 77 ILR 1988, p. 636; the Denmark-Norway (Jan Mayen) case, ICJ Rep. 1993, p. 38; the Canada-France (St Pierre and Miquelon) arbitration, 10 June 1992. 31 ILM, (1992), p. 1145; the Yemen-Eritrea arbitration, (Te text of the award at: http://www.pca-cpa.or/ER-YEMain.htm (16.05.00).) In the cases and arbitrations, the courts have applied the same principles to the delimitation of the both maritime areas. See moreover, M. Evans, “Delimitation and the Common Maritime Boundary”. 64 British Yearbook of International Law, (1993), p. 283-332, at 297-298.; D. J. Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). p. 78.; D. W. Bowett, Exploitation of Mineral Resources and the Continental Shelf. in, U. Leanza, (ed), The International Legal Regime of the Mediterranean. (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffre Editore, 1987), p. 21-31; p. 23 and 24.
[14] Due to the relative narrowness of the Aegean Sea, -no wider than 400 miles even in its widest section, the existence of many islands which makes the Aegean even narrower in terms of water areas to be delimited and the rules regulating the extent of these two maritime areas, the delimitation lines for the EEZ and the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea would eventually coincide. See, Y. Acer, Settlement of the Aegean Maritime Disputes on the Basis of International Law. (Unpublished doctoral thesis, the University of Bristol, May, 2000.), p. 262-264.

[15] For the arguments of Greece and Turkey over the Aegean disputes, see, ibid., pp. 23-56, 126-142, 196-206

[16] Turkey purports since the meetings between the two foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece in 1975 at Roma and Brussels that the disputes should be taken up and settled through a process of comprehensive dialogue. The Note Verbale of Turkey to Greece, 30 September 1975. Text in, the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case. (Greece v Turkey). Pleadings. 1978. p. 35.

[17] For instance, Turkey made comprehensive proposals on 24 March 1996 and 12 February 1998 for the settlement of the Aegean disputes between the two countries. With these proposals, Turkey proposed a ‘process of peace’ which would have several stages towards the settlement of the disputes. According to the peace process, the two States should start comprehensive talks, and submit the unresolved disputes to the ICJ. See, ‘The Statement of the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr M. Yılmaz Concerning the Peace Process on the Aegean Sea’ 24 December 1996; ‘The Information Note of the Turkish Foreign Ministry over the Settlement of the Aegean Disputes on 12 February 1998’.

[18] “The Press Release of the Turkish Foreign Ministry of 12 February 1998 Concerning the ‘Peace Call to Greece.’”

[19] “The Press Information Note of Turkey to Greece as to the Peace Initiative for the Settlement of the Aegean Disputes on 11 March 1998.” 12 March 1998. Furthermore, Turkey points out that even if the rules and principle of international law are to be applied, these would better be applied through a process of talks between the two countries. The “Statement of the Turkish Representative, Ambassador Mr. S. Bilge during the Bern Meetings on 31 January 1976 Concerning the Turkish Position”.  In, the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case. (Greece v. Turkey). Pleadings. 1978. p. 167.

[20] It has been purported that the ‘Lausanne Balance’ that is said to have been established in the Aegean Sea by the Lausanne Peace Treaties could better be protected via the settlement of the Aegean disputes together through a process of dialogue. See for instance, The Turkish Note Verbale to Greece of 15 March 1976. In, ibid., p. 44. Most of the Turkish lawyers seem to think that even if the disputes are submitted to the ICJ, it is essential that the jurisdiction of the Court should be determined quite carefully and strictly. It is to say that bilateral talks are essential before the going to the Court. For the views of many distinguished international lawyers in Turkey such as H. Pazarcı, I. Akipek, Y. İnan and M. Gönlübol, see, the related article in Milliyet Newspaper, 2 April 1987.

[21] Such a choice of Greece was first expressed openly during the meetings held by the foreign ministers of the two countries between 17-19 May 1975 at Rome and on 31 May 1975 at Brussels. For the statements concerning the meetings, see, the Note Verbale of Greece dated 10 February 1975. In, the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case. (Greece v Turkey). Pleadings. 1978. p. 31; Keesing’s, (1975), p. 27011.

[22] The text of the Greek application in, the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case. (Greece v Turkey). Pleadings. 1978. The decision of the Court ruling that it lacked jurisdiction is in, the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case. (Greece v Turkey). Judgement of 19 December 1978. ICJ Reports, 1978, p. 3.

[23] For instance, “Statement of the Greek Foreign Ministry Spokesman C. Bikas on 16 November 1995.” In, BBC SWB, EE/2465 B/3, 20 November 1995. In his statement, he noted that Greece does not accept talks on all the issues which would inevitably mean that Greece approves the existence of such disputes. 

[24] See, infra, C 1.

[25] For the arguments of both States on the continental shelf dispute, see, Y. Acer, op. cit., p. 203-213; S. İlhan, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri El Kitabı. (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1989). p. 26-30.

[26] Y. İnan and S. Başeren, “Ege Karasuları Sorunu.” 7 Dış Politika Dergisi, (1997), p. 33-53, s. 36-40; S. Güneş, “12 Mil Sorunu ve Ege’nin Yarı-Kapalı Statüsü” 1 Dış Politika Dergisi, (1995), p. 73-95.
[27] H. Pazarcı, Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü. 2. basım. (Ankara, Turhan Kitapevi, 1992), p. 28-69; F. Sönmezoğlu, Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler. (İstanbul, Der Yay., 2000), p. 336-339.
[28] A. Karamahmut, Ege’de Temel Sorun, Egemenliği Tartışmalı Adalar. (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998) p. 6-17; F. Sönmezoğlu, op. cit., p. 339-343; E. Denk, Egemenliği Tartışmalı Adalar: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Çalışma. (Ankara, Mülkiyeliler Birliği Yay., 1999)

[29] For the second meeting of the Turkish-Greek Press Council, see, the Hürriyet Newspaper, 08.10.2000.

[30] The joint concert of Greek singer Haris Alexiou and Turkish singer Sezen Aksu could be mentioned as an example.

[31] For instance, the movie titled as the ‘Oyunbozan’ which is a joint production of Turkish and Greek production companies and acted by Turkish and Greek actors and actresses has been put on show on 24 October 2000.

[32] For instance a computer company named as the “İndex Bilgisayar” has been established with a joint investment and opened to shareholders at the Turkish Stock Exchange (İMKB). See, the Milliyet Newspaper, 20 October 2000. Moreover, the Greek and Turkish peoples have started to visit each other’s countries more frequently.

[33] Turkey and Greece are planning to be Greece co-host countries for the European Football Championship 2008 and to make a joint application for this purpose.

[34] The cooperation between Greece and Turkey was said to have started long time ago than the earthquake hit Turkey. Statement by Alternate Foreign Minster of Greece, Mr. Y. Kranidiotis, to the BBC World Service, 18.8.1999. Really, the first stage of the recent dialogue between the two countries started in Ankara on 26 July 1999. Some secondary issues such as tourism, environment were discussed. Within a week, the second stage took place in Athens. See, the Sabah Newspaper, 27 July 1999.

[35] See, the Press Release of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, 22 July 1999.

[36] The Sabah Newspaper, 27.07.99.

[37] The Joint Statement presented to the Press by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey on 16 September 1999.

[38] The Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Preparing for Enlargement, the Enlargement Process. Press Release, Brussels, No. 00300/99, 11.12.1999.

[39] See, the Hürriyet Newspaper, 21 January 2000.

[40] In May, 1988, Greece accepted to apply the CBMs. Turkey and Greece thus accepted the CBMs proposed by the Secretary-General of NATO during the NATO Summit in Luxembourg between 28-29 May 1988. For the details of CBMs, see, the Press Release of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey on the CBMs. 05 June 1998.

[41] But, since 1987, military aircrafts of both States are flying over the Aegean Sea unarmed. In this context, Turkey cancelled some pre-arranged military manoeuvres. See, the Hürriyet Newspaper, 5 November 1999.

[42] This attitude of Greece has been emphasized by the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou. For the comments of Papandreou on this subject, see, the Sabah Newspaper, 21 January 2000; the Hürriyet Newspaper, 21 January 2000.

[43] During the NATO’s ‘Dynamic Mix’ military manoeuvre held in May 2000, some Turkish military aircrafts were deployed on a Greek island in the Aegean Sea. During another NATO military manoeuvre ‘Destined Glory’ in October 2000, 16 Greek military aircrafts were deployed for first time in 28 years in Balıkesir and Eskişehir airbases, Turkey. There have also been some mutual visits of high-ranking military staff. See for instance, the Sabah Newspaper, 17 September 2000.

[44] For such developments, see, the Milliyet Newspaper, 19 September 2000.

[45] It is a matter of fact that Greece has accused Turkey in this matter and presented itself as a supporter of Kurds without any reservation.

[46] It was decided that officials from the Foreign Ministries of the two States would meet 29 September 2000. See, the Sabah Newspaper, 19. 09. 2000. Moreover, it was also declared that the Foreign Ministers of the two States would meet first in Marmaris on 15 October 2000 and shortly after in Rhodes to discuss the common issues.

[47] See, the Sabah Newspaper, 19 September 2000.

[48] See, infra, C 1 a.

[49] For instance, the Prime Ministers of the two countries met during the Southeast European Summit in October 2000.

[50] For instance, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries met during the annual meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association and expressed a will to continue the dialogue and review the application of CBMs soon. See, the Milliyet Newspaper, 1 November 2000.

[51] For instance, the Greek Assembly which suspended during the troubled NATO military manoeuvre, has decided to continue endorsing these agreements. See, the Milliyet Newspaper, 2 November 2000.

[52] The Milliyet Newspaper, 07.04.2001.

[53] The Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 9 November 2001.

[54] The Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions, Preparing For Enlargement, the Enlargement Process. Press Release, Brussels, 11.12.1999, No. 00300/99.

[55] The means are those enumerated in Article 33 (1) of the UN Charter.

[56] The Document dated 8 March 2001.

[57] The reflections of the decision in this regard will be discussed in some details below.  See, infra, C 1 c.

[58] See, supra, A 1.

[59] Firstly, the representatives of both countries during the meeting of the Turkey-EU Association Council held in Luxembourg on 29 April 1997 decided to set up a committee of experts from both sides to work towards the solution of the disputes. The Committee would consider the issues to be submitted by both Parties and will recommend non-binding solutions to them. See, for instance, Weekly Press Conference Given in Turkish by the Turkish Foreign Ministry on 5 November 1997.

[60] The Madrid Deceleration was made by Greece and Turkey on 10 July 1997 when two foreign minters met during the NATO Summit in Madrid. Press Release by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey Regarding the Remarks of the Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesmen as to a Question, 28 January 1998. During the meetings held between foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece at the NATO Summit in early June 1997, there seemed to appear a proximity on 8 July 1997 between the views of both Parties as to the solution of the disputes in a peaceful manner. Press Release Regarding the Latest Conducts with Greece, 10 July 1997. In fact, the two countries agreed on a documents which set out certain principles on the relations and solution of disputes between the parties. Both parties agreed to show respect for “vital interests” in the Aegean Sea and refrain from any unilateral action there. The Statement of the Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Mr. Necati Utkan, 28 January 1998.

[61] Greek Foreign Minster visited Turkey between 19-22 January 2000 and the Turkish Foreign Minster, in return visited Greece between 1-3 February 2000. Ten agreements have been signed on issues like tourism; environment; investment; terrorism, organised crimes, illegal migration and smuggling. See, the Hürriyet Newspaper, 21 January 2000.

[62] During the visit of Mr. Papandreou in January 2000, the two States have signed an agreement on terrorism. But, the PKK was not referred to within the framework of terrorism. Moreover, Papandreou refrained from answering the questions on this subject. See, the Sabah Newspaper, 21.01.2000.

[63] The NATO’s military manoeuvre ‘Destined Glory’ is participated by Turkey, Greece, the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain and held between 9-25 October 2000 in the Eastern Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.

[64] See, the Press Release of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, 23 October 2000. See moreover, the Milliyet Newspaper, 17 October 2000; 23 October 2000.

[65] The Milliyet Newspaper, 24 October 2000. For the views about the manoeuvres, see, the Press Release of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, 23 October 2000.

[66] The Milliyet Newspaper, 24.10.2000.

[67] It is still a matter of fact that the CBMs that have been suggested by Turkey many times. See, Press Release by the Foreign Ministry of Turkey Regarding the Remarks of the Spokesman of the Greek Government on 20 January 1998, 22 January 12, 1998. And Greece accepted in some occasions to apply such measures. Some of these proposals were generally determined between Greece and Turkey in the previous meetings especially in late 1980s such as the meeting between the Foreign Ministers in Athens in May 1988 and in Istanbul in September 1988. Moreover, Turkey and Greece accepted the proposal from the Secretary General of NATO which called Greece and Turkey to make a statement reflecting a consensus for the constitution of a first step regarding the Confidence Building Measures at the margins of the NATO Ministerial Meeting held in Luxembourg, on 28-29 May 1998. Greece and Turkey also declared that they intended to continue talks with the Secretary General in order to clarify, strengthen and complement the set of Confidence Building Measures which the 1988 Agreements. Statement on the Confidence Building Measures, 04 June 1998. Press Release Concerning the CBMs, 05 June 1998.
[68] Turkey seemed to have been making a considerable emphasis on actualising these measures hoping that it would establish a confident situation for better relations and dialogue, in just and lasting manner. See, for instance, the Statement of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey on Confidence Building Measures. 04 June 1998.

[69] It cancelled a military manoeuvre that was already planned to take place in November 1999. See, the Hürriyet Newspaper, 5 November 1999. Previously, in accordance with the agreement between Greece and Turkey in Bern, Turkey refrains from conducting any exploration or exploitation in the continental shelf areas of the Aegean Sea. A Turkish scientific research vessel, the Piri Reis conducted its annual reach within the Turkish territorial waters and Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mr. Ataman said “The scientific research to be conducted by Piri Reis is not directed towards the continental shelf. Actually, Turkey and Greece have undertaken the obligation to refrain from making use of the continental shelf. In line with this obligation both countries have, since 1976, taken care not to conduct activities directed towards the continental shelf and the oil research beyond the territorial waters in the Aegean.” The TRT TV Ankara 10 August 1994, quoted in, BBC SWB, EE/2072 B/6, 12 August 1994.

[70] Greece shows no sign of implementing the confidence building measures that it refused to apply previously. Recently, during the visit of Greek Foreign Minster to Turkey, such measures have been suggested once again by Turkey. Greece however sufficed to say that it would consider it. See, the Sabah Newspaper, 21 January 2000; the Hürriyet Newspaper, 21 January 2000. Quite recently, Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Robertson has started a new initiative to create a new CBMs draft agreement. This new draft would improve the already suggested such measurements and limit the duration and space of military exercises and establish an early warning system in order to avoid any actual conflict between Greece and Turkey. NTV News, (Bulletin in Turkish), 11:00 am local Turkish time, 21.02.2000.

[71] Greece has been trying to secure to be put in the document the factors that Turkey keeps the Island under occupation and the Cyprus problem should be solved in accordance with the relevant decisions of the United Nations. See, the Milliyet Newspaper, 24 October 2000.

[72] The NTV-TV, İstanbul, 23 October 2000, 23:00 (Turkish Local Time), News Bulletin.

[73] An opinion poll done among young Greeks has shown that they believe that there is not yet sufficient confidence and trust between the two communities fro the settlement of bilateral disputes. See, Milliyet Newspaper, 25 October 2000.

[74] For instance, during the meetings between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey in New York in September 2000, the Spokesman of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Mr. Reppas stated that the only dispute in the Aegean Sea is the delimitation of the continental shelf areas between Greece and Turkey. The TRT Telegün, 18/09.00, p. 144.

[75] See for instance, the Interview given by the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou to the Kathimerini Newspaper on 20 December 1999.

[76] The bulletin of the Athens News Agency, 25.10.2000.

[77] The Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit stated that Greece does not accept any dispute other than the delimitation of the continental shelf, while we think that there are some more disputes in the Aegean Sea. See, the Milliyet Newspaper, 27 October 2000.

[78] See, supra, B 2.

[79] The Greek Foreign Minister said: “I believe our country stands to gain a great deal from taking initiatives, bringing up issues, having dialogue”. He continued that dialogue with Turkey is necessary and useful “in order to investigate whether there are ways of approaching Turkey.” Interview Given by the Foreign Minster of Greece, Papandreou to the Kathimerini Daily, July 5, 1999. In another occasion, he said that “I believe we are in a new phase. This is not merely a function of circumstance. It fits with our overall principles on which we base our foreign policy. Communication is better than silence: dialogue with substance must substitute for the dialogue of the deaf”. Speech of Foreign Minster of Greece, Papandreou, at Foreign Policy Association, New York, 21 September 1999.

[80] Foreign Minster Mr. Papandreou implied that the dialogue already started on the so-called minor issues will cover the major issues such as Cyprus and the Aegean continental shelf in the future. Interview Given by the Foreign Mister of Greece Papandreou to the Kathimerini, 20 December 1999. It was similarly stated by another Greek official that “The climate has been good and we hope that eventually these discussions will have an impact on the big issues.” See, Press Release Concerning the Greece’s Support to the Major Earthquake Aid to Turkey, the Reuters, Brussels, 1 September 1999. Deputy Foreign Minster of Greece, Mr. Kranidiotis, said that “relations between the two countries are at a good point” and expressed hope that “this climate will be maintained and will aid the swift resolution of major issues based on the principles of International Law.” Statement of the Deputy Foreign Minster of Greece, Mr. Kranidiotis, Brussels, ANA, 02.09.1999.

[81] It is a matter of fact that Turkey has so far made many proposals and many efforts for a negotiated settlement of the Aegean issues. See, supra, A 1.

[82] Before the scheduled visit of the Greek Foreign Minster Papandreou, Turkey seemed to be looking forward to the realisation of the visit to evaluate the outcome of the present dialogue process to determine the “prospective fields of cooperation, take concrete decisions and give instructions to the technicians accordingly.” Answers by Foreign Minster Mr. İsmail Cem in Response to Questions from Mrs. Ani Podimata of the To Vima, 13 January 2000. This showed that, Turkey is keen to see the two countries negotiating on more significant issues such as the Aegean issues.

[83] The Spokesman of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Mr. Reppas pointed out recently that the dispute on the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf should be submitted to the ICJ. He further stated that the proposal of the Turkish Prime Minister Mr. Ecevit to start dialogue on the settlement of the Aegean disputes, as appeared in newspapers, could not be accepted by Greece. The TRT Telegün, 18.09.00. p. 144. The Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou emphasized specifically the “Greek sovereign rights” and noted that they could not be a subject of discussion or negotiation. The Interview given by the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou to the Kathimerini Newspaper on 20 September 1999.

[84] This has been demonstrated during the negotiations on the European Defence and Security Policy between the EU and Turkey as to the use of NATO facilities by the EU in future operations. Greece has strictly opposed to the suggestion that EU would not intervene in the Aegean issues at all.

[85] In the Turkish National Program, it has been indicated in Introduction that: “Turkey will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue;

[86] The NTV-TV, 25 October 2000, 09:00 (Turkish Local Time).

[87] When the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Mr. İsmail Cem arrived in the Athens Airport to start his official visit to Greece, the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou gave a lengthy speech in which he emphasized that any improvement about the Aegean issues depends on the settlement of the Cyprus problem. NTV-TV, 09.12.1999, 18:00 (Turkish Local Time)

[88] The TRT Telegün, 20.09.2000, p. 142. The conflicting views and suggestions of Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus problem, see, P. Oberling, The Road to Bellapalas, The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus. (New York: Boulder, Social Science Monographs, 1982), pp. 162-181; H. J. Axt, “The Triadic Conflict in The Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus” 51 Internationale Politik, (1996), pp. 33-38.

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Globalization And New Medievalism: A Reconsideration Of The Concept Of Sovereignty
Lacin İdil OZTIĞ

Understanding The New Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes Within Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?
Mesut OZCAN-Ali Resul USUL

Turkish Foreign Policy (1971-1980): Ideologies Vs. Realities
Sedat LACİNER

The Utility And Limits Of International Human Rights Law And International Humanitarian Laws Parallel Applicability
Konstantinos MASTORODIMOS

Assessing The Icty Jurisprudence In Defining The Elements Of The Crime Of Genocide: The Need For A Plan
Stylianos MALLIARIS

Kirkuk- Haifa Pipeline
İdris DEMİR

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Recent Developments and Prospect for Settlement of the Aegean Disputes Through Dialogue Recent Developments and Prospect for Settlement of the Aegean Disputes Through Dialogue Recent Developments and Prospect for Settlement of the Aegean Disputes Through Dialogue Recent Developments and Prospect for Settlement of the Aegean Disputes Through Dialogue 
Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW)
USAK House,
Ayten Sok. No:21
Mebusevleri, Tandogan, Ankara, Turkey