This research paper seeks to investigate as well as to analyze the Russian influence over the Central Asian countries in the context of Kyrgyzstan.  While entering Kyrgyzstan, during the passport check at the airport, a police officer asked me, “how did you get an Azerbaijani passport if you don’t know the Russian language”, I was surprised - do I need to know the Russian language in order to get an Azerbaijani passport? Nevertheless, lately, when I spent two weeks in Bishkek, the capital city of Kyrgyzstan, I came to notice the essence of the policeman’s wonder. Another event came out during a conversation with a political science student from Turkmenistan about the foreign policy of Central Asian countries, he said to me, “do you really think that we have our own foreign policy; it is Russia that decides our foreign policy”. These two events led me to research the influence of Russia in this region. The paper is divided into three parts: social, economic, and political factors. 

Social factors: Kyrgyzstan is an eighteen-year-old independent country, but Russia is still considered an historical ally for promoting assistance for economic and cultural development of the country, which began in the nineteenth century and pushed the Kyrgyz population from nomadic tribes to governmental structures and city buildings. The most prominent issue of the Russian influence in sociological terms is the dominance of the Russian language in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian language still remains the language of everyday use, particularly in the region and around the capital, where about 25 percent of the country’s population lives. Many ethnic Kyrgyz, including most of the political class, are far more comfortable in Russian than in Kyrgyz language. [1]

Today, in all spheres of educational and social life the Kyrgyz population faces up to the expanding influence of the Russian language. Russian language fluency is an important factor in Kyrgyz society for obtaining higher education. The education process in many universities is run largely in the Russian language due to the lack of literature or textbooks in the Kyrgyz language. Kyrgyz instruction is possible only in some departments where textbooks are available. Even though, Kyrgyz-Russian (Slavic) University named after former Russian president, Boris Yeltsin is a prestigious university in Kyrgyzstan, which plays ground role for the promotion of the development of and safeguard the Russian language, culture, and tradition. Fluency in the Russian language and familiarity with Russian literature are considered hallmarks of cosmopolitanism and quality education. Studying at Moscow universities is popular among Kyrgyz youth. Even if someone tries to learn another language, such as English or French, the instruction language is Russian. There is no center that can teach English-Kyrgyz; there is only English-Russian.  [2]

Furthermore, on 25 May 2000 the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan adopted the Russian language as an official language. Now Kyrgyzstan has two official languages: Kyrgyz language as a state, Russian as an official language. [3] Because almost all elites, including the deputies in the national parliament as well as all high-level bureaucrats and intellectuals, prefer to speak Russian rather than their own language. They find it easy to express themselves in this language because they were educated during the Soviet period in the Russian language and cannot speak purely in their mother language. [4]

Beater Schulter, in his article about the language issue in Kyrgyzstan, summarizes the wide spread of the Russian language in Kyrgyz society in 5 points:

1.      “Because of economic pressure in Kyrgyzstan, many parents deem it more important for their children have a good command of Russian than of the language they speak at home. 

2.      Because the Russian language skills taught in non-Russian schools are not satisfactory, many parents attempt to send their children to a Russian school.

3.      Parents accept that their children will have a very hard time being totally immersed in a new language at school. They also accept that the children might forget their first language and that it will be difficult for them do develop a sound personal identity.

4.      Because the State language is perceived as the language of one ethnic group (i.e. the Kyrgyz), it is difficult for members of other ethnic groups to learn this language.

5.      Schools in Kyrgyzstan do not provide enough time or methodology for children to learn to communicate in various languages.” [5]

In addition, in Kyrgyzstan Russian TV and radio channels are broadcasted, and Russian newspapers are published. More than 10 Russian TV channels and radio stations broadcast in the Kyrgyzstan capital. For instance, Russian ORT and RTR are widely watched in Bishkek, where more than 20% of Kyrgyzstan’s five million residents live. Two leading Russian-language newspapers, "Vecherniy Bishkek" and "Delo No", are published in Kyrgyzstan as well. [6]

Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian country that has no any restriction for broadcasting Russian TVs and radios. All of these have significant impact over the society. Most Kyrgyz people receive news reports through Russian mass media outlets, Russian TV, radio and newspapers, which consequently shape Kyrgyz public opinion about world politics. They look at the world with the eyes of Russia. Like most of the rest of the former Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan uses the Cyrillic alphabet, which can present a problem for the community to share the worldview. [7]

On the other hand, Russian mass media outlets, most of the Kyrgyzstan’s TV channels, radios, and newspapers are broadcast and published in Russian language. Only some newspapers and TV channels use the Kyrgyz language as their instruction language. The State Television and Radio Broadcasting Corporation (KRT) is the biggest television and radio broadcasting company and only media outlet that broadcasts across the entire country. However, nearly a quarter of KRT is also broadcasting in the Russian language.  The level of the Russian language in state radio is the same as on the state television. [8]

Moreover, the spread of the Russian Orthodox Christianity is another factor of Russian influence over Kyrgyzstan. According to its Constitution, Kyrgyzstan is a secular state and the government provides all rights for religious practice. But in reality there is strict control by the government. On 12 January 2009, Kyrgyzstan president Kurmanbek Bakiyev signed a new Religious Law. It strengthened the government control over religion by banning private religious schools and religious sects. This amendment to the constitution also prohibits involvement of children in religious organizations and distribution of different religious materials. [9]

Only Islam and Russian Orthodox Christianity are allowed by the government without any restrictions. According to political analysts the Government Religious Law is an attempt to avoid the influence of Protestant Christianity and radical Islamic groups over the Kyrgyzstan society. Foreign organizations are also following the fate of religion by being under the strict government control. For example, the functioning of the “American Charitable Foundation” was partly restricted because of its religious views. [10]

The majority of the population practices Islam. Orthodoxy generally practiced in urban areas, where larger Russian ethnic population lives. The Kyrgyzstan Government recognizes three Muslim holidays, Nevruz (Nooruz), Kurban (Kurman Ait) and Ramadan, and Orthodox Christmas as national holidays. [11]

Besides those causes outlined above, there are some small factors that also affect the Kyrgyz community. These are the idea of dual citizenship and cultural cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Almost every year “Days of Russian Culture” are held in Kyrgyzstan and “Days of Kyrgyz Culture” are organized in Russia. According to the citizenship treaty signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz citizens are able to get Russian citizenship through a simplified procedure.  [12]

Economic factors: Nowadays, Kyrgyzstan is a poor, mountainous country with a predominantly agricultural economy. Cotton, tobacco, wool and meat are the main agricultural products, although only tobacco and cotton are exported in any quantity. Kyrgyzstan also exports some minerals and hydropower. Water is the one natural resource that Kyrgyzstan has in abundance and the development of its hydropower sector could free it from its dependence on imported energy. Oil and gas, machinery and equipment, and foodstuffs are Kyrgyzstan's main imports.

During the Soviet period Kyrgyzstan was part of the communist economic system, and it was the provider of primary commodities, such as gold, mercury, uranium, and also several agricultural goods, foodstuffs, cotton, wool, and meat. The Soviet economic system was based on the economic dependence between countries, as raw material was produced in one of the Soviet Republics and went into industry production in other. Because of this factor after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the production of gold, mercury, and uranium in Kyrgyzstan was sharply reduced due to decreased consumer demand. [13]

Additionally, since the Cold War there has been competition between world super powers, like the US and Russia, over Central Asia. Recently China also joined this game. But the Chinese policy differs from the US and Russian policy. It uses its soft power to spread its influence in the region. But despite the involvement of the big powers in the political and economic game, Russia is still the most influential country. Recently, Chinese production began to compete with Russian production, though Russia holds its dominance. In addition, most of the products of the Central Asian countries go to Russia. As we know, products of the Central Asian countries are based on the oil and gas fields, which Russia buys at cheap prices. However, after the Nabucco project came into existence Russia began to change its energy policy toward these countries because it was afraid of the influence of Western energy companies in the region. Western companies offered a higher price for the gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. But these countries still hesitate under the pressure of Russia to join the Nabucco gas pipeline.

Moreover, talking about the economic ties between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia has a major economic impact over Kyrgyzstan directly by mutual economic relations and through regional organizations, which are under the auspices of Russia, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Eurasian Economic Community. Russia uses these regional organizations for further increasing its economic influence over the region.

Kyrgyzstan depends economically on Russia in many ways. Imports from or through Russia are vital for Kyrgyzstan’s domestic market. It remains Kyrgyzstan's top trade partner, responsible for some 30% of Kyrgyzstan's total foreign trade turnover. Russian exports consist mainly of oil and rolled metal products, machinery and equipment. Between 2001 and 2006 the trade cycle between Russia and Kyrgyzstan increased approximately five times. Russian official sources show that there was a 44% increase in commerce between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in 2006, with turnover reaching $806 million, and bilateral trade in January-August 2007 was up 75% over the same period last year. [14]

Regarding the exploration of energy resources, Gazprom, Russia's state-controlled natural-gas monopoly, will undertake the exploration and development of gas fields and the modernization and construction of new gas-transport facilities. According to an agreement between Gazprom and the Kyrgyz government, the Russian company will acquire a controlling stake in Kyrgyzstan's national gas company, Kyrgyzgaz. Officials in Bishkek say that the Russian government had proposed Gazprom acquire a 75-percent-plus-one stake in the Kyrgyzstan national gas company. Russia's gas monopoly will also overhaul existing gas-transport networks and build new ones. [15] By giving such a share to the Russian giant Kyrgyzstan is becoming dependent on the government of another country, because as mentioned above Gazprom is not a private country, it is a state company, by which Russia might gain much more influence over Kyrgyzstan. Besides Gazprom, Russian electrical company Unified Energy Systems (EES) will build two hydropower stations, possibly with help from Russian Aluminum, which is seeking a convenient source of power for aluminum-production facilities it hopes to construct in Kyrgyzstan. [16]

Also, with the low economic development the unemployment rate in Kyrgyzstan is very high. Hundreds of thousands of migrants from Kyrgyzstan go to Russia for work and send home remittances. According to the data, the 2006 remittances from temporary workers to Kyrgyzstan totaled more than 7 hundred million dollars. [17] Thus, all these factors keep Kyrgyzstan in a position of dependency with Russia and let the latter expand its influence over Kyrgyzstan on all levels.  

Political factors: With the collapse of the institutional structure of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian countries tried to create a Western-style institutional framework, which provides democracy, rule of law, human rights, stable and sustainable societal and economic development. However, these challenges were faced with traditional Soviet-type institutional structures that took root in Central Asian societies during the Soviet Union, and the framework was unsuccessful.

Yet, the question arises of why former Soviet Republics of Central and Eastern Europe were successful in building Western-type governmental institutions, but former Central Asian Republics were not. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, European countries avoided Russian influence and entered the European Union political orbit. With several programs, the EU spread its policy to the east. But in the case of Central Asia, it was far from EU, and Russia still is a dominant power in this region. As mentioned above, the Central Asian countries also have dependence on Russia through several regional organizations, one of which is the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). After the Soviet Union, for keeping former Soviet Republics under its influence, Russia established the CIS. The treaty for establishing this organization was signed on 21 December 1991 in the capital city of Kazakhstan, with the membership of 12 former Soviet Republics, except Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. [18] This organization was somehow the logical continuation of the Soviet Union in Central Asia. It is not surprising that only Central Asian countries did not want the collapse of the Soviet Empire, which led them from a tribal community to governmental institutions and state building.

However, the differences between the Soviet Union and the CIS are that this time the countries gained so-called “independence” and have no dependence on Russia. The local leaders make the decisions about the Central Asian countries, not by orders from Moscow. Yet in reality Russia was the main decision-making power in this region; the only exception was that there was no central government in Moscow for ruling and regulating the ongoing process in this region. Russia just used its political, military, and economic power for influencing the Central Asian countries.

Furthermore, one of the facts that show how influential Russia is in Central Asia is that after the Soviet Empire, the leadership and bureaucratic institutions of the newly independent countries remained the same as they were during the Soviet Union. Presidents of four Central Asian countries were former communist party leaders: Uzbek President Islam Karimov, President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov, and Tajik President Imomali Rahmanov. President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan was not, although he was a member of the communist party. Members of Parliament were also from the communist party and bureaucrats from the Soviet time were serving in governmental offices. In addition, the ruling parties were the Communist parties. The only changes were the names of the parties. The Bolshevik Party has been replaced by equally authoritarian political parties, led by the former Communist elite, like the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan and the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, but some of them even continued under the same name, such as the Communist party of Tajikistan. [19]

As pointed out above Kyrgyzstan also followed a path similar to other Central Asian countries. Askar Akaev, a member of the former Communist party, came into power in Kyrgyzstan. Akayev became the president in 1990 and was re-elected in 1995 and again in 2000. [20] He was a great supporter of close political and economic cooperation between Kyrgyzstan and Russia. During his visit to Moscow in order to participate in “Days of Kyrgyz Culture” in Russia, he said that,  “Today, for Kyrgyzstan, there is no other country in the world that is closer or dearer than Russia. I declare firmly that you should not worry about the fate of your fellow countrymen in Kyrgyzstan. Their language and cultural needs have always been and will always be fully met and their rights are protected by our constitution”.  [21]

The other aspect of President Askar Akayev’s pro-Russian Policy was the establishment of the Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan. During the Soviet Union the military powers of the Central Asian Republics were totally integrated into the Red Army. After the independence of these countries, they tried to create their own military power, but it was highly expensive and these countries lacked the infrastructure to create it. The military capacity of Kyrgyzstan is limited and so weak that until 2003 Kyrgyzstan had approximately 9 thousand military forces. [22] And being situated in such an escalating region, near Afghanistan and with the existence of an Islamic fundamentalist threat in the southern part of country, made the prominence of the CIS or a Russian military base in the region unavoidable.

Another reason for the deployment of Russian troops in Kyrgyzstan was the establishment of the US military base in this country in late 2001 for its postwar operation in Afghanistan. September 11 led to significant changes in the political, security, and geostrategic situation of the Central Asian countries. The existence of the US's military troops in the north part of the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek signaled to Russia that this would lead to all round access to further military, political, and economical spheres of the US. Russia considered it as a direct threat to its geopolitical position in the region, following this, after America Moscow asked Kyrgyzstan to open Kant air base, which is located approximately 40 kilometers from Bishkek. Putin, former President of Russia, promised to reduce one-third of the $117 million Kyrgyzstan debt. [23] According to the agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Kant air base operated under the rule of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which was formed under the auspices of the CIS in 1992 and consists of Russia, Belarus, Armenia and the four Central Asian states Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, except Turkmenistan. [24] The differences between Manas and Kant air base is that Kant does not pay any rent or other compensation to Kyrgyzstan, unlike Manas, due to the excuse that it is a unit of the CSTO.

It is worthy to add that on March 2005 the fifteen-year Russian-backed president of Kyrgyzstan Asker Akaev was withdrawn from the Presidential post, and Kurmanbek Bakiev came to power after the 'Tulip Revolution’, following two other former Soviet Republics, Ukraine and Georgia. [25] But questions arise regarding how many changes were made after the revolution in the context of foreign policy, human rights, free and fair elections, and whether it fits the expectations of the population. Political scholars thought that the 'Tulip Revolution’ was another democratic movement, which was ended the third Soviet-styled and pro-Russian government in the former Soviet Republics. In contrast, the Revolution, observing the years after it, was just a changing of political regimes from one corrupted leader to another.

At a first glance, Bakiyev was following pro-Western policy and democratic governmental institutions. The power of the presidential post was limited in order to increase the role of parliament. But the constitutional referendum in October 2007 and the parliamentary elections of December 2007, as well as the banning of public demonstrations in central Bishkek changed the political situation in Kyrgyzstan. Bakiyev’s position was strengthened when his political party won most of the chairs in parliament after the election, and he turned his position to Russia. [26] Kyrgyz Member of Parliament Kamchybek Tashiev highlighted the ongoing process in Kyrgyzstan after the revolution as, “I think that a people's revolution happened, but the people's revolution did not provide the expected results. The main goal - changing the state structure to the advantage of the interests of the common people - was not achieved. We changed the constitution twice, but both constitutions, in the final analysis, did not answer the demands and interests of the people.” [27]

This issue culminated with the decision of the Kyrgyz Parliament to close the US lead air base in Bishkek with the order of Russia and to open a second Russian military unit in the south part of the country, in the city of Osh. In February 2009, after meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev declared that he would close the US military base in Bishkek. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the terms of renting the Manas air base, and demanded a hundred-fold increase in rent from $2 million to $200 million in 2006. After negotiations the US agreed to pay over $150 million per year. [28] Furthermore, Russia also announced that it would give Kyrgyzstan $2 billion in loans and $150 million in aid, as well as writing off debts of $180 million. [29]

Lately, Russia also signed a memorandum with Kyrgyzstan in order to develop and improve   the bilateral legal framework governing the presence of Russian troops in Kyrgyzstan and the deployment of an additional Russian military contingent in Kyrgyz territory. The agreement will be valid for 49 years and could be automatically extended for a 25-year period. [30] These events display Russian political attempts, which were addressed to the US in order to show that it is still a dominant force in Central Asia and if the US wants to do something in this region; it has to deal with Russia. Both of them were interpreted by political analysts as a warning to the US in order to stop challenging Eastern European countries, mainly Ukraine and Georgia, to the membership of NATO and give up its missile-defense plan in Poland.

In addition, the Kyrgyz President also had personal interest in securing Russia's support. Bakiyev was afraid that he would be unable to secure his position in the Presidential election and that the opposition would consequently win the elections.  The decision of the OSCE election monitoring group can prove Bakiyev's concern. They said that, “on Friday the country's presidential vote failed to meet the required international standards, with a number of irregularities observed during voting. The conduct of Election Day was a disappointment. There had been cases of ballot box stuffing, inaccuracies in the voter lists, multiple voting and other irregularities. The OSCE's preliminary report also said President Kurmanbek Bakiyev used administrative resources to ensure his reelection”. [31] Hence, Bakiyev's potential agreement to open an additional Russian base goes hand in hand with his effort to secure his re-election on July 23, 2009.

In conclusion, I would like to say that, throughout history, from Peter the Great until the end of the Soviet Union, Russia followed the expansionist policy, and today it goes same way of its predecessors and does not seem to give up its imperialistic thinking. The war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 was a clear example for Russian policy in its “Near Abroad”. It was the Russian attitude toward Western policy in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus of supporting colored revolutions to take these territories from the Russian orbit of influence.

However, the recent world financial crisis and reduction of oil prices by the OPEC countries under Western pressure remind Russia that being a military power and monopoly over the raw materials, such as oil and gas, are not sufficient to be a world power in today's international relations system. For that reason, Russia accepted a new strategy in order to re-create its position as a super power, which is illustrated in the publicly announced article by the president of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev. In the first part of this official document, he talked about the current position of Russia in military and economic terms and highlighted that, “the global economic crisis has shown that our affairs are far from being in the best state. Twenty years of tumultuous change has not spared our country from its humiliating dependence on raw materials. Our current economy still reflects the major flaw of the Soviet system: it largely ignores individual needs. With a few exceptions domestic business does not invent nor create the necessary things and technology that people need. We sell things that we have not produced, raw materials or imported goods. Finished products produced in Russia are largely plagued by their extremely low competitiveness”. [32]

Recently, he talked about the future perspective of Russian international politics and mentioned that being only a military power, which his predecessors did, is not enough to compete in the contemporary world. Russia needs comprehensive development. He said that, “in the coming decades Russia should become a country whose prosperity is ensured not so much thanks to commodities but by intellectual resources: the so-called intelligent economy, creating unique knowledge, exporting new technologies and innovative products”. President Medvedev highlighted five strategic perspectives for the economic modernization of Russia in terms of the efficiency of energy production and transportation, development of the nuclear and information technology to the new level, improvement of the ground and space infrastructure in order to transfer all types of information for the spreading of its “soft power”, and finally improving the medical technology in Russia. This was a message addressed to the Western world that Russia is going to modernize its foreign policy for achieving once again a world power status based on new principles. [33]

Thus, the current Russian-US confrontation over Central Asia is also one of a series of clashes, which have been mentioned above, between these two powers over their interests in a different part of the world, and it seems that Russia still considers this region a part of its historical and traditional sphere of influence and tries to secure its control over the region with economic contracts and military and security cooperation in order to avoid the growing impact of Western power.

   REFERENCES:

   1. Dukenbaev, Askat & W. Hansen, William, “Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan”, DEMSTAR, Research Report No. 16, September 2003; www.demstar.dk/papers/UPKyrgyzstan.pdf.

   2. Personal interview with Dr. Marina Tsoy, Head of the Programm “International Relations” at  the American International University of Central Asia, Tokmok, Kyrgyzstan, 14 August 2009.

3.  Albion, Adam, “Central Asia Report: February 25, 2004”, RFE/RL, Vol. 4, Num. 8, 25 February 2004.

4. Yigit, Sureyya, “Kyrgyzstan’s default mode is Russia”, oDRussia, 9 February 2009; http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/kyrgyzstan-s-default-mode-is-russia.

5. Schulter, Beatrice, “Language and Identity: The Situation in Kyrgyzstan and the Role of         Pedagogy”, CIMERA, 2003; www.cimera.org/files/other/en/11_Bea_en.pdf.

   6. Marat, Erica, “Russian Mass Media shape Public Opinion in Kyrgyzstan”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 3, Is. 226, 6 December 2006.

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32301.

   7. Ibid, interview.

   8. Ibid,  “Russian Mass Media shape Public Opinion in Kyrgyzstan”.

   9. “Kyrgyzstan President Signs Controversial New Religion Law”, Religion Clause, 14 January 2009; http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2009/01/kyrgyzstan-president-signs.html.

   10. Ibid, interview.

   11. Ibid, “Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan”.

   12. Ibid, interview.

   13. “Kyrgyzstan, Overview of economy”, Encuclopedia of the Nation; 

http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Kyrgyzstan-OVERVIEW-OF-ECONOMY.html.

   14. Blagov, Sergei, “Russia Pledges Economic Aid, May Get Stake in Kyrgyz Defence Industry”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue. 194, 19 October 2007;

http://jamestown.nvmserver.com/124/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33095.

   15. “Gazprom to buy controlling stake in Kyrgyz national gas company”, RIANOVOSTI, 05 August 2009.

   16. Gleason, Gregory, “Russia and the Politics of the Central Asian Electricity Grid”, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 50, Num. 3, May/June 2003.

   17. Ibid, interview.

   18. R. Babayev, Rufat, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: Is there anything to be explained by Neo-Functionalists?”, Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales Área    CEI y Países Bálticos; www.caei.com.ar/es/programas/cei/P27.pdf.

   19. Soucek, Svat, “A History of Inner Asia”, (Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 281

   20. Sysoev, Gennadi, “Will Poppy Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and Tulip Revolution in Kazakhstan take place?”, Ferghana.ru information agency, 15 December 2004; http://enews.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=722.

   21. Carlson, Charles, “Kyrgyzstan: President Defends Russian Presence In Central Asia”, GlobalSecurity.org, 2003;

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/09/mil-030924-rferl-135625.htm.

   22. Huasheng, Zhao, “Security Building in Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”; src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no2_ses/4-2_Zhao.pdf.

   23. Utyaganova, Maria, “Russian Military Base in Kyrgyzstan Reflects Government's Need for Backing”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute,18 December 2002; http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/375.

   24. Weinstain, Adam, “Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization”, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Winter/Spring 2007; kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/31125/.../13-Weinstein.pdf

   25. Heathershaw, John, “The Tulip Fades: "Revolution" and repercussions in Kyrgyzstan”, Perspective, Vol. 17, Num. 2, March/April 2007. 

   26. Goldstein, Jeff, “A Color Revolution in Bishkek Fades to Black”, World News, 24 August 2009; http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_56730.shtml.

   27. Pannier, Bruce, “Kyrgyzstan: Revolution Anniversary Highlights Political Failures”, RFE/RL, 23 March 2007.

   28. Harding, Luke, “Kyrgyzstan to Close Key US Military Airbase”, The Guardian, 4 February 2009.

   29. Baigin, Shamil, “Russia plays tricky game with U.S. over Kyrgyz base”, REUTERS UK, 4 February 2009.

   30. “Russia, Kyrgyzstan sign military memorandum”, RIANOVOSTI, 01 August 2009. 

   31. “OSCE “disappointed” by Kyrgyz presidential polls”, RIANOVOSTI, 24 July 2009.

   32. “Dmitry Medvedev’s Article, Go Russia!”, Official Web Portal of the Russian President, 10 September 2009,

        http://eng.kremlin.ru/speeches/2009/09/10/1534_type104017_221527.shtml