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First published by Journal of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies (JCACS), Vol: 2 No: 4, 2007, pp. 156-172. JCACS is an USAK publication. All rights reserved.
Chong Jin OH [1]
INTRODUCTION
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, all of the newly independent governments in Central Asia aimed at nationalizing or indigenizing the territories under their control and rectifying what many saw as decades of dominance by foreign actors. These states made great efforts to undertake various nation-building projects. For individuals in many nationalizing states in Central Asia, knowledge of the titular language became increasingly important in order to obtain, maintain and advance their career and position in the society. In other words, the titular nations had somewhere to stay and settle after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the non-titular groups, which included group such as the Koreans and the Ahýska Turks had nowhere to go.[2]
This work is an analysis of two deported diaspora[3], Koreans and Ahýska Turks[4], both of which experienced Stalin’s brutal deportations[5] and which now face new challenges in the nationalizing states. These small ethnic groups have no powerful protector to whom they can appeal for help and little chance to return to their homelands. This increases their sense of anxiety and vulnerability even though they have not been harassed or victimized in any discernible way. The objective of this work is to examine their mechanisms of survival and diaspora nationalism in the nationalizing Central Asian states. Particularly, this work focuses on the role of homeland in their effort to preserve their ethnic identity. By doing so, I attempt to illustrate how ethno-nationalist sentiments in the diaspora setting can draw their strength, ideas, material support, or simply nationalist enthusiasm from homelands. Above all, the task of this article is to examine the sources of diversity within diaspora relations and to move toward an analysis of the patterns of interaction among their traditional ethnic homelands, and the states in which they reside groups in Central Asia.
The Ahýska Turks and Koreans in the Soviet Central Asia
Throughout the Soviet period, the Koreans and Ahýska Turks, and perhaps all peoples of the Soviet Union, were subjugated to great losses in the realm of national culture. Under Soviet ideology and a policy encouraging the “merging of nationalities” they were forced to downplay their national specificities and identity. After the deportation, the Korean diasporas developed a modus vivendi of adaptation to the harsh circumstances of life in exile and consequent integration into a Russian/Russified society in a relatively short period of time. From a practically all-agrarian population, they were transformed into a well-educated urbanized community, but in Russian language? Many Soviet Koreans, especially intellectuals, argue that they had no choice but to move in step with the changing environment and to focus their energies on securing a stable socio-economic base. The Korean diaspora adopted a lifestyle that was thoroughly pro-system and assimilative. Thus, before perestroika, as German Kim and Valeriy Khan note, the Koreans in the Soviet Union barely had the opportunity to get their bearings.[6] and Uzbekistan, assimilation has drifted Koreans apart from their cultural and ethnic roots. In other words, the Soviet Koreans didn’t pay much attention to issues like a Korean national revival, returning to their homeland and other series of movements for cultural and identity preservation. Despite the Soviet Koreans’ remarkable economic and educational advancement since their deportation, their excessive assimilation raised the question of the long-term survival of their culture and identity. Indeed, most of the [ex-]Soviet Koreans were not fluent in Korean language or did not speak it at all. Not only among the educated children who moved into the cities and studied in the universities, but also among the farmers whose collectives were absorbed into the giant multi-ethnic sovkhozes or kolkhozes of Kazakhstan
Compared to Koreans, the Ahýska Turks engaged themselves more in preserving their identity and culture during the Soviet period. Since the end of the 1950s, the Ahýska Turks formed an underground organization and engaged themselves in a struggle for repatriation and rehabilitation. This group was the only organization leading the Ahýska Turkish movement during the Soviet regime. Despite the harsh assimilationist policies of the Soviet authorities during the 1960s and 1970s the Ahýska Turks preserved their identity and culture. Although the Soviet authorities imprisoned and arrested many members of the Ahýska Turkish movement, the Ahýska Turks actively continued to demand their relocation to their homelands and staunchly proclaimed their Turkishness.[7] While many Soviet Koreans urged their children to speak Russian and educated them in a Russian atmosphere for their social advancement and economically well-being, many Ahýska Turks mentioned that they were primarily concerned with teaching their children the importance of their own tradition, values, religion and language.[8] The Ahýska Turks have, in a way, used their language to identify themselves and have also used it as a tool against assimilation. Yavuz Zeybek argues that language is one of the most important elements for the formation of identities for the Turks.[9] In short, the Ahýska Turks passionately preserved their own language which fortified their ethnic consciousness and solidarity.
In all events, perestroika and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union brought about radical changes in the life and consciousness of the Ahýska Turks and Koreans in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Due to the dramatic changes in the economic, social, and political environment, both diasporas are in the process of reconstructing their national or diaspora identity in order to strengthen their solidarity. Moreover, they now have the chance to connect with co-ethnics from their respective homelands. After the Koreans made contact with the homeland and other Korean diasporas around the world, they started to embrace a new conception of themselves (one which puts more emphasis on Koreanness) and change their (Soviet) identities. For the Ahýska Turks, it was a time to realize their long-cherished hope: immigration to Turkey which is perceived as their homeland. As one woman from Tashkent region told the author, about forty percent of the Ahýska Turks in her village left for Turkey from the beginning of the 1990s.[10] was both a challenge and an opportunity to revive their ethnic identity and culture. For both diaspora minorities, formation of the independent titular nations in Central Asia
A Comparative Analysis of the Homelands’ (Turkey and Korea) Engagements with Their Own Diaspora
The Seoul Olympics opened the eyes of Soviet Koreans, who started to realize that South Korea was a dynamically developing country which had already achieved considerable economic success.[11] and Uzbekistan established diplomatic relations with both Korean states (North Korea and South Korea). At first, North Korea tried to compete with South Korea in establishing and developing ties with the Soviet Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. For instance, in 1989 three thousand textbooks in Korean were sent from Pyongyang.[12] Professors and taekwondo instructors came from North Korea to teach the Korean language and traditional martial arts. In addition, the North Korean government financed the All-Union Association for Promotion of the Unification of Korea. This organization was to promote a pro-North Korean diaspora thus many materials they brought were propaganda materials rather than those for purely educational purposes. During the first years of its activity this organization made it possible for several hundred Soviet Koreans to visit North Korea. However, the deep economic crisis which has struck North Korea in the mid-1990s forced Pyongyang to close its embassy in Almaty and call back all its diplomats. In Uzbekistan, only minimal personnel were left over (3 persons). As a result, on the whole North Korea left no noticeable traces and failed to impress and influence the Korean diaspora in any significant manner. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independent Kazakhstan
Relations with South Korea developed quickly and widely from the beginning. Thousands of Soviet Koreans were able to visit South Korea and in turn, thousands of South Koreans came to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.[13] conglomerates such as LG, Samsung, and Daewoo have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Dozens of Korean companies, including joint ventures, operated in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Such investments gave the Korean diaspora a great opportunity to work. Also the Association of Koreans in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan contributed to signing a number of contracts between and South Korean companies and Kazak authorities. By doing so, they could consolidate their position in the titular republics. Many Soviet Koreans mentioned that the image of South Korea as an economically developed country has contributed to the high status of the Korean diaspora. The Korean
For instance, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, realized the potential for investment and growth with South Koreans’ input when he visited South Korea in 1992.[14] firms such as Daewoo and Samsung in Uzbekistan. In this trip, Karimov stated, “I am convinced that we have set out on the correct path and further contact with the South Korean government…(means development) retarding not only economic questions but also ethnic and political questions.”[15] It is the presidents of these two countries, and not only individual entrepreneurs, who foresaw the potential for increased contacts in the economic sphere, not to mention the spheres of politics and ethnic relations. Currently, South Korea is the third biggest investing and trading country of Uzbekistan. South Korean’s investments were more than 1.7 billion US dollars in 1997.[16] That visit dealt primarily with questions of cooperation in the economic sphere between the two countries. During that visit, agreements were signed indicating that the two countries would agree to work together to promote the expansion of large South Korean
Of the various leaders of the Korean movement interviewed, one pointed to the significance of nurturing Korean business ventures as a mean to promote not only the economic well-being of the Korean communities but as a way of forming potential ties among Koreans and Soviet Koreans in Central Asia. The interviewee the president of a smaller Korean cultural organization, expressed that both the South Korean and local Korean diaspora businessmen working as citizens of their titular republics were not only helping to promote the economies of their own republics but also strengthening their ethnic solidarity. To be sure, when the economic well-being of local Korean communities is assured, this self-sufficiency can support various projects taking place at socio-cultural level. One Korean diplomat said that the funds that South Korea spent to support the Korean diaspora in Central Asia could create conditions for them to develop business in the region which will reduce their desire for emigration, thereby reflecting the interests of all three sides, Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan, Korea, and the Korean diaspora.[17]
In socio-cultural aspects, South Korea has been active in its support for the Korean diaspora communities. For example, with regard to cultural programs, such as the 60th anniversary of the Korean residence in Central Asia in 1997, the Korean government provided 15.000 US dollars for the ceremony and festival. It also provided 20.000 US dollars for the Central Asian Korean Newspaper Koryo Ilbo, and it sponsored various small and mid-sized businesses of the Korean local diaspora. Not only the South Korean government but also various South Korea based social support foundations have invested several million US dollars in the establishment of cultural or language learning centers, which teach Korean language as well as the titulars’ language (Kazak/ Uzbek). In these educational centers, they teach Korean language, promote traditional Korean art, disseminate facts about Korean history and culture, and hold various events to bring the Korean diaspora together. Every year these branches are expanding to other cities where there is a compact Korean population. All of the main buildings of the Association of Koreans in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were refurbished and modernized by the South Koreans. Not only the buildings or facilities, but also numerous teachers from South Korea are sent to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan since the independence. Every year, South Korean government is giving its teachers (from primary to high school) and professors a chance to work in Kazak or Uzbek schools and universities and its own language centers during their sabbatical year.[18]
There are three main governmental organizations of South Korea which deal with the Korean diaspora: The Korea Foundation, the Overseas Koreans foundation, and KOICA (Korea International Cooperation Agency). The Korea Foundation is under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its main project is to support Korean studies in region. Hence, it is running numerous visiting programs and fellowships and scholarships for students, teachers and professors of Korean studies or language.[19]
The Overseas Koreans Foundation is also under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but its mission differs with the Korea Foundation. While the Korea Foundation supports academic affairs, the Overseas Koreans Foundation focuses its support on various diasporic centers and organizations. The Overseas Koreans Foundation was founded with the announcement of the “Overseas Koreans Foundation Legislation” (Law No. 5313) passed on March 27, 1997.[20] community. The Overseas Koreans Foundation’s aim is to help overseas Koreans to maintain a sense of national fellowship among them and live as exemplary citizens in the nations where they are residing. In order to accomplish its mission, the Foundation took every measure to complete the construction of the Overseas Koreans Center, with the goal of providing exclusive service for Koreans living abroad when they pay a visit to their ethnic homeland. In this context, it gives support to diaspora’s radios, newspapers, TV stations, language and cultural centers, etc. In terms of a personal exchange program, the foundation offers various homeland visit programs to elderly Koreans and juveniles. In reverse, it gives South Korean high school and university students’ visit and voluntary activities in the compatriots’ village, organizations or centers during their vacation. In addition, to support the maintenance of national homogeneity it created the cyber Korean community Hanminjok Network, and established the Korean business network as an integrated hub for those overseas Koreans engaged in the fields of commerce, trade, information technology, science and technology. Then on October 30 of that year, the Foundation was inaugurated and put into official operation. All of its efforts have been focused on various cooperative programs, since the government thought that these initiatives would be a great help to overseas Koreans and serve as a driving force for the Korean
KOICA is also under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: its project may overlap with the Korea Foundation and the Overseas Koreans Foundation, however its mission and projects are broader in scope compared with the other two organizations. Rather than focusing on the Korean diaspora issues, its mission is targeted to the whole country, i.e., Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. KOICA focuses more on general issues such as supporting human resources development and providing the material and physical aid necessary to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development. KOICA’s aim is to contribute to strengthen Korea’s friendly relationships with its partner countries by promoting the socio-economic advancement in the developing world. Within this context, they are sending 40-50 experts in every field, from agricultural experts to IT (Information Techonology), Taekwondo masters, and even Korean language teachers, to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan every year.[21]universities while Taekwondo masters are sent to military or security related institutions. Actually, KOICA’s projects are not designed to support the Koreans diaspora in a direct manner. Nonetheless, the author witnessed during the fieldwork that not even a few of the local Koreans were benefiting from these programs as well. Besides, such activities from the homeland are giving great pride to the Korean diaspora in the region. These experts are sent to various titular governments’ institutions and offices. For example, Korean language experts are generally sent to
Like the Korean diaspora, the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave the Ahýska Turks the opportunity to learn about their homeland, Turkey.[22] and Uzbekistan.”[23] Turkey always had a bigger agenda when dealing with the region. To Turkey, Kazaks and Uzbeks and other Turkic ethnics were also lost brothers who were newly found after their independence. As a result, Ahýska Turks were pushed behind in terms of priority by Kazaks and Uzbeks, the dominant ethnic (or perhaps ruling ethnic) of the titular states. As mentioned earlier, Turkey’s official position concerning the Ahýska Turk’s issue was always in the big framework, “regarding all ethnic Turks outside Turkey in general.” There were only limited measures to repatriate some Ahýska Turks in the region. However, there are still many remaining in the titular states. During the Soviet period, many Ahýska Turks mentioned that they knew Turkey as very poor and under developed country. However, when they had a chance to properly see the situation in Turkey they all said they were shocked. Most of the Ahýska Turks were impressed by the level of development of Turkey and its modernization. Considering the pride they took in Turkishness throughout the Soviet era, this fact certainly boasted the morale of the Ahýska Turks in the titular states. However, Turkey’s role in engaging with their diaspora, Ahýska Turks, has been quite disappointing. As Aydýngün argues, “Turkey did not officially take into its agenda the problem experienced by the Ahýska Turks, in order not to damage its relations with Kazakhstan
TICA (Turkish International Cooperation Agency), which is more or less similar to KOICA in terms of their mission and objective, is the only Turkish government body that deals with the region. Therefore, its mission is not to support the Ahýska Turks directly. Rather, TICA focuses on more general issues such as providing material and technical assistance to the titular states for their socio-economical development. Like KOICA’s objective, Turkey seeks to strengthen its friendly relationships with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan with various projects. On a small scale TICA is sending Turkish books, newspapers, and other printed materials to the Ahýska Turkish community and organizations but it is generally done in a rather covert fashion. During talks with the head of TICA and KOICA together in Tashkent, the author could see the official attitudes of these two governments.[24] diaspora as much as possible with his programs. The difference has, perhaps, resulted from the policy of Turkey having no proper agenda on the Ahýska Turks’ issue. Faruk Uysal, a chairman from TICA Tashkent office, denied firmly that there is no such direct support program for the Ahýska Turks. Moreover, he said, it is TICA’s position to avoid the ethnic issues in their project which were sensitive subjects in the region. On the other hand, Dong-ho Kim, KOICA chairman in Tashkent, said openly that his Organization is working hard to aid the Korean
Although Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are Turkic countries, which share many heritages in common with Turkey, it seems Korea is freer from the titular governments’ censorship. As a result, Ahýska Turks get limited support from the Turkish government even that in indirect ways or from behind the scenes. For example, the Turkish government had a program to train the Ahýska Turks as teachers of Turkish classes in ordinary Kazak schools which are in the regular curriculum. However, its intention is neither to promote Ahýska Turk’s cultural revival, nor to preserve the Turkish language for them. In sum, such projects are more oriented toward the titulars (Kazaks or Uzbeks) rather than the Ahýska Turks.
In economic aspects, Turkish businesses are engaging with the Ahýska Turks while expanding their enterprise in the region. Though the scales of these businesses are smaller than that of Korea, Turkey is still one of the important economic actors in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. There are many small and mid-sized Turkish enterprises active in the region. Since there is almost no difference in terms of language between the Turks of Turkey and the Ahýska Turks, as local Turks, the Ahýska Turks have been playing a crucial role in building a bride between the Turkish entrepreneurs and Kazak counterparts. To the Turkish entrepreneurs, Ahýska Turks are important for their businesses since they are fluent both in Russian, the titular language, and Turkish. Moreover, Ahýska Turks are familiar with the procedures and the business manners of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Consequently, if they are qualified for the job, the Turkish companies offer a good number of opportunities to the Ahýska Turks.
However, this favorable situation did not last long for the Ahýska Turks. First, as mentioned, many Ahýska Turks resided in rural areas generally dealing with agricultural production. Thus, there were shortages of well-educated urban Ahýska Turks who could coordinate the work between the Turkish businessmen and their Kazak counterparts. As a result, the Ahýska Turks could not totally preoccupy wity such opportunities in the initial stage when they had a chance to play as an important middleman. Second, after a few years titulars become their vital competitors. Since the titulars, Kazak and Uzbek, were all ethnically Turkic whose languages were similar to Turkish, it didn’t take long to learn Turkish themselves. Moreover, after the independence, Turkey has been actively engaged with the titular states with its pro-Central Asian policy. With this welcoming policy, Turkey invited thousands of Kazaks and Uzbeks to study and do research in Turkey. Likewise, many Turkish departments in the Universities were occupied by the titulars (Kazak or Uzbek).[25] diaspora, a certain degree of urbanization and emphasis on education is needed among the Ahýska Turks. After the mid-1990s many titulars were equipped with Turkish language skills and good connections with their governments. Consequently, Turkish entrepreneurs started to prefer qualified Kazaks or Uzbeks (who had a good language ability, qualified diploma and connections with the local partners) rather than the local Ahýska Turks.[26] The author rarely met Ahýska Turks in Turkish companies. It seems that priority is given to the titulars rather than Ahýska Turks within the Turkish enterprises. Actually, some Turkish companies did not have any consideration of the Ahýska Turk at all. It was not in their agenda while employing the employees.[27] In this sense, perhaps, unlike the Korean
Although the official homeland engagement toward the Ahýska Turks is nominal for developing and preserving their ethnic identity, the Turkish media is playing a crucial role in keeping the Turkish identity. The Turkish government started satellite broadcasting in 1994 with its successful launch of the TURKSAT satellite system. Turkish media influence was made possible when Central Asian states gained independence. With this satellite system, there are numerous private channels, as well as state channels, airing through out Central Asia. There is even a channel which is targeted at Central Asia. TRT-Eurasia (Avrasya) TV (Currently TRT TURK) service has started to foster ethnic unity and reinforce a Turkic identity to various Turkic peoples.[28] Its aim was to establish a basis for Turkic pride and ultimately pan-Turkic goal of a strong solidarity among all Turks.[29] The Turkish government thought that this project was achievable, since Turkish people and Turkic peoples living in Central Asia are culturally and linguistically similar. Some Turkish politicians viewed the television channel as a propaganda tool in a larger campaign to establish the groundwork for a greater solidarity and cooperation among the Turks in the world.[30] As Schram mentioned, mass media might control interpersonal communication, planting new ideas in the minds of individuals.[31]
As part of its educational policy, TRT-Eurasia TV (TRT-TURK) has been encouraged to broadcast in Turkish with Turkish subtitles to promote familiarity with the Istanbul Turkish.[32]’s intention to encourage Central Asian Turkic republics to switch their alphabets to the Latin script Turkey uses.[33] Turks in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan can see all the state and private channels of Turkey. Increased knowledge of the homeland means an increase in empathy toward them. In particular, these satellite television channels are playing an important role in the development of identities. To be sure, this satellite system was not established for the Ahýska Turks or other diasporas. It implies a bigger and broader project and mission of Turkey. However, its influence on the Ahýska Turks is huge in terms of revitalizing their national identity and culture. TRT-Eurasia channel especially focused on cultural programs such as documentaries of the Turkic heritage and history. Such programs reminded the viewers of their past history, culture, and language. There were few channels at the beginning, however there are now more than 70 channels, all broadcasting in Turkish, covering topics ranging from news to music, entertainment, documentaries, etc. In other words, the Ahýska According to Robins, it was Turkey
One can find a big satellite antenna in every house of Ahýska Turks these days. Almost all of the houses that the author visited were equipped with the satellite system which allows Ahýska Turks to see all of the Turkish channels. An Ahýska Turk village headman in Sirdaria mentioned, “It isn’t expensive to install a satellite system in the house these days. Thus, almost every household can watch the homeland television now.” All the Ahýska Turks were enjoying Turkish television. There was almost no one who was watching the state-controlled, boring local channels. Many Ahýska Turks in Uzbekistan and Kazakstan see Turkish channels as very trustworthy, objective or impartial. If people have a goal of gaining information for important issues, they will become highly dependent upon available media which they see as credible. In other words, it should be said that the more credible channel, the more likely people would become dependant upon it. Thus, it was not only a matter of nationalism or ethnic identity which made them to watch Turkish channels, but the channels’ credibility as well as the content of the channels led to Ahýska Turks continuously watching Turkish television channels. The contents of local channels have by no means been qualified enough to compete with the programs of the Turkish channels. The programs from the Turkish channels were richer varied in the eyes of the viewers. As one Ahýska Turk said to the author, “We have never experienced this (watching the Turkish television) before. Thus it is exciting and quite interesting for many.”[34] are independent, the old communist apparatus of power is not fully eradicated. Domestic TV broadcasting is most heavily politically controlled. The people of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are only informed within the dictates of current regime, learning the truth long after the events. This situation led almost all the Ahýska Turks fixing their channels to Turkish television. Table I shown below is the top 4 responses collected from the Ahýska Turk during the fieldwork about the reasons for watching Turkish satellite television. Without a doubt, Turkish television is more open (practices free speech tenets) compared to the currently available local titular’s channels. Although Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
Table I
The reasons of watching Turkish satellite television by Ahýska Turks
Q. What is the reason of watching Turkish satellite television?
|
1.
|
It is trustworthy and impartial. Objective on events reporting.
|
2.
|
It shows a Turkish way of life (Turkish daily life, music, folklore, etc.)
|
3.
|
Turkish TV imparts in people a sense of Turkish pride
|
4.
|
It teaches the Turkish language
|
Source: Based on the interview data with Ahýska Turks (Uzb. 2005), (Kaz. 2003)
The Soviet Koreans are also in the same situation, however, they don’t have as many chances to watch homeland television channels, when compared with the Ahýska Turks. Since the Korean satellite system is focused on East Asia and the Asian Pacific region, it does not cover the Central Asian region. However, there are two Korean satellite channels operating in the region. Interestingly, these two channels were almost useless in motivating the Korean diaspora to accumulate their cultural heritage, heighten the diaspora’s awareness and contribute to their ethnic development. Even though these two channels were state owned channels, one of them, KBS WORLD, is a paid channel so that one has to pay 40 dollars every month to watch it. Koreans in America, Japan or other developed countries might be able to afford such a fee to watch a Korean channel but for the Soviet Koreans in Central Asia it is too expensive to watch. As a result, it can be watched only in the big language or cultural centers operated by South Koreans who can afford the fee. Another channel, which is called Arirang TV, is free of charge, thus some Soviet Koreans are watching it. Yet many of them are complaining about the channel and its orientations. Although there are some programs introducing homeland Korea and current issues, trends and language, which may be useful for the Korean diaspora to recreate their identity, absurdly all these programs were broadcasted in English with English subtitles. The English-centered broadcasting of the Arirang channel resulted in the Korean diaspora abandoning the channel since it was unfamiliar to them and hard to understand. As a result, many Koreans watch the Russian channels broadcast from Moscow, which they are familiar with. It is the result of the South Korean government’s Western oriented mentality, thinking that broadcasting in English would bring them a more globalized and have a bigger effect. But to whom? Among the hundreds of channels in the satellite, a person who chooses the Korean channel to watch will have a willingness to learn about Korea and Korean. Thus, broadcasting in Korean with English subtitles will be enough to meet all of the expectations of the viewers. Perhaps, Yavuz Zeybek gives a good statement related to the issue. He states that Turkish Eurasia TV does not make Central Asians or Turkish diaspora Turkish. They all identify themselves as Turkish or Turkic, then they watch the channel. They already know who they are so that the position of Turkish Eurasia TV is to promote this already known identity.[35]
As Teheranian argues, the mass media can create a national identity and culture.[36] Turks, thanks to the Turkish satellite television system Ahýska Turks are very well informed about their homeland by and its current issues. Even the younger generations who did not have a chance to visit Turkey knew all of the current Turkish pop-stars and streets of Istanbul and cafes by watching various programs. Without a doubt, this will narrow the gap between the diaspora and the homeland compatriots. These examples of homeland engagement with diasporic communities reveal the power and longevity of ethno-national bonds. These bonds do not necessarily bridge the cultural distance created over decades, however, in the long run this distance may become narrower by various engagement policies from the homeland. Mass media functions as an agent of gradual change through existing structures rather than directly modifying the structural constraints of development.[37] Consequently, there is no doubt that its consequences are huge and will have a deep impact in the long run. In the case of diasporas, the more they watch homeland broadcasting, the stronger become their ethnic identity. Moreover, once the mass media system is well-established it is not expensive to maintain and develop it. Its impact will be broader and deeper than any other measures. Although there is a lack of support from the Turkish government for the Ahýska
CONCLUSION
Since the independence of titular nations, i.e., Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the South Korean government overtly and continuously announced its intention to the Korean diasporas that it would not repatriate its compatriots in the region but guaranteed to help and protect their peaceful and prosperous future in the states they resided. Such consistent policy of the homeland made the Korean diasporas to vest their future in the titular states and actively participate in the diaspora activities (including politics) to maximize their benefits and advantageous position in each republic. Many Soviet Koreans in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and South Korea have been able to capitalize to varying degrees on their shared ethnicity to further their socio-economic prospects. In contrast, the lack of Turkey’s firm commitment to the Ahýska Turks left the latter like stray sheep. Many Ahýska Turks defined their situation as an exile situation in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. They could neither vest their future in the titular states nor see their future in their avowed homeland Turkey. Accordingly, the Ahýska Turks’ diaspora movement is not revitalizing (or successful) at the moment. Many Ahýska Turks hope to see their homeland Turkey to show certain interest in and responsibility for them. Actually, rather than the material support, many wanted to see Turkey’s public claim against them, even though it might be symbolic.[38] Many Ahýska Turks believe that this sort of action from Turkey would protect their rights and decrease discriminations from the titular states. Turkey’s paradoxical standpoint between the official policy and informal practices did not provide a solution for the survival of Ahýska Turks as a diaspora in the region.
Recent urbanization and intermarriage are perhaps seen as the biggest challenges in weakening ethnic identity, both for the Ahýska Turkish and Korean diasporas. This being the case however, one may also point out to the existence of similar challenges to the ethno-national culture in their very homelands, i.e., Turkey and South Korea, in the face of globalization or Westernization. This points out the critical role of diaspora associations in each republic. They are the engines of developing diaspora consciousness and preserving ethnic identity in the host states. However, these associations have limitations in their ability to support such activities due to the lack of funding and cadres. The diaspora activities should be linked to, and cooperate with, the homeland. In one sense, engagement between homelands and dispersed communities inherently catalyzes cultural revival and re-imagining of the co-ethnic groups as diasporic. Fortunately, both the Ahýska Turkish and the Korean diasporas have their own homeland that can support these activities. Homeland’s commitment to its diasporas is a key factor in preserving the diaspora ethnic identity and nationalism. Although, the nationalizing titular regime emerged in the region since 1991, the Ahýska Turkish and Korean diasporas can now have various contacts with their own homelands. The homelands’ (South Korea and Turkey) strong commitment and continuous engagements with their own diasporas can revitalize the Ahýska Turkish and Korean diasporas’ ethnic identities and culture. Perhaps this is the only way to maintain the diaspora identity and nationalism, unless the homeland has the willingness for the repatriation of its own diaspora.
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Pravda Vostoka, 5 March 1993.
“Kazakhstanui Koroyoin”, Dong-a Ilbo, 22 May 2005.
[1] He is an assistant professor at the Institute of Central Asian Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. E-mail: jin93@hanmail.net.
[2] As peoples deported by the Soviet regime, these groups, unlike the Russian diaspora, were forced to migrate against their will. Moreover they don’t have option, like the Russian diaspora, to repatriate to their motherland. Perhaps, this is reason why we can think the Ahýska and Korean diasporas were the main losers in the nation-building process in post-Soviet Central Asia due to their powerlessness and vulnerability.
[3] Although ideas concerning diaspora and its types vary, the concept of diaspora in this study is limited to the following: expatriate communities dispersed from an original homeland, often traumatically; a community which has a collective memory and myth about the homeland; a community which has a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long period of time and based on a sense of distinctiveness; a community that has the possibility of a distinctively creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism. These are crucial factors that distinguish them from any migrant community or ethnic minority. Mere physical dispersion does not automatically connote diaspora.
[4] The term ‘Ahýska /Meskhetian Turk’ is a controversial term. The Ahýska/Meskhetian Turks are known as Ahýska Turks in Turkey and "Meskhetian" Turks in the West and Russia. In this article the group in question will be referred as ‘Ahýska Turk’, since it was the appellation used by the group members themselves during the fieldwork carried in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
[5] The Koreans were deported on September 1938, and the Ahýska Turks were deported on November 1944 to Central Asia. During the deportation the Koreans and the Ahýska Turks were crammed into overcrowded, underheated, broken down, and filthy freight cars that transported them across the Eurasian continent. In case of the Korean diaspora, due to this overload a train was turned down near Khabarosk on September 13th 1937, which casued many casualties. Not only accidents, but also diseases during the journey, such as measles exacerbated by the hard conditions, increased the death toll.
[6] German Kim & Valeriy Khan, “The Korean Movement in Kazakhstan: Ten Years Later”, Korean and Korean American Studies Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 2/3, 2001, p. 114.
[7] Ahýska Turks’ organization Homeland Society’s main goal has been to work for the return of the Ahýska Turks to their homeland.
[8] Interview with Ahýska Turks and Korean Diasporas in Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 2003, 2005.
[9] Yavuz Zeybek, “Turkish Television to Central Asia: Perception of Turkish Avrasya Television in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, 1996, p. 115.
[10] Interview with an Ahýska Turkish woman, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 2005.
[11] Valeriy Khan, “Koreiskaia disapora segodnia”, Koryo Ilbo, 22 January 1994.
[12] Georgii Kan, Istoriia Koreitsev Kazakhstana, (Almaty: Gylym, 1995), p. 45.
[13] Korean embassies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan estimate the number of their citizens with permanent residence in their respective countries as such: Kazakstan, 2000, Uzbekistan, 1700.
[14] Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan: Along the Road of Deepening Economic Reform (Tashkent: 1995), p. 96.
[15] Pravda Vostoka, 5 March 1993.
[16] Korea EXIM Bank, Uzbekistan Kukga Hyun Whang mit Jinchul Bang-an, (Seoul: 2005), p. 119.
[17] Interview with a Counselor of Korean Embassy in Tashkent, 2005.
[18] Every year the Korean government is sending around 20 teachers to each republic. The government is providing housing and living expenses. Moreover, they all have their regular salary coming from their own institutions. Thus the competition is pretty high. One can extend its duration up to 3 years.
[19] Also, prominent Korean diaspora scientists in various fields are included in this program. They get grants or fellowships to do their further research in various Korean institutes.
[20] Overseas Koreans Foundation Brochure, (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005).
[21] KOICA, Annual Report 2004, (Seoul: KOICA, 2004), p. 4.
[22] The Ahýska Turks lived in 212 villages in Southern and Southwestern Georgia (Adigenskii, Akhaltsikhskii, Aspinskii, Akhalkalakhskii and Bogdanovskii districts) along the Turkish border. During the fieldwork the author observed that although the Ahýska Turks "belonged to the territory of Georgian national space," they never considered themselves as Georgians. Most do not identify themselves with Georgia let alone being Georgian at all. Many Ahýska Turks denied being Georgian and never disputed their Turkishness. Very few members of the community, mostly elderly, want to go to Ahýska, Georgia. Whether they want to or not, it seems that to return to Ahýska, Georgia is now only a symbolic homeland that they should be allowed to go back to. It has become their hypothetical homeland these days. Many middle aged and young Ahýska Turks associate them with Turkey.
[23] Ayţegül Aydýngün, “Ahýska (Meskhetian) Turks: Source of Conflict?”, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2002, p. 59.
[24] Interview with Faruk Uysal from TICA and Dong-ho Kim from KOICA, Tashkent, 2005.
[25] To remind, many Korean departments in the region were occupied by the local Koreans. Also, since many Ahýska Turks preserve their language very well there is no merit to study the Turkish departments.
[26] As one of Turkish businessman in Tashkent said during the interview, “It is more advantageous to work with a Uzbek who speaks Turkish, since he is more likely to overcome the difficulties of the complex system while doing businesses.” He also mentioned that there were many Uzbeks who can speak Turkish in the labor market these days. Also, many Turkish businessmen could speak the titular languages to some extent. It wasn’t hard for them to learn Kazak or Uzbek. During a visit to a couple of Turkish enterprises in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the author witnessed many titulars (Kazaks or Uzbeks) who were playing as a middleman between the Turkish entrepreneurs and local counterparts.
[27] Many Turkish businessmen said that if one knows Turkish, Russian and perhaps local language with qualified profession in ones fields they did not care about ethnicity, or giving priority to their compatriots, Ahýska Turks.
[28] Haluk Sahin and Asu Aksoy, “Global Media and Cultural Identity in Turkey,” Journal of Communication, Vol. 43, No. 2, 1993, p. 33.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., p. 38.
[31] Daniel Lerner, “Book Review: Mass Media and National Development by Wilbur Schramm, 1964,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1966, pp. 243-247.
[32] Philip Robins, “Between Sentiment Self-interest: Turkey’s Policy toward Azerbaijan and Central Asian States”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4, 1993, p. 607.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Interview with an Ahýska Turk in Chimkent, 2003.
[35] Yavuz Zeybek, “Turkish Television to Central Asia: Perception of Turkish Avrasya Television in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” Unpublished PhD dissertation, The University of Oklahoma, 1996, p. 125.
[36] Majid Teheranian, “Communications and National Development: Reflections on Theories and Policies,” in Majid Teheranian, Farhad Hakimzadeh, and Marcello Vidale (Ed.), Communication Policy for National Development (London: Routledge, 1977), pp. 17-25.
[37] Everett Rogers, “Communication and Development: The Passing of the Dominant Paradigm,” in Everett M. Rogers (Ed.), Communication and Development: Critical Perspectives (California: Sage, 1976), pp. 121-130.
[38] As one Ahýska Turk mentioned, “What we want is not material help from our homeland Turkey, but the homeland’s interest and its public claim against them.” Such response was very common among the Ahýska Turks during the interview. ; Interview with Ahmet Ali-Osman ođlu Nabiyev, Chimkent, 2003.
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