Neither military action and threats to stop or deter violence, nor economic sanctions, two traditional approaches to dealing with violent conflicts, are likely to be appropriate in post-Cold war conflicts. They are too costly for the sanctioners, too difficult to organize and maintain, moreover it is not clear that they will produce the desired results since they do not deal with the root causes of conflict such as ethnicity, race, religion, and xenophobia.  

      Consequently, governments have increasingly turned to efforts to find softer and less costly strategies for dealing with the ethno-national conflicts, specifically in the ECE and the FSU. Because of the need to find alternatives for resolving intra-national conflicts in post-Cold war world, international community and international organizations began to emphasis “preventive diplomacy” and introduced the term “conflict prevention”. In response of this, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali proposed to strengthen preventive diplomacy through strengthening the information-gathering and deterrent instruments available to the United Nations in his book An Agenda for Peace. In this book, the term preventive diplomacy is defined as the ‘action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.’ To this regard, the instruments that might be employed are: fact-finding and observer missions, early warning, early mediation, diplomatic and economic pressure, or event the preventive deployment of troops. In short, preventive diplomacy submits a new approach in this transition period. Chayes and Chayes define this transition period very well: “The old is not yet dead: the new cannot be born”. ⁹  

The Need of Preventive Diplomacy in Intra-state Conflicts 

Before we specifically look into the Crimean Tatar case, here I would like to review some theories of the conflict resolution literature and then apply them to our case study. 

      In dispute resolution literature, there are three general approaches: Power-based approach, a rights-based approach, and an interest-based approach.¹⁰ In power-based approach, disputing parties attempt to determine who is most powerful through a power contest and war is the most obvious and extreme version of this approach. In rights-based approach, the parties try to determine who is right according to international law. In an interest-based approach, parties attempt to reconcile their underlying interests by bridging their different needs, aspirations and fears and satisfying both sides. In other words, this approach avoids win-lose or lose-lose solutions. If we compare three approaches in terms of both cost and effectiveness, an interest-based approach tends to be the most cost-effective approach. Typically, this approach consumes less time, energy, and money than other approaches. Secondly, it averts enormous destruction of resources as well as lost opportunities (for trade, investment, etc.), because it attempts to address and meet the parties’ underlying interests and to achieve a satisfactory outcome. Lastly, a problem solving approach minimizes damage to the long-term relationship. Therefore, the conflict is less likely to recur and the resolution will be more stable.  

      Preventive diplomacy, as early as possible is the least complex, the most humane and the most cost-effective path for the international community to take in resolving disputes The UN Charter combines all three approaches into the UN’s structure. Different organizations like OSCE, HCNM, UNCIDP or different NGOs focus on different approaches of dispute settlement based on their plausibility and cost effectiveness. 

      The real key element to preventing intra-state conflict is early warning and preventive diplomacy. Both are aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and at helping to address and improve them. During 1989-94, only four of 94 armed conflicts were classical inter-state conflicts. The most common kinds of conflict were “internal conflicts over government (civil wars) or over territory (state formation conflicts).”¹¹ Most of these conflicts, including the Crimean Tatars case involved ethnic or communal groups.  

      The term ethnic conflict refers to the form the conflict takes and is not meant to suggest that ethnicity per se is the cause of the conflict.  As Ryan (1990) notes, ``The actual cause of conflicts may vary from case to case and can include exclusion from political power, a sense of injustice because of the way resources are distributed within a national or international division of labor, fears  that an identity is under threat an so on’’.¹²  For the Crimean Tatars all these conditions are valid.  Currently repatriating Crimean Tatars are economically frail, most of them do not have Ukrainian citizenship and as a result most of them are unemployed. Moreover, they don’t feel secure for their future,  they can not vote, they have no representation in the parliament, they see the houses formerly belonged to their parents now occupied by Russians and Ukrainians while they have  to struggle in tent towns without basic needs such as electricity, water or gas.  On the other hand, deteriorating Ukrainian economy and calls for union with Russia (expressed not only in Crimea but also in eastern Ukraine), further erode the already delicate relations between Russia and Ukraine. Regardless, the Crimean Tatars are still continuing to repatriate to Crimea knowing that they will face enormous obstacles and minority treatment in their own homeland¹³.  

      The conventional wisdom in some circles has been that the plethora of ethnic conflicts is based upon immutable ``ancient hatreds’’, and this is one of the ``root causes’’ of the conflict that exists in Crimea today.  As well known, especially among the Russians and the Crimean Tatars there is long list of “ancient hatreds’’ with  history of  violent wars, clashes and unending animosity continuing for centuries until the end of the Cold War era.  In history, the conflicts and hostilities between the Crimean Tatars, Russians and Ukrainians were equivalents of inter-state conflicts, but today in Crimea the conflict is definitely a good example of an intra-state conflict and it should be treated carefully since most of the intra-state conflicts do not always remain within the states.  Many factors can cause it to spread to their neighboring states and other kin states due to cross-border movement by rebels and refugees¹⁴.  

      Republic of Turkey is a kin state for the Crimean Tatars, and all through the history Turkey (or Ottoman Empire before the founding of Turkish Republic in 1923) the relations between Turkey and Crimean Tatars were very close due to ethnic, national and religious unity among both actors.  Moreover, currently Chechnya is a conflict zone, and it is also a neighboring and a kin state to the Crimean Tatars. Today, the whole Northern Caucasian conflict between the Georgians, and the Ossetians and the Abhazians, the Transcaucasus conflict between Armenians and Azeris on Nagorno-Karabakh, even the Kurd issues in Iraq and Turkey  have already created a ``hostility belt’’ or a ``conflict tunnel’’.  If a conflict erupts in Crimea, this whole area may turn into a war zone due to the effects of chain reaction between the neighboring or kin states.  Thus, every measure has to be taken by the international community to prevent these kinds of conflicts before it escalates any further, and before it gets to be too late and too costly in terms of human lives and millions of dollars. 

The Entrapping Nature of Conflict Escalation 

An understanding of the dynamics of how conflicts develop is essential. Hence, we would like to review a framework that will reveal the contributing factors to conflict escalation and attempt to demonstrate why it is so hard to settle disputes once they have begun to escalate. This particular framework will also exhibit why an alternative problem solving approach is needed at an early stage-before the conflict trap has been sprung. 

       Disputes and conflicts arise from conflicting goals or interests between individuals and groups and become manifested when one side makes a claim or demand which the other side rejects.  Since different individuals and groups necessarily have different sets of interests (needs, aspirations, fears, or concerns) in different settings, conflicts of interests are likely to occur in every relationship.¹⁵  

      In our case study, there are three main actors within the multi-ethnic population of the Crimea:  Russians, Ukrainians, and repatriating Tatars, groups with three different sets of needs, aspirations, fears, and concerns among other variables such as need for identity and security.  These three different sets of needs, and aspirations and other variables naturally create multiple dispute situations that might even end in violence in the future.  But disputes per se are not a problem.  The crucial factor is how they are handled constructively or destructively.  If handled constructively, they can have a positive function in helping to maintain relationships between individuals and groups by allowing each side to make the adjustments and accommodations which are necessary to meet the other’s need so that the relationship can develop.  If handled destructively, the damage can be devastating, as seen in the two world wars during this century and the more than 100 ``smaller’’ wars which have claimed over 20 million lives since the end of World War II.¹⁶  

      Thus, it is how individuals and groups act in response to disputes that makes the difference.  The key factor seems to be whether or not interests are taken into account in arriving at a solution.  The power based approach tends to be the most destructive conflict management, because its main objective is to persuade or coerce the other side to accept a particular solution. Those who pursue power-based approach believe that if sufficient punishment is applied, the other side will yield.  That’s why this approach usually ends in lose-lose situation for both parties. The best method for conflict prevention is interest-based approach, because it addresses the root of the conflict before it escalates.   Here, before we go into the interest-based approach of conflict prevention, first we need to examine how conflicts escalate in general. 

      Perhaps the most important characteristic of conflict escalation is its entrapping and self-perpetuating nature. Problematic nature of conflict escalation is usually determined by the interaction between parties. There are many important factors such as belief systems, perceptions, and misperceptions that play major roles in how the parties respond.  Here Connie Pecks’s model of ``The Entrapping Process of Conflict Escalation’’ will be taken as a reference framework¹⁷.  

         According to this model, historical grievances, contemporary grievances, zero-sum beliefs, and precipitating factors all contribute to a conflict escalation process by causing clashes over needs and values.  Then each side adopts a position and becomes committed to it. Then each side sees its position as ``right’’ and the other’s as ``wrong’’.  Each, as a result, uses coercive tactics to pressure the other to comply.  Then each responds to other’s actions and provocation which must be punished.  Then the communication between two parties is reduced and ``group think’’ increase, enemy image misperceptions come into the picture, and as a result conflict grows in size an importance.  As the conflict grows, gains as well as the losses reinforce conflict (through entrapment) by increasing perceived injustice and desire for retaliation.  As a result the conflict even grows bigger in size and importance.  At the end this process, we may end up with two possible conclusions:  One side wins/one side loses or both sides lose.  For both of these conclusions there exists one final fact. The losing side(s) interests go unaddressed and losses create new grievances in addition to original historical grievances that were one of the major factors that originated the escalation of the conflict in the first place. 

      Disputes which occur among parties who have a long-standing enmity for one another and a history of frequent and recurrent violent conflict are very difficult to prevent or resolve for number of reasons.  Memories of past psychological and physical injuries elicit feelings of grievance and generalized anger that harden almost automatically into enemy image perceptions.  Cultural reminders (stories, plays, songs, poems, art work etc.) promote or sustain this belief system and reinforce the belief in the ``good intentions’’ of one’s own group and the ``bad intentions’’ of the other-rectifying historical enmities and cultural, ethnic, or religious differences.  When tensions increase, propagandists and the mass media are recruited to reinforce the politicized history of the group.  These ``histories’’ are highly selective and seldom subject to critical appraisal.  Typically one side (one’s own group) is portrayed as heroic and good, while other is demonized and portrayed as evil, and aggressive.  As a result, threshold for the tension is lowered, and conflicts erupt with less provocation.  Thus, historical hostility is not only likely to make disputes more intense among groups, but it is likely to lower the threshold for provocation and thus trigger new conflicts more easily¹⁸.     

      In the case of the Crimean Tatars versus Russians and Ukrainians all above conditions that originates from historical grievances prevail.  In addition to the long history of wars, loss of tremendous amount of human lives from both sides, terror years of Stalin and Beria, and especially the forced mass deportation (sürgün) that took place in 1944, and its aftermath create a long chain of ``ancient hatreds between these three actors.  There are also deep cultural, ethnic and religious differences between the Crimean Tatars and Russians.  Russians are mostly Russian-Orthodox (Prava-Slavniy) whereas most Ukrainians are Catholics (and some are Orthodox) Crimean Tatars are Muslims.  Even during the Soviet years, stereotyping against the Muslim states of the FSU was very much alive.  There was always an enemy-image for the other.  While a famous song of the 1960s that had lyriques like ``If I was a Muslim Sultan Pasha, I could have married you too’’ implying Moslems are lustful creatures who can marry more than one wife, Moslem Crimean Tatars always remembered the Christian crosses of the Russian and Ukrainian soldiers who exiled them, deported them, and caused many of their kin to die.  There also exists an enormous amount of stereotyping material in Old Russian folk songs, folk tales, bedtime stories and even proverbs.  One Russian proverb states: ``Even the unexpected guest is better than an unexpected Tatar’’.  In folk tales, Tatars are portrayed as lustful savages who appear on horses, pillage the villages, rape women and children and disappear with the goods they steal.  Even during the Soviet years, moms scared their children by stating that if the children don’t behave, Tatars will come and take them away.  In many old and new movies, and television films Russians depicted Tatars as uneducated savages with no humanity and no compassion to human lives.  If there was a battle of good against evil, Tatars were always the ``evil’’ against the heroic Russian (Ukrainian) ``good’’. 

      These enemy-image misperceptions that develop through stereotyping, dehumanization, and scapegoating, help to create a psychological distance between the conflicting parties. Stereotyping involves an exaggerated, generalized set of beliefs about a group.  Scapegoating is a similar process, but in this case the ``other’’ group is blamed for unwelcome developments which are unrelated to its actions.   

      In addition to historical enemy-image misperceptions and stereotyping among Russians against Tatars in general, today in Crimea Russians also fear that the decline of their population will lead to irreversible loss of influence in the peninsula.  They believe a Tatar population explosion and the return of the Diaspora will eventually lead to a Tatar majority.  Russian domination of the mass media in the peninsula has made it possible to keep alive the myth of exploding Tatar birth rate.  Mustafa Cemiloglu, the leader of the Tatar Mejlis, responded to these concerns by pointing out that even if all Tatars return from Central Asia, the Tatar share of the Crimean population would be only 17 percent, and births barely outnumber deaths in the Crimean community¹⁹.  

      Apart from conflict between Ukrainian Cossacks and Tatar raiders in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries (including Tatar capture of Ukrainians as slaves) ²⁰, historically the Crimean Tatars do not share the same enmity with Ukraine as they do with Russia. Regardless, today the issue of the Crimean Tatar repatriation is still a secondary interest to Kyiv.  They are only a sub-plot in the more important task of keeping the peninsula within the new Ukrainian state. Consequently, Kyiv, despite its hostility towards pro-Russian separatism in the Crimea, has avoided openly siding with Tatars for fear of provoking a Russian backlash, either in Simperefol or Moscow²¹.  Kyiv, as well as Moscow still did not recognize the Mejlis, and at times of conflict between the Tatars and the Crimean authorities, such as during the demonstrations in October 1992, and March 1998, sided with the latter. 

      Another factor that contributes into the instability in Crimea is the persuasiveness of organized crime and its undermining of governmental authority.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, organized crime and official corruption became a part of life in the newly independent states and Crimea is not an exemption.  The central government in Kyiv lacks institutional control and Crimean authorities are widely alleged to be compromised by ties to organized criminal elements.  In one case ``Mafia’’ thugs beat to death two Crimean Tatar vendors, sparking rioting and confrontation between Tatars and Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, during which two more Tatars were killed²².  Moreover, unemployment based on lack of citizenship among the Crimean Tatars may also promote crime-generating tendencies among the younger generations of the Crimean Tatars themselves.  Furthermore, Tatar as well as Ukrainian minorities complain about discrimination by the Russian majority and radical anti-Ukrainian and Russian chauvinistic groups on the Crimean peninsula. An investigation of the 1995 riots after the killing of two Tatar market vendors, ended inconclusively²³.   

      While the Crimean Government, pleading insufficient funds, did not assent to request from the Tatar community for assistance in reestablishing its cultural heritage through Tatar language publications and educational institutions, the Central Government is working with the UNHCR, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Organization for Migration on support for the Tatar community²⁴ .   The OSCE, one of the international organizations, has paid attention to the plight of the Crimean Tatars, and with adequate funding it could ensure coordinated and sustained effort. While these organizations can help to the cause of Crimean Tatar repatriation, they can also directly prevent an escalation of a conflict in the peninsula and help in establishing civil society towards progressive democracy.    

 

Early Warning and Fact Finding: Preventive Diplomacy Tools²⁵

Since the collapse of the USSR, there seems to be several organizations dealing with fact finding and early warning in Crimea.  These missions are working with the local actors, as well as some international journalists and media members. Since 1991, several international and national NGOs also surfaced in the peninsula. All of these organizations are not only useful to prevent a future conflict, but are also necessary tools in developing a healthy civil society. 

      Diplomats sometimes mistakenly assume that preventive diplomacy is synonymous with the terms “early warning” or “fact finding”. But these form only one part of preventive diplomacy. The other essential part is “early action”, which involves use of the range of diplomatic approaches listed in Article 33²⁶ of the UN charter.  

      There is a growing insistence that the United Nations should develop and operate a system of early-warning to deal with potential political conflicts or humanitarian emergencies. Leon Gordenker distinguishes between early warning as contingency planning for refugee flows and early warning for conflict prevention.²⁷ Early warning is sounding alarm bells at the right time and in an appropriate manner. When it applies the most effectively, it alerts local and international communities to the likely onset of violence between or among groups or states. Early warning is a tool for preparedness, prevention, and mitigation with regard to disasters, emergencies and conflict situations.²⁸ It has at least three components: information (which must be accurate); analysis (which must be dispassionate); and communication (which must be accessible and clear).²⁹  

      Early warning involves reading specific indicators as signals and patterns of signals, and translating those patterns into some kind of prediction about the likelihood of the emergence or escalation of conflict. Early warning requires an extensive understanding and sustained interaction with local histories and realities. It also requires a capacity to track emerging disputes and assess their potential for conflict. In other words, it should recognize patterns of change that will lead to the acceleration of conflicts.

      Human rights and famine monitoring provide two models of early warning. Unlike human rights monitoring, which can be investigated by fact-finding missions, early warning requires a long-term presence on the ground and a broad political mandate. Early warning and conflict prevention are, above all, about politics. Therefore, as UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has observed, regional arrangements and organizations have an important role in early warning.³⁰ Unlike IOs, which have sanctions and incentives power to affect local actors, NGOs have neither powers nor resources to take preventive action. However, NGOs have a clear comparative advantage when it comes to early warning because they are ‘close to field’ and possess an understanding of and the trust of local actors.³¹  

      Fact-finding has different meaning in the context of preventive diplomacy. Although fact-finding is usually assumed as a human rights activity, it is increasingly being used as a conflict prevention tool. The “Declaration on Fact-Finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and Security” defines fact-finding as an activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of any dispute or situation which the competent United Nations organs need in of knowledge in order to fulfill their function.³² Similarly, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali emphasizes timely and accurate fact-finding in order to understand the root causes of conflict and recognizes UN’s role in fact-finding.³³ It is widely recognized as an objective source of information that can assist NGOs in pushing governments to act in a way that they would have done otherwise. 

       In the Crimean Tatars’ case, both early warning and fact-finding have an important role in conflict prevention process. All fact-finding missions have recognized severe problems concerning the repatriation of the Crimean Tatars. One of the fact finding/early warning missions that is closely monitoring the socio-political developments in Crimea is International Alert (IA). The IA was founded as an action-based non-governmental institution devoted to study of internal conflicts, preventive diplomacy and early warning systems which could help identify tensions and avert potential crises. Since 1992 IA has undertaken a consistent program of activities including early warning and conflict resolution in the FSU. The organization has sent a number of fact-finding missions to regions of conflict within the FSU. One of these missions produced a fact-finding report of the Crimean Tatars (September, 1993). During this mission, IA has investigated the situation in the Crimea, and considered the concerns of the Crimean Tatars and evaluated the potential for violent conflict in the region.³⁴ Moreover, as a one of the few NGOs working in the region with local people for conflict resolution, IA organizes a series of conflict resolution training seminars. Moreover, in 1995 IA undertook a feasibility study on their behalf on an early warning network in the FSU. These overall activities and projects help the conflict prevention efforts in Crimea.³⁵   

 

THE ROLE OF NGOs IN THE CRIMEAN TATARS CASE 

The disintegration of FSU has rapidly increased the number of NGOs in the region. This recent proliferation may be attributed to the change in the political atmosphere, favoring pluralism, as well as to emerging economic, social, political, and ethnic problems. The rapid increase in the number of NGOs should be regarded as an early warning signal of an impending crisis³⁶.  

      NGOs can be most effective simply by opening channels of communication and offering opposing sides for a dialogue. They can attempt to help restore mutual trust, dispel mutual stereotypes, and educate people about the tools of conflict resolution. NGOs can contribute to soft mediation by supporting media that foster peaceful dialogue and counter hate propaganda. While NGOs have comparatively fewer resources than governmental organizations, they also have greater credibility and freedom of maneuver. On the one hand, NGOs may be better equipped for soft prevention, such as creating channels for expressing grievances, than for official action, such as mediating and helping to implement agreements between opposing sides, On the other hand, governments are best equipped to use carrots and sticks to shift the incentives of the most influential parties to conflict while international institutions and NGOs can help empower local proponents of peaceful resolution by giving them a voice and additional resources.³⁷ 

      Indigenous NGOs currently operating in Crimea include humanitarian, ecological, youth, women’s, and human rights organizations. Similar to all ECE and FSU countries, NGOs in Crimea work for government and/or with its approval. Whole generations of people brought up in communist society do not yet realize how powerful citizens’ associations can be. As a result, it is widely believed that indigenous NGOs are powerless to contribute to changing the crisis situation. Also, the narrow scope of their activities limits the influence of the indigenous (local) NGOs.  

      However, the only organized group in Crimea is the Crimean Tatars. In June 1991, the Crimean Tatars convened the first Kurultai or national congress of the Crimean Tatar people. The members of the Milli Mejlis or National Council and its chairman were elected among Kurultai delegates. The Crimean Tatars additionally have established a system of national local self-government composed of regional and local Mejlises. The local Mejlises and the national Mejlis have no governmental powers. Their decisions are generally declarative or advisory. In 1991 the Kurultai declared non-violence as a basic principle of the Crimean Tatar movement.³⁸ We can claim that all of these organizations are non-governmental organizations. Moreover, there are several non-governmental organizations that are run by the Crimean Tatars themselves, i.e. these are indigenous organizations.  The largest NGO in Ukraine which works for the Milli Mejlis and solely run by Tatars is the Rebirth of Crimea Foundation (RCF).  RCF is interested in humanitarian and human rights issues of the Crimean Tatars and it may be used for preventive actions³⁹.  

      RCF formally opened its doors in the Crimean city of Bakchisaray in May 1994.  RCF has helped to establish other civic organizations in the Crimea in cooperation with the non-governmental organizations working in the Centers for Pluralism program. With the help of the RCF in Crimea, the following organizations have been created: The Rebirth of Bakhchisaray Society, the Crimean Association of Independent Journalists, and the League of Crimean Tatar Women⁴⁰.  

      A visit by the Dutch ambassador to Ukraine produced an $ 8,000 grant to RCF to equip a printing house to produce textbooks and children’s books in the Crimean Tatar language. Additionally, the Dutch embassy assisted RCF in applying for a larger grant concerning health care problems in 10-20 villages which are situated far from major cities. Health centers will be constructed to service these villages. Also, RCF received a grant of $ 5,000 for the ethnographical exhibition on “Material and Artistic Monuments of Crimean Tatar Culture” from the International Renaissance Foundation (Ukrainian Soros Foundation).⁴¹

      In addition to RCF, there are other Crimean Tatar NGOs that are currently working for the Crimean Tatars such as the Crimean Tatar Initiative (CTI), Evliyad, the Ukrainian House and Teachers Council. 

      Besides the indigenous NGOs, there are also numbers of international NGOs operating in Crimea.  These NGOs range from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the European Community Humanitarian Organization (ECHO) to short-term humanitarian and development projects-Open Society Institute/ Soros Foundation and UNICEF. Their activities related to delivering relief and developmental services, creating negotiation and dialogue mechanisms, monitoring and reporting on local conditions, creating and supporting citizens’ association, and monitoring elections.  

      USAID awarded $ 600,000 to support the construction of a water supply system in Bakhchisaray; administration of the project was left to RCF. Some nine kilometers of water-piping will be constructed. This is particularly important because a recent draught has caused a lack of adequate supplies of drinking water in the region, one of the major causes of the recent cholera epidemic⁴².   

      Apart from this, UN had begun a project for repatriation, resettlement and reintegration into Crimean society of the deported Tatar nation in June 1994. The objectives of this project are (a) to assist the returning population through the provision of building materials, municipal services, and residential dwellings, as well as through the establishment of schools and vocational training facilities, and (b) to support the integration of the population into Crimean society through the strengthening of community-based services (hospitals and clinics, libraries, community centers and small-scale enterprise promotion centers). The project expects to redress a great historical tragedy, accelerate the resettlement and reintegration process, lessen ethnic tensions on the peninsula and contribute to greater political stability in the region. United Nations Development Program, Habitat, UNESCO, and other agencies are responsible for implementation of project.⁴³ 

FOUR PARADIGMS OF INTERNATIONAL PREVENTIVE ACTION 

The classic debate over prevention has to do with balancing and proactive strategies.  Although any attempt at drawing typologies is kind of an oversimplification, identifying alternative paradigms for prevention is useful in order to organize a discussion of appropriate tools for intervention.  

      In his article, Kalypso Nicolaidis differentiates four paradigms of international preventive action:⁴⁴ coercive diplomacy, institutional inducement, cooperative management, and systemic transformation.  Among these four paradigms, the best one that fits to the Crimean Tatar case is the cooperative management.  

Cooperative Management 

Cooperative management approach is similar to early prevention. It rejects the idea that conflict prevention requires coercive and inducive strategies. Instead, prevention is necessitated outside intervention in order to develop or strengthen alternative means for peaceful settlements and address the root causes of conflict.⁴⁵ Also, it is based on ad hoc actions in response to a specific event in the target country which is akin to malaria pills for the adventurous traveler. By definitions, these actions rely on the consent of the internal parties. It also addresses a specific dispute, between specific parties at a specific moment in time. Outside intervention provides the means for dispute resolution and reconciliation while persuading the parties to forego violent options.  

      K. Nicolaidis defines it:

In its purest form, prevention of this sort does not rely on pressure but on persuasion; it relies on enhancing internal capacity rather than on bringing to bear external incentives. Individual governments routinely capitalize on their special relations with given countries to offer their services to mediate disputes. Actors in the international system, national or international organizations, and government or non-governmental organizations have made it their mission to promote dialogue, confidence, and cooperation among parties in the throes of protracted ethnic conflicts. ⁴⁶ 

      Traditionally, international mediation intensifies as domestic disputes turn into conflicts and conflicts turn deadly.  At a minimum, the goal of an outside intervener is to keep channels of communication open between disputants.  But this intervention should be done very carefully based on cultural and traditional subjectivity, historical grievances, and other variables between the disputing parties.  Actually, before any kind of international intervention, international relations scholars should carefully study the extent which mediation practice and negotiation theory need to be adapted when the ultimate goal is preventing deadly intrastate conflicts. 

      In later years, countries are increasingly turning to international organizations and other institutions (such as NGOs) for assistance in resolving disputes when attempts at direct negotiation fail.  One of the international preventive action cooperative management has following preventive tools: official good office and mediation, ‘third party insider’: High Commissioner on National Minorities (OSCE), unofficial or grassroots dialogue, promotion of cross-conflict learning, country-specific transition programs including institution buildings, elections, comprehensive peace plan, and United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR). Here, we will use some of these cooperative management tools and analyze their applicability to the Crimean Tatars case. Thus, I will precisely focus on the role of Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), specifically HCNM, and unofficial or grassroots dialogues such as problem solving workshops (PSWs) and peace camps.  

 

The OSCE: Insider Third Party, the HCNM and In-country missions⁴⁷ 

In the last few years, the OSCE began to turn away from the “settlement-and-enforcement’ paradigm toward developing a new approach for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the Europe.⁴⁸ This paradigm shift includes an ‘insider third party’⁴⁹, the long-term presence of missions on the ground and the mandate, and the High Commissioner’s mediator role as a facilitator and an adviser over the longer run. Member states have an obligation to accept fact-finding missions for investigative purposes. The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) is empowered to conduct on-site missions and to engage in preventive diplomacy among disputants at the earliest stages of tension. It has the authority to initiate conflict prevention activities without seeking prior political approval. The High Commissioner focuses on ‘satisfying the interests and alleviating the fears of all the parties involved’ rather than on determining or interpreting rights.⁵⁰ As the High Commissioner Max van der Stoel indicated he is not an advocate for minorities, an international ombudsman, or an OSCE human rights investigator.⁵¹  

      In addition to obtaining first-hand information from the parties concerned, the High Commissioner seeks to promote dialogue, confidence and cooperation between them.⁵² The High Commissioner consults with the Chairman-in-Office (CIO) of his plans to visit a participating state and reports confidentially upon completion of his visit. In fact, there has been a close and constructive collaboration between the High Commissioner and the Chairman-in-Office this crucial start-up period. Early warning follows a political decision authorizing and defining parameters of a mediatory effort, and the OSCE may authorize the High Commissioner to undertake a formal program of “early action”.⁵³  

      The High Commissioner preventive diplomacy has three important features: impartiality, confidentiality, and cooperation. Impartiality is to be interpreted as the High Commissioner is not being an instrument for the protection of minorities or international ombudsman who acts on their behalf. He/she listens to all parties concerned and also offers all of them his/her advice, and not just governments. Second, confidentiality is important because it leads to a situation where parties involved feel they can be more cooperative and are less inclined to maintain strong demands. Lastly, durable solutions are only possible if there is a sufficient measure of consent from the parties directly involved.⁵⁴  

       The in-country missions were developed by the OSCE to respond to the perceived needs of specific situations. There are currently nine local missions operating within the OSCE region. Four missions, operating in Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia, and Ukraine, have been characterized as preventive diplomacy missions.⁵⁵  But it does have its limitations, especially to the extent that it relies in part on the implicit link between the acceptance of its activities and the hopes of accession by its target countries to institutions like the EU or the Council of Europe.  Most important, the OSCE has not been able to help establish institutions inside the countries where it has intervened that can sustain long-term dialogue and transform the conflicts or that could ultimately be taken by local actors. 

      The HCNM and the missions do not possess or exercise any coercive authority. They focus on policy and politics, rather than rights, and their concern with the process by which parties are dealing with their conflict, rather than the substance of the legal, economic, and social issues regarding treatment of minorities. They focus on satisfying interests and alleviating the fears of all parties concerned.  

      The consensus rule and the cooperative and dialogue-based approach have been the key to the OSCE’s success in preventive diplomacy. However, it also limits its ability and role the most intractable and violent conflicts in Europe because it depends heavily on political support from and good relations among the OSCE’s most influential members. Second, its lack of “teeth” is also another limitation. 

The Crimean Tatars and OSCE  

In 16^th February 1994, the High Commissioner Max van der Stoel began to get involved with Ukraine, in particular with the situation in Crimea. Generally, he stressed the issue of language and its impact on inter-ethnic relations in Ukraine. He suggested that the Ukrainian language obligation should not lead to fears of forced ‘Ukrainization’ among the Russians who constitute the 62% of the total population in Crimea who call for greater autonomy from Kyiv and stronger ties with Russia.  Furthermore, during his visit to Crimea, van Der Stoel noted that the question of repatriating Crimean Tatars, posed problems for inter-ethnic relations on the peninsula as long as their resettlement issues are not solved. For these reasons among others, the OSCE decided to send a team of experts to look into the constitutional and economic matters in Ukraine, accompanied by one of van der Stoel’s personal advisers. Extensive meetings and discussions were held with political and economic leaders in both Kiev and Simferopol (Akmescit).⁵⁶ Only in 1994, van der Stoel himself visited the region for four times.  

      In 1995, van der Stoel visited the Ukraine between 17^th - 23^rd September. During this trip, he met with Ukraine’s President, Foreign Minister, and Supreme Council Chairman. He discussed the Ukrainian constitutional process with them as well as the problems connected with the drawing up of the Crimean constitution and its conformity to the norms and provisions of Ukraine’s future constitution. In these meetings, they have also discussed complications, which are emerging in the course of the return to Ukraine of the Crimean Tatars. Moreover, between 20^th-22^nd September a round table was held in Yalta where the discussants reviewed the issues of the repatriating nation once deported from the Crimea. Representatives of the central bodies of power of Ukraine, the republic of Crimea, as well as scholars and OSCE observers participated in this round table. The High Commissioner also stressed that one of his tasks while visiting Ukraine was to study the ways of increasing international aid to the Crimean Tatars.⁵⁷  

      On 25-29 August 1996, the High Commissioner visited Ukraine again and this time he met with deputy speaker of the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) Refat Chubarov, who is also the First Deputy Chairman of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars. Another meeting was also held with the Chairman of the Mejlis, Mr. Cemiloglu. After that, the High Commissioner visited Ukraine and Crimea regularly on 18-21 December 1996, 11-14 May 1997, 2-5 November 1997, and 18-22 May 1998.   

      In its 1997 annual report, OSCE mission in Ukraine indicated that the mission’s focus of activity has shifted towards the unresolved economic and social problems associated with the return of over 250,000 of the Crimean Tatars to the peninsula. In this effort, the Mission has worked very closely with the HCNM and some international organizations, including the UNDP, the UNCHR, and the IOM, in order to be able to request for increased contributions from the donor community to help with the re-integration of the former deportees. An international conference was held in early 1998 to realize this goal. The Mission has actively tried to draw attention to the recently eased citizenship regulations which can help approximately 100,000 Crimean Tatars to become Ukrainian citizens. In this effort the Mission is still closely working with the UNHCR to publicize the new citizenship law among the scattered deportee communities on the peninsula.⁵⁸  

 

CONCLUSION 

Suggestions

• Talks on settlement must be tied to a visible economic reconstruction program. It is widely agreed the possibility of conflict will not decrease until the average person has adequate shelter over his or her head, enough to eat, and a job with a steady income.


• Neither the UN nor NGOs came to the Soviet republics with experience working in the FSU. On an interorganizational level, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs must develop liaison groups to share the information and insights. Ukraine’s political and administrative structure is full of obstructionism.


• IOs and NGOs must devote significant time to educating the public-both government officials and local populations-about the role of international human rights and humanitarian law, the concept of individual rights, and the role of private voluntary organizations, all of which are still relatively new to the FSU.


• Dialogue between parties should be encouraged by promoting and device or process that rewards inter-ethnic cooperation such as electoral or constitutional devices that encourage the development of coalitions and aid distribution to the Crimean Tatars and by encouraging moderate and centrist group such as the Democracy Party of Crimea and the Party of Inter-Ethnic Concord of Crimea.

      The Crimean Tatars case provides a basis for establishing general rule for conflict prevention, at least in ECE and FSU. Like all cases of potential or actual conflict in ECE and FSU involve multi-ethnic state undergoing a painful socio-economic and political transition, where ethnic minorities are struggling for their perceived rights against an ethnic majority that is engaged in a process of nation-state building. With past inter-ethnic grievances, some politicians play the nationalist card in order to regain power.  

      Moreover, the setting up of instruments such as the CSCE missions and the HCNM devoted to conflict prevention has also had a positive effect. CSCE missions and fact finding missions, visits and recommendations by the HCNM, and contacts and technical expertise from the Council of Europe (COE) have greatly contributed to the defusing of tension in Crimea, where the parties are relatively amenable and open to compromise.  

      Minority rights together with democratic practices and economic stability is one part of the answer. Beyond legal provisions, international action should attempt to improve the minorities’ living conditions, increase their presence in administrations and raise the number of centers of education, teachers, newspapers, radio and TV stations, cultural associations and trans-border projects. The international community can contribute to the financing of some of these projects.   

Obstacles

• Conflict prevention, in an international environment where external interference to states’ internal matters is looked suspicious is hampered by the constraints imposed by sovereignty.


• The difficulties of decision-making in most IOs, where consensus is the rule and the slowness of the international community in gathering momentum for action, constitute another hindrance to effective prevention. Moreover, the lack of political will greatly undermines the credibility of international action.


• The existing instruments are also far from perfect. To begin with, IOs have certain inherent shortcomings because of their dependence on the cooperation of their leading members. Moreover, some of the institutions deal with the key element of early warning are badly understaffed (HCNM) and there is no arrangement for recruiting international mediators.


• Bureaucratic inertia, lack of common interests, and lack of political will at present appear formidable obstacles to conflict prevention regimes.

      There is no question that internal violence and ethno-national conflict present an increasing threat to stability in ECE and FSU region. The real danger today is not that the international community may intervene at all. However, sophisticated our warning systems, it is only when conflicts are “on the screen”, literally as well as figuratively, that they received attention. Often, that is when it is too late. We should thus strip prediction from prevention to the greatest extent possible. In the same vein as the distinction between “preventive” and “predictive” medicine, conflict prevention may be the most cost-effective strategy with regard to domestic conflicts. Rapid reaction capacities need to be enhanced and relied on automatically. Provided that they can be designed to minimize perverse effects, systemic transformative actions should progressively become part of the operational design of international institutions and NGOs. Priority should be granted to preventing the recurrence of conflicts through adequate reconstruction and reconciliation program. The early warning bell has been rung in Crimea. We should focus on whether the signals are being interpreted properly and how future responses may best be formulated. In the long run, developing infrastructure for peace requires an increasing degree of institutionalization and long-range planning.  

      Justifiably, Crimean Tatars want to rectify the injustice done to them by the 1944 deportation. With or without outside help, their resettlement of the Crimea will continue. However, poverty is widespread affecting many Tatars, but also plenty of Russians, Ukrainians, and others and a mood of desperation threaten to proliferate. Amid such conditions, irrationality can overpower common sense, sparking a chain-reaction of violence. Even if the influx of Tatars is not a direct cause of conflict, repatriation could be used as a pretext to initiate trouble. Keeping in this mind, Tatar figure to play a central role in determining how development will unfold in Crimea. The international community should therefore implement extensive conflict prevention measures. 

      As it stands now, the Crimea’s problems are so extensive that they can not be completely alleviated by international aid.  But additional foreign assistance may ease the widespread feeling of hopelessness among the Crimean Tatars, as well as the frustrations and fears.  In my opinion fact finding missions, regional or international NGOs, and some other international organizations can help prevent an explosion of a conflict in Crimea. Conditions are now favorable for undertaking conflict-prevention initiatives. First, after the bloody war in Chechnya, radical tendencies in the Crimea, both among Russians and Tatars decreased. Also, the low-grade nature of the Crimean territorial dispute facilitates the opening of a constructive inter-ethnic dialogue. Meanwhile, constitutional arrangements defining the Crimea’s status within Ukraine await finalization, meaning the remains some room for bargaining. Finally, the Mejlis remained in the hands of moderates following the Kurultai in June 1996, meaning Tatars will continue to show restraint for the foreseeable future. Changes in the existing set of circumstances might complicate the chances that conflict prevention measures would have desired effect.         The window for effective action may not remain open forever long.  Feelings of frustrations in the Crimea are increasing.  After the signed agreement about the Black Sea Fleet, the relations between Ukraine and Russia seems to be cooling down, but under the surface there are still many unaddressed issues.  Furthermore, there appears to be a sharp division between the radicals and the other within the Crimean Tatar Mejlis.  The time is now for effective international action.  Waiting heightens the risk of a conflict that could deal a mortal blow to the development of civil society not only in the Crimea, but across much of the FSU.

[1] The first condition of the Article 33 states that ``The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice’’.  The second condition of the same article goes as follows:  The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means’’.

[2] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. (1992), “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping”, Report of the United Nations Secretary General, 1992,  http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html, p. 11.

[3] Ibid, p. 13.

[4] During this brutal deportation, over 250,000 people were relocated. Although the Crimea, which is located north of Turkey today, is a part of Ukraine, the majority of the peninsula’s population is Russian.  Actually since the 13th century, Crimea was a homeland (rodina/vatan) for the Crimean Tatars until the deportation (sürgün). See Allworth, Edward. “Mass Exile, Ethnocide, Group Derogation–Anomaly or Norm in Soviet Nationality Politics?” in Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival. 2nd ed., Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia Book Series. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998b, pp. 180-206.

[5] See Allworth, Edward.  “Renewing Self-Awareness.” in the Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland, 2nd ed., Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia Book Series. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998a, pp.1-27; Williams, Brian G. “A Community Reimagined. The Role of “Homeland” in the Forging of National Identity: The Case of the Crimean Tatars”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 17, no.2, 1997, p.225-252.

[6] Lund, Michael S. Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996; Touval, Saadia. “Case Study: Lessons of Preventive Diplomacy in Yugoslavia”, in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A.Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington D.C., p. 403-419.

[7] Kritz, Neil J. “The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase”, in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A.Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington D.C., 1996, p. 587.

[8] Chiagas, Diana “Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue  and Cooperation” in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World, ed. Abram Chayes and Antoina Handler Chayes, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1996, p. 28-29.

[9] Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes, “Introduction”, in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World, ed. Abram Chayes and Antoina Handler Chayes, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1996, p. 3.

[10]  See W.L.Ury, J.M. Brett and S.B. Goldberg. Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988. 

[11] Wallensteen, P. and M. Sollenberg. “After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-94. Journal of Peace Research, 32, 1995, p.345.

[12] Peck, Connie. The United Nations as a Dispute Settlement System: Improving Mechanisms for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict, Kluwer Law International: UNITAR, Boston, 1996, p. 46.

[13] See Doroszewska, Ursula. “Reclaiming a Homeland: An Interview with Mustafa Dzhemilev.”, Uncaptive Minds 5, no.3 (21), Fall 1992, p.51-62.

[14] See Cemiloglu, Mustafa. (1995), “A History of the Crimean Tatar National Liberation Movement: A Sociopolitical Perspective”, in Crimea: Dynamics, Challenges, and Prospects, ed. Maria Drohobychky, American Association for the Advancement of Science, pp.87-105.

[15] Peck, Connie. The United Nations,  p.24.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid. p 27.

[18] See Altan, Mubeyyin Batu. “Structures: The Importance of Family­­–a Personal Memoir”, in the Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland, 1st ed., Edward Allworth, ed., Central Asia Book Series. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998, pp.99-110.

[19] The Washington Times, November 22, 1996.

[20] Fisher, Alan. The Crimean Tatars, Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 2nd ed., 1987.

[21] Doroszewska, Ursula. “We Prefer Ukraine: An Interview with Nadir Bekirov”, Uncaptive Minds 8, no.2 (29), Summer 1995, p.55-61.

[22] U.S. Dept. of State report: Ukraine Human Rights Practices.  March 1996.

[23] See Guboglo, Mikhail and Svetlana Chervonnaia,“The Crimean Tatar Question and the Present Ethnopolitical Situation in Crimea” Russian Politics and Law 33, no.6 November–December, 1995, p.31-60.

[24] U.S. Dept. of State Report.  February 1997.

[25] See Munuera, Gabriel, Preventing armed conflict in Europe: lessons from recent experience, Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris, June 1994; Lund, Michael S. “Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy”, in Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict, eds. Chester A.Crocker & Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, United States Institute of Peace Press: Washington D.C., p.379-403.

[26] These methods include good offices, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, enquiry, arbitration, and judicial settlement.

[27] Gordenker, Leon “Early Warning: Conceptual and Practical Issues”, in Early Warning and Conflict Resolution, eds Kumar Rupensinghe and Michiko Kuroda, St Martin’s Press: New York, 1992, p.1-15.

[28] Kuroda, Michiko “Early Warning Capacity of the UN System”, in Early Warning and Conflict Resolution, eds Kumar Rupensinghe and Michiko Kuroda, St Martin’s Press: New York, 1992, p.217.

[29] MacFarquhar, Emily Robert I. Rotberg, and Martha A.Chen. “Introduction”, in Vigilance and Vengeance, ed. Robert I.Rotberg, Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 1996, p.4.

[30] Boutros Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, A report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992. New York: United Nations, June 17, 1992, p.16.

[31] Nicolaidis, Kalypso “International Preventive Action: Developing Strategic Framework”, in Vigilance and Vengeance, ed. Robert I.Rotberg, Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 1996, p.60;  Beska, Violeta Petroska. “NGOs, Early Warning, and Preventive Action: Macedonia”, in Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies, ed. Robert I.Rotberg, Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 1996, p.133-147.

[32]  Quoted in Birckenbach, Hanne-Margret. Preventive Diplomacy: Conclusions from International Intervention into the Estonian and Latvian Conflicts over citizenship, SCHIFF, Kiel, 1997, p.11.

[33] Ibid, p.14.

[34] For more information, Andrew Wilson, The Crimean Tatars: A Situation Report on the Crimean Tatars. London: International Alert, 1994.

[35] International Alert Home page: http://www.international-alert.org/aboutmain.htm

[36] See Frankel, Eran. “International NGOs in Preventive Diplomacy and Early Warning: Macedonia”, in Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies, ed. Robert I.Rotberg, Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 1996, p.113-133.

[37] Nicolaidis, Kalypso p.65.

[38] Chubarov, Refat. “Different Nationalisms: The Case of Crimea”, Uncaptive Minds, Summer-Fall 1997, nos 3-4 (33-34), p.45.

[39] Wilson, Andrew. (1998), “Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult Homecoming”, in The Tatars of Crimea: Return to the Homeland, ed. Edward A.Allworth, Duke University Press, Durham, pp.352-354.

[40] See Kazarin, Vladimir. (1998), Problems of the National Identity in Crimea and Construction of Regional Autonomy. Paper given at the Third Annual ASN (Association of Nationality Studies) Conference on April 19, 1998.

[41] Crimean Tatar home page. http:///www.euronet.nl/users/sota/krimtatar.html

[42] See Stein, Melanie H. “Conflict Prevention in Transition Economies: A Role for the European Bank for Reconstruction, in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1996, p.339-381.

[43] Crimean Tatar home page. http:///www.euronet.nl/users/sota/tatardep.html

[44]  Nicolaidis, Kalypso. “International Preventive Action: Developing a Strategic Framework”, Robert I. Rotberg.  Vigilance and Vengeance,.  NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies.  Brookings Institution Press.  Washington DC/The World Peace Foundation, Cambridge , Massachusetts, p.40-59.

[45] Ibid, p.38.

[46] Ibid, p.49.

[47] See Rummel, Reinhardt. “The European Union’s Politico-Diplomatic Contribution to the Prevention of Ethno-National Conflict” in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1996, pp.197-237.

[48] Chiagas, Diana with Elizabeth McClintock and Christophe Kamp. “Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation, in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1996, p.37.

[49]  See Ibid, p.25-99.

[50] Ibid, p.66.

[51] The High Commissioner speech, March 6,1993, “International Response to ethnic conflicts: focusing on prevention”, Saskatchewan, Canada. Http://www.osceprag.cz/inst/hcnm/06mar93.htm.

[52]  High Commissioner on National Minorities Factsheet, http://www.osceprag.cz/inst/hcnm/hcnm3.htm

[53] The HC speech, 8 July 1993, “Early response to ethnic conflict: Focusing on prevention”, Helsinki, Finland, http://www.osceprag/cz/inst/hcnm/08jul93.htm.

[54] The HC’s speech, 18 October 1996, “The role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities conflict prevention”, Skopje, FYR Macedonia, http://www.osceprag.cz/inst/hcnm/18oct96.htm.

[55] Chiagas, Diana with Elizabeth McClintock and Christophe Kamp. “Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation, in Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The Brookings Institution: Washington D.C., 1996, p.56.

[56] The HC’s speech, 28 October 1994, “Controlling ethnic tensions in Europe: The experience of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities”, Oxford, http://www.osceprag.cz/inst/hcnm/28oct94.htm.

[57] BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, September 20 1995. “OSCE High Commissioner visits Ukraine”.