Abstract[1]

It has often been argued that the EU appears to be endeavoring to purposely create a ‘security community' with those countries in its 'near abroad'. However, I argue in this article that relations between the EU and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states are not similar to those with other neighboring countries in terms of democracy, democratization and security. The central argument is that the EU’s security considerations do not completely correspond with features of the policy of democratization in Muslim Mediterranean countries, in contrast with relations with the other neighboring states. Therefore, while the EU acknowledges the legitimacy of the democratic peace arguments regarding other neighboring countries, it suspects the validity of this proposition in the Mediterranean context.

Keywords: European Union, European Security, Democracy, Democratization, the Mediterranean, Islam

First published in Review of International Law and Politics, (RILP), Vol. 3, No 11, 2007. 

INTRODUCTION

The method that the European Union has chosen to manage issues of security concerning neighbouring countries has continued to remain the focus of attention for students of International Relations. A number of scholars have purported that the principal strategy of the EU as regards the securing of its frontiers, and hence the whole EU, is to create a 'pacific rim' around it. It is consequently often argued that the central theme of this strategy has been the promotion and support of democratization in neighbouring states, including the Central and Eastern European states (CEECs) (prior to their accession to the EU), the Western Balkans, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, and an exertion of ‘political conditionality' in its relations with these states. It has often been argued that the EU appears to be endeavouring to purposely create a ‘security community' with those countries in its immediate vicinity in its 'near abroad' in such a way.[2]

In this article, I argue that relations between the EU and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states are dissimilar to those with other neighbouring countries in terms of democracy, democratization and security. The European Union's security considerations do not completely correspond with features of the policy of democratization in Muslim Mediterranean countries, in contrast with relations with the other neighbouring states. Hence, it seems that while the EU acknowledges the legitimacy of the democratic peace arguments regarding other neighbouring countries, it suspects the validity of this proposition in the Mediterranean context.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEMOCRACTIZATION

When looking at the EU's foreign and security policy towards the neighbouring states it could be seen as correct, as a number of scholars advocate, if it were to be evaluated as an endeavor on the institution's part to enlarge its “security community”[3] through integration and democratization of its  neighbouring states. This view that is constantly purported within ‘the democratic peace thesis’ serves to help sustain European security in a more diversified and “wider” manner.[4] This strategy has been manifested clearly by the EU's policies towards neighbouring countries, including the CEECs (before they became EU members) and the states in the Western Balkans.

The Central and Eastern European Countries

A large number of leading academics and policy makers have claimed correctly that the real security of the EU could be only realized through a process of further democratization within the CEECs.[5] The most original and effective method of dealing with the security issues that arose concerning the CEECs were the European Agreements carried out with these states. As far as the Europe Agreements are concerned, Karen E. Smith stated clearly that the political nature of the agreements directly intended to create a climate of confidence that would lead to stability-enhancing reforms and thus the creation of a secure Europe[6]. After the official declaration of the EU that the union would enlarge eastwards through incorporation of Eastern Europe at the 2004 Essen Summit, EU membership has become the main incentive to the CEECs to pursue more democratizing policies. The so-called Copenhagen criteria had been at the heart of the political conditionality criteria cited by the EU for new states' entry. The Commission had monitored closely the political progress in the CEECs in particular and released regular reports every year for these countries before they acceded to the Union.

Slovakia was the only country excluded by the commission from the enlargement process at the start in 1997 largely on account of its failure to fulfill the political conditions of the Copenhagen criteria, even though it met the economic criteria better than many of the other applicant states. However, Slovakia later improved its human rights records and its quality of democracy in the post-Meciar period and subsequently became an EU member. [7]

The EU has intended to expand the European “security community” through the integration of Eastern Europe to generate a more secure Europe through the use of some tough methods. For the EU, a more secure Europe can be created only through the emergence of a more democratic Eastern Europe where liberal democracy and market economy should be general norms. Hence, the EU has successfully used the conditionality of EU membership as the carrot to which CEECs should aspire, and as a possible means of sanction, which in practice would mean dropping an offending country from the list of candidates. Eventually, the CEECs have joined the EU after accomplishing their political transformations successfully.[8]

The Western Balkans

Similar to the EU's policy towards the CEECs, democratic transformation through political conditionality has been the cement of the EU's foreign policy and security towards the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans has been the principal region of crisis in Europe that has suffered from unsolved ethnical-historical claims, weak and unstable political regimes, the results of failed economic transformation, and widespread corruption and criminalization. Although no comprehensive EU policy towards the region had been formulated prior to the end of the Bosnian War in 1995, the Bosnian tragedy and serious threats to stability in the region forced the EU's creation of policies in this regard[9]. The Rome Conference in February 1996, ‘the Royaumont Process for the Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South-East Europe' in December 1996 and the EU's Regional Approach to those states were among the first serious attempts of the EU to stabilize the region and encourage democratic reforms.

The Regional Approach to Albania and the former Yugoslavia included political conditionality, stating that the EU's relations with these states “will depend on the willingness of the countries concerned to work towards strengthening peace and respect of human rights, the rights of minorities and democratic principles”[10] A typical ‘essential element clause' was inserted into the Community regulation concerning financial aid entitled the OBNOVA regulation, which declared that democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms were vital elements of future relations. As Pippan emphasizes, the OBNOVA clause went a step further than the previous human rights clauses in the relations with the CEECs and other states with the ‘specific conditions' that were added to the clause.[11] The Council adopted a specific guideline in this regard in April 1997: ‘Conclusions on the Principle of Conditionality Governing the Development of the European Union's Relations with Certain Countries of South-East Europe'. The guideline made it clear that the political conditionality for the Western Balkans definitely contains the standard human rights and democracy clauses (democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the minority rights) and compliance with the International Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague and other Peace Agreements.

The Kosovo crisis of 1998-99 eventually served to alter the EU policy considerably. The Regional Approach was transformed into the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and prepared the ground for EU membership for these states.[12] The states of the Western Balkans now are presented with the prospect of becoming EU members, as endorsed by the European Council meetings in Feira in June 2000 and Thessaloniki in June 2003. Croatia was the first Western Balkan country that applied for EU membership in March 2003 and awarded candidate status on 18 June 2004, following the Commission's positive Avis concerning its desires for EU membership. The accession negotiations with Croatia started in 2005 and twelve chapters out of 35 have been opened as of June 2007. Macedonia applied for EU membership on 22 March 2004 and the EU has approved its application and now it has candidate country status.

There have been several rounds of discussions on concluding a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Albania since January 2003 when negotiations with the EU were launched. A feasibility study on opening SAA negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted by the Commission on 18 November 2003. Negotiations to open a SAA with Serbia and Montenegro started, after the state adopted a new Constitution. The SAA with Macedonia was signed on 9 April 2001 and entered into force on 1 April 2004. Kosovo, which is administered under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, benefits from the SAP. The eruption of ethnically- motivated violence in Kosovo in March 2004 that alarmed the EU into the taking of the position that the stabilization of Kosovo within the SAP context is very critical for European security. In addition, The Thessaloniki European Council and the Summit between the EU and these states in June 2003 proposed some new instruments within the framework of the SAP, including a European Partnership similar to the former EU entrance process for the CEECs. Similar to the Europe Agreement with the CEECs, political conditionality is at the heart of the SAAs.  The standard wording of the political conditionality as embodied in the ‘essential clause' is as follows:

Respect for the democratic principles and human rights as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as defined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe, respect for International law principles and the rule of law as well as the principles of market economy ...shall form the basis of the domestic and external policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of this Agreement.[13]

Although the main wording of the essential clause is similar to the Europe Agreements, inclusion of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and OSCE documents within the text and requirement of compliance with international law principles are new. It therefore follows that standards are high for the states of the Western Balkans. Furthermore, the EU attaches the utmost significance to the implementations of the adopted political reforms. A special review mechanism was created in April 2001 to monitor these states in terms of political conditionality. The Commission has prepared monitoring country reports similar to the progress reports for the candidate countries.

The EU’s New Policy Towards its Neighbours

After the Central European states and Eastern European states, with the exception of Romania and Bulgaria, joined the Union in 2004, the EU's new concern in terms of the European security has been its recently restructured Eastern border. What should the EU do, which is facing a new ‘Desert of Tartars' to sustain a secure Europe? [14] Is it possible for the EU to purposely create a cordon sanitare against the threats emanating from outside Europe?[15] The EU's response to the security problem after the enlargement is the so-called ‘European Neighbourhood Policy' (ENP) and ‘Wider Europe' debates, which were first outlined by the Commission in its communication to the Council and the European Parliament on 11 March 2003.[16] The ENP involves the EU's immediate neighbours to the east-Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and the neighbours that have participated in the Barcelona process. One of the most interesting parts of the Commission's report is that the Commission recommends that “the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and friendly neighbourhood relations- a ring of friends- with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations.”[17]

Similarly, the European Security Strategy, endorsed at the European Council of December 2003, manifested that the EU’s aim is to “make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood” and “to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations”

As dutifully described in ‘the Strategy Paper' on the ENP, which lays out the principles, methodology and geographical scope of this vision, the central principles in the framework of relations with the neighbours are commitment to “common values principally adhering to the fields of the rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.” [18]

According to some researchers, the ENP is a result of policy learning from the enlargement experience and therefore, it is an effort to emulate the success of enlargement in particular in terms of European democratic conditionality and socialization[19]. It is not now very clear to understand whether the ENP will be as successful as the EU’s policy of democracy conditionality in the CEECs, because it is a work in progress. Furthermore, as Kelley argues,[20] the ENP countries in general “are starting out at much lower points of democracy, human rights, labour rights and law and order.”

THE MEDITERREAN DIMENSION: DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY ‘Bon pour l’Orient’

As stated above, the ENP has been applied to all the non-EU participants in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with the exception of Turkey which presently holds candidate status. The EU's motto of “a ring of well-governed countries around the EU” is also sound for the Southern Mediterranean countries.

It was at the 1994 Corfu European Council that the EU decided to design a comprehensive Mediterranean policy. The Barcelona Declaration on 28 November 1995 redefined the relationships between the twelve and the MEDA countries and introduced a political dimension to the “Euro-Mediterranean partnership”[21], which was announced by the Commission on 18 October 1994. The declaration formulated a “Political and Security Partnership”, which includes, inter alia, the approval of a “Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability” adopted at the 4th conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Partnership (Marseilles, November 2000); economic and financial cooperation and a “Social Cultural and Human Affairs Partnership”. The partnership is given legal effect through bilateral Association Agreements and MEDA Framework Conventions.

As R. Youngs argues, European policy-makers often indicated the Barcelona Process as representing the introduction of the discourse of democracy to EU-Mediterranean relations for the first time explicitly identifying political pluralism as a norm between Europe and the Arab World.[22] Furthermore, according to Youngs, the architects of the Mediterranean policy during the latter half of the 1990s declared that the emphasis on democracy and human rights in the EMP reflected a genuine reassessment of European interests. For them, “political liberalization was... now seen as the best means of engendering both stability and moderation in the Mediterranean... Political liberalization... would enhance well-being, stability and Europe's own security...” Youngs concluded that this ‘comprehensive' approach towards security reflected the belief that the problems with the region were not related to Islamic beliefs directly but the deteriorating economic conditions suffered by Mediterranean communities. Accordingly, the EU would address the socio-economic roots of radical Islam and political liberalization in the region would over time “provide the means of more effectively securing a Euro-Mediterranean area of shared prosperity and stability”[23]

Thus, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, signed after the Barcelona Declaration, embrace democracy and human rights clauses, similar to the other agreements that the EU has signed with third states.[24] In addition to the association agreements, the MEDA regulations incorporate an essential human rights clause:

This Regulation is based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and also for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which constitute an essential element thereof, the violation of which element will justify the adoption of appropriate measures.[25]

‘The essential element clause', employed in agreements with the states, stipulates that human rights henceforth constitute an essential element of the agreements.[26] Moreover, at the end of 1997, the Commission suggested a change in the MEDA Regulation to employ the suspension mechanism through ‘qualified majority'.[27]

However, while the human rights and conditionality clauses enshrined in the agreements with the Mediterranean countries exist, most of the time, as far as the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries are concerned, the strict and coherent employment of human right clauses against friendly, pro-Western but authoritarian and repressive states by the EU is not a common practice. Contrary to the case of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, the EU deems more participatory democracy in the Mediterranean Muslim countries detrimental to its interests. Youngs also underlines this discrepancy indicating that the scarcity any degree of critical edge in the CSFP statement pertaining to political developments in the Mediterranean was “conspicuous alongside the ubiquity of such criticism towards the Lomé Agreement with the ACP states and towards Eastern Europe. Fraudulent elections failed to elicit the kind of expression of concern with which the EU frequently greeted similar irregularities in other regions, and the incremental tightening of political space in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia met with no substantive response.”[28] As Byrne and Shamas demonstrated, human rights objectives and further democratization are placed outside the reform-centered policy of the Union.[29]

A number of researchers contend that this is because of “the nexus between democratization and security” that had proven to be conflict-ridden ever since the EMP was set up.[30] Hence, for these authors, “The EU has to choose between two conflicting goals: stabilization and democratization...The EU gives higher priority to stabilization and promotes democratization only to a limited degree.”[31] Nonetheless, it can be argued that there is no contradiction between security and democracy in the EU's general strategy in this regard but democracy and security are not given equal priority in this region by EU decision makers. In other words, democracy and democratization have been a genuine method for conflict resolution, peace building and regional transformation in the CEECs, the Western Balkans and with regard to developments involving the EU's new eastern neighbours, but this seems not to be the case as far as the Southern Mediterranean states are concerned.

What are the essential factors behind the EU's two different human rights and democracy policies? First of all, the EU's concern about political regimes of its Mediterranean neighbours is related to issues confined to the possible ‘threats' coming from some Mediterranean states. When we cite the security concern of the EU in the Mediterranean region, poverty-related, “soft” issues come to fore, that is, increasing socio-political inequalities between the North and South of the Mediterranean rim, increasing population and increasing unemployment in the South, legal or illegal migration to the EU member states, drug smuggling, the threat of “Islamic fundamentalism-terrorism” which may spill over into the European states, and “in more apocalyptic visions”, a declining indigenous population which is often combined with “migration flows” and the subsequent destabilization of their local Muslim people.[32]

The EU's concern over democracy and human rights in the CEECs (before they acceded to the EU) and the Western Balkans is differs completely from the Community's concern over democracy and human rights in its foreign relations with  third states (including the MEDA countries), mainly because the CEECs would become EU members and the Western Balkan states will in future join the club  and a member state with a non-democratic political system would constitute  a fundamental danger to the European system, which has experienced many of the most notable cruelties and atrocities of recent history, including the recent ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo, both world wars and the Holocaust. As Ole Wæver rightly put it, the most important ‘other' of Europe is “Europe's own past which should not be allowed to become its future.”[33] Therefore, it would not be a surprise to find some significant discrepancies between the EU's human rights policies towards the candidatures and other states.

Second, although the first factor could explain the problem to some extent, thinking of the EU's demanding policy regarding democratic conditionality towards the new eastern neighbours: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, we require additional explanations in this regard. As John L. Esposito, among other scholars, rightly argues, the EU suspects that more democratization and more political participation would put an end to the authoritarian but friendly and ‘stable' regimes and pave the way for an ‘instability' in the region with or without the need for an ‘Islamic government' that might change all the political balances in the region and even within the EU itself.[34] The decision-makers in the EU appear to assume that an Islamic government in the region may prove to be anti-Western and detrimental to the central EU interests in the area. Furthermore, this could trigger a new wave of immigration into the EU and even radicalize the local Muslims in the European states. This might mean increasing racism and xenophobia all around Europe. Thus, the Western powers and the authoritarian elites in the Middle East could “sacrifice democratization” to halt any sort of an Islamic resurgence in the area.[35]

According to some authors democratization itself is a dangerous process for maintaining the status quo and stability in a region. For example, Mansfield and Snyder assert that the process of democratization creates “a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions, and high-energy mass politics.[36] It brings new social groups and classes onto the political stage… Governing a society that is democratizing is like driving a car while throwing away the steering wheel, stepping on the gas, and fighting over which passenger will be in the driver’s seat.” Thus, as far as democratization in the region is concerned, engendering the status quo might not create a positive climate for the EU’s interests.

Moreover, the political culture in the region is often claimed as a barrier to flourishing of democracy there.  G. Joffé's ideas in this regard are worth to be cited: “The problem is, however, that unless such approaches are culturally appropriate they cause profound social and economical division within Middle Eastern and North African societies, and thus exacerbate the very ills they are supposed to cure… The concepts of human rights and democracy it imposes do not necessarily relate to the basic values of the societies on which they are imposed.[37] In other words, democratization in the Muslim Mediterranean countries is twice as dangerous as in “normal” countries owing to the role of Islamic ideology in these countries: the danger of democratization + the danger of Islamically-oriented government[38]. Youngs, in this regard, believes that EU policy makers are suspicious that any political change in the region did not jeopardize stability. For the EU governments, democratization should not undermine the incumbents' regimes. They believe that at least in the short term political liberalization would benefit Islamists.[39]

Furthermore, some other researchers put forward that the EU is not indifferent to the political situation in the Mediterranean region. However, for them, the EU committed itself to the long-game in the region: democratic socialization, creation of robust civil societies throughout the region and opening political liberalism through economic liberalism. The EU seeks to promote democratic norms through institutionalized co-operation, such as the MEDA democracy programme, the MED programmes, the Forum Civil Euro-med, Euro-Mediterranean conferences, which have bottom up approach and supports NGOs, grass-roots advocacy networks, awareness-building circles and civic education in the region. Thus, the core of the strategy in the long run brings democratic political culture and democratic norms into the region and making the region secure for whole Europe. [40]

However, whether the mechanisms of socialization work are at least suspicious. The Civil Forum, central to the promotion of the civil society in the region, remained trivial. The grass roots approach failed. Several instruments of socialization, like the Arab version of Euronews, and Euro-Islam Dialogue Forum for norm dissemination failed[41]. This is again partly related to the EU's fear of the Islamic resurgence in the region.[42] In addition, member countries of Europe with colonial heritages of their own have paralyzed the application of sanctions to preserve their own reserved domain from interference from other EU countries.[43]

The terrorist attack on the US on September 11 was another watershed in Euro-Mediterranean relations. It is now a widespread argument that the balance between security and democracy in the global politics has shifted back to security after September 11 and therefore the consideration of security in the Mediterranean Region is gradually becoming detached from its democratic requirements for the European states.[44] As Youngs rightly put, the attack demonstrated that support for the authoritarian but friendly regimes in the area had not produced a secure region for the EU.[45] Therefore, the recent initiative of the EU, the ENP, can be considered in this context. However, it is difficult to deny that, terrorist attacks such as the Casablanca bombing in May 2003 and the train explosion in Spain in March 2004 may legitimize the oppressive characters of the authoritarian regimes under the pretext of fighting terrorism.[46]

Could the ENP be a new influential instrument of the EU to promote democracy in this region? Some authors think that the transition from the EMP to the ENP could be “a shift of gears regarding the principle of conditionality. Thus, while the Barcelona Process introduced (theoretically) the principle of ‘negative conditionality’, the Neighbourhood Policy is explicitly based on the principle of positive conditionality.”[47] Thus, some authors argue that the EU’s democracy conditionality and promotion of democracy in the region will be much stronger compared to previous cases. [48]

CONCLUSION

The credentials of liberal democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights are arguably among the most serious considerations of the EU, in particular, within the post-Cold War period. One of the basic arguments in this article is that this consideration is not just a moral issue for the decision makers in the EU but also a matter of security, European security. Sustaining liberal regimes in neighbouring countries (including the CEECs, the Western Balkan and the Muslim Mediterranean states) has established the linchpin of the general strategy of the European security in the post-Cold War period. Democratic transformations and the consolidation of democracies in this region are considered to have provided a boost to European security as well. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the EU's general strategy in this regard is not so valid for the Muslim Mediterranean region because of the reasons that have been discussed above. However, this incoherent policy of the EU may serve to both diminish the EU’s reputation in this regard and question the European conditionality that the EU has been applying towards relations in its 'neighborhood'.