This study considers socio-political life in Turkey following the military coup of 1960, up to the 1980 military take-over. Central questions include: how were the traditional policy makers and the ways in which they responded to the crises in Turkey affected; how did the political parties respond to Turkey’s increasing problems during the 1970s, and what was the role played by the military in such crises; how and why did the socialist revolutionary groups use street fighting and terrorism as a means of changing the political system? In order to answer these questions it is necessary to examine a number of parallel issues, which were crucial to developments in Turkey. The first considerations are the socio-economic conditions and the legal and constitutional framework, which resulted in a reaction against the official ideology of the state at a time when socialism was being introduced into Turkish political life. Secondly, this article examines the reasons why some groups of used accepted channels of democracy, while others adopted terror tactics to achieve similar goals. The study also examines the resilience of Turkish democracy when faced with the threat of terrorism, and the ability and capacity of the government of the day, and of the political parties, to overcome the opposition of the terrorist splinter groups.

This study assesses reasons why the governments of Turkey failed to deal effectively with terrorism and had to seek the support of the military to overcome crises which threatened the fledgling democracy in the country. The nature of politics and political parties in the 1970s, when crisis in the Turkish economy was commonplace, and when violence, social disorder and terrorism were almost daily occurrences, is also examined.

The Socialist Movement in Turkey

During the 1950s Turkey achieved a partial democracy, which did not fulfil the aspirations of the public.[1] The resulting frustrations manifested themselves in public disorder and strife. In this environment, the government led by Aydın Menderes was in a weak position when the armed forces took control in 1960, following which the military commanders ruled the country for 18 months before returning the country to civil rule in 1961. Primarily because the army leaders did not seek political power, the initial coup was achieved without violence. As a well-known fact, Atatürk had proclaimed that military and political power should be kept separate, with the result that as the guardian of Atatürk’s principles, the ruling military officers were uneasy about occupying political positions. Subsequent representations by the National Unity Committee were accepted by these officers, who agreed to restore civil democratic control.[2]

In 1945 the President Inonu decided to allow the formation of opposition parties. The main factors that persuaded him to democratise the regime were the international pressure, the long tradition of westernisation and the social unrest due to wartime shortages and profiteering.[3] As a result, fifteen new parties were founded in two years, yet the Democratic Party (DP) emerged as the biggest one. The DP soon became the spokesman for private enterprise and individual initiative. The Democrats also gained the support of the businessmen as well as the liberal intelligentsia.[4] In the 1950s, Turkish attempts to establish a multi-party democracy raised so much optimism and confidence amongst the public. This period is now known as the ‘revolution of the Turkish democracy’. However, the 1960 military intervention raised many questions about the resilience and vulnerability of this new democracy. During the 1960s, Turkey entered a new and uncharted phase, labelled a pluralistic democracy.[5] This period of democratic experiences witnessed a dramatic rise in public argument and political violence, starting in the late 1960s and increasing in the late 1970s. It is worth investigating of causes of this, because they are thought to be the main reasons behind the faltering Turkish democracy in 1971 and again in 1980. Political observers believe that the activists of the radical left, emanating from a wide range of socialist ideologies, constituted a major contributory factor to the political instability in Turkey during this period. As part of this study, particular attention is concentrated on these socialist movements between 1960 and 1970, and on the development of underground insurgency following the 1969 elections.

Preconditions of the Movement

The first factor that nourished the left movements was development in the trade unions. In 1952, during the period of Democrat Party rule (1950-1960), the first centralised trade union, known as the Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions, was created. The stated objective of the Democrat Party when setting up a labour union was to create one central body of workers with which the government could establish a dialogue. At the same time, the government hoped that bargaining and negotiation could be made more effective by eliminating the need to discuss labour issues with many different bodies. Also, more importantly, the new order would enable the government to establish and maintain better control of the newly emerging working class.[6] Such a situation, it was hoped, would may reduce political consciousness and militancy among the rank-and-file members so as to facilitate drigisme from above.[7] Various writers have described state-labour relations under the Democratic Party government as a sub-type of inclusive state corporatism, whereby it is the state, which legislates and regulates the Unions, co-opting its leadership for the purpose of de-politicising, weakening and dominating labour.

After 1960, internal migration increased to more industrialised parts of the country, especially to the cities in the western part like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, and Bursa, and consequently urbanisation proceeded at an unexpectedly fast rate. At that time a large number of Turkish workers also emigrated to Germany. The movement of labour from agriculture into industry provided employment within the cities, and a growth in working-class movements. In the 1970s the Turkish economy grew rapidly. It was the decade of industrial development.[8] In common with many developing countries, increasing industrialisation caused serious social disorders, as a result of workers operating within a more structured industrial environment being able to achieve a level of solidarity not previously possible in an agricultural economy.

As a consequence, industrialisation had serious political implications. On the one hand, Turkey was establishing a middle class, which Huntington[9] suggested that it is a necessary precondition for stable, liberal democracy. At the same time, the process of industrialisation was creating a number of discrete industrial working groups, considered as the breeding ground for socialism by the Turkish socialists of the 1960s. This was in direct contrast to the claim of a classless society in the 1930s by Peker and his associates.[10]

The migration of agricultural labour to industrial areas was inevitable as Turkey became less isolated, and as farming itself became increasingly more mechanised. The status quo that had existed for centuries started to collapse, with the traditional relationship between workers and farmers, landlords and tenant farmers no longer being maintained. The displacement of these people was not just confined to Turkish cities, as many Turkish nationals emigrated to Germany and other countries. Consequently, as Ahmad[11] argued, these developments and others materially affected political life in the country. At this time, the role of the Young Turks of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had been replaced by the new industrial workers in the big cities and the Turkish guest-workers abroad, who collectively increasingly influenced Turkish socio-political and economical life.[12]

In 1963, labour unions were granted the right to strike, with the predictable result that the industrial workers used their new powers to become a source of major unrest. The extension of educational opportunity and the growth of mass communication, in some part due to the government’s efforts, resulted in a noticeable rise in economic and social expectations, the advent of which made it more difficult for largely traditional political leaders to maintain control over the new, more politicised, working class.

Moreover, the international environment was very suitable for a dramatic increase in the leftist ideologies. The global political trends inevitably nourished the Turkish left. Turkish political life was very vulnerable to the radical, ideological movements and some groups were not ready for such a change. For example Turkish university students had become an active and radical force in the political life of the country since the beginning of the multiparty period.[13]

Legal and Constitutional Factors

One of the most important factors that deeply affected the development of the Turkish left and left-originated terrorist movements was the legal element (and the ways in which it affected the socialist movement in Turkey). As a framework for such a debate, Barchard identified some of the main obstacles to Turkish policy-making in relation to the many newly-arisen issues and new developments within society:

The inability of the system to react swiftly to events, and its slowness in taking decisions; the total lack of detailed day-to-day planning; and the strange combination of rigorous procedures and tough laws with a certain aimlessness in practice, all demand attention. No one complains more of the difficulties of dealing with bureaucracy than the ordinary Turkish citizen whose complaints in this area are notorious... These shortcomings have bedevilled every Turkish government and reduced its capacity to make changes. ‘Turkey is a country where the state may be strong, but the government is always weak’, says one former US ambassador to Ankara.[14]

Nevertheless, the liberalisation of political life in Turkey, following the adoption in 1961 of the most democratic constitution in her history, created one of the most important preconditions for legal activity by proponents of socialist ideologies, alongside the rise of the working class.[15] Indeed, following the 1961 constitution, Behice Boran, one of the most important figures of the socialist movement in Turkey, noted that ‘... essentially it was only following 27 May 1960 that socialism in Turkey became a legitimate currency of political thought and a political movement’.[16]

An understanding of the effects of the 1961 constitution is an essential prerequisite to an appreciation of the political and social developments in the country in the 1960s. While the labour force produced some grounds for socialist movements, it is equally important to recognise that there were additional legal grounds for political developments. Therefore, it is worth briefly mentioning the legal development of the Turkish constitution, since the rule of law is treated as one of the main element of democracy whereby opposing political viewpoints and aspirations can be accommodated within a pluralistic society.

It is generally agreed by researchers that the history of the Turkish constitutional movement commenced in 1808, this being the first time that the Sultan could be persuaded by the Grand Vezir (Prime Minister), supported by some of his army commanders, that he had to declare a charter for the sake of restoring the ailing state’s authority and of reducing the general unrest. The second attempt at constitutional reform was in 1839, when the Sultan’s close economic ties with the British Empire, and his well-educated Grand Vezir Mustafa Resid Pasa, unilaterally declared a new charter and promised to obey the laws which the Sultan himself had issued.[17] However, these charters did not last long and were quickly rescinded. This situation prevailed until 1876 when a charter generally recognised as being the First Constitution was introduced. This document established a representative assembly, thereby ushering in an era of parliamentary rule for the first time in the history of the Ottoman Empire. A few months later, however, it was suspended by Sultan Abdulhamid II until its restoration by the Young Turks’ revolution of 1908. This constitution was modified several times until the last Ottoman Parliament, which was dissolved on 11 April 1920.

Since the birth of the new Republic of Turkey, there has been an ongoing debate on the number of constitutions, the general consensus now being that there have been three. Authors such as Tuncay[18] refer to the constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982, while others, including Altug[19] and Sencer[20], also include that of 1921. This study is based on the findings of the former, and briefly investigates the constitutions of 1924, 1961 and 1982 for their effects on Turkish political life. Motivation and intent, combined with the democratic processes, will assist us in understanding the reasons and objectives of the politicians who implemented these constitutions.

The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on 29 October 1923 by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which was prominent in obtaining independence from the victorious Allied powers after the First World War. The first constitution of the Turkish Republic was declared on 20 April 1924, at the instigation of the Grand National Assembly, having been conceived during the War of Independence. It is this first constitution that has created the fundamental ideology of modern Turkey. Bernard Lewis argues ‘These were new radical ideas and their appearance in a constitution and subsequent enactment marks the first decisive step in the legal processes that transformed Turkey from an Islamic universal empire into a secular national state’.[21] It is argued that creators of the constitution of 1924 were influenced by the French and Polish constitutions, which when combined with the difficulties experienced within Turkey after its recent hostilities meant that the constitution was conservative and did not include radical liberal approach to democratic freedoms. This is especially apparent when one considers article 5, which gives absolute power to the Grand National Assembly and states that the laws and their interpretation cannot be questioned by any other executive body, although Article 8 declares that the judicial authority, exercised by independent tribunals in the name of the nation in accordance with the laws and regulations in force, has the authority to deliver interpretations of laws passed by the general assembly.[22] Critics argue, however, that the general assembly exercises judicial power as well, this latter point having caused its critics to question the true nature of Turkish Democracy. Tuncay[23] noted the following on the Constitution of 1924:

This constitution was widely inspired by the French and Polish constitutions... Legislative power was to be exercised by the Grand National Assembly, the representative of the national sovereignty, while executive power was delegated to the government, which was chosen from among the deputies. Although this Constitution delegated the judicial authority to independent judges, it did not accept judicial reviews of constitutionality. Moreover, it guaranteed some fundamental rights and freedoms but did not indicate the sanctions in case of their breach. .... this constitution was very susceptible to dictatorship.[24]

Tuncay also observed that this constitution was enacted during a period when wartime conditions prevailed, when the wielding of what some observers believed to be unconstitutional power was considered acceptable.[25] Indeed, enactment of the 1924 constitution generated a kind of government which has since been described by many observers as ‘one party rule’, although Turkey later introduced multi-party democracy during the 1950s.

Although the 1924 constitution provided for a system of government that could function satisfactorily, it had some vulnerable characteristics, which became particularly evident after the establishment of the multi-party system. Although, in theory, the Assembly had supremacy over government, in practice the reverse was true: it was the government, which dominated the Assembly. The President, the Prime Minister, other members of the Council of Ministers, and the President of the Assembly were all members of the majority party. The enormous powers granted to Parliament by the 1924 constitution were exploited by the sitting government in the interests of the majority party. The absence of a system that provided for an effective judicial review of legislative acts and the absence of a strong pluralist society in Turkey facilitated the Democrat Party government’s domination of the Assembly in the 1950s; In May 1960 the Democrat Party was swept from power by a military coup. The leaders of the coup formed Milli Birlik Komitesi, the National Unity Committee (NUC) which introduced a temporary constitution on 12 June 1960, and suspended the provision of the 1924 constitution relating to legislative and executive powers. On the very first day of the coup, the NUC appointed a special commission, composed of professors from the universities of Ankara and Istanbul, to draft a new constitution.[26]

Given the political and practical effects of the 1924 constitution, its support of what, in effect, was a one-party parliamentary state and its regulation of all aspects of public and private life, it was essential for the new regime to introduce reforms. The 1961 constitution gave particular weight to both human rights and to the separation of state powers. It is widely accepted that the new constitution was intended to address directly what was perceived to be the anti-democratic provisions in the 1924 constitution.[27] The new constitution of 1961 contained significant provisions designed to ensure the impartiality of the President of the Republic as well as new rights for individuals. These included new stipulations in respect of human rights and liberties, the intention being that under the constitution the Assembly could be challenged through an independent judiciary, thus establishing a system under which the absolute power exercised by previous political rulers would be reduced. As noted earlier, politics within the Assembly were very much dictated by the leader of the ruling party. The constitution of 1961 attempted to make the position of President non-political, by making anyone aspiring to the presidency sever all political links with any political party, and decreeing that the President had to submit himself for the election and could not be President for more than one term.

The 1961 constitution paid special attention to the judicial branch of government. The provisions included guarantees of the independence of the judges and were comprehensive and detailed. Kili[28] noted that the authors of the constitution fully recognised the importance of the role of the judiciary in maintaining constitutional democracy. Consequently Article 144 introduced a new authority known as the Supreme Council of Judges, which was given power to decide all matters relating to the appointment of the judiciary. Article 144 also provided for judicial review of administrative acts, and established a constitutional court entrusted with the power and authority to protect the rights of the individual. This established in legal terms the rights, liberties, and guarantees of the populace within a constitutional democracy. It can be said that the 1961 constitution was the single most important event in securing Turkish democratic development since 1924.

In contrast to its predecessor, the constitution of 1961 listed and guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms, recognising also the right of collective bargaining and strikes. The legislative branch was divided into two separate bodies, the House of Representatives and the Senate. Executive power was exercised by a cabinet in the traditional parliamentary sense. Most importantly, the Court of the Constitution was established with authority to review the legality of laws passed by the Grand National Assembly. Observers of Turkish political history have stated that having suffered the trauma of the First World War, Turkey was not prepared for a multi-party system when the 1924 Constitution was drafted. The constitution of 1961 was considered by many to respond to the need for the establishment of a more pluralistic democracy.[29] According to these observers the constitution of 1961 provided conditions suitable for the development of socialism within a legal and democratic framework.

Many authors, like Boran[30], Altan[31], Ozdemir[32], Ahmad[33], Dodd[34], stressed that the 1961 constitution permitted ideological debate outside the Kemalist framework and that, as a result, socialist and social democratic clubs were permitted to operate legally within the framework of the law. Moreover they also believed that improving relations with the outside world, as well as the dramatic increase in the labour force and the better education enjoyed by an expanding number of young people throughout the country, created appropriate for the development of socialist thought and practice within Turkey.

Initially, everything seems to have gone smoothly for the socialists, without recourse to non-peaceful means. So what went so wrong that the development of socialism in Turkey ended up in violence? To find a clue to the answer to this question, it is necessary to investigate the extent of the socialist movement in Turkish political life in relation to its operational strategies, its aims and its effect on the pluralistic democracy.

The Turkish Socialist Movement and Its Effect on Political Development in Turkey

In its early stages, Turkiye Isci Partisi, the Turkish Labour Party (TLP), the largest and most organised socialist party in the country, in common with the rest of the Turkish socialist movement, consisted not so much of the working class but other, non-proletarian workers, which markedly outnumbered the Turkish proletariat. According to TLP data, the class and social structure of the party was as follows: 27 percent of the party members were industrial workers, 9 percent agricultural workers, 17 percent peasants, and 47 percent were non-proletarian urban workers such as craftsmen, clerks, students, and intellectuals.[35] This basic social characteristic of the TLP was described by Lipovsky and Boran as being representative of the interests of non-proletarian workers as well as the working class.[36] Another characteristic of the TLP was the non-theoretical level of Turkish socialism which was developed within Turkey. Indeed, the leading member of the TLP, Behice Boran, summarised the situation when he claimed that ‘Turkish socialism has not produced any great theoreticians of socialism’.[37] However, in its defence, it has to be said that Turkish socialism was shaped and fostered from the huge amount of socialist literature available internationally at the time.

From its foundation in 1962 until its first congress on 9th February 1964, the TLP concentrated on a nationwide organisation campaign. This first congress introduced the population to two clear, major and pragmatic tenets. Firstly, socio-economic progress was possible only on the basis of a non-capitalist path to development, and secondly, in order to achieve the non-capitalist path of development, changing the nature of power was second step.[38] In the TLP programme adopted at the first congress in 1964, as in the party charter, nowhere appeared the words socialist or socialism appear. This point of secrecy can be explained by the circumstances facing the TLP, with particular reference to the legacy of Kemalist political policies.

From the establishment of the Republic up to the emergency of the TLP in 1962, Turkey had been governed by a succession of essentially capitalist parties, which advocated what Mardin[39] described as a form of state capitalism. First, there was the rule of Ataturk, followed by that of the RPP, which continued his policies of Kemalism, as discussed in Chapter III. The Democrats succeeded them in 1950, and the Justice Party replaced them in turn, after the military coup of 1960. Observers like Ozdemir[40], Tuncay[41] and Belge[42], argued that although these parties had some differences they all operated within the framework of Kemalism. The dictate emanating from the first Labour Party congress was, therefore, the first time that any party had proposed a programme opposing Kemalism. The Turkish Labour Party chose not to use the word socialism or socialist as part of its strategy to lessen opposition, at least for the time being, although the party ideologues considered socialism the ultimate goal of the party. As Igor Lipovsky explained:

In 1961-1965 they limited themselves mostly to criticising capitalism and its inability to solve the problems of social and economic development of Turkey: they propagated the ‘non-capitalist way of development of Turkey.[43]

The leader of the TLP, Mehmet Ali Aybar, defined the their understanding of the non-capitalist path of development as a mixed economy on a planned foundation with a dominant role exercised by the state sector. He declared that the main parts of his party’s proposals were agrarian reform, the nationalisation of foreign trade, banks, insurance companies and of foreign capital in the country.[44] ‘The non-capitalist way’, Aybar explained, ‘is the name of the economic policy that the TLP will implement after taking power with the aim of constructing socialism’.[45] While the socialists were trying to avoid strong opposition from the Kemalists, they were also taking account of another strong theme of Turkish cultural identity, that of Islam, which was as opposed to socialism as it was to non-believers.

In order to achieve their goal, the strategy of the Turkish Labour Party was different from other socialist movements, which they believed to have adopted a revolutionary approach rather than an evolutionary one. Aybar illustrated the need for their evolutionary policy as:

Turkey is not making the transition to socialism in one fell swoop. No society can move to socialism at once. After assuming power the foundations of a socialist economy will be laid and socialist relation of production will replace the capitalist ones. These transformations will constitute a definite stage in the historical process.[46]

The economic policy of the TLP was designed to gain public confidence and thereby to create conditions in which they could move to the second stage of the evolutionary process.

Critics argued that with its dual strategies for success, of secrecy or indivisibility and evolution, socialism reaped the benefit in the 1965 general election in which the Labour Party won almost 270,000 votes and sent 15 delegates to the Turkish Parliament. Encouraged by their success in the elections, the TLP decided to change the direction of the party from the struggle for national democratic transformation to formulating solutions and proposals of a socialist nature. The new policy of the party appeared to be a struggle for socialism and justice in peaceful way.[47] After the 1965 elections, the TLP started to use the word socialism openly, it ended the policy of secrecy, and took advantage of the opportunity to use the parliamentary forum to propagate its socialist ideas.

Between 1965 and the end of the decade, however, the TLP’s use of normal, democratic channels to gain power and influence started to change towards a more violent strategy. During the-mid 1960s, three important strategies appeared for the establishment of socialism in Turkey. The first, which was supported by the Turkish Labour Party, was to develop a political consciousness among the labouring masses, to organise them, and having won the parliamentary elections, to implement the required social and economic changes.[48] The second, which was defended by the socialist intellectuals known as the Yon group, was for a coup with the aid of the military and civilian intelligentsia. They argued that, having taken power, it would be possible to institute reforms supported by the labouring people.[49] This method was strongly opposed by TLP and its leaders who believed in ‘no coups and reform from above to build socialism’.[50] Mainly the extreme left known as the Proletarian Revolutionists, who were operating in the country illegally, suggested the third path. They believed that power could be achieved only through armed force with the support of the broad popular masses. They argued against constructing socialism through electoral success and believed in the ability of the leftist sector of the military and civilian intelligentsia to lead the country to socialism.[51]

During the 1960’s, these three stratagems were often debated amongst the socialists in Turkey. The first, defended by the Turkish Labour Party, enjoyed the largest support among the socialists. It could be said that the strategy of the TLP was itself designed within the framework of the 1961 constitution and that they used the parliamentary system of the country for its own political ends. Defending the official strategy of the party, Boran stressed that: ‘… in a country where parliamentarism exists, a party of the working class should not belittle the importance of elections and parliamentary activity. We regard our chief goal as taking part in elections, fighting for the vote of the elector, and representing in Parliament the working classes and strata of the labouring people who are its allies’.[52]

At the following parliamentary elections, the Labour Party won 35,000 votes less than in 1965, its share of the vote falling from 3 to 2.65 percent, and the Party returned only two deputies to Parliament. Thus, the 1969 election was a major setback to the TLP, with many of its followers seeing no hope for meaningful change through the processes of formal democracy.[53] Following the TLP’s failure at the 1969 elections, adoption of the policies of the Proletarian Revolutionists towards armed struggle became more popular among the socialists in Turkey, especially members of youth organisations. Consequently, the Revolutionary Youth, the Proletarian Socialists, the Turkish Workers and the Peasants’ Liberation Army all adopted policies of armed struggle for the implementation of socialism in Turkey. The ideological leaders of these groups were influenced by the thoughts of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro and Guevara (Che)’.

One of the leading figures in the Turkish socialist revolutionary movement, Mahir Cayan, defended the use of violence to obtain political goals as follows: ‘It is justified to use violence in Turkey, since the country is considered to be under the occupation of external imperialists and their capitalist allies within the country’.[54] This attitude towards revolutionary socialism in Turkey was not so very different from views of other nineteenth-and-twentieth century terrorist organisations. Whatever the legal and constitutional freedoms for different political activities, and for freedom of speech and thought, there are still extreme groups who wish to act outside the framework of legitimate order and the rule of law. Terrorist organisations have come to believe that the quickest way (perhaps the only way) to achieve their ends and to gain power is to terrorise society and to undermine legitimate government authority, rather than to persist with prolonged political debate within the established democratic process.

The youth organisations were ultra leftist groups which operated on the basis of the ideological and political precepts advanced by the Proletarian Revolutionaries and the Proletarian Socialists. Although the total number of members of these terrorist organisations was no more than a few thousand, they succeeded in destabilising the political situation in the country and in jeopardising Turkey’s foreign policy obligations.[55] As Wilkinson noted: ‘It is fallacious to assume that terrorists need mass support before they can perpetrate murder and destruction, as we have already observed, many contemporary terrorist groups are tiny’.[56]

To summarise, from the beginning of the Turkish Republic, the evolution of democracy has led to a more pluralistic system, including participation by socialist activists in the political life of the country. However, these same organisations also engaged in terrorist activities and caused enormous damage to the still young, fragile and imperfectly formed democratic system. The result was to weaken the government in power and to bring about the second military intervention in Turkey, on 12 March 1971.

One obvious weakness in the strategy of the Turkish socialists was a result of their incorrect assessment of the dynamics of Turkish society, in which the socio-political life was too strongly consistent with Kemalism and Islamic themes to provide any realistic opportunities for socialism in the short term. This was in spite of the fact that there were some trends which should have favoured a move towards socialism, such as the increasing numbers of the working class, more liberal amendments to the 1961 constitution, an already extensive library of translated foreign socialist literature, and the increasing popularity of socialism as a political doctrine throughout the rest of the world. In spite of all this, a serious misjudgement was made by some members of the socialist party in trying to use the military to further their political ambitions. The use of direct terrorism by extreme hard-liners within the socialist movement, prevented wider acceptance of socialism. The next section examines the effects of these terrorist activities and the response of the political parties to them.

Terrorism and the Political Parties in 1960-70s

Social Discourses

Following the 1961 military coup, the Turkish political system could not fully recover. The army continued to play an important role as guardians of Kemalism, and in the words of Hershlag Turkish democracy became a ‘guided democracy’.[57] Also some political groups could not be accommodated within the existing system. The weakness of Turkish democracy, the global economic crisis, interventions of some Communist neighbour countries and some social and economic crises caused the stability of the country to deteriorate. During the 1970s these factors both caused and were affected by the political violence.

Throughout the seventies, Turkey experienced important changes in its democratic, social and economic system. The rise of extremists at both ends of the political spectrum, right and left, resulted in extensive terrorism. This led to serious conflict between the major political parties, Adalet Partisi (Justice Party, JP), Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, RRP), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party, NSP), and Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (National Action Party, NAP). As a result there were endless debates about the 1961 constitution – whether or not it was too liberal– and the development of ineffective government policies, which in turn led to a state of social instability, and eventually, in 1980, to military intervention.

The centre-right parties (JP, NAP and MSP) had different and diverging views of how best to resolve the rising problem of terrorism from the centre-left RPP, which had been accused of encouraging and fostering terrorism during the 1970s.[58] The Turkish democracy could not curb the radical groups in a legal, democratic system. Competition between the right and left groups aggravated the problem and the left groups in particular could not be satisfied within the regime. Thus, even the moderate parties became the subject of the political polarisation.[59] As has been noted, even the major parties had very little previous parliamentary experience and their aggressive rhetoric against each other increased the tension. Also this prevented the political parties from producing an effective solution to ever-increasing social turmoil and instability. The catastrophic effect of an ineffectual political system made the country vulnerable to the military coups and social conflicts such as terrorism.

Also as a result of the imperfect civil after the military coups occurred in 1960 and 1970, the internal conflicts, the country was unable to sustain the impressive rate of real economic growth, of 6.5 percent per year that it had recorded during the 1960s.[60] In addition, Turkey relied on the importation of many raw materials, including 80% of its total oil requirement, and as a result the oil crisis of 1973 had a dramatic effect on the whole Turkish economy. The rapid rise in oil prices and the need to meet foreign exchange requirements for essential energy imports left Turkey facing mounting deficits in its balance of payments.[61] By 1979, the annual rate of inflation had risen to 100% with the Gross National Product actually falling slightly in real terms, whereas unemployment increased.[62] Finally, international borrowing opportunities were withdrawn and Turkey was faced with imminent bankruptcy. The outcome was one familiar to Turkish economists, politicians, sociologists and researchers, as a vicious circle: economic crisis, unemployment, social disorder, and terrorism.

The Response of Political Parties

An analysis of the political parties and governments of the 1970s gives a better understanding of the failure of Turkey’s second experiment in democracy. The country was unprepared to face the economic turmoil caused by the 1973 oil crisis, and the parliamentary election of the same year produced a National Assembly with no governing majority, as shown in figure 4. 1. This weakness at a time of economic and social crisis led to a situation where no effective decisions were made, due to the widely differing ideologies of the parties. Instead of leadership and consensus there was only dissent.

Figure 4.1: The Result of Turkish Parliamentary Elections, 1961-1977, percentage of seats.

Prime Minister Statistic Office (1980)

After the years of electoral failure, the Republican Peoples Party emerged in 1973 as the largest party with a third of the popular vote and 41% of the Assembly seats. A political commentator on the 1973 elections, Ozbudun[63], attribute the rise of the RPP to two factors: first, the energetic leadership of Bulent Ecevit, who replaced the autocratic Inonu as party leader, and secondly, the new social democratic image of the party. Ozbudun also considered that, as the 1973 voting patterns indicate, the new image of the RPP appealed to the urban lower classes, including those who may join the extreme groups, following the closer of the TLP with the military coup of 1971.[64] This view was shared by many authors as well as by Ecevit himself.[65] This change signified a realignment in the Turkish party system, as the old centre-periphery divisions were replaced by a new functional party system . The RPP increased its vote particularly in the former strongholds of the Democratic and Justice Parties, winning support from previously loyal supporters of the centre-right DP and the conservative JP.[66]

The RPP can be considered as centre-left while the JP, the NAP, the DP (Democrat Party), and the NSP are centre-right parties. As figure 4.1 indicate, the parties on the centre right were badly split in the 1973 elections. The JP obtained only about 30% of the vote while the Democrat Party, a splinter group of the JP, received just under 12% of the vote, as did the National Salvation party.

The main differences between the three centre-right parties can be summarised as being that the NSP combined its upholding of Islamic moral and cultural values with a defence of the interest of small merchants, artisans, and businessmen, whereas the manifestos of the JP and DP failed to make this broad appeal. Importantly, another new political party, the National Action Party, established itself in Turkish politics in the 1970s. Although it won only a small minority of the vote in 1973 (3.4%), the NAP grew in the 1970s under the leadership of the former revolutionary Alparslan Turkes. Although this political movement was initially insignificant, in a comparatively short period of time, through a combination of dedication, discipline, and inspirational leadership, it became an important organised political force.[67] The National Action Party’s ideology combined an ardent anti-communist nationalism with strongly interventionist economic policies. It was accused of using military-type youth organisations seemingly implicated in right-wing terror by the socialist terrorist groups.[68]

The data in figure 4.1 have two important implications, one immediate and the other long-term. According to Rustow, between 1973 and 1980 the small number of seats held in the Assembly by the NSP and NAP were often sufficient to swing the balance between the two major parties, and hence they were able to extract important concessions. He also noted that:

The prolonged, cynical haggling often would immobilise legislative activity altogether. The resulting governmental paralysis would discredit the democratic process, encourage political activists to resort to street violence instead and prevent the enfeebled government from coping with the resulting wave of terrorism without calling in the military or being displaced by them.[69]

Moreover, Turkish political parties had already experienced the lack of a co-ordinated administrative authority in implementing policies. As noted by Heper[70] and Barchard[71], a hung Parliament and weak coalition governments reduced the capacity of the governments to make the efficient and effective changes that the circumstances of the time needed. It seems, following the military coup of 1960 and another military intervention in 1971 to the political life of the country did contributed to the fragmentation of political parties and political process did not take place in its natural manner, instead it appears that rather enforce and unnatural political development taken place.

The first coalition government was formed under the premiership of Bulent Ecevit. This initial coalition consisted of members of the social-democratic RPP and the Islamic NSP. The coalition collapsed in the autumn of 1974 and was eventually replaced by a ‘National Front’ coalition under Suleyman Demirel, with the participation of the JP, the NSP and the NAP. The instability of this period is indicated by the fact that eight governments held office during the seven years between 1973 and 1980. As a natural consequence of this there were no successful government policies that could seek long term success since there was not a single viable government.

Furthermore, of those eight governments, five represented majorities in the Grand National Assembly. Of the remaining three, the first was an all-party cabinet, appointed to supervise the election of 1973. The second was a ‘technocratic government’ of civil servants, diplomats, and professors selected to overcome a parliamentary deadlock in the winter of 1973-74, and the third was a minority government of Ecevit’s RPP that failed to obtain a vote of confidence after the 1977 elections.

The 1977 election did not significantly change matters, although the strength of the two leading parties within the coalition did increase at the expense of the minority parties. The RPP, which increased its share of the popular vote by eight points, came close to an absolute parliamentary majority. The JP also improved its share of the vote and its members of assembly seats. The NSP lost about one-quarter of its votes and half of its parliamentary contingent. The defeat of the NSP in the elections of 1977 might have reflected its Islamic supporters’ resentment of the coalition government established by the NSP and centre-left RPP. The right-wing NAP grew considerably, however, almost doubling its popular vote while increasing its small contingent of assembly seats fivefold, up to 7.6 %.[72]

Following the 1977 elections, another weak and paralysed coalition government called the Nationalist Front was formed, again under Suleyman Demirel, with the participation of the JP, NSP, NAP. This period of Turkish politics up to 1980 could be described as a ‘reign of terror’, which lacked effective government. Within a few months, the National Front government had lost its parliamentary majority as a result of the defection of some JP deputies. Consequently, Bulent Ecevit was able to form a government with the help of these dissident JP members, who were rewarded with ministerial posts in the new government. This new government lasted barely 22 months, losing power in November 1979, when the partial elections for one-third of the Senate and the five vacant National Assembly seats resulted in sharp gains by the JP, which won 47.8% of the vote.[73] At the same time, support for the RPP declined dramatically to 29.8% Prime Minister’s Statistics Office 1980. Consequently, Suleyman Demirel formed a government with the parliamentary support of his former partners, the NAP, and the NSP. This government had been in office less than one year when it was ousted by the military coup of 12 September 1980.

How can we account for the failure of Turkey’s experience with democracy during the 1970s? The immediate reason given by the Chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren, was the growing political violence and terrorism that, between 1975 and 1980, left more than 5.000 people killed and three times as many wounded.[74] Acts of violence, which became particularly acute between 1978 and 1980, also included armed assaults, sabotages, kidnappings, bank robberies, the destruction of workplaces, and bombings. At this time, some 49 radical left-wing groups existed, opposed by a number of right-wing organisations. The political situation within the country was in turmoil.[75] Thus, in a sense, the pattern that led to the military intervention of 1971 was repeated during the late 1970s only on a much larger and more alarming scale.

Although, as previously discussed, Turkey had been developing politically and had enjoyed some degree of liberal democracy, it was still lacking a secure infrastructure in which to contain and resolve such sharpening conflicts as political terrorism. The democratic institutions, which have emerged in other European countries, have done so as the result of civil war, revolution and continuing reform. A second major blow to the political stability of Turkey was the government’s decision to declare martial law and to view the resolution of violence on streets as the job of the military. They treated it as a security matter, rather proposing any real political alternatives to reduce the rising political tension within society.

Figure 2 The Incidence of Terrorist Attacks Between 1974-1980

Source: EGMA / TMDB- ARC. / Sec. Doc, 840746.

Figure 2 indicates the dramatic rise in terrorist incidents in second half of 1970s. This caused much damage to all aspects of life in the country. The governments were unable to cope with the worsening situation, even though martial law was in effect in much of the country. Martial law under the Turkish constitutional system entails the transfer of police functions to the military authorities, the restriction or complete suspension of civil liberties and the creation of military martial law courts to try offences associated with the causes that led to the declaration of martial law. This section of the Turkish constitution has been criticised by many journalists and academics. Altug describes it as being a highly authoritarian and restrictive.[76] In spite of this, even martial law could not contain the political violence and terrorist activities during this period.

Social scientists, such as Ozbudun and Evin[77], Turan[78] and Erguder[79], have all agreed that besides the combination of the economic and social unrest, other important factors lay behind the constitutional crisis. These included infiltration of the police force, by both the right-and left-wing extremists, combined with the resentment of martial law by the majority of the population. The three military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980 were preceded by martial law regimes instituted by civilian governments.

To what extent were civilians responsible for the failure of Turkey’s second experiment with democracy? Some critics state that it was the ideological polarisation of the different political parties within Turkey, which created the context for the crisis. These extremes increasingly caused political frustration, which eventually led to the politically motivated violence.[80] As was noted earlier, after the dramatic failure of the Turkish Labour Party in the election of 1969 many of the extremist left-wing ideologists considered terrorism to be a legitimate method of achieving their objectives. One of the most infamous figures of the extreme left, Mahir Cayan, made it quite clear early in the 1970s that he considered that there was no alternative, and that political power had to be obtained through the methods of armed violence.[81]

The radical left, unlike the radical right, was not represented in Parliament. However, extreme leftist ideologies found many supporters among students, teachers, and in some sectors of the industrial working class. When the leading conservative party of Suleyman Demirel (JP) was pulled to the right by its partnership with the NAP and the NSP, the Social Democrat Party of Bulent Ecevit (RPP) was pulled to the left by the radical groups within its own organisation. Evin stated that ‘at no time in recent Turkish history has Parliament been so divided, polarised and politicised as it was in the late 1970s’.[82] Changes of government were followed by extensive purges in all ministries, involving not only the top echelons but also many middle and or lower-rank civil servants. Partisanship became a norm in the civil service, which had retained its essentially non-political character until the mid-1970s.[83]

The practice of pluralistic democracy in Turkey had failed to attain maturity and mutual tolerance between the right-wing parties and the same could be said for the centre-left RPP. The NSP was not itself involved in violence but its use of Islamic themes did not endear itself to those committed to the Kemalist legacy of secularism, including the military (Mardin 1984). However, terrorist attacks and the rapid collapse of government authority, combined with the high rate of inflation and the deadlock over the election of the President in 1980, limited the possibilities for the solution of Turkey’s multi-sided crisis. For Karpat, only the National Salvation Party of Necmeddin Erbakan, with its policies and political organisation, was capable of appealing to the citizens’ basic loyalties.[84]

Many authors shared this view because the argument stressed the responsible behaviour and inherent security of the NSP. Although essentially a radical rightist association, the NSP had managed to remain outside the violence which had overtaken the other radical parties. Moreover, there seems to be a consensus among many researchers about the party programme of NSP, which appealed to the majority in respect of economic policy and social justice. At the same time, it also offered to the left certain considerations in regard to history, culture and national identity. In substance it offered something for everyone, and could have created a common front, whereas the RPP and the right-wing JP were lacking any real consensus regarding issues and policies concerning the combating of terrorism and an effective economic policy.

Alternatively, it was argued that the parliamentary arithmetic and the inability or unwillingness of the two major parties (the RPP and the JP) to agree on a grand coalition and a minority government arrangement gave the two minor parties (NAP and NSP) an enormous bargaining power, which they effectively used to obtain important ministries and to staff them with their own partisans.[85]

The second alternative to overcome Turkey’s crisis was seen as a military take-over. It was agreed that this would neutralise the Islamist NSP’s appeal, reaffirm the Republic’s fundamental principles and possibly preserve the necessary foundations for the restoration of a civilian democratic order. It has been a long running argument since the military coup of 1980 that fear of the NSP alternative made the military intervention welcome in some quarters.[86] According to this, much of the population, deeply disappointed by the paralysis of the political system and the threats to their lives and security, was not only fully prepared to accept the military intervention but actually sought it, especially after they had lost faith in the political parties as a result of the endless verbal debates and accusations and counter-accusations.

A coalition between the two major parties (RPP and JP) would have been welcomed by most of the important political groups in Turkey, including the business community, the leading trade union confederation, the press, the military, and by a majority of the JP and the RPP deputies. All these political groups shared the view that a government based on their joint support would probably have been strong enough to deal effectively with the subsequent political violence. However, the deep personal rivalry between Demirel and Ecevit, which was said by Ozbudun to be due to their tendencies to see problems from a narrow partisan perspective, and their failure to appreciate the real gravity of the situation, made such a democratic rescue operation impossible.[87] It can be argued that democracy can only take root within a society where awareness of the majority of political parties, their leaders, and the general population is well advanced on democratic values. Many countries has shown, anti-democracy parties can perhaps be tolerated in opposition but their active participation in government tends to undermine the system.[88]

A related phenomenon that contributed to the decline in the legitimacy of the political system in Turkey was the immobility of several governments and Parliaments during much of the 1970s. The very narrow parliamentary majorities and the heterogeneous nature of the governing coalitions, both the Nationalist Front and the Ecevit governments, meant that new policies could be initiated only with great difficulty. Pressing economic problems, such as high inflation, major deficits in the international trade balance, shortage of investment and consumer goods, unemployment, and international problems, such as the Cyprus crisis and the United States arms embargo, were aggravated by the inability of government to take effective and immediate policy decisions.[89] Put another way, this lack of effectiveness served to de-legitimise the regime. Perhaps the most telling example of such governmental failure was the inability of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to elect a president of the Republic in 1980. Actually, this was not a failure of the Assembly according to Ozdemir, who argued that the constitution of 1961 made it difficult for a weak government to elect the president of the Republic.[90] Nevertheless, the six-month presidential deadlock provided further justification for the military coup of 12 September 1980. Examples of lesser deadlocks abounded, particularly in matters of economic and foreign policy.

The experience during the 1970s also demonstrated another inherent weakness of the 1961 constitution, which was that Parliament frequently lacked a decisive majority for one party because of the divisive electoral system of proportional representation. As Rustow noted in his study:

The variety of proportional representation, in due course, produced in Turkey the same splintering of parties that had paralysed the Weimer Germany in the 1920s and the French Fourth Republic in the 1950s and is creating periodic difficulties for Israel’s governments.[91]

As was noted above, Turks have inherited from the highly bureaucratic Ottoman state a tendency to accord respect to laws and regulations as long as there is a government deemed capable of enforcing them. It was argued that historically Ottoman and Turkish governments have been authoritarian only when their authority to maintain the law was challenged. As illustrated previously, totalitarianism, as understood in the west and in Eastern Europe, has been conspicuously absent in Turkey even under the most restrictive governments.[92]

Recent history has witnessed efforts to undermine democracy in Turkey. The traditional understanding of government and authority, and their implicit supremacy, began to be replaced by an individualistic and interest-oriented understanding of government and authority. Indeed, it has been argued that democracy was successfully established, at some level such as party competition and participation) and has survived in Turkey (with some lapses) not only because of a temporary coincidence of interests and opinions among Turkey’s elite but also because of the coincidence of traditional beliefs and values with certain forms of collective action of the Turkish people.[93]

On balance, however, it appears that it was not popular disillusion with democracy but the failure of the political parties and the intelligentsia to develop an economic policy or political consensus amongst themselves which prevented democracy from succeeding in Turkey in this period. These issues were not confined to the economy, they also concerned social justice, culture, religion and the historical identity of Turkey. Although the failure to establish a consensus undermined democracy, it did not destroy the concept in the eyes of the people.

However, predictably, opposing factions within Turkey perceived the nature of democracy from different viewpoints. The radical left claimed that parliamentary democracy in Turkey was a device to perpetuate social injustice and backwardness, allowing the upper classes to enrich themselves by maintaining semi-feudal relations in society. The right considered that democracy had destroyed the traditional social order and its values, allowing the left the freedom to subvert and undermine the national integrity and character. Both shared the deeply entrenched belief that democracy had permitted the ignorant masses, alleged to be mainly preoccupied with petty material interests, to make and influence fundamental decisions affecting the welfare and future of society and that a variety of established groups had been allowed to manipulate the ignorant electorate according to their own wishes

It is also important to note that the new elite group, which emerged during the 1960s, differed from the traditionalists who, together with their claim to enhanced formal education, superior family background and wealth, emphasised their association with the Republican Peoples Party. This elitism placed an emphasis on leadership ability and the capability of defining the problems affecting the entire nation-society.

Turkey After 1983: The Post-Military Period

1982 Constitution and the a New legal Framework

Turkey has learned from its mistakes. We will never again experience such problems which deteriorated the country’s economy, threatened its unity, cost the lives of its citizens, and from now on, it is time to look forward to a prosperous Turkey, not backward (Ozal, in Barlas 1994: 11).

This was the famous slogan of Turgut Ozal, the leader of the newly established Motherland Party, which was established following the passage of the new 1982 constitution. The constitution, approved by the constituent Assembly in 1982, established a system that lay between the extreme concentration of powers of the Ataturk era and the elaborate checks and balances erected in 1961. Although the 1982 constitution was clearly closer to the 1961 version than the concentrated powers of the 1924 constitution, the current system provides for decisive remedies in times of national crisis (Turan 1993: 92). On these occasions, the broad civil, political, and social rights can be suspended to further the national. In normal times, the primacy of civilian rule and the sanctity of human rights are established in law. The new constitution was introduced in an effort to redress the imbalances in the previous two-house Parliament that had so conspicuously failed to provide effective government in the period leading up to the military take-over of 1980.

The aim of the new constitution was to create a system of government that would avoid political chaos posing a threat to the fledgling democracy of the country. Under these guidelines, new systems were introduced to strengthen the powers of the presidency compared with the authority granted in the 1961 constitution. Another striking characteristic of this constitution is that it was designed to avoid the damaging effects of terrorism on democracy, specifically making reference to the National Security Council. This body was originally created in 1961 to assist in taking decisions and ensuring necessary co-ordination in the field of national security policy in its broadest definition. The Cabinet was empowered to give priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council. The powers of this are no longer the ultimate authority of the state, as they had been between 1980 and 1983. Designed as a safety valve, the National Security Council permits the senior military commanders to communicate their views and concerns to the top civilian leaders, and provides a forum for the President to speak in the name of the armed forces.

An independent judiciary remains an integral basis of the new system. Once appointed, judges and public prosecutors serve until they are 65 years of age, provided they maintain a good character. As an innovation, the 1982 Constitution institutes State Security Courts to deal with offences against the integrity of the state, the democratic order, and the internal and external security of the country.

Ozal Period

The military coup of 1980 ended in 1983 following new elections. After the military period, Turgut Ozal, the leader of Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party), secured a victory and gained a comfortable majority in 1983 and became Prime Minister. During his time in office (1983-1989, he won the next elections in 1987 and was elected by Parliament as President in 1989, serving as President until his death in 1993. Ozal adopted liberal economic policies and forged closer ties with Turkey’s western allies, which ensured the development of Turkish democracy along Western lines. The Turkish press and political groups enjoyed more freedom with the abolishing of articles 141, 142 and 163 from Turkey’s criminal laws, which banned the introduction of communism and Islamic discussion into political debate (Barlas 1984). The era of Ozal, aside from the economic boom that the country experienced, has also become known for the huge developments in telecommunication and the introduction of the first private television channel. There are now more than fifteen national television channels in Turkey, many of which have undoubtedly helped in improving political knowledge and understanding in society. De Gaulle noted, famously, ‘you can not govern the country with a single party which has got two hundred different chessmen’. This phenomenon became apparent in the Turkish political agenda (Birsel 1998). The developing economy and relatively more democratic government increased democratic demands and diversity. Similar to the 1970s the terrorist organisations, notably the PKK, wanted to exploit this, yet now the political and economic structure were stronger than ever. Since terrorism in 1980s and response of the Ozal governments are discussed in the Chapter VI in detailed, now we do not go further.