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Wednesday, 16 May 2012
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The Aegean Issue: Parties’ Arguments and the Relevant Delimination Law - 2
Yucel ACER, U.S.A.K.

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3. “Relative Weight” to be Accorded to the Various Factors


 


As seen in the preceding paragraphs, the case law has suggested a pattern in which delimitation is to be affected by attributing the primary role to the geographical factors and the secondary role to certain other relevant factors. However, these general guidelines can not completely settle the practical application of the delimitation law. The principles identified so far may be sufficient to clarify what factors are primary and what factors are secondary importance. However, these principles are not sufficiently specific to indicate what effect every geographical element or other elements should have.[1]


A quick answer to the problem may be that it is the peculiar circumstances rather than the principles themselves that can determine the issue of relative effect.[2] However, in order to have a predictable and practical legal course it should at least be possible to have certain guidelines that would indicate approximately the effect to be accorded to a factor in certain circumstances. The practicality of the delimitation law should be demonstrated in solving this issue.


The previous review has already shown that geographical factors appear to be much more influential than any other relevant factors within the delimitation process. They are the factors which indicate the “initial” and “main” delimitation line in any delimitation case.[3] However, since there are many geographical factors, their relative weight in relation to one another is a matter for consideration.


The Tribunal in the UK-France Arbitration observed that as far as the determination of the initial line is concerned, coastal configuration in “its general direction” plays a significant role.[4] The ICJ Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case similarly observed that “the delimitation line to be drawn in a given area, will depend upon the coastal configuration.”[5] When the ICJ emphasised “the coast of each of the Parties” as constituting the starting line in the Tunisia-Libya Case, it seemed to be referring to the mainland coasts, rather than the coasts of the islands.[6] The treatment of islands by the Tribunal in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration clearly points to the mainland geography as the primary factor.[7]


The evidence is sufficient to show that it is the coastal configuration which is the most dominant factor in the determination of the initial and main delimitation line. The elements which constitute coastal configuration has been clarified in delimitation cases as the general configurations of a coast,[8] the difference in the coastal lengths,[9] or the islands and islets in the delimitation area.[10]


However, what is important about the costal configurations is the “coastal configuration in its general direction”. Individual configurations could only play a secondary role relative to the general configurations. Moreover, individual configurations could be disregarded altogether under certain considerations.[11] As the ICJ Chamber pointed out in the Gulf of Maine Case, it is not every coastal configuration that would be reflective on the course of delimitation line.[12]


The identification of what the minor and major factors is left, to a certain extent, to the individual circumstances of every case. However, there are two general principles which play a role in identification of such factors. They are the principles of proportionality and non-encroachment.


The principle of proportionality has been introduced as a ratio between the coastal lengths and the maritime areas to be attributed to the parties. In fact, the parties’ coastal lengths could simply be one of the relevant geographical elements that may have a varied role on the initial and main delimitation line.[13]


However, the balance between the coastal lengths and the maritime areas to be attributed would indicate, the relative weight to be accorded to different geographical factors on the basis of equity.[14] Generally speaking, while the general coastal configurations determine the course of the delimitation line, it is the coastal length which is used as a yardstick in appreciating whether the effect of an individual configuration or any other factor would be excessive.[15] The role of the islands is, for instance, simply judged on the basis of the principle of proportionality.[16]


The principle of non-encroachment is the other principle that similarly determines the relative effect of the relevant geographical factors. The principle was once taken as referring to the element of natural prolongation.[17] Considering that the role of natural prolongation diminished and was replaced by the element of distance, the principle signifies that the delimitation must leave to a State the areas that are in the vicinity of its coasts.[18] Accordingly, any method that attribute an effect in a manner to cut off from the seaward projection of a given coast would not be equitable.[19] This includes geographical factors such as islands.[20]


The relative weight to be attributed to the non-geographical factors which are of a secondary role are yet to be determined in our review. As previously noted, it is certain that they do not affect the delimitation line to the same extent as the geographical factors.[21] On the other hand, their role, when compared to each other within the delimitation process, is another matter and seems to be left to the peculiar circumstances of every individual case. However, the principles of proportionality and non-encroachment again constitute a yardstick in determining their relative effect.[22]


Despite their significant roles, neither the principle of proportionality nor the principle of non-encroachment is absolute. The supervising role of the principle of proportionality does not amount to simply dividing the maritime areas with respect to the ratios between the respective coastlines and the areas to be attributed to them. If that were so, other factors would not have a role to play.[23] Clearly, equity of a delimitation process means taking all the relevant factors into account.[24]


Contrary to such an idea of proportionality, its true role is to remedy, on the basis of approximate proportions between coastal lengths and maritime areas, the “substantial disproportions” or “inequities” caused by certain configurations or factors.[25] It is not therefore to be used in the mathematical sense of an accurate test.


Similarly, the principle of non-encroachment is not as strict as it first appears. In some geographical situations, the cut-off effect is unavoidable, so that some degree of encroachment can be allowed on the basis of coastal geography such as when both coasts are concave, as in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration.[26] The necessity of attributing some effect to the competing coastal front in the Canada-France Arbitration legitimised the cut-off effect on the projection of the Canadian coastline.[27] In fact, identifying proximity or vicinity proved to be a difficult matter in the circumstances of individual cases.[28] It certainly renders the principle of non-encroachment a quite subjective one. Eventually, the role of the principle of non-encroachment in identifying the relative effect of the relevant factors in a delimitation process is dependent to a great extent on the circumstances of the case in hand.


It should be noted here that the earliest judgment of the ICJ in the North Sea Cases that gave a dominant role to the element of natural prolongation[29] should not create confusion. As the role of sea-bed features has gradually decreased on the delimitation line,[30] there is no principle of natural prolongation that would judge the relative effect of the factors relevant to a delimitation in hand.


It is therefore clear that despite their non-absolute role, the principle of proportionality and non-encroachment constitute the most general yardsticks in evaluating the relative weight to be attributed to various relevant factors, geographical or otherwise. They will not allow excessive weight to any of the relevant factors with a view to arrive at an equitable solution.


 


4. Calculation of Proportionality


 


According to the definition made in case law, the proportionality test compares the ratios between the respective coastal lengths and the maritime areas to be attributed.[31] These ratios therefore basically involve the determination of the length of relevant coastlines and the water areas to be attributed. However, the calculations could be a matter of disagreement, as seen in case law.[32] As the ICJ observed in the Jan Mayen Case, the practical implementation of the principle may sometimes be complicated by both the difficulties in defining with sufficient precision which coasts and which areas are to be treated as relevant, and by the presence of claims of third States in the delimitation area.[33]


 


4.1. Relevant area


The solution of these problems in case law seems to have necessitated that the “area” relevant to the delimitation in hand should be determined first.[34] The delimitation judgments have presented certain guidelines for identifying the relevant area in a given case. First of all, relevant area did not need to be defined in very specific terms. The ICJ noted in the Libya-Malta Case that the determination needs to be only defined in broad terms.[35] Sometimes, it is not possible to define it in specific terms as the Tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration observed that it “can have only an approximate idea of the zone to be considered, based on an approximate evaluation.”[36]


Another principle, as observed by the ICJ in the Tunisia-Libya Case,[37] is that the “relevant area” was not limited to the “area in dispute”. The Court defined the former as the “general area relevant for the delimitation” and observed that “the only areas which can be relevant for the determination of the claims of Libya and Tunisia to the continental shelf in front of their respective coasts are those which can be considered as lying either off the Tunisian or off the Libyan coast. These areas form together the area which is relevant to the decision of the dispute.” On the other hand, the area in dispute, according to the Court, is the area which forms only a “part of this whole area”, “where one claim encroaches on the other” and “lies both off the Libyan coast and off the Tunisian coast”.[38]


The criterion of the ICJ in the Tunisia-Libya Case thus depended on the element of “lying off the coast of either party”. In fact, by such an observation, the Court depended on the relevant coasts to identify the relevant area. Therefore, once the relevant coasts, which stretch to a point on the coast beyond which the coast in questions no longer has a relation with the coast of the other party, are identified,[39] delineating the relevant area is a simple matter. The areas lying off the coast of either party will simply be the relevant areas.


However, in the Gulf of Maine Case, the Chamber mostly respected the parties’ claims to identify the relevant area. Although the case mainly concerned the Gulf of Maine area, the Chamber also included the areas lying to seaward of and against the Gulf towards the outer edges of the triangle as no claim may go beyond these bounds.[40] Similarly, the parties’ claims could be said to have played the dominant role in identifying the relevant area in the Canada-France Arbitration. The Tribunal took the area as relevant which the parties agreed was the geographical concavity framed by the Canadian coast leading from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of St. Lawrence.[41] In the Jan Mayen Case, the ICJ observed that the parties’ claims mostly determine the relevant area.[42]


However the above does not mean that one party could bring any area into the consideration just by expanding its claims. The areas claimed by either party must have a relation, basically in a geographical sense, with the main area covered by the arguments of both parties. Despite the first impression, the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case did not take the claims of the parties as fully determinant. It also pointed out that “the involvement of coasts other than those directly surrounded by the Gulf does not and may not have the effect of extending the delimitation area to maritime areas which have in fact nothing to do with it.”[43] The Chamber observed moreover that the considerations of socio-economic or human geography could also be relevant in establishing the connexion between the areas and the delimitation. But, it only had in mind “physical geography to the extent that its purpose is to describe the present-day aspect of the land and water surface of the globe.”[44]


Similarly in the Jan Mayen Case, the Court did not find the determination of the extent of Greenland’s coastline by Denmark “arbitrary”, not because its claims were determinant, but because the points selected by Denmark had geographical relations with the possible equidistant lines.[45]


The existence of a third State’s claim is another complicating factor. The ICJ in the Libya-Malta Case saw the area as involving geographical difficulties due to the claims of some other States.[46] The relevant area should not, according to the Court, comprise the areas where the claims of third States also exist. Since the Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain their claims, the decision must be limited to a geographical area in which no claims of a third State exist.[47] Therefore, where there were claims of third States in the area, the Court refrained from defining the relevant area and the relevant coasts since it would involve an artificial prolongation of the delimitation line.


 


4.2. Coastal lengths


Once the relevant area is defined, there remains the issue of determining the length of relevant coasts. It should be determined for two separate reasons. As noted above,[48] the difference between the coastal lengths of States is a factor relevant to the delimitation itself, especially for the establishment of the initial delimitation line. On the other hand, the coastal lengths should be established for the purpose of conducting the proportionality test on the basis of the delimitation line which is provisionally established.


The measurement of the relevant coasts could, however, be a problem for many reasons. There could be the presence of offshore islands, coastal configurations, territorial waters, or the internal waters. The problem has eventually necessitated development of certain principles for the solution.


The first issue to come up in this context is whether all the coasts or some parts of them within the relevant area are relevant for the calculation of the coastal lengths. In general terms, the ICJ observed in the Tunisia-Libya Case that for the purpose of shelf delimitation between the parties it is not the whole coast of each party which can be taken into account”. According to the Court, “there comes a point on the coast of the two Parties beyond which the coasts in question no longer have a relation with the coast of the other Party relevant for submarine delimitation”.[49] It does not however suggest that some coasts within the relevant area might be disregarded. As we have said in the preceding section, the Court in this case depended on the relevant coastlines to identify the relevant area[50] so that there is an overlap between the relevant area and the relevant coastlines that surround it.


Only the judgment of the Canada-France Arbitration implied otherwise. Although the parties in this case agreed on the “relevant area” as the geographical concavity framed by the Canadian coasts including the whole southern coast of Newfoundland and the whole north-eastern coast of Nova Scotia,[51] they differed on the “coasts that should be considered as fronting on the area of dispute.”[52] While Canada took all these coasts as relevant for the delimitation, France would exclude certain segments of the southern coast of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia which were already approved as constituting the parts of coasts surrounding the relevant area.[53]


The Court seemed to have accepted the French justification but observed that some of the coasts that had been excluded by France were in fact “generating projections which meet and overlap, either literally or in opposition.”[54] On the same basis, the Tribunal observed that France had justifiably excluded the Canadian line across Fortune Bay and opposite the north and east coast of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, since the north and east coasts of St. Pierre and Miquelon did not face the area in dispute. The Court therefore excluded all the coasts which were not facing the area in dispute or which were not meeting and overlapping with the projection of the opposite relevant coasts.[55] By doing so, it made a distinction between the relevant area and the coasts relevant for the calculation of the coastal lengths. The relevant coasts are only those facing the area in dispute or those whose projections meet and overlap.


Therefore, it is established that only the coasts which face the disputed area or the coasts of the parties whose projections meet, would be included. Some coasts that are in the delimitation area may be included, depending on the circumstances of the case. This is to mean that there is no general principle on the identification of which coast in the delimitation area will be included into the calculation.


There is, however, a further problem to be settled and it concerns the coastlines of islands. It is almost certain that the coastal islands that are in close vicinity of the mainland are included in the determination of the general direction of the coastlines. No clear precedent exists as to whether the islands which fall out of such a general direction would be included in the calculation. It is however implied that the islands that are located off the mainland do not seem to be regarded as fully affecting the calculation of coastal lengths. To what extent the islands’ coastlines will be taken into consideration depends on the characteristics of both the delimitation area and the islands concerned.[56]


The measurement of the relevant coasts constitutes a further problem. In order to overcome the difficulties caused by various circumstances, the ICJ in the North Sea Cases observed that the respective coastlines of the parties for the purpose of proportionality are “measured according to their general direction”. While leaving the determination of the “appropriate technical method” to the parties, it proposed the “principle of coastal front” for measuring the general direction of coastline, which consists of drawing a straight baseline between the extreme points at either end of the coasts concerned or, in some cases, a series of such lines.[57] The Court’s reason for choosing the method of general direction was that it would “establish the necessary balance between States with straight and those with markedly concave or convex coasts or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their true proportions.”[58]


The fact that only the general direction of the coastlines rather than every single configuration should be taken into account was further approved in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration. The parties were in disagreement over the calculation of coastal length. The Tribunal observed that “In fact what counts for the delimitation to be made is the length of the coastlines following its general direction”.[59] The Tribunal in the Canada-France Arbitration again measured the coastlines “by segments, according to their lines of general direction.”[60] In the Jan Mayen Case, the ICJ measured the lengths of the relevant coastlines directly and on the basis of straight lines drawn between the points that constitute the geographical limit of those relevant coastlines.[61]


 


4.3. Relevant water area


Another aspect of the proportionality test is the measurement of the water area which is to be compared with the ratios between the coastal lengths of the parties. In the Tunisia-Libya Case, Libya argued that the entire area of sea-bed and subsoil beyond the low-water mark of each State must be taken into account.[62] The Court in that case calculated the sea-bed areas beyond the low-water mark.[63] However, the Court observed that it is the circumstances of the area that determine whether the territorial and internal waters should be included in the calculation. The Court emphasised that if they made a significant difference in ratios, they would be excluded.[64]


It is also a problem to identify which water areas beyond the internal and territorial waters should be included in the calculation. The Tribunal in the Canada-France Arbitration emphasised a principle that it is necessary to compare like with like and observed that “in comparing like with like it is necessary to take into account not only the projection to 200 miles awarded to French islands, but also the Canadian area resulting from an identical projection extending the relevant area eastwards along Newfoundland 200 miles area to a point due south of Cape Race, and so embracing the whole economic zone generated to the south by the south coast of Newfoundland.”[65] Therefore, the Tribunal calculated the relevant maritime area on the basis of the 200-nautical mile limit generated by the Canadian and French coastlines that project into the area.


The Jan Mayen judgment presented quite a different solution. The ICJ felt it necessary to concentrate only on the area in dispute in order to to compare the water areas awarded to the parties, the 200-mile line drawn from the Greenland coastline claimed by Denmark and the equidistant line claimed by Norway.[66] However, the handling of the Court’s calculation of relevant waters should only be considered in the way in which it handled the proportionality principle in the circumstances of that case. In fact, the Court arrived at a solution that produced a division of the water area which was so different from the coastlines’ proportions, i.e. 1:9, that it appeared not to have taken the proportionality test seriously.[67]


Another difficulty in the determination of the relevant water area could be the presence of the third States’ claims in the area concerned. The ICJ in the Tunisia-Libya Case considered this matter to be significant but suggested that an imaginary line delimiting the maritime areas of the parties with other States should be fixed.[68] The difficulty is therefore settled by establishing an imaginary delimitation line that would enable the calculation of relevant water areas.[69]


 


5. Multi-Purpose Delimitation


 


Requesting a delimitation line that would govern only one maritime area is in fact just one among a number of possibilities. Another possibility in a delimitation process is a single line for the areas of continental shelf, EEZ, and territorial sea. Generally speaking, territorial sea does not seem to fit into this setting as it is significantly different from other two maritime areas in terms of nature and extent.[70] Such a line was decided in two separate cases, namely the Guinea-Guinea Bissau and the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitrations. It was possible in the former case, since the line to be indicated was an adjacent delimitation line in a certain part of the delimitation area.[71] In the latter case, a single line for three separate delimitation areas was possible since a certain part of the delimitation area was so narrow that a single line had to be established.[72] However, where such lines were delimited, they should be considered as delimiting only the territorial waters of the parties.


One other possibility is the trend in both State practice[73] and in third-party settlements whereby two States might decide to have a single line which would govern both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic or fisheries zone within 200 miles. The parties in three separate cases explicitly requested the ICJ or the competent ad hoc tribunals to delimit a single line for both the continental shelf and fisheries zone superjacent to the continental shelf.[74]


The last possibility is that the delimitation of more than one maritime area could separately be the subject of the same delimitation process. In this possibility, however, the result would not necessarily be a single line for all. The concept of the continental shelf has not altogether been swept aside by the EEZ.[75] Thus, the delimitation line could well be different for both maritime areas, as the relevant circumstances are not exactly the same for these concepts.[76]


However, the conceptual link and similarities between the two concepts in terms of their legal nature and extent[77] are so extensive that the ICJ in the Jan Mayen Case came up with a single line, although the parties did not specifically request this.[78] Since the principle of distance played a wider role in the determination of the continental shelf extent,[79] it was possible that the principles and rules underlying the concept of the EEZ be applicable, even in a case concerning only the delimitation of the continental shelf.[80] In this context, there is no reason to consider the EEZ or the fisheries zone overlying the continental shelf.[81]


In addition to these legal facts, practical considerations also confirm the same possibility.[82] If the continental margin does not extend beyond 200 miles, it is possible that the outer limit could coincide in many other sea areas. On the other hand, in an area where the distance is less than 400 miles, it is almost certain that the delimitation line will coincide. There cannot be a wider continental shelf than the EEZ as the EEZ of the other State would also cover the sea-bed and subsoil of the area.[83] But the outer limit should not coincide if the other State only possessed an exclusive fisheries zone in the superjacent waters.


The significant problem is whether these facts suggest that the delimitation principles that are applicable to the continental shelf and the EEZ should also be applicable to a single but dual-purpose line. Both the customary and the conventional law do not specifically provide a delimitation rule for such a single-line delimitation. The ICJ in the Gulf of Maine Case had a legal lacuna to fill. Due to the close link between these two concepts, the Chamber did not rule that Article 6 of the 1958 Convention which was the rule applicable to the continental shelf delimitation between the parties would also be applicable to the single-line delimitation in hand. Article 6 could not be applicable because these concepts are, in the Court’s mind, separate concepts.[84] This fact has also been confirmed in the single-line delimitations made since by the international courts.[85]


The jurisprudence established clearly that the applicable law is applied to the single-multi-purpose delimitation is the customary rule of maritime delimitation. It means that the delimitation must be affected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles in order to reach an equitable result by taking into account all the relevant circumstances.[86]


On the other hand, the way in which the delimitation law is implemented in a single-line delimitation is another significant matter. The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case, with a sophisticated approach, made a distinction between the circumstances peculiar to the concept of continental shelf on one hand, and those to the concept of the EEZ on the other. In such a case, it would be expected that the role of geography should, beyond any doubt, be the dominant one, given the fact that sea-bed features have nothing to do with the concept of the EEZ.[87] The judgment approved, in general, that the principles and circumstances that are relevant to both concepts should be applied in a single-line delimitation. It is a significant point that only the criteria that are common to both concepts should be applied.[88]


The criteria that are common to both concepts are those derived from the geography.[89] As the criterion of distance within 200 miles has become applicable to both concepts, it constitutes another common element to be considered.[90] Less significant factors such as fisheries and mineral resources are also to be considered.[91] What should not be relevant has also been pronounced. Factors that are related to ecology, geology or geomorphology are not to be considered as they are peculiar to either the EEZ or the continental shelf alone.[92] In the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration for instance, the Tribunal decided to establish a single-all purpose delimitation boundary but did not consider the sea-bed features among the relevant factors.[93]


The only judgment that seemed to be at variance with what was said with regard to the role of sea-bed features is the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Award. The Tribunal in that case seemed prepared to take into account such factors even within 200 miles if the natural prolongations of the parties were physically separate from one another.[94]


It is consequently possible to conclude that single-line delimitation could be requested by States for the delimitation of both the continental shelf and the EEZ. It is also possible for coastal States to delimit the continental shelf and the EEZ separately within the same delimitation process. However, from a practical point of view, it is unlikely that they would reach a delimitation line other than a single line for both maritime areas, despite the fact that factors relevant to these concepts are different in some respects. Therefore, where a single line is to be established, the applicable delimitation law is not different from what is applicable separately. It is the customary law of delimitation that would be applied. Within this context, only those that are common to both concepts would be considered as relevant factors within the delimitation process.


 


6. The Role of Islands in a Delimitation Process


 


High-tide natural elevations which fall into the legal definition of an “island” are fully entitled to their own maritime areas including the continental shelf and the fisheries or exclusive economic zone.[95] The rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.[96] However, the case of the islands within a delimitation process is a different matter.[97] Both State practice and jurisprudence on delimitation provide that islands may be characterised as a “limited” or “no-effect” in a delimitation process depending on the various characteristics of both these islands and the area to be delimited.[98] The location of islands in relation to the mainlands is quite significant in this respect. Moreover, some other features of islands are considered in relation to the role of islands. All those factors will be examined on the basis of a classification according to their location.


 


6.1. Islands situated close to the mainland


Some of the islands which are situated in close vicinity of the mainland coast are called “coastal islands”. Here, the concept of a coastal island does not refer to every island that is situated in the vicinity of any mainland coast. It refers only to those that are situated in the vicinity of terra firma, i.e. of the mainland to which they belong.


The islands situated just off the mainland to which they belong were considered by the Arbitration Tribunal in the UK-France Arbitration.[99] The Scilly Isles of the UK and the French Island of Ushant were situated very close to their own mainlands. The Tribunal’s concern was whether giving full-effect to these islands would change the equidistant boundary between the mainlands in an unjust and inequitable sense.[100] In the Tunisia-Libya Case, the ICJ dealt with the similarly situated Tunisian islands of Kerkennah.[101] The Kerkennah Islands were a few miles off the Tunisian coast facing the maritime projection of the Libyan mainland coasts. Giving full-effect to these islands would, in the Court’s view, increase much further the Tunisian projection onto that of Libya.[102]


There was a similar situation in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration where the islands were situated just off the mainland.[103] Moreover, Guinea and Guinea Bissau were situated as adjacent States and their position was fairly similar to that of Tunisia and Libya. The difference in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration was the fact that rather than an island surrounded by many small islets, many islands of Guinea Bissau were situated off the mainland coast.


According to the Tribunal “when account is taken of the fact that...the two States abut on the same continental shelf with coasts not markedly different in extent and broadly similar in their relation to that shelf”, giving a full-effect to these islets would not be equitable.[104] It is a fact, however, that these islands were given some effect in shaping the delimitation line. In almost all the cases where these islands were given an effect, the way in which the effect was given was to consider them as part of the mainland coastlines. In this context, their role was limited since in some cases, they did not change the direction of coastal line as far as their location.


The Tribunal in the UK-France Arbitration thought in a similar way but observed that Ushant and Scilly “cannot be disregarded in delimiting the continental shelf boundary without “refashioning geography”, as both Ushant and Scilly were islands of “a certain size and population” constituting “natural geographical facts of the Atlantic region”.[105]


The ICJ in the Tunisia-Libya Case would not disregard the Kerkennah Islands which were surrounded by islets and low-tide elevations and were considered as “a circumstance relevant for the delimitation”, on the basis of “their size and position”.[106] The Kerkennah islands were referred to in drawing a baseline according to the coastal direction for the purpose of shelf delimitation.[107] Rather than shifting that line as far as their location, they only shifted the line in a partial manner up to a line between the island and the mainland.[108] Depending on the relevant State practice, the Court gave them “half-effect” or “half-angle” in this context.[109]


According to the Tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, what was important was to ensure that each party controlled the maritime territory opposite and in the vicinity of its coasts. In this context, the important factor was the coastal configuration which must include the relevant islands.[110] Rather than affecting the calculation of the length of the general coastline on the basis of their full coastal length, these islands would only affect the calculation by shifting the general direction of the coastal line as far as their location. These islands would therefore play rather a limited role in the establishment of the line representing the coastal direction.[111]


The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration addressed a situation in which a considerable number of islands were situated off the mainland coast of both countries. Although some of the coastal islands of Eritrea, called the Dahlak Archipelago, are scattered further off the mainland, the Tribunal considered all of them as constituting the integral part of the mainland coast, which was also agreed by both parties.[112] The equidistant delimitation line was measured from the straight baseline drawn on the foremost islands of the Dahlak Archipelago.[113] The Tribunal also pointed to the fact that some of these islands were inhabited and therefore important such as the Yemeni island of Kamaran and the Eritrean island of Dahlak.[114] It is however a matter of fact that the Tribunal did not attribute any effect to the such coastal islands in the southern section of the delimitation.[115]


Only in the Gulf of Maine Case, were coastal islands given an effect in a different way. The Chamber found the island of Seal (together with its smaller neighbour, the island of Mud) to be in a similar situation, situated just off the Canadian coast and close to the closing line of the Gulf. “Though minor” said the Chamber, it might have some influence because of its “dimensions and, more particularly, of its geographical position”. However, the Court used it in establishing the ratios for the purpose of proportionality. But again, the effect given was limited. The Chamber observed that it would be excessive to treat the coastline of Nova Scotia as transferred south-west-wards by the whole of the distance between the island of Seal and that coast. Accordingly, a half-effect was appropriate.[116]


Obviously, most of the coastal islands were given an effect within the delimitation process by including them in the establishment of the coastal line from which the delimitation line was to be measured. These islands affected the coastline as far as their location in many cases. In some cases, their effect in this sense was rather limited as they did not change the direction of the coastline far as their location. In both situations, the location, size, inhabitancy and economic importance of the island played a role in assessing its effect.


It seems that the role of these elements is judged against their effect on the median line between the mainlands. This means that their eventual role seems to be appreciated on the basis of a balance between their features and the distorting effect they produce on the equidistant line between the mainlands.


The same considerations seemed to have necessitated no-effect decision on the Tunisian island of Jerba. The Court ignored the island as it was almost touched on its own coast. According to the Court “in the part of the area to be delimited in which the island of Jerba would be relevant, there are other considerations which prevail over the effect of its mere presence”.[117] The Judgment in the North Sea Cases did not consider the case of islands, but provided that in a case where the natural prolongation of two opposite States met and overlapped, the solution would be a median line which would ignore “the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal projections” and provide equal division of the area.[118]


In the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, the islands scattered further out to sea were not taken into account in the determination of the coastal direction and coastal lengths.[119] The enclave solution seems to be regarded as better suited, the width of which would depend on the circumstances of the islands. The Tribunal gave only 12 miles territorial sea to the islands of Alcatraz, but no continental shelf towards the north.[120]


In the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, the Tribunal observed the fact that the mid-sea islands of Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr group of Yemen, were situated “well out to sea” should mean that “they should not be taken into consideration in computing the boundary line between Yemen and Eritrea”. The Tribunal further pointed to the fact that they were “barren” and had an “inhospitable nature.”[121] It decided that they should have “no-effect” upon the delimitation line.[122]


Similar to the coastal islands, the location, size and other relevant features of the mid-sea islands and the area to be delimited play the most significant role in judging their effect. However, the location of these islands is a negative element in the determination of their role. They could even be ignored altogether due to their location. This is because islands produce dramatic change on the delimitation line which is mainly determined on the basis of the mainland coasts.


The review has so far shown that coastal islands are taken into account mostly in establishing the coastal line from which the delimitation  line is measured. Sometimes, they are also considered in establishing the coastal lengths for the purpose of proportionality. In both cases, these islands are mostly given limited effect. It seems that considerations relevant to the mainland geography override them. The limited effect given to these islands is judged on the basis of their location and other relevant characteristics identified above.


 


6.2. Islands situated on the “wrong side”


The other possible location for islands might be well away from their mainland and close to the coast of another State. This was the situation in the UK-France Arbitration. The Channel Islands in the British Isles of the UK were situated just a few miles off the French mainland coast. The Arbitration Court addressed their role in the delimitation between the mainlands with reference to the customary law of delimitation. Due to their location, it was almost illogical to consider them in relation to the delimitation line indicated by the mainland coasts because they were beyond the line. It seems that this fact led the Tribunal to consider an enclave solution.


The Tribunal indicated that geographical location runs contrary to the continental shelf area that they would be attributed.[123] It observed that they “are situated on the French side of a median line drawn between the mainlands” and are situated “practically within the arms of a gulf on the French coast”.[124] This clearly demonstrated that because of their geographical position, they would be considered directly against the French mainland coast but would not be attributed equal continental shelf areas as the competing French mainland coast. They constitute in the Court’s view a typical example of “special circumstances” in the meaning of Article 6, or “relevant circumstances” calling for an equitable method of delimitation in the meaning of the customary rule.[125]


The Court accordingly indicated a “secondary boundary” delimiting the continental shelf of the Channel Islands in the southern section of the mid-Channel line. The Court emphasised that their entitlement to their own continental shelf areas would be limited.[126] It gave 12 miles continental shelf to the Islands because the French continental shelf should not encroach upon the already declared 12-mile fishery zone of the islands.[127] They possessed “a considerable population and a substantial agricultural and commercial economy”. Moreover, as they enjoyed “a very large measure of political, legislative, administrative and economic autonomy”[128] and detached geographically from the UK,[129] they have their own rights separately from the UK. Moreover, they are not merely “rocks or small islands”.


It was such a limited enclave since it seemed that the overall delimitation in the Tribunal’s mind was still between the mainlands of the UK and France. The Court observed that the circumstances in the area demonstrated a geographical balance that would indicate a median line as the equitable delimitation line between the mainlands of the UK and France. Such a balance was, the Court said, disturbed by the presence of the Channel Islands in the vicinity of the French coast.[130]


Therefore, the role of such islands is again related to their location, size, and other relevant characteristics. In such cases, the location of these islands runs very much against the extent of the maritime areas they would be attributed. It seems that they would only be attributed restricted maritime areas if they were sizeable and socially and economically significant. Otherwise, it is unlikely that they would be allocated any continental shelf and EEZ areas in a delimitation between mainlands. Accordingly, the exact weight that these islands would have been given was similarly left to these individual characteristics of the case.[131]


The islands which are situated on the wrong side but not so close to the mainland of another State have not so far been addressed in judicial cases. However, like other islands, their role should depend on their location, size and relevant characteristics. It is however certain that they are better situated in terms of generating maritime areas as they are more closely associated with the delimitation line indicated. It seems however that such islands may not be allowed any maritime areas if they are not sizeable and significant from a socio-economic point of view.[132]


 


6.3. Islands in various situations


Many other cases introduced completely different geographical settings from those that have been considered above. In all the above judgments, the islands were considered in the delimitation between two mainland countries. However, the Canada-France Arbitration was quite different in the sense that the overseas French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon were situated just off the Canadian mainland coast. The Arbitration Court had to treat them as competing mainland coasts since there was no French mainland nearby which could have otherwise been the main reference point.


The Tribunal emphasised the difference between the lengths of the coastlines in this case. It was, according to the Court, the particular geographical circumstances i.e. the presence or absence of competing coasts of another State, which gave way to that factor. This implied that despite their relatively short coastline, they might have wider or full maritime areas if there were no competing coasts, i.e. the Canadian coasts.[133] Accordingly, since the French islands did not conflict with any opposite or laterally aligned Canadian coast in the second sector towards the south and south-east, they were, according to the Court, fully entitled to a maritime zone of 200 nautical miles in that part. In such circumstances, these islands would be treated as a primary element rather than a secondary one having no distortion on the projection of another State.[134]


However, where they face the coasts of Canada, the disproportion between the coastline was significant. The Court explained that the difference in length of all the parties’ relevant coasts was an important factor to be taken into account for an equitable delimitation. In this case, the disproportion necessitated attributing a restricted maritime area to these islands.


Therefore, in the absence of an initial delimitation line that would have been indicated by the mainlands, the Tribunal took the criterion of proportionality as the reference point to judge the distortion that the French islands could generate in their full-effect. Similar to the statement in the UK-France Arbitration, other characteristics of these islands would have a role in determining their exact role.[135] Under all such considerations, the Court granted in the western sector 12-mile EEZ from the outer limit of its territorial sea.[136]


A small island country was in dispute with a continental country in the Libya-Malta Case. Malta, which is an island country, argued that “It is only in the case of dependent islands,... that international law gives varying effect to them depending on such factors as size, geographical position, population or economy.”[137] Libya, a continental country, urged the Court to make no distinction between an island State and an island politically linked to a mainland State.[138]


The Court approved the significance of the distinction but not in the same way as Malta put it. According to the Court, its status as an island State not only created a difference in treatment but also changed the relation of its coasts with the coasts of neighbouring countries.[139] In other words, it might well be that the sea boundaries in this region would be different if the islands of Malta were part of the territory of one of the surrounding countries rather than an independent State. It was quite similar to the Arbitration Court’s observation in the Canada-France Arbitration that “there are no grounds for contending that the extent of the maritime rights of an island depends on its political status.”[140]


Given the fact that the coasts of Libya and Malta were overlapping, the coastal lengths were the only main reference point.[141] The Court treated Malta on the basis of its relatively short coastline and its position “in the wider geographical context”, particularly in a semi-enclosed sea.[142] Rather than being an independent island State, these factors played the role and produced a relatively less continental shelf area for Malta. The Court did not, moreover, accept the relevance of economic and security factors that were put forward by Malta.


The Jan Mayen Case was another unique case since the delimitation was to be conducted between the islands of two different countries without the effect of the mainlands which were situated outside the delimitation area. Thus the mainlands would not provide any reference points. Having considered the coastal lengths and economic and coastal characteristics, Denmark considered the island of Jan Mayen as falling into the category of “special circumstances”. Thus, a median line should not be established as the initial delimitation line which would not obviously reflect the difference between the coastal lengths.[143]


The Court considered the coastal lengths and some other factors in a different way. Although Jan Mayen had a coastal length half the that of Greenland, it still “generates potential title to the maritime areas recognised by customary law, i.e., in principle, up to a limit of 200 miles from its baselines.”[144] The Court’s consideration of other factors i.e. economic and cultural factors[145] was that they did not entail attribution of half-effect to Jan Mayen.[146] Since two islands were in consideration, the Court seemed to treat them on an equal footing, but awarded less continental shelf area to Jan Mayen on the basis of shorter coastal lengths.


It seems that if the two islands were in dispute with each other in a delimitation case, the peculiar characteristics as well as the lengths of coastline would play quite a significant role. This is similar to a case where a small island State is up against a much larger continental country. In this situation, the coastal lengths seem to be the dominant factor, as supported by the principle of non-encroachment.


 


6.4. The natural prolongation of islands


Another significant point concerning the islands within a delimitation process is the role to be attributed to their natural prolongation. It was considered and concluded by the Court in the UK-France Arbitration that the natural prolongation of islands should be treated in the same way as the mainland territory. This is to say that its effect should be appreciated in the light of all the relevant geographical and other circumstances.[147] However, the Court emphasised the danger of giving an absolute effect to the natural prolongation of an island which could enable a small island to block the natural prolongation of the territory of the nearby mainland.[148]


The Arbitration Court in the Canada-France Arbitration addressed the issue of encroachment of an island on the natural prolongation of another State. Canada had argued that the French islands generated no continental shelf of their own since, “the islands are superimposed upon the Canadian continental shelf.”[149] It could be assumed that the Chamber accepted this observation of the Court in the UK-France Arbitration. It was evident from the Chamber’s observation that “‘natural prolongation’, in spite of its physical origins has throughout its history become more and more a complex and juridical concept.” The element of natural prolongation should be appreciated in the light of relevant geographical and other circumstances of a particular case rather than as an absolute factor.[150]


 


6.5. Some conclusions


The above review shows that the entitlement to maritime areas is a distinct matter from the maritime delimitation. As far as the islands are concerned, it is appropriate to say that establishing a direct link between entitlement and delimitation is not legally justified. Although islands, except rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life, are fully entitled to their own continental shelf and EEZ, they may be given limited or no-effect status in a delimitation process depending on various considerations related both to the islands and to the related area.


The above review also shows that when they are considered in a delimitation between two mainlands, the geographical position of islands is critical. Because of their location, islands create a degree of distortion on the delimitation line indicated by the mainlands. Various other characteristics of the islands could also play a role in appreciating how much distortion by these islands could be tolerated.[151] The islands situated just off the mainland coasts are mostly used in establishing the line that reflects the general coastal direction. Islands situated further off the mainland or situated on the wrong side of median delimitation line between the mainlands are again attributed a limited maritime areas. It seems that unless they are quite significant in terms of size and socio-economic characteristics, they are unlikely to have any effect at all.


Islands could be in various other situations. In all these cases where the maritime projections meet and overlap, it is the coastal length and other specified characteristics of these islands which would determine the extent of maritime area they would be attributed.[152]


Apart from these general observations which could well be regarded as very significant principles applicable to future cases, they do not constitute an exact pattern to be followed, as all situations are different to some degree. Moreover, some situations could be significantly different from those considered by international courts so far. As the Court in the UK-France Arbitration observed, the treatment might be different in a situation where numerous islands stretch out one after another near the mainland of an other State.[153] This is generally the situation in the Aegean Sea.[154] It does not however mean that all the situations considered in the preceding paragraphs do not constitute a precedent for the Aegean Sea. They are in fact relevant either by providing certain general principles for the treatment of islands in a delimitation process or by addressing a similar geographical situation when the Aegean islands are considered in separate delimitation sectors.


 


7. Sectoral Approach to the Maritime Delimitation


 


The sectoral approach has legal and practical advantages in conducting an equitable delimitation process. The geographical situations in some of the judicial cases were too complex to be handled as a whole due to the existence of various coastal configurations and islands or islets. Dividing the delimitation area into separate sectors according to their differentiating characteristics was deemed to be a simplifying approach.


Principles according to which the delimitation area is divided into different sectors emerge from the jurisprudence. The geographical situation in the Tunisia-Libya Case could be regarded as a complex one as it comprised various coastal configurations and islands. The ICJ observed that it would lead to a “proper appreciation” if the certain areas were treated separately. It accordingly separated the area “close to the coasts of the Parties” from the area “further offshore”.[155] In the Gulf of Maine Case, the geographical situation was complicated with the intrinsic pattern of coastal relations and the presence of islands. The ICJ Chamber accordingly separated the delimitation area into three different areas as “innermost part”, “central segment”, and “outside” area.[156] In the Canada-France Arbitration, the situation complicated by the existence of varying coastal relations. The Arbitration Court accordingly divided the area into two different sectors. It separated the “western seaward projection” from the other area “towards the south and south-east” where the projections of the parties’ coasts did not meet.[157]


In the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, the Tribunal considered the delimitation area in three separate sectors. Although the coasts of the parties were opposite to each other in all delimitation areas, the distance between them was variable. Moreover, coastal and mid-sea islands were in various locations. The Tribunal accordingly considered northern, central and southern sectors separately.[158]


The geographical situation in most of the delimitation area in the UK-France Arbitration could again be considered a complex one. The Tribunal considered the delimitation area in these sectors separately. The area between the mainlands of the two parties, apart from the Channel Islands region, was considered as the English Channel region. The Tribunal considered the area in the Atlantic as a separate area since the position of the two States’ mainland coasts was adjacent rather than opposite.[159] Moreover there were some small coastal islands to be considered in the Atlantic Region.[160]


The judgements have also explained the logic behind the way in which the delimitation area is separated into different sectors. In the Tunisia-Libya Case, the ICJ observed that the difference in treatment of the area close to the coast from the areas further offshore “is ultimately dictated by the primordial requirement of achieving an overall equitable result”[161] The Arbitration Court in the UK-France Arbitration employed a very similar expression when it observed that “In order to reach an equitable result, it is necessary to examine separately two different sectors of the maritime area where the delimitation is to be affected.”[162]


It is felt that equity will be achieved more efficiently with separate sectors because the applicable principles and methods to the delimitation will be different since the circumstances are different in separate sectors. The Tribunal in the UK-France Arbitration observed that the principles and methods would be different in separate sectors.[163] Different sectors might require the application of different delimitation method or methods.[164] The Court in the Tunisia-Libya Case made it clear that “the use of any one method of delimitation which may seem appropriate, in the light of relevant circumstances close to the shores of the States concerned, may well suffer from the defect” in the areas further off.[165]


The Gulf of Maine Case presented an illustrative example. In this case, the coasts of the parties in the inner section were adjacent and thus a “lateral equidistant line” could be “convenient”. However, in the further section of the Gulf, the “geographical situation changes radically”. It “becomes a frontal opposition relationship”.[166] Moreover, the projection of the US coast in the first section was also facing this second area.[167] Evidently, a more suitable method would be appropriate in this second sector.[168] The third section posed a different geographical pattern that called for the application of some other methods.[169] The reason in the Canada-France Arbitration for a sectoral approach was the same in the sense that the different coastal relations between the parties would eventually necessitate different methods of delimitation in different sectors.[170]


Whether the sectoral approach means isolating all these sectors from each other is another issue. The ICJ observed in the Tunisia-Libya Case that when it is dealing with the first sector, i.e. the offshore area, it is really “confining its attention to the delimitation” in this section. It said that at such a stage “it is legitimate to disregard the present coastal configurations found at more than a comparatively short distance from that point, for example, the island of Jerba.”[171]


However, it does not mean that different sectors of the delimitation area would be altogether isolated. The ICJ in that case seemed to have confined its observation to the stage that it is concerned with. In fact the course of the delimitation line in one sector could be affected by the course of the line in the other segments as provided by the ICJ Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case.[172] More importantly, the principle of proportionality that deals with the whole delimitation area[173] firmly indicates that different sectors are not completely independent from each other as all the delimitation should comply with the general test of proportionality.


It is therefore appropriate to conclude that in the judgments on maritime delimitation, the delimitation areas were divided into separate sectors according to certain guidelines. As the different sectors had different circumstances, they necessitated the application of different principles and resulting methods. However, it does not mean that they are isolated from each other. They are still linked as equity has to be achieved for the delimitation area as a whole.






[1] The Arbitration Court in the Canada France Case pointed out that “geographical facts do not, in themselves, determine the line to be drawn”, the “rules of international law, as well as equitable principles, must be applied to determine the relevance and weight of the geographical features”, par, 24.




[2] Evans notes that although the issue of relative weight has a significant role in maritime delimitation process, it did not receive a direct answer from the courts. Evans (1991), p. 17, 28. The ICJ noted in the Tunisia-Libya Case that “No attempt is made to explain in this or any other case how the factors identified as relevant are to be balanced up”, par. 132. It also noted that “no rigid rule exists as to the exact weight to be attached to each element of the case”, par 71. The ICJ in the Jan Mayen Case observed that affecting a delimitation of maritime areas also means determining “the relative weight to be accorded to different considerations in each case”, par. 58.




[3] See supra, B 2.1.




[4] See par. 100.




[5] See par. 205. See also par. 188.




[6] See par. 74.




[7] The Eritrea-Yemen Award, par 115 onwards. See further infra, B 6.




[8] See, for instance, the North Sea Cases, par. 98.




[9] The Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, par. 97, p. 117.; The Tunisia-Libya Case, par. 78; The Libya-Malta Case, par. 68; The Jan Mayen Case, par. 67.




[10] For an analysis of the role of islands within the delimitation process, see infra, B 6.




[11] See par. 100. The Court did not, as it could not be expected to do, give a general account of the particular configurations of the coast or individual geographical features which could distort the course of the boundary, rather than those in the Channel area, such as the presence of islands in the Channel area and in the Atlantic region.




[12] It is the general configuration which should be followed. This is why the Court was worried about “the disproportionately distorting effect of the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal projections”, par. 201. See moreover, infra, B 4.




[13] In the ICJ’s view in the Gulf of Maine Case, a “substantial disproportion” in the coast lengths as a result of delimitation was not an equitable delimitation, although the length of respective coastlines did not exclusively determine the delimitation line. ICJ Rep., 1984, par. 185. The Jan Mayen Case, par. 65, 67, the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, par. 165.




[14] The ICJ in the Gulf of Maine Case observed that “this concept is put forward mainly as a means of choosing whether a provisional delimitation established initially on the basis of other criteria, and by the use of a method which has nothing to do with that concept can or cannot be considered satisfactory in relation to certain geographical features of the specific case”. par. 185. See also the Tunisia-Libya Case, par. 103. the Libya-Malta Case, par. 56. For a review, see, for instance, Herman, (1984), p. 848.




[15] In the North Sea Cases, as one of the geographical factors, the configuration of the Parties’ coasts was disregarded by the Court since they would have magnified the effect on the delimitation line if they were fully respected. The result of this “magnified effect” was construed by the Court with reference to an “element of a reasonable degree of proportionality” which would establish a balance between the coastal lengths and the areas of continental shelves to be attributed to them. Thus the Court would not allow a disproportionate result just because one of the Parties’ coastlines was concave while the other’s was convex, par. 98. See also the UK-France Arbitration, par. 99-101; the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, par. 98, 118, 120.




[16] In the specific context of the UK-France Arbitration, the Tribunal pointed to a “balance of the geographical circumstances” in terms of the coastal lengths of the Parties. If there were any geographical elements that could disturb such a balance to a considerable extent, the Court would not allow this, par. 182. See moreover, infra, B 6.2.




[17] The ICJ in the North Sea Cases observed that the delimitation is to be affected “in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other”, par. 101, C, 1.




[18] See the Canada-France Arbitration, par. 58. The Tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration observed that “In order for any delimitation to be made on an equitable and objective basis, it is necessary to ensure that, as far as possible, each State controls the maritime territories opposite its coasts and in their vicinity”, par. 92.




[19] The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case observed that “The Court partly accepted the US’s contention that any criterion or method likely to have the effect of cutting off a given coast or part of a coast from the seaward projection to which it is said to be entitled, must be rejected.” par. 219. See also the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, par. 92, 98, 103.




[20] The Tribunal in the Canada-France Arbitration did not allow the islands to have maritime area extending towards the south-east since “such a seaward projection must not be allowed to encroach upon or cut off a parallel frontal projection of the adjacent segments of the Newfoundland southern coast”, par. 70.




[21] The effects of these factors in the delimitation process were already mentioned above. See supra, B 2.2.




[22] See, for instance, the Canada-France Arbitration, par. 33. 65, 93; The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, par. 165-168. For the role of these factors in a delimitation process, see supra, B 2.2.




[23] The Court in the UK-France Arbitration observed in this regard that proportionality was not a “question of simply assigning to them areas of the shelf in proportion to the lengths of their coastlines”, par. 101. And it does not therefore “require nice calculations of the areas of continental shelf...”, par. 250, p. 377. See also the Gulf of Maine Case, par. 185; the Libya-Malta Case, par. 59. The Arbitration Court in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration observed that proportionality “cannot be affected by simply dividing the maritime zones equally between the two States in proportion to the length of their coastlines....It must be used in a reasonable way, with due account being given to other circumstances in the case”, par. 120, p. 688. See also the Eritrea-Yemen Award, par. 165; Herman, (1984), p. 850.




[24] The ICJ in the Tunisia-Libya Case dismissed the idea of absolute equality by using hypothetical areas in the absence of the outer limits of the Parties’ continental shelf. And it said that “The Court is not here dealing with absolute areas, but with proportions”, par. 130. The ICJ in the Jan Mayen Case similarly observed that “the law does not require a delimitation based upon an endeavor to share out an area of overlap on the basis of comparative figures for the length of coastal fronts and the areas generated by them”, par. 64. See also par. 68, p. 68-69. The words of the Arbitration Court in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration were clear when it observed that: proportionality does not concern mathematical equality but rather legal equality, par. 188, p. 678.




[25] The Arbitration Court in the UK-France Arbitration observed that “its role is rather that of a criterion to assess the distorting effects of particular geographical features and the extent of the resulting inequity”, par. 250. See also the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, par. 118; the Libya-Malta Case, par. 56.




[26] See, par. 103. See also the Tunisia-Libya Case, par. 76.




[27] See, par. 67.




[28] “There seems in consequence to be no necessary and certainly no complete identity between the notions of adjacency and proximity….Hence it would seem that the notion of adjacency, so constantly employed in continental shelf doctrine from the start, only implies proximity in a general sense…[not a] rule…which would be to prohibit any State (otherwise than by agreement) from exercising continental shelf rights in respect of areas closer to the coast of another State”, par. 42.




[29] The ICJ in the North Sea Cases observed that “the continental shelf of any State must be the natural prolongation of its land territory and must not encroach upon what is the natural prolongation of the territory of another State.” par. 85 (b), (c). It seemed that natural prolongation was the dominant principle in both governing and determining an equitable delimitation of the continental shelf as being the basis of title to the continental shelf rights. See par. 43.




[30] See supra, B 2.2.1.




[31] For instance, the ICJ in the North Sea Cases put it as “the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation affected according to equitable principles ought to bring about between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned and the lengths of their respective coastlines, these being measured according to their general direction in order to establish the necessary balance between States with straight and those with markedly concave or convex coasts, or to reduce very irregular coastlines to their truer proportions. The choice and application of the appropriate technical methods would be a matter for the parties”, par. 98.




[32] See generally Charney, (1994 I), pp. 241-243.




[33] See par. 67. Judge Weil, in his dissenting opinion in the Canada-France Arbitration, regarded the proportionality test as arbitrary for the reason that its calculation could be highly subjective. 31 ILM, (1992), par. 24, p. 1206. Similarly, defining the relevant coasts and maritime areas has been the primary difficulty in the Canada-France Arbitration both for the parties and the Tribunal. See, for instance, the Counter-Memorial Submitted by Canada, 1 February 1991, pp. 17-29. See also, Highet, (1994), p. 454.




[34] The Tribunal in the Canada-France Arbitration felt that it had to first identify the “relevant area” for the identification of relevant coasts, par. 26. In the Libya-Malta Case, the ICJ observed that “In order to assess any disparity between lengths of coasts, it is first necessary to determine which area being contemplated.” According to the Court, “such a test would be meaningless in the absence of a precise definition of the ‘relevant coasts’ and the ‘relevant area’”. It further said that “the Court has here to consider the coast of the Parties within the area to which…its Judgments relates”, par. 67.




[35] See par. 67.




[36] See par. 94.




[37] There was a disagreement between the Parties on the definition of “relevant area”. Libya defined the “relevant area” to the delimitation as an “area of interest” while Tunisia rejected that idea. ICJ Rep. 1982, par. 35, p. 42.




[38] See par. 74.




[39] See par. 75. The fact that the coasts of the Parties relevant to the delimitation would be those opposite each other has also been approved by the Eritrea-Yemen Award, par. 167.




[40] See par. 39. Chamber thus differentiated the Gulf of Maine area from the “delimitation area”. par. 38. In fact, the parties also referred to these areas in their arguments.




[41] See par. 26.




[42] See par. 18.




[43] See par. 41. In his separate opinion, Judge Schwebel argued, however; that only some part of Gulf of New Brunswick which actually fronts upon the Gulf of Maine should be included.




[44] See, par. 43, p. 273. See also par. 44, 45, 47, 50, 59.




[45] See par. 20.




[46] It observed that “difficulties are particularly evident in the present case where, in the first place, the geographical context is such that the identification of the relevant coast and the relevant area is so much at large that virtually any variant could be chosen, leading to widely different results”, par. 74.




[47] See par. 20-21. See also par. 74.




[48] See supra, B 3.




[49] It explained further that “the submarine extension of any part of the coast of one Party which because of its geographic situation cannot overlap with the extension of the coast of the other is to be excluded from further consideration by the Court”. par. 75.




[50] See par. 74.




[51] See par. 26.




[52] 31 ILM, 1992, par. 27.




[53] In support, France argued: “only those coasts that are in relation to one another and that generate projections which meet and overlap should be considered”, ibid., par. 28, p. 1161.




[54] See par. 29, p. 1161.




[55] See par. 30. The Tribunal in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration observed that it is not all the coastline of Yemen and Eritrea which were regarded as relevant to the delimitation, but only those opposite to each other. See par. 167.




[56] The ICJ in the Tunisia-Libya Case calculated the Libyan coast without taking into account the small inlets, rocks and lagoons, par. 131. The significant feature of the Chamber’s calculation in the Gulf of Maine Case was that it included the Seal Islands into the determination of the ratio by giving it an “half effect”, par. 222. See further infra. B 6, especially 6.1. to 6.3. This was a matter of a considerable concern in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration where the Tribunal did not add the total to be obtained by all the islands’ coastline. The Tribunal accepted that “In the present case, ...account should be taken of the coastal islands and the Bijagos Archipelago…but not of the scattered islands”. However, according to the Tribunal, “relevant islands must not be taken into account in the form of the total obtained by adding together the parameters each of them, but as elements determining the general direction of the entire coastline of the country considered, par. 97.




[57] See, par. 98.




[58] See par. 98.




[59] See par. 97. For the calculation of the coastal lengths in the case law, see also, Charney, (1994 I), p. 242.




[60] The straight lines were those that were simplified straight-line segments of the coastline drawn between salient turning points within the relevant area, par. 33. In the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, the Tribunal accepted that the coastal length is measured according to its general direction. See par. 166.




[61] See par. 69.




[62] See par. 97.




[63] See par. 131.




[64] See par. 103. It was noted that “In the circumstances of the present case, the Court is not convinced by the Tunisian contention that the areas of internal and territorial waters must be excluded from consideration…continental shelf in the legal sense does not include the sea-bed areas below territorial and internal waters; but the question is not one of definition, but of proportionality as a function of equity….Furthermore, the element of proportionality is related to the length of the coast of the States concerned, not to straight baselines drawn around those coasts”, par. 104.




[65] See par. 93.




[66] This was the area enclosed by lines connecting points AIJBCMDLK, not the entire relevant area (i.e. that enclosed by lines connecting points AEFBCMGH). For these points on the delimitation line, see the map attached to the Judgment. By implication, this approach strengthens arguments for novel analyses and delimitations in every case, par. 68. See also Charney, (1994), p. 243.




[67] The Court hold that a delimitation dividing the area in the same ratio as that found for the relevant coastlines was not required, par. 69. As the Court itself pointed out, previous cases had considered much smaller differences to be a basis for adjusting the boundary line, i.e. the Gulf of Maine Case. The Tribunal in the Canada-France Arbitration determined that the maritime boundary line it had constructed produced a ratio of areas of 16.4:1 (Canada: France) If the variance from the ratio of relevant coastlines (15.3:1) were significant, the Tribunal seemed that it would make the necessary adjustment, par. 93.




[68] The Court observed that “if it were not possible to base calculations of proportionality upon hypothesis of this kind, it is difficult to see how any two States could agree on a bilateral delimitation as being equitable until all the other delimitations in the area had been affected”, par. 130.




[69] See moreover, supra, B 2.2.3.




[70] These maritime areas are very different in nature and extent, as already explained. For these differences, see Part III, A 1, 2; B 1, 2, 3. C 1, 2. See also Wail, (1989), pp. 117-118.




[71] The Parties requested the Tribunal to indicate a single line that would be applicable to the territorial sea, continental shelf and the EEZ between them. ILR, (1988), par. 86, p. 675. Even in this Case, Wail observes that within 12 miles of littoral boundary, it is only a territorial sea boundary and beyond that limit the line is a single boundary for both the continental shelf and the EEZ. Weil, (1989), p. 118.




[72] The area around the islands of Zuqar and Hanish, the territorial sea claims of both States overlapped. See par. 154-158.




[73] For State practice, see Weil, (1989), p. 131-132. Attard observes that it is a growing trend in State practice but not an obligation. Attard, (1987), p. 78. 79. See also Bowett, (1987), p. 23, 24, 27.




[74] In the Gulf of Maine Case, the Parties requested the ICJ Chamber to “draw a single delimitation line for both the continental shelf and the superjacent fishery zone”. ICJ Rep. 1984, par. 119, p. 301. In the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, the Parties requested the Tribunal to draw a “single line” for “the maritime territories containing the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf” 77 ILR, (1988), par. 86, p. 675. In the Canada-France Arbitration, the Parties required the Court “to establish a single delimitation as between the Parties of the maritime areas” that would “apply to the sea-bed and the superjacent waters in the area subject to the delimitation.” 31 ILM, (1992), par. 36 and 82, p. 1163, 1172, 1173.




[75] See Part III, C 1.




[76] See Part III, B 1, 2, C 1. Weil observes that although the delimitation rule for both concepts are the same, the result could well be different as the considerations are not exactly the same. Weil, (1989), p. 119.




[77] See Part III, 2.1, 3.1. This has in fact been confirmed by the ICJ in explicit terms. The ICJ observed in the Libya-Malta Case that “the rights enjoyed by a State over its continental shelf would also be proposed by it over the sea-bed and subsoil of any exclusive economic zone which it might proclaim.” par. 33.




[78] In this Case, the Parties were not in agreement on the Court’s exact task. But the Court found that “the Court in the present case is not empowered-or constrained- by any such agreement for a single dual-purpose boundary.” par. 43.




[79] See Part III, B 2; C 1. The ICJ in this regard observed in the Libya-Malta Case that “for juridical and practical reasons, the distance criterion must now apply to the continental shelf as well as to the exclusive economic zone.” par. 34, p. 33. The Court further observed that “one of the relevant circumstances to be taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf of a State is the legally permissible extent of the exclusive economic zone appertaining to that same State.” par. 33.




[80] The Court in the Libya-Malta Case observed that “In the view of the Court, even though the present case relates only to the delimitation of the continental shelf and not to the exclusive economic zone, the principle and rules underlying the latter concept cannot be left out of consideration. As the 1982 Convention demonstrates, the two institutions-continental shelf and exclusive economic zone are linked together in modern law”, par. 33.




[81] This has been confirmed by the ICJ in the Jan Mayen Case when it observed that “the Court takes note that the Parties adopt in this respect the same position in that they see no objection for the settlement of the present dispute, to the boundary of the exclusive economic zone which is customary”, par. 47. See generally Evans, (1993), pp. 296-97.




[82] See, for instance, the Canada-France Arbitration, par. 37.




[83] For a discussion of this issue, see Evans, (1993), pp. 297-298.




[84] It observed that a treaty obligation which was confined to the continental shelf could not be interpreted so as to “extend to a field which is evidently much greater, unquestionably heterogeneous, and accordingly fundamentally different”, par. 119. Moreover, the Chamber explicitly observed that the combined rule of “equidistance-special circumstances” was only applicable to the delimitation of the continental shelf between the parties, par. 121-125. See also the Canada-France Arbitration, par. 40.




[85] The Canada-France Arbitration, par. 40; the Jan Mayen Case, par. 43, 44.




[86] The Gulf of Maine Case, par. 154, 192; the Canada-France Arbitration, par. 38. See generally Evans, (1993), p. 313.




[87] See par. 194. See also par. 199, p. 329.




[88] The Chamber observed in this regard that “a delimitation by a single line such as that which has to be carried out in the present case…can only be carried out by the application of a criterion or combination of criteria, which does not have preferential treatment to one of these two objects to the detriment of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of either of them.” The Chamber further emphasized that “it is necessary in a case like the present one, to rule out the application of any criteria found to be typically and exclusively bound up with the particular characteristics of one alone of the two natural realities that have to be delimited in conjunction”, par. 193. The “preference will henceforth inevitably be given to criteria that because of their more neutral character are best suited for use in a multi-purpose delimitation”, par. 194. See moreover, Charney, (1994), pp. 246-247.




[89] The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case clarified further and observed that “it is accordingly toward an application to the present case of criteria more especially derived from geography that it feels bound to run”, par. 195.




[90] The ICJ in the Libya-Malta Case confirmed this as it observed that “greater importance must be attributed to elements, such as distance form the coast.” par. 33.




[91] See, for instance, the Canada-France Arbitration, par. 83-88, 89-91. See also, Bowett, (1987), p. 30.




[92] The ICJ in the Gulf of Maine Case refused the relevance of ecological factors as they are related exclusively to the fisheries zone, par. 193. On the other hand a fact became clearer as the Judgments consistently emphasized that the geological or geophysical features of the sea-bed are not relevant to the delimitation of a single line for both the continental shelf and superjacent waters. See the Gulf of Maine Case, par. 193, 195; the Libya-Malta Case, par. 77; the Canada-France Arbitration, par. 47. The Tribunal in the Canada-France Arbitration even turned the principle of non-encroachment into one that represents the projections of coast rather than the natural prolongations, par. 58.




[93] See par. 132. See moreover par. 133 and onwards.




[94] See par. 116. The ICJ also considered all the different factors relevant to both the continental shelf and the fisheries zone separately. See, for instance, the consideration of the circumstances relevant to the continental shelf delimitation in par. 42 and onwards and the circumstances relevant to fisheries in par. 52 and onwards. However, as noted, establishing a single delimitation line was not the task of the Court in this case.




[95] See Part III, D.




[96] See Part III, D 1, 2.




[97] As we have been dealing with the relative effect of the relevant factors within the delimitation process, it became obvious that islands are secondary to the coastal geography of the Parties’ mainlands. See supra, B 3. There are some authors who ignore the difference between entitlement and the delimitation and consider islands to be as significant as mainlands despite the facts identified above on the basis of the international Judgments. See, for instance, Kozyris, (1998), pp. 373-374.




[98] For the State practice on the issue, see Karl, (1977), pp. 643-673. He presents a fairly illustrative examination of State practice concerning the delimitation that also considers the case of islands. State practice, as Karl pointed out, “provides a substantial basis for the formulation of an analytic model of continental shelf delimitation which relies primarily on the location of an island with respect to the delimiting States and on the location of the delimiting States with respect to one another.” Ibid., p. 651. As to the case-law, see generally Evans, (1991), pp. 11-13. However, Kozyris criticizes the principle that islands should be considered on the basis of their location within the delimitation process. Kozyris, (1998), p. 378.




[99] In fact, many such islands could be taken as only baselines so that they would be regarded as part of the mainland as only having territorial sea of their own, so far as the delimitation of the continental shelf is concerned. See Karl, (1977), pp. 656-657.




[100] The Court tried to find out whether “the prolongation of the Scilly Isles some distance further westwards than the island of Ushant renders ‘unjust’ or ‘inequitable’ an equidistant boundary delimited from the baselines of the French and United Kingdom coasts”, par. 243. See Colson, (1978), p. 110.




[101] The Parties gave them different effects ranging from no-effect to full-effect. Libya said that “in arriving at the general direction of the coastlines, the Island of Jerba invites omission, since it is clearly an exceptional feature and its inclusion would introduce irrelevant complications. Similarly, the Kerkennah Islands should be excluded since they occupy little more than 180 square kilometers.” ICJ Rep., 1982, par. 79, p. 63. See also Herman, (1984), p. 831.




[102] The Court observed that “to cause the delimitation line to veer even as far as 62 degrees, to run parallel to the island coastline, would, in the circumstances of the case, amount to giving excessive weight to the Kerkennah Islands”, par. 128.




[103] The coastline in the area to be delimited in this case was marked by the presence of numerous islands. To determine the extent to which these islands could be taken into account for delimitation purposes the Arbitration Court classified them in different categories. See par. 95.




[104] The Tribunal accepted that they would have a certain effect to displace the strict equidistant line which would, in their absence, be indicated by the coastal geography, par. 244. The same fact that the coastal geography seemed to be very similar in the absence of them led the Court to conclude that “the position of the Scilly Isles west-south-west of the Cornish peninsula constitutes a “special circumstance” justifying a boundary other than the strict median line”, par. 245. The full-effect of the Scilly Isles would deflect the equidistant line on a considerably more south-westerly course than would be the case if it were to be delimited from the baselines of the English mainland, par. 243.




[105] See par. 248.




[106] See par. 128. The Court said that “In these geographical circumstances, the Court has to take into account not only the islands, but also the low-tide elevations. While they do not, as do islands, have any continental shelf of their own, they do enjoy some recognition in international law for certain purposes, as is shown by the 1958 Geneva Conventions as well as the draft convention of the Law of the Sea”, par. 28. See also par. 79.




[107] See par. 128.




[108] In the area where these islands were situated, there was a change of direction in the Tunisian coast making the Tunisian coast inclined towards the maritime projection of the Libyan coasts. The Court in this regard said that “the existence and position of the Kerkennah Islands and surrounding low-tide elevations, on the other hand, are material”, par. 79, 129. For the calculation of half effect in State practice, see Beazley, (1979), pp. 154-159.




[109] See par. 129. For the “half-effect” given to the islands in State practice, see Beazley, (1979), pp. 153-154.




[110] The Court provided in that regard that “In order to ensure that each party has control over the maritime territory opposite and in the vicinity of its coasts an important factor is the coastal configuration and orientation. The configuration must include the relevant island i.e. the coastal islands and the Bijagos Archipelago”, par. 98.




[111] the North Sea Cases, par. 51; the Tunisia-Libya Case, par. 93.




[112] See par. 118, 139, 146, 151.




[113] See par. 146. See also par 152.




[114] See par. 139, 150.




[115] See par. 127, 128.




[116] As the Chamber further explained, “Since it was only a question of adjusting the proportion by reference to which the corrected median line was to be located, the result of the effect to be given to the land was a small traverse displacement of that lines, not an angular displacement, and its practical impact was therefore limited”, par. 222.




[117] See par. 79.




[118] While the coastal lengths were comparable, the Court would not allow such islets to effect considerably the line indicated par. 57, p. 36.




[119] See par. 97.




[120] See par. 111.




[121] See par. 147.




[122] See par. 148. Such islands in the southern section of the delimitation area, i.e. the Zuqar-Hanish group, were considered in delimiting the overlapping territorial waters of the Parties. The Court refused enclave solution because the solution would create “impractical” “hazardous” areas in the neighbourhood of a main international shipping lane. Instead, the Tribunal gave continuous delimitation areas to these islands. See par. 155. The Tribunal further said that principle of non-encroachment would not justify the enclave solution. See par. 157.




[123] For the role of such characteristics of islands, see Karl, (1977), pp. 648-649.




[124] See par. 183.




[125] The Court seemed to have considered the Channel Islands as separate from the mainland UK, but not as an independent State. Then judged their effect on the median line between the mainlands which was indicated in the absence of these islands. In this regard, the Court “has first to determine whether the Channel Islands should be considered to be a projection, as it were, from the United Kingdom’s mainland...”, par. 189. If it were so, the mid-channel median line would automatically deviate southwards in a long loop around the Channel Islands, par. 189. “In the opinion of the Court, ...it is rather the question of the extent of their own entitlement to continental shelf as islands separate from the United Kingdom. This view of the matter appears to the Court to be correct, subject to its previous finding that, as between the United Kingdom and the French Republic and for the present purpose, the Channel Islands are separate islands of the United Kingdom, not separate States”, par. 190. The Court observed that “The presence of these British islands close to the French coast, if they are given full-effect in delimiting the continental shelf, will manifestly result in a substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise accrue to the French Republic. This fact by itself appears to the Court to be, prima facie, a circumstance creative of inequity and calling for a method of delimitation that in some measure redress the inequity”, par. 196.




[126] The Court observed that “The legal framework within which the Court must decide the course of the boundary (or boundaries) in the Channel Islands is, therefore, that of two opposite States one of which possesses island territories close to the coast of the other State. To state this conclusion is not, however, to deny all relevance to the size and importance of the Channel Islands which, on the contrary, may properly be taken into account in balancing the equities in this region”, par. 187. See also par. 192. The Court also referred to the State practice to justify such method, par. 251.




[127] See par. 202.




[128] In the Court’s view, these islands had so much autonomy that “the United Kingdom asks the Court to regard them as, in effect, distinct island States for the purpose of determining the continental shelf appurtenant to them”, par. 184. In that Case as to certain characteristics of the Channel Islands such as security, the Court accepted “the equitable considerations invoked by the United Kingdom as carrying a certain weight”, par. 198. For the relevant arguments over such factors, see par. 188. See also, Colson, (1978), p. 103.




[129] See par. 199.




[130] See par. 183. Accordingly, the UK proposed, under certain circumstances, a continuous link of the continental shelf between its mainland and the Channel Islands, par. 188.




[131] The UK-France Arbitration, par. 197-205. See also Schneider, (1995), p. 571.




[132] The Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case would not approve any method that would give undue effect to tiny islands, uninhabited rocks or low-tide elevations sometimes lying at considerable distance from the mainland.




[133] The Court observed that “The extent of the seaward projections will depend, in every case, on the geographical circumstances; for example, a particular coast, however short, may have a seaward projection as far as 200 miles, if there are no competing coasts that could require a curtailed reach”, par. 4.




[134] See par. 70, p. 1170.




[135] The Court took into account the specific characteristics of St. Pierre and Miquelon such as they were different from the rocks or small islands, and their “considerable population and a substantial agricultural and commercial economy”, as the Arbitration Court pointed to in the UK-France Arbitration. See par. 184. The Court in the present case observed that some of these factors are equally present in the case of St. Pierre and Miquelon, par. 52.




[136] See par. 69. But the Court would be against any proposal such as an enclave solution which would not give any maritime area to these islands beyond their territorial sea since it would not be “equitable”. A limited extension of the enclave beyond the territorial sea in this western sector would meet to some degree the reasonable expectations of France of title beyond the narrow belt of territorial sea, despite some encroachment. par. 68.




[137] The Libya-Malta Judgment, par. 52.




[138] Ibid.




[139] The Court observed that there is no status of “island State” in relation to continental shelf rights, which could have a sort of privileged status, par. 53.




[140] Canadian argument was to the effect that the status of political dependency of the French islands with respect to metropolitan France was a factor justifying less extensive maritime rights than if they constituted an independent island State. 31 ILM, (1992), par. 48, p. 116. According to the Court, no distinction in this respect was made by Article 121 (par. 2) of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea or by the corresponding provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and on the Continental Shelf, par. 49.




[141] See Charney, (1994), p. 241.




[142] See par 53. And it is clear that the Court in the Libya-Malta Case took into account the “general geographical context” in adjusting the initial line “so as to lie closer to the coast of Malta” within the consideration of proportionality, par. 69 and 71.




[143] To justify its contention, Denmark said that “it is small in relation to the opposite coasts of Greenland, and it cannot sustain and has not sustained human habitation or economic life of its own. (Article 121 (par 3) of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea); more broadly, Denmark has referred in this connection to factors of geography, population, constitutional status of the respective territories of Jan Mayen and Greenland, socio-economic structure, cultural heritage, proportionality, the conduct of the parties and other delimitations in the region”, par. 60. Denmark noted that Jan Mayen had no settled population, as only 25 persons temporarily inhabited the island for purposes of employment, and the island could not sustain and had not sustained human habitation or economic life of its own. Denmark also relied on what it referred to as the “cultural factor”, the attachment of the people of Greenland to their land and the surrounding sea, par. 15, 79.




[144] The Court continued that “To attribute to Norway merely the residual area left after giving full-effect to the eastern coast of Greenland would run wholly counter to the rights of Jan Mayen and also to the demands of equity”, par. 70.




[145] “Cultural factors” meant the attachment of the people of Greenland to their land and the surrounding, sea. par. 15, 79.




[146] The Court concluded that, “in the delimitation to be affected in this case, there is no reason to consider either the limited nature of the population of Jan Mayen or socio-economic factors as circumstances to be taken into account”, par. 80. Surprisingly, the Court did not reject the relevance of security considerations to the delimitation in question. It observed that although security matters might not be relevant in the present case, such considerations were satisfied with the delimitation line indicated, even if they were relevant. It suggested a possibility that they could be relevant in certain circumstances, See par. 81. See also the Libya-Malta Case, par. 51.




[147] See supra, B 2.2.1.




[148] In this context, the Court said that “if the force of the principle of natural prolongation of territory were absolute, a small island would back the natural prolongation of the territory of the nearby mainland in the same way, if not always to the same extent, as a larger island. The question of the appurtenance to the Channel Islands of the areas of continental shelf extending to their north and north-west is not therefore resolved merely by referring to the principle of natural prolongation of territory”, par. 192.




[149] See par. 46.




[150] The Court observed that “It should not be forgotten, either, that the physical structure of the sea-bed ceases to be important when the object, as in this case, is to establish a single, all purpose delimitation both of the sea-bed and the superjacent waters”, par. 47.




[151] In State practice too, many islands have not been ignored totally depending on their various characteristics. See Karl, (1977), pp. 662-663. The Court in the UK-France Arbitration observed that “The true position, in the opinion of the Court, is that the principle of natural prolongation of territory is neither to be set aside nor treated as absolute in a case where islands belonging to one State are situated on continental shelf which would otherwise constitute a natural prolongation of the territory of another State. The application of that principle in such a case, as in other cases concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf, has to be appreciated in the light of all the relevant geographical and other circumstances”, par. 194.




[152] See also, ibid., p. 663.




[153] The Court’s understanding was that “The case is quite different from that of small islands on the right side of or close to the median line, and it is also quite different from the case where numerous islands stretch out one after another long distances from the mainland. The precedents of semi-enclaves, arising out of such cases, which are invoked by the United Kingdom, do not therefore, seem to the Court to be in point”, par. 199.




[154] The case of the Aegean Sea, as far as the role of islands in the possible delimitation is concerned, has been described as “one of the most complicated delimitation problems”. See Karl, (1977), pp. 669-672.




[155] See par. 114. The Court clarified that the “considerations which dictate this difference of treatment...are ultimately related to the varying influences of the individual circumstances characterizing the area”, par. 115.




[156] The “innermost part of the Gulf of Maine” was from “Cape Elizabeth to the international boundary terminus”. The “central segment” was the rest of the coasts of both parties in the Gulf which are opposite. The “outside” area was the area “which lies outside and over against the Gulf of Maine”, par. 188. See also par. 189, 214, 223, 224.




[157] See par. 67, 68.




[158] See the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, par. 122, 126.




[159] See par. 103.




[160] See par. 204, 206.




[161] See par. 114.




[162] See par. 66.




[163] See par. 75. See also par. 73, 74, 145.




[164] Concerning the English Channel region apart from the Channel Islands region, the Tribunal observed that “the Channel Islands region apart, they are also agreed that within the English Channel the boundary should, in principle, be the median line. The Court has already indicated that this is also its own opinion”, par. 103.




[165] See par. 115. This fact was already affirmed by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases when it emphasized that “the distorting effect of lateral equidistant lines under certain conditions of coastal configuration are nevertheless comparatively small within the limits of territorial waters, but produce their maximum effect in the localities where the main continental shelf areas lie further out”, par. 59. One possible method of avoiding an inequitable result is to “employ one method of delimiting up to a given distance from the coasts, and thenceforth to employ a different method”, par. 115. The Court seemed to be concerned with the effect of a perpendicular line in the circumstances of the different sectors.




[166] See par. 188, 189.




[167] See par. 217, 218.




[168] See par. 214, 216, 223.




[169] See par. 224.




[170] In the first sector, the seaward extension of the French coast beyond its territorial sea would cause some degree of encroachment and cut-off to the seaward projection towards the south of Newfoundland, par. 67. In the second sector, the seaward projection of the French coast would not cause such an effect since the coast of the Parties did not meet directly in this second section, par. 70.




[171] See par. 120, p. 85.




[172] The Chamber observed that “it appears beyond any doubt that, in principle, the determination of the path of this segment must depend upon that of the two previous segments of the line”. ICJ Rep., 1984, par. 226, p. 338. Furthermore, to establish the point on the closing line from which the perpendicular line will be drawn, it considered the line in the second segment that met the closing line, as the reference point. ICJ Rep., 1984, par. 226, p. 338.




[173] For a review of this principle, see supra, B 3.



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