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Friday, 10 February 2012
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Maritime Delimitation in the Aegean Sea - Part II
By Yucel ACER, U.S.A.K.

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2.3. Other Greek islands nearer to its mainland



Some of the Greek islands are located not so close to its mainland but still closer to the Greek mainland than to the Turkish mainland. Such islands are found in all three sectors. Seven major islands are so situated in the northern Aegean Sea.[1] The island of Samothrace is very close to the indicated delimitation line. Six other islands seem to constitute a group as they are close to each other and within distance of 50 miles from the Greek mainland. In the central Aegean Sea, there is only one island that could be regarded as being similarly situated. This is the island of Skiros that is located about 50 miles off mainland Greece.


The southern Aegean Sea accommodates an enormous number of such islands that cover the whole area from the mainland to the delimitation line identified above. These islands constitute almost the entire group of the Cyclades. The largest island in the Aegean Sea, namely Crete, should also be considered as being similarly located. Turkey has only one such island, the island of Gökçeada which is situated at a distance of about 10 miles off the Turkish mainland in the northern Aegean Sea.


All above mentioned Greek islands have one thing in common. If they are considered on the same basis as the Turkish mainland, the delimitation line would be decided between these Greek islands and the Turkish mainland in all three sectors. The southern Aegean Sea in particular presents an even more striking situation as the number of such islands is much higher. This means that, eventually, the delimitation line that we have established on the basis of mainland coasts would be transferred to the limit of the Turkish territorial waters.


In this situation, Turkey would not have any significant continental shelf and EEZ areas in the entire Aegean Sea. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, these Greek islands are located very close to the median line between the mainlands, they will reduce significantly the Turkish continental shelf and EEZ attributed by the delimitation line suggested by the mainlands only. Secondly, all these islands and the other Greek islands[2] have their own territorial sea, which restricts the continental shelf/EEZ areas to be left to Turkey.[3]


Therefore, in order to reach an equitable result, there seems to be no other solution than to ignore all these Greek islands. It could, however, be suggested that half or restricted effects could be the equitable solution. It should be noted that even if they were given restricted effect, the result for Turkey would not be less dramatic than that of full-effect. Any reduction in the already restricted Turkish continental shelf/EEZ areas by the effect of islands, would be quite significantly adverse for Turkey. It seems that the equitable principle would be more respected when these islands are not given any maritime areas beyond their own territorial waters.


Some of these Greek islands may still be justified by the delimitation principles to have at least limited areas of continental shelf and EEZ of their own on the basis of their relatively large size and socio-economic significance. Such islands include Skiros, Andros, Tinos, Naxos, Paros, Karpathos and Crete, as they are relatively larger and more populated. As far as islands other than Crete are concerned, considerations relevant to the mainlands should prevail over their size and socio-economic significance. They should not be allowed to restrict dramatically the continental shelf and EEZ of a mainland country such as Turkey, just because they are relatively larger and more populated than others.[4]


The award of the Tribunal in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration confirms this fact.[5] Although giving them a limited effect would not have a considerable effect to the extent as would be the case in the Aegean Sea, the Tribunal simply disregarded all the islands situated in the mid-sea, namely the island of Jabal al-Tayr and the Zubayr group. The Yemeni islands are no less sizeable than the islands of Greece which are situated in the mid-section of the Aegean Sea.[6]


Another example is the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration in which the islands of Alcatraz was situated very close to the delimitation line that had previously been indicated by the Tribunal. The Tribunal would not allow the Alcatraz group to distort the line indicated by the coasts of the two countries. An enclave solution seemed to be regarded as better suited, the size of which depended on the characteristics of the islands. The Tribunal gave only a 12 miles territorial sea to the Alcatraz group, but no continental shelf to its north.[7]


The island of Crete needs to be given further consideration as it is the largest and most populated island of the Aegean Sea. It is also significant in terms of location.[8] It is not located between the mainland of both parties. It is located in an area where the mainland coasts of both States are rather adjacent to each other. It projects not only towards the Aegean Sea but also towards the rest of the Mediterranean. Its projection towards the north and northeast meets with that of the Turkish mainland.


If considered equally with the Turkish mainland, its effect on the delimitation line is no different from the effect of all the other islands considered above. However, granting Crete a limited effect on the delimitation line does not have a disproportionate effect on the basis of its size and significance. The delimitation line between the mainlands of Greece and Turkey should deviate from the equidistant line to allow some continental shelf and EEZ areas to Crete. How far the line should deviate from the equidistant line could ultimately be decided by the two States or by a third party.[9]


 


2.4. The islands on the “wrong side”


The islands on the “wrong side”[10] in the Aegean Sea are the Greek islands that are closer to Turkey than to Greece. They are to the east of the median line between the mainlands.[11]


Generally speaking, the islands situated on the “wrong side” can be divided into two separate groups in terms of their location.[12] Some of them are situated closer to or on the median line rather than the Turkish mainland. There are such islands in all three sectors but the northern and southern Aegean have more islands in this category than the others.[13] Secondly, most of these islands are situated very close to the Turkish mainland so that they could have been considered as Turkish coastal islands, had they belonged to Turkey. Many of them like Lesvos in the northern Aegean Sea, Chios in the mid-Aegean Sea, and Samos, Kos, and Rhodes in the southern Aegean Sea are major islands.[14]


It does not matter if they are situated closer to the median line or to the mainland of Turkey, the results of their full or limited effect on the delimitation line between the mainlands are quite similar to the islands considered in the previous sections. Similarly, the islands on the wrong side have a potential to reduce the delimitation line of the continental shelf and EEZ of Turkey to the limit of its territorial sea. It is not surprising that the reasons are exactly the same. They have territorial waters restricting the areas to be delimited as the continental shelf and EEZ. In the south-east Aegean Sea, where the group of Greek islands, the Dodecanese, is situated there is hardly any maritime areas left to be delimited as continental shelf or EEZ even under the current 6-mile territorial sea limit.[15]


If these Greek islands are given full or limited effect, Turkey will be able to have some continental shelf/EEZ areas beyond its territorial sea only in the northern Aegean Sea. In this region, the continental shelf and EEZ areas of Turkey will stretch in the form of short fingers between the Greek islands of Limnos and Lesvos.[16]


In accordance with these facts, the delimitation process in the Aegean Sea cannot allow any continental shelf/EEZ areas to be given to islands on the wrong side, if Turkey is to be given any continental shelf and EEZ areas in the entire Aegean Sea.[17] It should be emphasized again that islands cannot prevail over the considerations that are related to the mainlands.[18]


Moreover, the principle of non-encroachment or coastal projection necessitates that the projection of mainlands should be respected as much as possible.[19] Allowing the Greek islands on the wrong side to have any continental shelf/EEZ beyond the limit of their territorial waters would significantly cut off the projection of the Turkish mainland in all sectors. This cannot be justified by any delimitation principle.[20]


The previous judicial cases in which there were similarities to the situation in the Aegean Sea confirm furthermore, that these islands in the Aegean Sea should be considered with restraint. The situation in the UK-France Arbitration was quite similar. Secondly and more importantly, the location of these islands in these cases was not exactly the same. The islands in both cases are situated on the wrong side and are quite close to the mainland of another State. Moreover, the coasts of the two countries in the UK-France Arbitration were opposite each other as are the coasts of Greece and Turkey in most parts of the Aegean Sea. Even the related arguments of the parties in the UK-France Arbitration as to the Channel Islands were quite similar to those of Greece and Turkey.[21]


The situation was well addressed by the Arbitration Court with reference to the customary law of delimitation. The Tribunal had the mainlands of the two countries in mind when conducting delimitation. As to islands so situated, the Court indicated that their geographical location runs against the continental shelf area that they would be attributed.[22] It pointed to a balance between the mainlands and did not allow these islands to disturb that balance significantly.[23] Even if the full-effect of the Channel Islands did not affect the delimitation between the mainlands as much as the Greek islands do in the Aegean Sea, the Tribunal gave them only a limited effect. It gave a 12-mile continental shelf to the Islands.


However, the size and socio-economic significance may necessitate granting certain effect to the islands situated on the wrong side in the Aegean Sea.[24] It seems in accordance with judicial precedents that characteristics such as location and socio-economic features of islands forced the courts in previous cases to allow them at least a limited maritime area. This may suggest that some major islands in the eastern Aegean Sea, such as Limnos, Chios, Samos, Kos and Rhodes which have a considerable population and economic life, should be given at least limited effect.


With the position that the Tribunal gave 12 miles continental shelf to the Channel Islands, First of all, French continental shelf should not encroach upon the already declared 12-mile fishery zone of these islands.[25] Secondly, they had many characteristics which differentiated them from the “rocks or small islands”. They were “possessing a considerable population and a substantial agricultural and commercial economy”. Moreover, they were clearly territorial and political units having their own rights separate from the United Kingdom and enjoying “a very large measure of political, legislative, administrative and economic autonomy”.[26] The Tribunal also observed that the exact weight that islands should be given depended on the individual characteristics of a case. The peculiar characteristics of the Channel Islands within the context of the delimitation necessitated the attribution of some maritime areas. Accordingly, the Court indicated a “secondary boundary” separating the continental shelf of the Channel Islands in the southern section of the mid-Channel line.


In the Canada-France Arbitration where overseas French islands in the vicinity of the Canadian coast were considered, the Tribunal did not leave these islands without any effect. These French islands could be regarded as situated on the wrong side as they were situated very near to the Canadian coast.[27] The Tribunal observed that the specific Canadian proposal of an enclave was not equitable because it denied the islands any maritime area beyond their territorial sea.[28]


The circumstances of the Aegean Sea are, however, quite different. First of all, the consequences of allowing any effect to the Greek islands are much more catastrophic for the other party than in any such previous cases. Secondly, some of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea are not so isolated, in terms of size and population, to depend on their own continental/EEZ areas.[29] Moreover, they have considerable and sufficient maritime areas as their territorial waters.[30] Finally, in the case where all such Greece islands are ignored altogether, Greece would still have more continental shelf/EEZ areas than those of Turkey. This does not include its territorial waters which already cover almost half of the whole Aegean Sea under the current 6-mile limit.


 


 


C. Other Relevant Considerations


 


It has been made quite clear so far in the present study that in order to arrive at an equitable delimitation, it is essential that all the relevant factors be considered.[31] The relevant factors are not restricted to geographical considerations. Many other factors such as sea-bed features and resource-related factors need to be taken into account. The remaining sections of Part VI will accordingly consider whether the delimitation line suggested above needs to be adjusted on the basis of these factors.


 


1. The Effect of Sea-Bed Features in the Aegean Sea


 


There were suggestions in the early delimitation judgments that as long as they were identifiable, the continental shelf area of one State in the geomorphological sense should not be cut off by the continental shelf of another.[32] Having considered the sea-bed structure of the Aegean Sea,[33] Turkey once argued that since the Greek islands in the eastern Aegean Sea are situated on the natural prolongation of the Turkish mainland, they could not possibly have a continental shelf of their own.[34]


However, as already seen, within a delimitation process, sea-bed features have become less important in determining the delimitation line that is shaped by the coastal geography.[35] It has also been noted that in areas where the distance is less than 400 miles between two opposite coasts, the role of sea-bed features is further restricted by the principle of distance.[36]


The outer limit of the continental shelf of one party in the Aegean Sea could not possibly be beyond or even close to 200 miles. In such restricted areas, the relevance of sea-bed features will be very limited. Moreover, if a single delimitation for both the continental shelf and the EEZ is specifically requested, the sea-bed features which are exclusively related to the continental shelf alone cease to be relevant to the delimitation.[37] The delimitation process in the Aegean Sea may concern not only the delimitation of the continental shelf but also the delimitation of both the continental shelf and the EEZ at the same time. If such a delimitation were specifically requested by the parties, factors such as sea-bed features should be disregarded.[38]


However, if a single delimitation line is not specifically requested, the sea-bed features could still be of certain significance. Assuming that the Greek islands are situated on the natural prolongation of the Turkish mainland, the sea-bed features of the Aegean Sea could be significant in the sense that they could be taken as further support for a delimitation line which is mostly equidistant from the mainlands.[39]


It is not, however, clear whether the eastern Aegean islands of Greece are situated on the natural prolongation of the Turkish mainland. We have noted that there are conflicting views on this. The only relevant sea-bed feature is the Aegean deep trough which runs in an “S” shape through the mid-Aegean Sea from north to south. Alongside the line, there is a limited extent of oceanisation. Moreover, the eastern Aegean islands demonstrate similarities with the Turkish mainland in terms of soil and rock structures,[40]. suggesting separate natural prolongations of the two sides.[41]


Since the controversy over the issue is still a fact,[42] the sea-bed features are too vague to be relied on for the delimitation purpose.[43] It is appropriate to conclude that the sea-bed features have little relevance to the delimitation in the Aegean Sea for all the above reasons. Therefore, the sea-bed features in the Aegean Sea could not be relied on to make any deviation from the delimitation line that is suggested in the present study.


 


2. The Effect of Resource-Related Factors in the Aegean Sea


 


The level of the economic development of countries is not relevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ[44] on the basis that it is unpredictable and changeable over time.[45] Natural resources of the area to be delimited and the socio-economic characteristics of both mainlands and islands are, however, factors relevant to the delimitation.[46]


From the Greek perspective, the Aegean Sea has a socio-economic values in two different respects. Firstly, the Sea presents certain interests to Greece as a whole in terms of navigation, transport, and sea-related resources such as fisheries, and mineral resources including petroleum. On the other hand, the Aegean Sea serves the Greek population living on the Aegean islands in terms of their socio-economic livelihood which includes fisheries.[47]


From Turkey’s perspective, the Aegean Sea is similarly significant for both the country as a whole and the population living on the mainland coast which surrounds the Aegean Sea.[48] It is significant for the country in terms of its natural resources as well as for commercial purposes such as navigation. Similarly, the population living on Turkey’s Aegean coastline is dependent on the natural resources, especially the fisheries.[49]


It is therefore appropriate to note that the interests of both countries in the Aegean Sea are quite similar. They both use the Aegean Sea for economic reasons such as fishing, extracting other natural resources and exploiting commercial interests such as navigation.


However, the fact that Greece possesses many islands does not make this country more dependent on the Aegean Sea The number of Greek islands is much higher but the Turkish population which is dependent on the Aegean Sea is not less than that of Greece.[50]


In the Jan Mayen Case, the issue of natural resources actually affected the delimitation line. In the delimitation area, there was only one area which was particularly rich and significant in terms of fish resources.[51] The Court contemplated whether it should shift or adjust “the line, as a fishery zone boundary…to ensure equitable access to the capelin fishery resources for the vulnerable fishing communities concerned.”[52] The Court, by depending on the relatively stable nature of capelin stocks, ruled that the initial line was too far to the west for Denmark to be assured of equitable access to the capelin stocks, as it attributed to Norway the whole area of overlapping claims. Accordingly, the line was shifted eastwards.[53]


However, the Jan Mayen Case cannot be used as a precedent for the Aegean Sea in this context. It is different from the Aegean Sea since there is an area rich in fish resources and should be accessed equally by the two countries. It seems that the equidistant delimitation line that has been suggested above does not have catastrophic result for the interests of either of the two countries or for their populations living in and around the Aegean Sea. According to the information available, the Aegean Sea does not have any areas which are particularly rich in terms of natural resources.[54] It suggests that a median delimitation line cannot possibly be catastrophic for the economic livelihood of the population, either Greek or Turkish, in the Aegean Sea. According to the information available, the Aegean Sea does not have any areas which are particularly rich in terms of natural resources.[55] It suggests that a median delimitation line cannot possibly be catastrophic for the economic livelihood of the population, either Greek or Turkish, in the Aegean Sea.


The islands of Greece in the Aegean Sea in particular do not significantly depend on fisheries. The populations of these islands are dependent on both agriculture and tourism.[56] Even if the Greek islands were dependent on fisheries, there is no way that the median line would be catastrophic for them. They already have enough sea areas in the form of territorial waters.[57] On the other hand, the median delimitation line would actually increase the maritime areas of the Greek islands to include the whole of the western Aegean Sea, in addition to its territorial waters. Therefore, there could be no justification for an argument that the equidistant delimitation line would be inequitable in the sense of the economic well-being of the population of the Greek islands.


The judgment of the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine Case could be taken as relevant in this context. The Chamber did not change the delimitation line on the basis of fisheries, since factors such as fishing, navigation, defense or petroleum exploration and exploitation would not affect the line catastrophically the “livelihood and economic well-being” of the population of the countries concerned.[58]


It is therefore beyond any doubt that Greek interests in terms of navigation, and transport would not be damaged by a median delimitation line. It should be emphasized again that EEZ and the continental shelf areas, unlike territorial sea, do not interfere with international navigation or many other freedoms offered by the high seas.[59] It has already been concluded that the current 6-mile territorial sea limit in the Aegean Sea is sufficient for Greece as far as navigation in the Aegean is concerned.[60] Therefore, it is difficult to argue that median line delimitation between the mainlands radically changes the existing situation in the Aegean Sea and produces inequity for Greece on the basis of the above facts.


 


3. The Role of Security Considerations in the Aegean Sea


 


Considerations other than those related to natural resources and the economic livelihood of the people can be evaluated to see whether there are any gross inequities with the established delimitation line. There are, on the other hand, other factors that must be considered to support the established delimitation line.[61] Among them the security interests of the two countries seem to be a significant factor within the circumstances of the Aegean Sea.


What maritime security means for both Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea has already been explained in some details in relation to the territorial sea dispute.[62] For the Turkish side, a narrower maritime area means restricted security on the basis of the fact that Greece has a huge number of militarized islands dispersed all over the Sea.[63] Moreover, the maritime areas for Turkey to maneuver in the Aegean Sea has already been restricted even before the continental shelf and the EEZ are delimited. In this sense, a delimitation that attributes the continental shelf/EEZ of a significant size to Turkey is certainly in the security interests of Turkey. A delimitation line that does not attribute the continental shelf/EEZ to the Greek islands could be regarded by the Greek side as inequitable on the basis of the security considerations. The specific problem for Greece is that the median line that would attribute Turkey areas of continental shelf/EEZ between some Greek islands and the Greek mainland[64] might be an element weakening the security of these Greek islands.


The answer should take into account any security concerns Greece may have in the event of a median delimitation line. Greece and the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea already have sufficient maritime areas for these purposes. First of all, Greece will not be in a situation to have restricted maritime areas for its military activities. Secondly, the continental shelf and the EEZ concepts are, unlike the territorial sea, quite unrelated to security matters. These maritime areas do not affect the security considerations in any significant sense.[65]


Finally, the existence of the Turkish continental shelf/EEZ areas behind the Greek islands could not create a security problem for the Greek islands. Only a few Greek islands in the northern Aegean Sea would have considerable Turkish maritime areas behind them.[66] In any account, the existence of the Turkish continental shelf or the EEZ in such areas does not cut the maritime connection of these islands to the mainland Greece.[67] Therefore, it is not justified to argue that the security of the Greek islands would be threatened by an equidistant delimitation line between the mainlands.


 


4. Proportionality in the Aegean Sea


 


The review in Part V has demonstrated that the principle of proportionality is one of the general principles which determine the relative weight to be attributed to various factors within a delimitation process. The principle performs this function by reference to the ratios between the respective coastal lengths of the parties and the maritime areas to be attributed. Accordingly, there should be a proportion between the maritime areas attributed to the parties and their coastlines.[68]


The mainland coasts of Greece and Turkey have already been respected as much as possible during the delimitation process, as required by the delimitation principles. Some coastal configurations are however ignored or given limited effect. Moreover, islands and non-geographical factors have been considered. In the final account, some features have been ignored or attributed limited effect.


Whether all these appreciation have resulted in a gross inequity in the Aegean Sea delimitation might be indicated by the test of proportionality. It does not, however, necessitate establishing an exact match between the maritime areas and coastlines. As already stated, there will otherwise be no room to give any effect to the other relevant factors. It only gives a general idea whether the result is grossly inequitable.[69]


The coastlines in the Aegean Sea as factors relevant to the delimitation have been identified above. It has been noted in the light of applicable principles that the identification of coastal lengths for the purpose of delimitation is a separate task from identifying the relevant coastlines for the purpose of the proportionality.[70]


On the basis of the relevant principles,[71] the mainland coasts of both Greece and Turkey should be relevant to the proportionality test. Secondly, they should be calculated according to their general direction. This means that all the configurations of the coastlines would not be counted. However, there is nothing to suggest in the Aegean Sea that all the coastlines that are relevant to the delimitation should not be included in the calculation for proportionality test.


According to the general direction of the mainland coasts, the length of the two countries’ mainland coasts are almost the same.[72] If every configurations of the mainland coast of both parties is considered, the length of the Turkish coastline is slightly longer.[73]


The problem concerning the establishment of the ratios between the coastlines and the maritime areas for the proportionality test in the Aegean Sea is whether the coasts of the Aegean islands are to be counted. There are in fact two possibilities in the Aegean Sea concerning the proportionality test. The first is to include the coastline of the islands that have affected the delimitation like Evvia and Crete in this calculation. Since the island of Crete affected the delimitation in a limited sense, its coastline should be given a partial role to play.[74] Moreover, as most of its coasts do not face the delimitation area in the Aegean Sea, at least half of its coasts should be excluded from the calculation.[75] In this case, there seems to be no significant difference between the coastal lengths of Greece and Turkey.


The second possibility is to include the coasts of all the Aegean islands into the calculation.[76] The coastal length of the Greek islands is around 8,500 km in total.[77] If the Greek islands are fully taken into account, the ratios would considerably favor Greece. The coastal length of Turkey will, however, stay almost the same.[78]


On the other hand, the calculation of the maritime areas that have been attributed to Greece and Turkey by the suggested delimitation line is a simple one. The calculation of the maritime area that is relevant for the delimitation, i.e. relevant area, is a different process, as has been reviewed.[79] The relevant area in the Aegean Sea has been identified above.[80] All the area that is beyond the territorial and internal waters are relevant waters. It is, however, noted that, in the southern Aegean Sea, the relevant water area ends a point which is equidistant from the coasts of the third parties having possible title.[81]


The high sea areas in the Aegean Sea currently constitute around 48.85% of the whole Sea, 214,000 km2 in total. However, according to the relevant principles,[82] the relevant areas is not only the areas beyond the territorial waters and internal waters.[83] Within the circumstances of the Aegean Sea, it is necessary to include all the water space in consideration in order to conduct a fair test of proportionality and thus produce an equitable settlement.


When the ratio between the continental shelf and/or EEZ of the two countries with that of the coastal lengths is compared, the suggested delimitation line should be approved equitable. In this comparison, the coastline of Evvia is taken as a part of Greek mainland coast and Crete’s coastline is included partially.


When the coasts of all the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea and all the maritime areas including the territorial and internal waters are included in the calculation, the result should still be equitable. Currently, Greece has 43.68% of the whole Aegean Sea as its territorial waters, which makes 93,475 km2 territorial waters.[84] Around 68% of the whole Aegean Sea, which is 214,000 km2, becomes Greece’s maritime areas as a result of the suggested delimitation line. This means that the total Greek maritime areas will be around 145,475 km2.


A comparison does not consequently indicate that a gross inequity is created by the delimitation line proposed here. While the mainland coastal lengths of the two States are generally equal excluding most of the Aegean islands, they share the high sea areas of the Aegean Sea almost equally as their respective continental shelf/ EEZ areas. If all the maritime areas are considered, Greece has almost two-thirds of the Aegean Sea as it has a much longer coastline including its islands.[85] They sufficiently indicate that the delimitation line proposed in the present study does not need to be corrected in the final account.






[1] These are Skopelos, Alonnisos, Skantzoura, Pelagos, Yiura, and Piperi.




[2] See infra, B 2.4.




[3] Greece itself, by depending on the circumstances which existed between its country and Italy in the Mediterranean, accorded a delimitation deal which gives very limited effect to the Greek island of Fanos and half-effect to another Greek island Strophades in the area. For the Agreement, see Charney and Alexander, (1993), p. 1591; Van Dyke, (1996), p. 402.




[4] It has been made clear that the location of these islands runs against the maritime areas they could get. If they cause an effect like one in the Aegean Sea, the size and their socio-economic characteristics should not be given any effect. See Part V, B 6.1; 6.5.




[5] In that case the arguments raised by the parties are similar to those of Greece and Turkey. Eritrea ignored Yemen’s islands of the Zuqar-Hanish group which were situated in the mid-sea section. It proposed a median line cut through Zuqar and Greater Hanish. See par 122.




[6] The only difference was that these islands were barren and of an “inhospitable” nature. See par. 147.




[7] See par. 111.




[8] See Part I, A 1.2.1; A 2.3.2. See also Appendix II, Table 7.




[9] It is quite likely that Crete will also receive more continental shelf and EEZ areas towards its south in a delimitation between Greece and countries on the North African coast.




[10] See Part V, B 6.2.




[11] See Appendix II, Table 1.




[12] For the location of all these islands in relation to the delimitation line, see Appendix I, Map 6.




[13] In the northern Aegean Sea, Samothrace is situated almost at the delimitation line. Limnos, which is a bigger island than Samothrace, is similarly situated very close to the delimitation line but mostly inside the eastern side of the line. The location of Evstratios, which is the smallest among them, is quite similar as it is situated very near to the delimitation line. In the southern Aegean Sea, some small islands of the Dodecanese are closer to the median line. See Appendix I, Map 6.




[14] See Appendix I, Map 6.




[15] For these, see Appendix I, Map 2, 3 and 4. See also, Part I, A 1; Blake, (1985), p. 3.




[16] Even for such islands situated in the Northern Aegean Sea where Turkey would still have some continental shelf/EEZ area resulting from the full-effect of these islands, Van Dyke points out that “The Greek islands on the wrong side (the eastern side) of this [equidistant] line would be entitled to territorial sea enclaves around them, but these enclaves should be limited to 6 nautical miles.” Van Dyke, (1996), p. 402.




[17] Van Dyke notes that “Turkey’s position is stronger with regard to the islands in the Eastern Aegean, particularly those near its coast.” Van Dyke, (1996), p. 402.




[18] See Part V, B 6.5.




[19] See Part V, B 3. As to the islands on the wrong side, the Tribunal in the Canada-France Arbitration observed that the projection of mainlands should be protected as much as possible. par. 70. The Tribunal allowed only a very limited encroachment in the western section. It allowed a limited extension of the enclave beyond the territorial sea in the western sector would meet to some degree the reasonable expectations of France of title beyond the narrow belt of territorial sea even if causing some encroachment to certain Canadian seaward projections. par. 68. Within the circumstances of the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, the Tribunal tried to prevent any cut-off effect from the islands on the wrong side. par. 103.




[20] Some seem to consider a delimitation which assigns “fingers” of continental shelf extending westwards between the Greek islands without encroaching behind them would be more equitable. Wilson argues that such a delimitation would be appropriate as it would not actually intervene between the islands and the Greek mainland, the political continuity of Greece would remain unaffected. Wilson, (1979/80), p. 14. It means that these islands or at least some of them should be given a certain amount of continental shelf/EEZ area. As Wilson himself accepts, such delimitation would assign only 13% of the Aegean sea-bed to Turkey. Wilson, (1979/80), p. 14, 27. However, the result of attributing the restricted or full-effect to these islands is not significantly different in the sense that Turkey would get an insignificant maritime area.




[21] Generally speaking, the UK proposed, under certain circumstances, a continuous line of the continental shelf between its mainland and the Channel Islands. See par. 188. France, on the other hand, attributed very limited effect. par. 149-151.




[22] See Part V, B 6 2. See also Karl, (1977), pp. 648-649.




[23] The Court observed that “The presence of these British islands close to the French coast, if they are given full-effect in delimiting the continental shelf, will manifestly result in a substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise accrue to the French Republic. This fact by itself appears to the Court to be, prima facia, a circumstance creative of inequity and calling for a method of delimitation that in some measure redresses the inequity, par. 196. See also par. 183. Accordingly, the UK proposed, under certain circumstances, a continuous link of continental shelf between its mainland and the Channel Islands. See par. 188. The Court observed that they “are situated on the French side of a median line drawn between the mainlands” and are situated “practically within the arms of a gulf on the French coast”, par. 183.




[24] See Part V, B 6.2.




[25] See par. 202.




[26] The Court continued that these islands had so much autonomy that “the United Kingdom asks the Court to regard them as, in effect, distinct island States for the purpose of determining the continental shelf appurtenant to them”, par. 184. In that case as to the certain characteristics of the Channel Islands, such as security defence and so on, the Court said “The Court accepts the equitable considerations invoked by the United Kingdom as carrying a certain weight”, par. 198. For the arguments over such factors, see par. 188. See also, Colson, (1978), p. 103.




[27] In fact, the French islands are located in the vicinity of Newfoundland which is also an island. However it is much bigger than the French islands and so close to the Canadian mainland that it is appropriate to regard Newfoundland as part of the Canadian mainland coast. In fact, the French islands also face the projection of Nova Scotia which is part of the Canadian mainland.




[28] See par. 68. The Tribunal observed that a relevant distinction was made by the Court of Arbitration in the 1977 UK-France Arbitration when it stated that “the case of the Channel Islands, must, in the view of the Court, be differentiated from that of rocks or small islands by reason of the presence of certain factors such as the considerable population and a substantial agricultural and commercial economy.” Some of these factors are present in the case of St. Pierre and Miquelon, and Newfoundland, in the Canada-France Arbitration, par. 52. In the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration, the Alcatraz group which was on the wrong side of the perpendicular line, and given certain effect, par. 103.




[29] The Arbitration Tribunal in the Canada-France Arbitration also pointed to that fact that the French islands were in the same situation of being separate units, par. 52. In both cases, i.e. the UK-France Arbitration and the Canada-France Arbitration, the islands were so isolated historically and socially that it would be equitable to attribute them some degree of maritime area wider than their territorial waters.




[30] Such maritime areas beyond their territorial waters could only be excessive in terms of the economic and commercial interests of Greece in the Aegean Sea. Köymen notes that if more than three thousand Greek islands dispersed over the Aegean Sea were attributed a continental shelf, the delimitation of which was carried out by the application of the median-line or equidistance method, Turkey would be deprived of even one square inch of continental shelf outside the limits of her territorial waters”, Köymen, (1978), p. 506.




[31] See Part III, B 3; C 2.




[32] See Part V, B 2.2.1. See also Part III, B 3.




[33] See Part I, A 3.3.




[34] See Part V, A 2.




[35] See Part V, B 2.2.1; B 3. In the final account, it is not the natural prolongation in physical sense that exclusively constitutes the basis of title any more. It is mere distance from the mainland up to 200 miles from the coast. See Part III, B 2. Beyond that limit, certain sea-bed features play such a role and thus could be relevant to the delimitation of the continental shelf.




[36] See Part V, B 2.2.1. This is due to the fact that distance, rather than the sea-bed features play a dominant role in the establishment of the seaward extent of the continental shelf. See Part III, B 2.




[37] See Part V, B 5.




[38] See supra, A 1.




[39] Despite the shrinking role of sea-bed features, the Arbitration Court in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration still took them into account in the case which concerned the single delimitation line for both maritime areas. Having indicated that they were still secondary factors having an effect on a delimitation line which was already indicated by the coastal geography, the Tribunal observed that “the rule of natural prolongation can be effectively invoked for purposes of delimitation”, if it is identifiable, par. 116. In the present case, since, the natural prolongation of both parties were part of single continental shelf under the available scientific information, the Tribunal did not consider it sufficiently important to be taken into account to affect the delimitation line. See also par. 114, 115.




[40] See Part V, B 2.2.1. It has been noted that the island of Crete does not seem to be associated with the Turkish mainland in a geological sense. It suggests that a delimitation line which does not give any continental shelf area to Crete dose not necessarily comply with the sea-bed features of the Aegean Sea.




[41] See Part I, A 3.3. This is deep zone whish starts in the Saros Bay and stretches north-east, south-west towards the Greek shores, then turns back and stretches south-east and then south-west up through the gap between Samothraki and Imros and then between Thassos and Limnos. See the Times Atlas and Encyclopaedia of the Sea, p. 17. See Part I, A 3.3.




[42] See Part I, A 3.2.




[43] This is how the ICJ reacted in the face of conflicting information on the respective natural prolongations of Libya and Tunisia in the Tunisia-Libya Case. See par. 60-62, especially 66.




[44] See Part V, B 2.2. As the ICJ observed in the Libya-Malta Case, the “relative economic position of the two States in question”, i.e. their developed or less-developed status has been found irrelevant to the delimitation of maritime areas in the delimitation judgments. It observed that considerations are totally unrelated to the underlying intention of the applicable rules of international law, par. 50.




[45] See Part V, B 2.2.2. See particularly the Libya-Malta Case, par. 50.




[46] See Part V, B.2.2.2; B 6.




[47] See Part I, A 2.




[48] See Part I, A 2.1.




[49] For details, see Part I, A 2.1.




[50] See Part I, A 2.




[51] See par. 73, 74.




[52] See par. 75.




[53] See par. 76.




[54] See Part I, A 2.1; A 2.3.




[55] See Part I, A 2.1; A 2.3.




[56] See Part I, A 2.




[57] See supra, B 2.4.




[58] The Gulf of Maine Case, par. 237-239




[59] The constructions to explore or explore the continental shelf and the EEZ and “safety zones” around them could interfere with navigation. See Part V, Article 56 and 60 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Article 60, paragraph 7 of the 1982 Convention provides that “Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may not be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognised sea lanes essential to international navigation.” Article 80 of the 1982 Convention provides that Article 60 applies mutadis mutandis to artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf for all purposes. However, the interference is insignificant if the interference of the territorial waters regime with the international navigation is considered. See Part III, B 1; C 1.




[60] See Part IV, D 1.




[61] Their effect could not be “decisive”. See Part V, B 2.2.4.




[62] See Part IV, C. 2.




[63] Van Dyke notes that “Turkey’s security interests include the right of unimpeded navigation and the right of overflight. Turkey is also concerned about limiting the militarisation of the Greek islands adjacent to its shores. Greece also has important security interests that need to be considered.” Van Dyke, (1996), p. 400.




[64] See Appendix I, Map 6.




[65] See Part V, B 2.2.4.




[66] These are Limnos, Lesvos, Efstratios, Chios, Psara, Ikaria and Samos. There would be some Turkish continental shelf/EEZ areas behind some Greek islands in the south but these areas would be very limited. See Appendix I, Map 6.




[67] See Appendix I, Map 6 that demonstrates the suggested delimitation line.




[68] See Part V, B 4.




[69] Such general measurements have also been preferred in most of the cases by the international courts. See Part V, B 4.




[70] See supra, A 2.2.




[71] See Part IV, B 4.2.




[72] They are both about 800 miles long. The calculation is made on a map of 1:5 000 000 mile-scale. Philip’s World Atlas, (1991), pp. 20-21.




[73] Roughly speaking, while the Greek mainland coast is 1,156 miles long, the Turkish mainland coast is 1,287 miles long. These figures are calculated on a map of 1:5 000 000 mile-scale. Philip’s World Atlas, p. 20-21. Measured from the Dalaman River to the Turkish-Greek land frontier terminus in the northeast Aegean, the Turkish coastline that faces the Aegean Sea is 2,815 km long. Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996, p. 4.




[74] The Tribunal in the Guinea-Guinea Bissau Arbitration did not consider the islands that did not affect the delimitation. According to the Tribunal, “relevant islands must not be taken into account in the form of the total obtained by adding together the parameters of each of them, but as elements determining the general direction of the entire coastline of the country considered”, par. 97. What the ICJ Chamber did in the Gulf of Maine Case with regard to the Seal islands was quite similar as it included them in the ratio by giving them only “half-effect”, as they did not affect the delimitation at all, par. 222, p. 337.




[75] The Tribunal in the Canada-France observed that the coastlines of islands that are not facing the projection of another State either “literally or in opposition”, can be excluded. The Tribunal seemed to accept French justification but observed that some of the coast which had been excluded by France was in fact “generating projections which meet and overlap, either literally or in opposition”, par. 29. On the same basis, the Tribunal observed that France justifiably excluded the Canadian line across Fortune Bay and opposite the north and east coast of Miquelon and St. Pierre as far as the longitude of point 9 of the 1972 Agreement, since the north and east coasts of Miquelon and St. Pierre do not face the area in dispute. The Tribunal, therefore, also justified the exclusion of these coasts of St. Pierre and Miquelon by Canada, par. 30.




[76] As the ICJ noted in the Tunisia-Libya Case, it is the “relevant circumstances of the area” which will determine whether it should be “the comparison between the more restricted or between the more extensive area.” The Court further noted that “In a case such as the present one in which the two calculations would produce different results, it is the relevant circumstances of the area which will afford the basis for determining whether it is the comparison between the more restricted or between the more extensive area that will determine whether the result is equitable”, par. 103.




[77] For the figures, see Appendix II, Table 2.




[78] The coastline of Turkish islands is only 679 km-long. While the Aegean islands have a 679 km-long coastline, the Black Sea islands’ coastline is 6 km, and the Mediterranean islands have 130 km-long coastline. Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996, p. 4.




[79] See Part V, B 4.1; 4.3.




[80] See supra, A 2.1.




[81] See Appendix I, Map 6.




[82] See Part V, B 4.3.




[83] As the ICJ noted in the Tunisia-Libya Case, “If both States claim territorial waters of the same breadth around coasts of generally similar configuration, and calculated from baselines determined on the same general basis, then the relative proportions to each other of the areas of continental shelf stricto sensu appertaining to each State are likely to be broadly the same as the relative proportions of the sea-bed areas comprising both the continental shelf and the bed of the territorial sea and internal waters”, par. 103.




[84] For these figures, see Appendix II, Tables 1 and 2.




[85] For similar observations, see the Statement made by O. Bölükbaşı, of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meeting on the Aegean Issues: Problems-Legal and Political Matrix, sponsored by the Foreign Policy Institute, Hacettepe University, 19 January 1995, İstanbul; Van Dyke, (1996), p. 403.





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