3.1. Established maritime rights

3.1.1. The Baselines

As early as 1936, Greece’s Law 230 provided that the Greek territorial sea was measured from the coast.[1] This is to mean that Greece adopted what is called the system of normal baseline,[2] which leaves wider high seas and international navigation.[3] When Greece became a party to the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in 1972, it made a reservation according to which it would, in the absence of international agreement, “apply the normal baseline for the measurement of the territorial sea to delimit shelf boundaries.”[4] Since then, there has been no deviation from the baseline system it applies. The fact that Greece has interests in the preservation of free navigation[5] was an element that seemed to have played a major role in its preference on normal baseline systems.

The system of normal baseline has more recently been confirmed for the Greek coasts. With regard to closing lines across gulfs and bays, Greece again seems to be concerned with free navigation. First of all, the relevant Greek law does not indicate which coastal indentations would be regarded as bay in legal terms.[6] Without a definition, Greece however favours the view that the indentations whose mouths do not exceed 10 miles could be closed with a straight baseline. The wider bays will be closed where the distance is 10 miles across.[7]

Obviously, the Greek domestic law does not allow the system of straight baselines or the 24-mile closing line for bays although they are allowed by both the 1958 Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and later by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.[8] The Greek domestic law rather provides for the normal baselines and the 10-mile closing line for bays on Greek coasts.[9] It should be noted, however, that there are many criticisms of Greece adopting normal baselines rather than straight baselines.[10] It is emphasised that if Greece benefits from its right to the system of straight baselines as a party to 1982 Convention, it would gain considerable maritime areas as its Aegean coasts are deeply fringed and surrounded by many islands and islets in close vicinity.

Unlike Greece, however, Turkey did not and does not seem to have any such navigational reason to keep its baselines favourable to the wider open seas. It accordingly preferred a system that gives wider maritime areas to the coastal State. Article 4 of the first Turkish regulation as to the subject, namely the Law of 1964,[11] stated that the “lowest ebb line” extending along the coast was the normal baseline from which the width of the territorial sea was to be measured. However, paragraph 2 stated that “in indented coasts or in areas with islands located close to shore, the method of straight baselines connecting the foremost points of the shore and the islands does apply”. Moreover, Article 5 of the Law also referred to the closing lines for gulfs with entrances not extending 24 nautical miles. The Article did not require the “semicircular test” and thus departed from the 1958 Convention to which Turkey was not and is not a party.[12]

The most recent regulation, the Territorial Waters Act of 1982, replaced the 1964 regulation. The Act provides in Article 3 that baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is to be measured would be delimited by the Council of Ministers.[13] Shortly afterwards, the Council of Ministers declared that “taking into account the peculiar characteristics of the seas which surround Turkey and of the principle of equity, [it] has decided that the situation obtained before the proclamation of this law will be continued.”[14]

The previous situation, established by the 1964 regulation, was actually shown on a map prepared by the Turkish Office of Navigation and Hydrography (TONH) in May 1965.[15] According to the map, many lines connecting foremost points of the mainland, as well as points on some islands lying in the close vicinity are established for the Mediterranean coast which is deeply indented. The bays of İskenderun and Taşucu are closed with two lines measuring 23.5 and 7 miles respectively. It seems that the practice in this part is in accordance with the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.[16]

On the Aegean coast, the map similarly indicates many continuous lines. The Aegean coast of Turkey is deeply indented and fringed with some small islands and rocks. As the map indicates, straight lines have been drawn to connect the foremost points of these features. About six juridical bays have been closed with straight lines.[17] The mouth of the Çanakkale Strait is also closed by the straight lines that pass on the foremost points of the Turkish islands of Gökçeada, Bozcaada, and the Rabbit Islands in the mouth of the strait.[18]

It should also be noted here that a map attached to the decree issued by the Council of Minister in 1987 by which exploration licences were granted to the TPOA, did not seem to have adopted the system of straight baselines.[19] Since the Council of Ministers had already approved the previous practice that was with the system of straight baselines as unofficially shown on the map of the TONH, it seems correct to assume that Turkey applies the same system of straight baselines.[20]

As we can see, Greece and Turkey currently apply different baselines systems in the Aegean Sea. Baselines have a potential to affect both the measurement and the delimitation of the maritime areas, as they are all measured from baselines.[21] The difference in the system of baseline in the Aegean Sea is therefore something that should be considered for the settlement of maritime issues.[22]

3.1.2. Territorial sea limits in the Aegean Sea

As should be clear so far, the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 regulates inter alia the status of the Aegean Sea in many respects.[23] It does not, however, regulate the territorial sea limits in the Aegean. Some authors,[24] however, consider by relying on certain factors that the Lausanne Peace Treaty provides 3 miles of territorial sea in the Aegean Sea for the two countries. Firstly, they points to the fact that the Treaty refers to the figure of 3 miles to provide that islands which are within this limit belong to Turkey.[25] Moreover, they argue that the 3-mile territorial sea limit is also inferable from both the attitudes during the Lausanne Conference and the practice in that region at that time.[26]

In a sense, the result of the discussion is not significant since both Greece and Turkey accepted wider limits in the Aegean Sea in later years. Since 1931, Greece has made several regulations that concern the breadth of Greek territorial waters.[27] A Presidential Decree in 1931[28] defined the extent of the territorial waters “for the purpose of aviation and control thereof”. The decree declared that “The extent of the territorial waters referred to in Article 2 of Act No. 5017 shall be fixed at 10 nautical miles from the coast of State...”. Act No. 5017 had already declared in that year that “The State exercises complete and absolute sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” The term “Greek territory” as used in this Act or in the regulation made pursuant to the Act “shall be deemed to include the territorial waters and the air space above these waters.”[29]

The territorial sea of Greece was defined again for another purpose in 1934. Law 6114 of April 1934 defined the territorial sea for the purpose of “fees paid in cases of salvage as three nautical miles from the coasts without prejudice to provisions of laws concerning special matters.” A similar arrangement was made in 1935 by another law concerning “towing within the territorial sea.”[30]

It therefore seems that various limits rather than a single limit for the Greek territorial waters had been referred to by 1936. Law 230 of September 1936 however settled the issue in a quite specific way. Article 1 of Law No. 230 provided that “The extent of the territorial sea is fixed at six nautical miles from the coast, without prejudice to provisions in force concerning special matters, with respect to which the territorial zone shall be delimited at a distance either larger or smaller than six miles.”[31] Law 230 thus put a general limit to the Greek territorial sea as 6 miles.

However, it did not repeal the pre-existing limits accepted for special purposes. What is significant as a result is that the Presidential Decree of 1931 had already put in place a 10-mile limit pursuant to Law 5017 of 13 June, 1931, “for the purposes of aviation and the control thereof.” It was obviously a wider limit than 6 miles. Accordingly, Greece at present observes a 6 miles territorial sea but still keeps its national airspace at a distance of 10 miles in the Aegean Sea.

While Greece was enacting these regulations with respect to its territorial waters, Turkey did not clearly regulate the breadth of its territorial sea until 1964. Turkey de facto applied a 3-mile territorial sea in the Aegean Sea based on the assumption that the 3-mile limit had been implied by the Lausanne Peace Treaty.[32]

In 1964, the Territorial Waters Law No. 476 was enacted to clarify the situation.[33] The Law introduced a general principle that the extent of the Turkish territorial sea was 6 miles. Article 2, however, introduced an exception by providing that wider limits could be declared on the basis of reciprocity against States claiming wider territorial waters. In accordance with that law, the limits of Turkish territorial waters in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean were fixed at 12 miles on the basis of reciprocity. However, the limits in the Aegean Sea were declared to be 6 miles.

The principle of reciprocity was later deemed to be inappropriate by Turkey in the sense that it could give the initiative to other States to extend the current territorial sea limit.[34] In order to correct the situation, Law 476 was replaced by a new regulation in 1982. The new regulation, the Territorial Sea Act No. 2674,[35] provides as the general principle that the width of the territorial sea is 6 nautical miles. The regulation, however, authorised the Council of Ministers “to accept limits other than 6 miles for certain seas according to the equitable principles by taking into account all of the relevant circumstances and conditions of the seas concerned.”[36] On the basis of this authorisation, the Council of Ministers, “by taking into account all of the circumstances of the seas surrounding Turkey and equitable principles”, approved the pre-existing limit of 12 miles in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and the limit of 6 miles in the Aegean Sea.[37]

At present, therefore, both Greece and Turkey apply the 6-mile territorial sea in the Aegean Sea. Greece still observes a national airspace which is 4 miles wider than its territorial waters.

3.2. Maritime rights in dispute in the Aegean Sea

3.2.1. Proposed 12-mile limit by Greece

Although the territorial sea limit seems to have been settled at 6 miles in the Aegean Sea, it is not still without controversy as Greece is considering making further changes to the current extent of its territorial sea by extending its territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 miles. However, this is something that Turkey rigorously argues to be illegal and unacceptable.

The extent of the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea was a matter of controversy as early as 1936. The extension from 3 miles to 6 miles by Greece attracted objections from the major maritime nations of that time, which were understandably in favour of a narrow territorial sea limit of 3 miles.[38] Turkey would also inevitably suffer from the shrinking sea areas available for free navigation and for its other activities in the Aegean Sea. It did not however raise any objection to the Greek 6 miles claim.[39] The lack of objection was said to be due to the good relations that existed during that period between the two countries.[40]

The initial dispute between Greece and Turkey as to the territorial sea extent in the Aegean emerged in 1964 when Turkey decided to extend its territorial sea to 6 miles.[41] Although Greece had already claimed the same limit, it objected to this move on the basis that the 6-mile Turkish territorial waters would interfere with Greece’s fishing rights.[42]

The actual territorial sea dispute between the two countries began to emerge later in the early years of the 1970s, when Greece started to express its choice in favour of a 12-mile limit for territorial waters. UNCLOS III constituted an arena for Greece to raise its arguments that eventually tempted Turkey to join in. It became clear throughout the Conference that the objectives of the two countries as to a prospective conventional rule on the breadth of the territorial sea differed fundamentally as a result of their preferences over the territorial sea limits. Generally speaking, while Greece favoured a general and uniform limit of 12 miles, Turkey was seeking a rule that would be flexible enough to allow narrower limits for seas with special circumstances such as the Aegean.[43]

The Conference eventually accepted that “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles”.[44] The practical consequence of this has been that Turkey began to put more pressure on Greece to prevent any actual extension.[45]

When the UN Convention came into force on 14 November 1994, the Aegean territorial sea dispute entered a new phase.[46] Greece has not yet extended its territorial waters. This does not however mean that it has abandoned its desire to extend its territorial waters as it regularly reiterates it. Turkey reacts with strong statements to prevent any actual extension.[47]

The Greek Parliament ratified the UN Convention on 1 June 1995 and permitted the Government to implement it at its discretion.[48] Following the Parliament’s ratification, statements made by the Greek Government reiterates the Greek intention to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles when Greece deemed it “expedient and nationally beneficial to do so.”[49]

On the other hand, the Turkish Government emphasises that the extension of the territorial sea in the Aegean Sea will never be acceptable to Turkey.[50]When the TGNA discussed the situation arising from Greece’s ratification of the 1982 Convention and unanimously approved a declaration in its 8 June 1995 session, which provided in part that

While the TGNA hopes that the Greek Government will not decide to increase its territorial waters in the Aegean beyond six miles,...it has nevertheless decided to grant the Turkish Government all powers, including those that may be deemed necessary in the military field, for the protection and defence of our country’s vital interests in the face of such an eventuality.[51]

Although there is not yet an actual extension of Greek territorial waters, even the intention causes enormous tension. It therefore seems that the two States need to settle the matter in order to remove a major source of tension in their relations. The relevant legal principles constitute the major ground on which the territorial sea dispute can be addressed and settled consequently as will be examined later in the present study.[52]

3.2.2. Territorial sea delimitation in the Aegean Sea

Whether Greece is legally entitled to extend its territorial sea limit in the Aegean Sea is the major aspect of the Aegean territorial sea dispute.[53] However, in the face of both history and the current Turkish arguments, there is also a need to establish a line to separate the territorial waters of the two countries in the Aegean Sea.[54]

There is no previous agreement between Greece and Turkey that establishes an extensive territorial sea boundary between the Turkish mainland and the nearby Greek islands. The Lausanne Peace Treaty did not establish any territorial sea boundary[55] but provided for the establishment of the Official International Boundary Commission which worked between 1925-26 and drew the boundary only where the land frontier terminates at sea.[56]

The map prepared by the Commission shows an unconnected “international boundary line” which starts at the mouth of the Martisa (Meriç or Evros) River and runs seaward in a south-south-easterly direction, thus ignoring the general direction of the Greek-Turkish adjacent coasts.[57] The line follows roughly a median line, except at the east of Chios where it almost touches the mainland of Turkey. It seems that the Commission extended this line southwards between the Greek islands of Samothrace, Limnos, Lesvos, Chios, Samos and the Turkish mainland coast.

The Commission established the line when the territorial sea limits of both countries were 3 miles. Moreover, there is no official basis for the view that this line delimits the territorial sea of both States. It was obvious that the Commission’s line was established as an extension of the “Greek-Turkish frontier” rather than a territorial sea boundary.[58]

The only instrument that established a delimitation line for the Aegean territorial sea is the Treaty of January 1932 between Turkey and Italy.[59] It regulated principally the sovereignty over the islands and islets in the area between the island of Castellorizo and the coast of Anatolia by enumerating them by names in Articles 1-4. Moreover, the Treaty in Article 5 established a delimitation line for the respective territorial waters (delimitation des eaux territoriales) between the coast of Anatolia and the island of Castellorizo and its adjacent islets.[60]

Since the sovereignty over this group, together with the rest of the Dodecanese archipelago, was attributed to Greece by the 1947 Peace Treaty with Italy, the line drawn by the Agreement should still be the delimitation line in that specific region between Greece and Turkey.[61]

The line drawn by the Treaty is not really a median line. It diverges in many places from the course of a precise median line between the Turkish coast and Castellorizo as well as its adjacent islands. Another significant point as to the line is that it was further extended northwards by a protocol between Turkey and Italy in December of 1932.[62] The document established a “frontier line” (la ligne frontiere) between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast by connecting 37 different points. It provided that up to the distance of 12 miles between the territories of the contracting States, the line established would both separate the areas of national sovereignty in the sea (la souverianite deux Pays sur les eaux de la mer), and constitute a line which would divide the areas in which the islands would belong to the party nearby. Where the distance is more than 12 miles, the line would not delimit the sovereignty over the water areas, but separate only the areas in which sovereignty over the islands is regulated.

As noted before, the validity of this second document is disputed by Greece and Turkey. It is therefore apparent that there is no line delimiting the territorial seas of Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea,[63] except for a line that has been drawn in very restricted areas in the northeast and southeast Aegean Sea.[64]

Although the territorial sea delimitation in the Aegean Sea is unsettled, the present study does not address it in much detail. The issue creates relatively very little tension between the two countries. Both States seem to observe the median line between the Turkish mainland and the Greek islands nearby. It is therefore appropriate to restrict the consideration of the territorial sea dispute to its more urgent and significant aspect, namely the legality of any extension beyond the current 6 miles and address the issue only where it is related to the main issue.[65]

3.2.3. The extent of Greece’s national airspace

As seen above, Greece observes a 10-mile national airspace which is 4 miles wider than its territorial sea.[66] The 10-mile Greek national airspace has attracted and still attracts strong Turkish opposition.[67] It is an issue which causes tension and sometimes even confrontation between the two countries in the Aegean skies. To demonstrate its non-recognition practically, Turkey uses areas beyond the 6 miles territorial sea for military flights as part of the international airspace.[68] Greece regularly launches protests over these “violations” of its national airspace by Turkish aircrafts.[69]

The Turkish position on the issue is explained on the basis that it is contrary to international law and practice. Turkey argues that international law does restrict the national airspace to the limit of the territorial sea. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Articles 1 and 2 of the Chicago Conventions of 1944 on Civil Aviation[70] are mentioned by Turkey to prove that the breadth of national airspace has to correspond to the breadth of territorial sea.[71] Turkey also puts forward the lack of any precedent in the State practice as another reason proving invalidity of the 10-mile Greek airspace.[72]

Greece, on the other hand, depends its position on some historic data. It argues that it has a right to a 10-mile national airspace on the basis of a local custom or historic right which, according to Greece, was founded by long-standing practice in the absence of objection from other States including Turkey.[73] The tacit acceptance by States, according to Greece, established a right, which is, as it appears from the argument, in the nature of historic rights or a local custom between the States concerned.[74] It emphasises that since Turkey did not object to that practice for many years,[75] it cannot, as a result, legally object to such an “established right”.[76]

The legality of the 10-mile limit of Greek national airspace in the Aegean is closely related to maritime issues, especially to the territorial sea.[77] The aim is not to indicate a legal solution to the dispute in the present study but to address it as far as it is related to the dispute over the Aegean territorial sea.[78]

3.2.4. Dispute over the continental shelf delimitation

With the introduction of the continental shelf concept into international law in the late 1940s and 1950s,[79] it was Greece that first attempted to benefit from the continental shelf rights. It started geophysical explorations to search for oil in the Aegean in the early years of the 1960s. The search eventually paid off in 1968 with the discovery of oil reserves near the Greek island of Thassos. The search for oil reserves continued from 1968 to 1972 by way of granting exploration licences to multinational companies that could, under the licences, “explore and exploit areas of the northern, central and southern Aegean”.[80] The licensed areas also covered the places beyond the territorial waters of two countries despite the fact that these areas were yet to be delimited between the two neighbouring States.

No objection from Turkey to these activities was recorded at that time. Turkey’s response rather took a practical form.[81] In November 1973, Turkey granted 27 petroleum concessions to the Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPOA)[82] covering some parts of the Aegean. The concessions referred to the “continental shelf areas outside the Turkish territorial waters in the Aegean Sea”.[83]

The problem was that the concessions granted by Greece and Turkey coincided in some parts. The map attached to Turkey’s declaration[84] showed that Turkey considered the median line between the mainlands as the line delimiting the Aegean continental shelves between the two countries. The map indicated no continental shelf areas appertaining to the Greek islands situated beyond the imaginary median line running across the Aegean Sea from north to south.

Greece reacted furiously to this attempt as a “unilateral delimitation”. It was noted by Greece that some areas licensed were “Greek continental shelf areas” near the Greek islands of Samothrace, Limnos, Aghios Eustaritos, Lesvos, Chios, Psara, and Antipsara. Since they denied the continental shelf to these Greek islands, the Turkish petroleum concessions were inadmissible to Greece.[85] In response, Turkey defended its position and argued that it was the “equitable” delimitation line according to international law.[86]

Disagreeing over the delimitation line in such a manner, Turkey invited Greece for negotiation in order to find a solution according to international law that would be “in the interests of both countries”.[87] Greece, in response, noted that it would not oppose “a delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries based on the provisions of present day positive international law, as codified by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.”[88] Turkey reiterated its position that the differences over the continental shelf delimitation should be resolved through the negotiations on the basis of international law.[89]

However, these suggestions could not be put into practice. While further proposals were in progress, TPAO proceeded with the concessions, by sending the research vessel Çandarlı to the licensed areas.[90] Greece protested and informed Turkey that it should have sought the consent of the Greek Government, since Çandarlı had sailed “into waters superjacent in whole or in part to the continental shelf of islands” in the eastern Aegean Sea.[91] Turkey responded that Çandarlı was carrying out research “dans le plateau continental turc conformement aux regles du droit international”. The situation, it observed, indicated the urgency of finding a solution to the problem with a mutual agreement in conformity with the rules of international law.[92]

The research activities continued to cause tension in the following months. The situation became so dangerous that, for the first time, the government leaders met on 27 June 1974 to scale down the tension. The delimitation of the continental shelf became a matter of negotiations between Greece and Turkey for the first time, but no result was reached, probably due to the differences over the applicable rules of international law.[93]

On 2 July 1974, the Turkish Government granted four more exploration licences to the TPOA in addition to those given in November 1973. The exploration areas were thus extended further westward around Bozcaada in the north; Ayios Evstratios in the middle; and the Dodecanese in the south.[94] The decision again referred to “continental shelf areas of Turkey” for the purpose of exploration. Settlement of the dispute became even more difficult because of the two countries’ hostility over the “Cyprus problem” which accelerated and entered a new phase with Turkey’s military interference in the island in July 1974.[95]

It became even clearer through the following argumentative notes[96] that the two sides basically differed on the applicable rules of international law.[97] The two countries also differed on whether the dispute should be referred to the ICJ or be negotiated without outside interference. While Greece preferred a settlement through the ICJ, Turkey was against an initial recourse to the ICJ without first attempting to settle the dispute through direct negotiations.[98] For these reasons, further meetings produced neither a solution nor an agreement on the means of finding a solution.

Greece had taken Turkey’s acceptance of the possibility of referring the matter to the Court as amounting to a special agreement, as a compromise, and used this to submit the dispute directly to the Court.[99] Upon the further research activities of Turkey in the Aegean Sea in 1976,[100] Greece considered this Turkish research as a “flagrant violation of Greek sovereign rights in contradiction with international law”,[101] and asked for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. At the same time, it submitted a unilateral application to the ICJ on 19 August 1976 for the settlement of the dispute.

The Greek application to the UN Security Council depended on the alleged threat to peace by the Turkish violation of Greek sovereign rights. After the consultations, the Security Council first urged the parties to “do everything in their power to reduce the present tension in the area”. Then, it proposed the previously failed way and called on the parties “to resume direct negotiations” and “to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences which they may identify in connexion with their present dispute.”[102]

Greece’s application to the ICJ instituted “proceedings against the Republic of Turkey in respect of a dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf appertaining to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, and the rights of the parties thereover.”[103] The Application also concerned a request for interim measures of protection to be indicated by the Court for the preservation of the rights of Greece, pending the final decision.[104] However, the Court ruled that “the circumstances as they now present themselves to the Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power…to indicate interim measures of protection.”[105] The Court did not address the substantive request, as it decided, by 12 votes to 2, that it was “without jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Government of the Hellenic Republic on 10 August 1976”,[106] in the face of Turkey’s objection to the jurisdiction of the Court.[107]

Although the proceedings at the ICJ created some delays for the implementation of the Security Council’s decision, Greece and Turkey eventually concluded the so-called ten-point agreement in November 1976 in Bern, Switzerland, even before the Court’s decision on jurisdictional matters.[108] The agreement did not solve the dispute but established a framework for future negotiations for a solution. It also provided some safeguards against the creation of further tension in the Aegean. Among them the most important was to prevent any party from conducting exploration or exploitation activities on “the continental shelf of the Aegean” until the solution is found.

However, despite the further negotiations between the two countries in 1977, no solution was achieved.[109] The recent period, after the emergence of the continental shelf dispute in the 1970s, has similarly witnessed both crises and negotiations with no result. The first crisis in this period was sparked in mid-1980s with a move by the PASOK[110] to take control of the multinational consortium, the North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC) which exploited the Prinos oil field off the Greek island of Thassos. This caused what was called the “March crisis” as Turkey saw the take-over as an indication of a new Greek intension to proceed with oil exploration.[111]

Upon this move, Turkey decided to give more permits to TPAO for oil explorations outside the Turkish territorial waters and off the Greek islands of Lesvos, Limnos and Samothrace.[112] The diffusion of the crisis[113] led to the start of new wave of negotiations between the two countries which, however, produced no result.[114] Moreover, despite the positive atmosphere created by the two leaders in Davos, the following meetings did not solve any outstanding of the disputes.[115]

Since then, no serious negotiations have been held between the two countries to address specifically the delimitation of the continental shelf. The two States still refrain from any act of exploitation in the Aegean Sea[116] and the dispute is still to be settled. This is no surprise since both parties seem to stick to their respective views as to both the means and bases of settlement.[117] Delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea on the basis of international law will take a considerable examination in the present study.[118]

3.2.5. Delimitation of the possible exclusive economic zone

The concept of the EEZ emerged during the discussions at UNCLOS III and was shortly considered as part of customary international law. This is a concept that gives extensive exclusive rights to the coastal State over living and non-living resources as well as jurisdiction over the structures related, up to 200 miles from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured.[119]

Greece has not so far proclaimed an EEZ in the Aegean Sea. It does not however mean that it does not intend to do so. Reference has already been made to the EEZ in the new Greek law relating to the “Exploration, Research and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons and Related Issues”.[120] Moreover, the European Union has proposed the establishment of a 200 miles fisheries zone in the Mediterranean for the conservation and management of fishing resources that fall within its exclusive competence. As a full member of the EU, Greece is likely to declare the EEZ as a result of the EU move.[121] Moreover, Greece is under pressure from its own public, especially from some Greek academics that it should declare the EEZ to take the initiative on this issue.[122]

Nor has Turkey so far declared an EEZ in the Aegean, although it has already done so in the Black Sea. However, unlike Greece, Turkey does not seem to have an immediate plan or desire to establish an EEZ area in the Aegean. It seems rather that Turkey is against the declaration of an EEZ by any party before the settlement of the continental shelf dispute. This is an understandable attitude from the Turkish perspective as the delimitation of existing maritime areas in the Aegean is already a very sensitive issue. Turkey would not risk having another possible Greek maritime claim in the narrow waters of the Aegean Sea which could only further complicate the settlement of the delimitation dispute.[123]

The concepts of the EEZ and the continental shelf are integrated in the contemporary international law in terms of both conception and seaward extent.[124] As a result, there are in fact many benefits of considering both maritime areas together for the purpose of delimitation especially in a relatively narrow sea area like the Aegean Sea. The present study accordingly will examine the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ in the Aegean together in order to establish a complete picture of the Aegean maritime issues.[125]

4. Conclusions

The review in this Chapter has established the historical basis of the Aegean disputes and clarified the sources and characteristics of the disagreements. The review has also demonstrated that some disputes are related to the interpretation or application of certain international agreements. In this context, the determination of sovereignty over certain islands and islets in clear terms is a disputed matter. Another is related to the demilitarized status of the eastern Aegean islands which was established by certain international treaties.

Rest of the Aegean disputes result from a need to regulate certain aspects of the Aegean status. Greece’s entitlement to extend its territorial waters and to have a 10-mile national airspace are two disputes in this context. Others concern basically the delimitation matters with regard to the territorial waters, the continental shelf and a prospective EEZ. These issues could be classified as the “Aegean maritime disputes” and are all related to each other in this sense. Some of them are, however, more significant than the others as they cause more tension. In the following chapters, the three main issues, namely Greece’s intention to declare 12 miles territorial sea, delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf and delimitation of the prospective Aegean EEZ, will be given the most of the considerations. Other issues will be considered as far as they relate to these three main disputes.