ABSTRACT
It is generally believed that Cyprus question has been a dispute among Greece, Turkey, Great Britain and Cyprus itself. However, the riots that erupted on the island in October 1931 and their repercussions in Greece revealed that Greek ruling circles and public opinion treated the Cyprus dispute until 1960 as a matter between Greece/Greek Cypriots and Britain. The crisis in October 1931 had come about a short while after Turkey and Greece established good-neighborly relations in the summer and fall of 1930 by signing two sets of treaties that ushered in a new phase in the history of the Turkish-Greek relations. This article analyzes the October 1931 riots and the subsequent Greek official and popular reactions to them as they manifest how Greece perceived the Cyprus dispute until 1960.
Author: Bestami Sadi Bilgiç
Article's Full-Name: THE CYPRUS CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1931 AND GREECE’S REACTION: THE PLACE OF TURKEY AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN THE EYES OF GREEK AND GREEK CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP
Originally published in Review of International Law and Politics (RILP), Ankara. Vol. 1, No. 4, 2005, pp. 91-101.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the USAK (International Strategic Research Organization), Ankara!
INTRODUCTION
On 21 October 1931 riots erupted in Cyprus and the ensuing events culminated in the burning down of the house of the British Governor in Nicosia. The agitation was an open expression of the desire by the Greek Cypriots for enosis, union with Greece. The enosis desires had been kept alive since 1878, and the whole Cyprus question continued to be treated as an issue between Britain and Greece, although the island had been originally taken from the Ottoman Empire by the British, who forced the new Turkish state to confirm their annexation of the island in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In this article, Greece’s reaction to the Cyprus crisis of 1931 will be discussed. Both official Greek position and popular manifestations will be examined.
It is generally believed that Cyprus question is a dispute among Greece, Turkey, Great Britain and Cyprus itself. However, the developments on the island in October 1931 and their repercussions in Greece revealed that in the eyes of the Greek ruling circles and public opinion, the Cyprus dispute was a matter between Greece, Greek Cypriots and Britain.
Here, it should also be noted that this crisis came about a short while after Turkey and Greek established good-neighborly relations in the summer and fall of 1930 by signing two sets of treaties that ushered in a new page in the history of the Turkish-Greek relations. To understand the issue better, an attempt will be made first to review some of the roots of the trouble between the Greek Cypriots and the British, going back to the Treaty of Lausanne.
Cyprus after Lausanne, 1923-1931:
With the Lausanne treaty, Turkey renounced all its claims over the island. There were specific provisions, though, for Turkish Cypriots who opted for Turkish nationality and demanded to immigrate to Turkey. Following the Lausanne agreement, Turkey redefined its policy toward Cyprus. Accordingly, Ankara supported British rule of the island as the best guarantee that the position of the Turkish Cypriots would be secure from the threat of Enosis. Moreover, the Turkish government attempted to encourage Turkish Cypriots to immigrate to the mainland. It also monitored the activities of anti-republican elements on the island, and attempted to safeguard certain commercial interests. Furthermore, Turkey sought to encourage the adoption of new reforms in Turkey by the Turkish community on the island and to assist the Turkish Cypriot community in areas like health and education. Overall Turkey sought to pursue a balanced policy by accommodating the British and at the same time appearing to intervene in the internal affairs of the island.
The Turkish government opened up a consulate in Nicosia in 1925 in order to provide Turkish Cypriots with information and assist them in migration to Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish government asked Britain to extend the time permitted for those who wished to take Turkish nationality to make their declaration from three to twelve months. Ultimately, only about nine thousand Turkish-Cypriots applied for Turkish nationality, and only about half of the applicants actually immigrated to Turkey.
Greece was also keen on keeping good relations with the British. The official policy of both England and Greece that the matter of ceding Cyprus to Greece, as once had been proposed in 1915 by the British to lure the Greek government to take sides with the Allies but eventually rejected by Athens, was no longer open to discussion. Yet, Athens still followed a low-profile but persistent campaign aimed at persuading the British to surrender their predominant political position on the island in exchange for strategic guarantees and base rights. The Greek strategy was to keep Cyprus alive as a diplomatic issue without antagonizing the British. The conviction in Greek ruling circles was that, given sufficient time and patience, the British would eventually accede to the enosis sentiment present both in Greece and on Cyprus.
In an attempt to clarify the status of Cyprus, the British High Commissioner of the island read on 1 May 1925 the Lettres Patent, proclaiming Cyprus a British Crown Colony with certain legislative changes. Greek Cypriot leaders reacted with frustration. The Archbishop of Cyprus protested the change of status of the island because it contravened “the desires of the island’s population.” However, this protest could not avoid the fate of the previous demarches by the Greek Cypriot leadership and thus was overlooked by the British authorities outright. Another memorandum by the Greek Cypriot members of the legislative council followed on 17 November 1925. In December of the same year, though, the Turks, Catholics, Maronites and Armenians presented counter-petitions against union with Greece. The British administration duly informed the Greek Cypriot deputies that the question of union was definitely closed. Yet, the Greek Cypriot agitation towards enosis did not stop. Another opportunity arose in November 1926 for the Greek Cypriot leadership to agitate for enosis during the deliberations in the legislative council for the 1927 budget estimates.
The Turkish Tribute
In November 1926, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot members of the legislative council unanimously rejected the 1927 budget estimates. On 28 December 1926, Sir Ronald Storrs, the Governor of Cyprus, delivered an address to the members of the legislative council in which he outlined his position in clear terms. He particularly criticized the decision of the council, which, he maintained, was taken without thorough examination due to the inclusion of the annual provision for the payment of the so-called Turkish Tribute.
The so-called Turkish Tribute was an annual sum that the British government agreed to pay to the Ottoman Empire at the time of the British occupation of Cyprus in 1878. It seems, though, that the money did not in effect go to the Ottoman government, but to the foreign bondholders of the Ottoman Loan of 1855, guaranteed by Britain and France. The Cypriots saw the payment of the tribute as a burden on the island, and the members of the council felt that they could bring the matter to the attention of the British government by rejecting the budget estimates. In rejecting the budget, the Turkish Cypriot members of the council sided with the Greek Cypriot members which were dubbed “an unusual occurrence” by the American consul in Port Said.
The wrangling over the Turkish tribute in the legislative council continued until 31 August 1927, when finally the Governor of Cyprus informed the members of the council that the island had been relieved of payment of the Turkish tribute, though it still retained a smaller financial liability as a contribution towards the British imperial defense.
Fiftieth Anniversary Celebrations of the British Annexation of Cyprus
In 1928, the British government in Cyprus prepared an official commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the British occupation of the island. A Greek Cypriot member of the Legislative Council, Theodotou, wrote a letter published in several Athenian newspapers asking that the celebration should not take place. In his letter, Theodotou addressed the Governor of Cyprus asserting that “the people of Cyprus” demanded union with Greece. Theodotou maintained that the celebrations would only remind the Greek Cypriots of their subordination to Britain, increasing their resentment towards British disregard for Greek Cypriot desires for enosis. He also pleaded with the Governor not to invite Greek Cypriots to the celebrations because it would be considered a lack of respect for their aspirations for enosis. He then concluded:
“We have said several times, and repeated it that even though we should be deprived of everything, we would still cry ‘Greece!’ And in the same way, though we should swim in gold, we should cry this word. The yoke is always a yoke, even when it is England. Let Cyprus then be united to its native land. Justice requires it; also British interests, examined in their larger aspect.”
Further plans within the Greek Cypriot community were drawn in February 1928, in several meetings in which bishops and deputies in the Legislative Council took part. The meetings adopted certain resolutions. Accordingly, the Greek Cypriots would abstain from taking part in any meeting or celebration, athletic games, dinners or teas that would be given on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the British occupation. The assembly declared that Greek Cypriots could not participate in any celebration of their subordination. Secondly, on the date of the anniversary of the British occupation, prayers would be offered for the union with Greece in all the churches in Cyprus, which numbered more than seven hundred. Moreover, the anniversary of the Greek revolt of 25 March 1821 would in that year be celebrated ostentatiously. Finally, the Archbishop and the deputies would publish a message in the explanation of the abstention and proclaim the will of the Greek Cypriots for union with Greece. Eventually the celebrations took place, albeit less enthusiastically than Governor Storrs hoped, according to the Athenian press. Ethnos, for instance, wrote that once more Cyprus manifested its desire for union with Greece. The whole people of Cyprus prayed yesterday, 25 March, for this union. It left the small number of English functionaries to celebrate alone. The Hestia evaluated the celebrations more or less in the same fashion.. It asserted that the “strong national character of the island which has been conserved intact through ages, has found once again occasion to manifest itself with such imposing grandeur that those are forced to recognize it who, for one reason or another, do not desire the repetition of these manifestations.” After the Greek general elections in August 1928 brought Venizelos back to power, however, he made his position on the Cyprus question clear by declaring in November that there was no Cypriot question in Greece, although there might be a question between the “Cypriots and the Government of Great Britain.”
The Riots of 1931 and Repercussions in Greece
The enosist agitation continued until 1931 when riots broke out on the island against the British regime. The riots posed another test to the Turkish-Greek reconciliation, one that the relationship survived. The event that eventually instigated the disturbances was the proclamation of the Metropolitan of Kytion, on 17 October 1931, in which he announced his resignation from the local parliament. Addressing his “Hellenic brothers”, the Metropolitan announced that he had sent his resignation to the governor. Protesting against the “arbitrary acts of foreign dynasts”, he said that for fifty-five years, the Greek Cypriots had endured the administration of foreigners “unacquainted with their sentiments and most elementary rights” and indifferent to the needs of this “unhappy island”, in the hope that the liberal sentiments of the old England which had “so well assisted our great country to recover its liberty” would triumph over conceptions of “a shabby colonial interest.” The Metropolitan’s proclamation continued:
“During this dark period of fifty years we have let no opportunity pass of proclaiming our sacred desire to be united to Mother Greece, an inspiration which England was the first to recognize as just and sacred when in 1915 she offered Cyprus to the Hellenic Government of that time. On several occasions, we have sent delegations to London; the memoranda and resolutions in favor of union, more than hundred times. We have had, or rather taken, two occasions – the first in 1907 and the second a year ago – to receive, with the blue and white flag of Greece and the cry of “Long live the Union”, two members of the English Government who had come to investigate on the spot; the Cyprian question. Alas! Instead of being moved by this fine sight of a people, little and poor but proud in seeking liberty, you have done and still do anything possible to show us that we have sadly deceived ourselves in relying upon your liberal sentiments.
He then called on his fellow-Greek Cypriots to join him and refuse to comply with the demands of the authorities, and called for a campaign to unite Cyprus with Greece. He said that the Greek Cypriots had composed about four fifths of the population in Cyprus for many years. They were also convinced that the Turkish Cypriots, “with whom we dwell in such harmony, duly enlightened will unhesitatingly prefer, to the present distress, the equality before the laws and the prosperity which they will enjoy under a liberal Hellenic regime.” He concluded his proclamation by saying, “We proclaim the Union of Cyprus to Mother Greece and we declare that we will do everything humanly possible to effect this decision as soon as possible, feeling certain that the God of Justice and Morality will aid us in this struggle of Right against brute force.”
All the other Greek Cypriot deputies followed his example and resigned from the legislature. Various other officials also resigned. The American Charge d’Affaires in Athens noted that the Greek Cypriots’ move “has far reaching potentialities because of the Metropolitan’s relations to the Greek state in addition to his ecclesiastical capacity.”
On 21 October, a mass meeting was held in Nicosia at which around five to ten thousand people were alleged to have been present. The crowd proclaimed the Metropolitan of Kytion the chief of the “rebellion”, and accompanied by the ex-deputies, went forward to the Governor’s house. Governor Storrs in a conversation then took place with the leaders promised to convey their message to the British government and requested them to disperse the mob. At that point, it was reported, several automobiles containing police reinforcements arrived. Then the crowd burned the automobiles and entered the Governor’s house, which they looted and destroyed by fire. The reason for this action, according to Remillard, the American Consul in Port Said, was the crowd’s conviction that their leaders were being held imprisoned by the British authorities. The Governor escaped to a private house where he proclaimed martial law and telegraphed Malta and Alexandria for urgent assistance. Shortly afterwards, police fired on the mob killing one person and wounding ten.
This initial incident was reportedly followed by further disturbances at Larnaca and Limassol, where the houses of the district commissioners were also burned. Shortly afterwards, however, quiet was restored, although the situation remained tense. Atherton wrote to Washington that the causes of the outbreak were “tolerably familiar.” For many years, a section of the Greek Cypriot community, chiefly lawyers, moneylenders, schoolteachers, and latterly the Greek Orthodox clergy had demanded union with Greece, and the movement had changed in intensity at various periods, Atherton maintained. The specific excuse that led to the October 1931 riots, however, was said to have been the resentment of local politicians against steps that the Governor of the island had taken because of the refusal of the Greek Cypriot members of the legislative council to cooperate with the British authorities. During the summer of 1931 when the British administration proposed to meet a deficit in the budget by the substation import duties for the ad valorem duties, which had been imposed since the days of the Ottoman administration, the Greek Cypriot politicians succeeded in defeating the measure. But as they could suggest no alternative remedy, the specific import duties were imposed by an order in council. Since then Greek Cypriot opposition had hardened.
By the end of October 1931, order was restored almost completely over the island. The leaders of the rebellion were arrested and deported. The further course of the conflict lies beyond the scope of this article. Only Greece’s reaction to this major pro-enosis riot will be assessed.
The available evidence suggests that Greece was very much interested in the events of October 1931. The popular feeling in Greece was apparently in sympathy with the rioters. Robert Skinner, the American Ambassador in Athens, reported to Washington that the recent events in Cyprus had raised a storm of patriotic indignation in Greece that he had not seen before in his five years of residence there. There could be no doubt of its genuineness, Skinner maintained, and public feeling was such that Britain which had long enjoyed peculiar prestige in this country, was now equally in disfavor, “disfavor so pronounced as to have given rise to foolish talk of boycott on British goods and to have compelled the Prime Minister to prohibit the holding of requiem service in Athens for the dead, because it was proposed at the conclusion of the service to make a demonstration before the British Legation.” The requiem service was held, nevertheless, in Marousi, a suburb of the city conducted by the Archbishop of Greece himself, after which a resolution was endorsed by several patriotic organizations. The resolution declared that the struggle of the Greek Cypriots was just and sacred. Secondly, an appeal was made to all liberal men throughout the entire world to create the atmosphere of sympathy on behalf of the Greek Cypriot cause which would contribute to the revocation of orders given at London. Furthermore, the immediate intervention of the League of Nations was requested to stop the “extermination of the Cyprian people” and to provide justice. Finally, a committee was formed, which was composed of representatives of national organizations that would transmit this resolution to the foreign legations in Athens, the Greek government and the political party leaders. Moreover, the Archbishop of Athens on 1 November issued a statement on behalf of the synod of the Greek Orthodox Church, expressing sympathy with the imprisoned bishops and other private persons in Cyprus, and he himself telegraphed the Archbishop of Canterbury along similar lines. Meanwhile a committee of forty-five was formed, headed by Admiral Paul Condouriotis, a former president, and this committee issued an appeal calling upon the British nation to agree for the union of Cyprus with Greece. The appeal was noteworthy from the fact that the signatories were all famous names. Many of them also had large financial interests in Britain. Besides, some of them were known for their pro-English sentiments. An explanatory announcement published by the committee after its first meeting on 30 October 1931 expressed sympathy with the Greek Cypriots’ agitation for enosis, and asked the British government to accede to the union of Cyprus with Greece.
Notwithstanding the vociferous popular support for the Greek Cypriots’ agitation, the Greek government took a cautious stance. In reply to a request for his opinion on the situation from the editor of the Daily News of London, Venizelos made the following signed statement on 24 October:
“In reply to your telegram, I recall that I have stated on all occasions that the question of Cyprus concerns the Cyprians and the British Government and that the Hellenic Government will carefully avoid all interference in a question which constitutes a domestic affair of Great Britain. This does not prevent me from expressing my profound regret over the recent excesses and especially over the attack on the police and the burning of the government palace of the island. No reasonable man can believe that such conduct could help in inducing the British Government to satisfy the national aspirations of the Cyprian Greeks. The nervousness recently manifested by the inhabitants of the island may perhaps have been stimulated to a certain degree by the fact that the important organs of the English press have placed in doubt since the existence of the national sentiment of the Cyprians, who not willing to see their sentiments falsely interpreted, have wished to show them in a more emphatic manner. Unfortunately, this manifestation has taken on an anarchical character and has developed into the sad events which are known.”
During a reception given on 29 October 1931 by the Turkish legation in Athens on the occasion of the anniversary of the promulgation of the Turkish Republic, Venizelos expressed his embarrassment at the Greek Cypriot attempt to realize their national aspirations through illegal means and by force. “I am convinced that England will forsake Cyprus to Greece one day,” he said, and added that if it had not been for the violent agitation, he thought the Conservative party would have approved Greek annexation. However, it was a matter of prestige in the mean time. When the Turkish minister disagreed with the allegation that the Greek authorities had been culpable in the recent violent outbreaks, Venizelos confirmed his conviction that it had not been Greek government actions. But he candidly admitted, “The British Government had taken back the exequatur of our Consul in Cyprus. Unless the British administration had found substantial evidence on the complicity of our Consul, they would not have had recourse to such an action.” He could afford to be so frank, the Turkish minister noted, because of the friendship between Turkey and Greece.
Furthermore, in a conversation he had with the American ambassador in Athens, Venizelos expressed his profound regret for the Greek Cypriots’ destroyed property and claimed that in such a situation, Britain had to apply repressive measures. Venizelos especially lamented the entire course of events “because he was hopeful that the British Government would see its way clear one of these days to retain for itself a naval station and turn over the island as a whole, which is a source of no profit and of no special advantage to it, to the Hellenic Government. He feels that his hopes in this respect have been put back for an indefinite period.”
During his address on the occasion of the reopening of the Greek parliament on 18 November 1931, Venizelos touched upon the recent difficulties in Cyprus. His fellow citizens had criticized him to some extent for not sharing the popular sentiments. In his speech, Venizelos said that the agitation in Cyprus was bound to produce a deep echo throughout the Greek nation, and nobody should be surprised of these manifestations when serious newspapers in England contested the genuineness of the national sentiments of the Greek Cypriots and their repercussions generally among the Greeks of Greece. Unfortunately, he continued, the manifestations of this sympathy were not always confined within the proper limitation. He blamed the Athenian press for not condemning the various excesses committed in Cyprus, especially the destruction of public buildings. Then, he commented on the long friendship between Britain and Greece which, he said, probably prevented the disturbances from going further than they did. Otherwise, he maintained, there would have been incidents which would only have caused rejoicing among Greece’s enemies. He also denied that enosis at such a price would be in Greece’s interest: “The most vital interests of Greece impose upon her, the obligation of maintaining an imperturbable friendship with Great Britain and with Italy as well. This friendship would be fatally disturbed if the Hellenic State fomented or favored the pursuit of national aspirations on the part of the inhabitants of the Greek islands. I have the duty to make this declaration so long as the great powers consider that their essential interests require them to maintain their sovereignty over the islands, no force can disturb it.”If only, Britain decided that Cyprus was of no more use or its interests could be achieved by retaining control of only a part of the territory, Greek Cypriot aspirations could be met. And even this would require that relations between the community and the British government return to normal.
Skinner commented; Venizelos’ declarations showed that the Greek government had initiated a policy of preventing noisy demonstrations in favor of the union of Cyprus, believing that the desired results could be obtained by quiet negotiations. The difficulty is that, Skinner maintained, “The Greek people, who are temperamentally inclined to express their political desires openly, loudly, and above all repeatedly, may not be willing to resign themselves to the policy of watchful waiting so wisely recommended by their Prime Minister.”
CONCLUSION
As the official declarations by the Greek government and popular manifestations revealed, the Cyprus question was seen in Greece as a matter among Greece, Greek Cypriots and Britain. There was almost no mention about Turkey or Turkish interests on the island. On the contrary, the Greek Prime Minister was able to go as far as expressing to the Turkish Ambassador in Athens his joy over the matter that the Turkish Cypriots took sides with the Greek Cypriots during the riots of 1931, which he saw as a reflection of the reconciliation between Turkey and Greece. As a matter of fact, a pamphlet published in 1960 by the Turkish Foreign Ministry on the Cyprus crisis of 1931 points out that the Turkish Cypriot minority departed from its traditional support for the British position. It credits this changed stance to the friendly relations between Greece and Turkey, citing Venizelos’ remark that “the Turkish minority would have definitely taken sides with the English at another time,” and the Greek press’s pleasure at the failure of what they called the British governor’s continuous efforts to incite the Turks against Greek Cypriots. Though, the Turkish Cypriots not supporting British should not mean that the Turkish Cypriots were not against the union of the island with Greece. Every time, the Greek Cypriot dignitaries submitted to the British authorities their demands for enosis, petitions by the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community countered these. Also, a year before the October 1931 riots, during the visit of the British Secretary of the Colonies to the island, the Turkish Cypriot leadership found an opportunity to reiterate their views as regards the union of the island with Greece. In a rather long address, Zeka Bey told the Colonial Secretary that enosis was totally unacceptable to them. The reason presented was that as long as the island is ceded to Greece, the Turkish element would be wiped out from the island. The Turkish obedience to the British rule should not be interpreted to the effect that the Turkish element would not raise any objections to another alien rule.
The Turkish-Greek rapprochement of 1930 had opened a new era for the Turkish-Greek relations. The two neighbors started a political, economic and military cooperation instead of conflict and competition for the regional superiority. The reconciliation between the two countries also enabled the Greek government to be so bold in expressing its stance over the Cyprus question, which was treated as a dispute between the Greek-Greek Cypriot side and the British. As regards the Turkish community on the island, the status this community would be bestowed would be the same with the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. In 1930s, especially after the Turkish-Greek reconciliation, the Turkish minority in Western Thrace enjoyed a considerable tranquility. However, this betterment of living was conditioned upon the course of the general Turkish-Greek relations. It appears that in 1930s the Greek government as well as the Greek Cypriot leadership reckoned for a similar treatment for the Turkish Cypriot community.
Originally published in Review of International Law and Politics (RILP), Ankara. Vol. 1, No. 4, 2005, pp. 91-101.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior written permission of the USAK (International Strategic Research Organization), Ankara!
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