Stating that the German Chancellor Angela Merkel is against the Turkish accession to the EU is not the most original claim in the international relations literature. It is also a widely accepted argument that her election campaign took advantage of the discussions about the Turkish membership and used it as a domestic policy instrument. Yet one must take into account how probable it is for politicians changing their minds, and more importantly, how unpredictable today’s world challenged by economic, social, global, security and identity problems is.

This article should thus be viewed as an attempt to grasp a deeper understanding of Merkel’s statements on the Turkish accession to the EU and to evaluate them in order to establish a sound basis for the analysis of the near future. To understand the current German position in the whole debate, a brief look at the Germans home and particularly foreign affairs in the last years is necessary. The first part will focus on the “normalisation process” of Germany. This chapter places emphasis on the German European Policy agreeing with Knelangen[1] who views the change in the German European Policy as an important example of the change in its foreign policy. Here, the elections of 2005 and their results will be briefly revealed. Following this, the second chapter aims to analyse the current German position in the debate about the Turkish accession and to reveal the inconsistencies if there are any. Here, the perspectives on the European Union and its enlargement in Germany with special focus on Angela Merkel’s statements will also be shown. The third and last chapter summarises the main findings from the first two parts.

I. The Normalisation Process of Germany- Continuity or Change?

“…Farewell and heal...” In his book, „the German Way“, Egon Bahr (2003) [2] quotes the German literate Hermann Hesse to illustrate the new German foreign affairs. Bredow [3]agrees with both of these authors and points to the historical lexicon of the “German question”, which is deepened after the reunification of Germany. The fear from Germany has been associated with the findings of the new motives in their foreign policy, which has started to talk about the “national interests”. Yet this is a debated aspect. Some scholars argue that there is only a slight change to adapt to the demands of today’s world[4] and this adaptation is essential for having continuity in foreign policy, whereas many political scientists like Knelangen[5]  and Bredow[6] support the thesis of the new route of German foreign policy and try to see the proofs in the European policy.

Understanding the question of the foreign policy requires a comprehension of the endogenous dynamics. As Saalfeld[7] points to, the debate on the continuity versus change in the party system reveals important aspects of the issue and should be considered at first stage in order to understand the foreign policy dimension.

The reference point within this context of continuity vs. change is the reunification of Germany, which has brought about certain arguments about the party system.

The term Parteienstaat (‘party state’) indicates that parties are one of the important elements of German political life. Article 21 of the Basic Law and the Party Act of 1967 emphasise their legal recognition in Germany’s constitutional framework.

 Saalfeld concludes his main findings with the argument that the scenario of polarisation and blockage has therefore lost credibility since the mid-1990s and one should overcome the fear from the continuity of Weimar Republic[8].

On the other hand, that the German fear continues was shown with the “normalisation” question. The discussions about the normalisation process has been deepened with the red-green coalition of Gerhard Schröder und Joschka Fischer, who for the first time after the Second World War sent the German military forces abroad by the Kosovo mission[9].

The emphasis on the German national interests deepened with the discussions about the enlargement of the EU in 2004. “Quo vadis Europe?” had never been asked so seriously before. The discussion became a new route and started to focus on a choice between further deepening and enlarging of the Union. Following the end of the Cold War and the end of the ideological cleavage in Europe, the reunification of Germany called for the increased willingness for a united Europe. Even before 2004, the question was asked, if Germany, the most enthusiastic supporter of the enlargement for the post communist countries of Europe, had started to take a new position which was not comparable of the clear and pro-integration position of the past.

Schröder had stated tougher defence of national interests and increased pragmatism in his goals for the European policy before the establishment of the red-green coalition in 1998. If that was the “farewell” to the traditional German foreign policy generated worries in Europe[10].  The question was now “quo vadis Germany?”.

On the other hand, the Schröder-Fischer coalition still emphasised the pursuance of the continuity in the foreign policy. The continuity with the greater focus on national interests views Knelangen[11] as the normalisation process of Germany. Yet this caused the double strategic goals in the European policy -pursuing the German interests in the Union more actively and playing its cards with the confidence. This self-confidence arose from Germany’s key role in the EU together with “the acceptance of its room for manoeuvre within the scope of the Union”[12].

It is a fact that Germany’s economic problems after the reunification had played an important role in this context.  This caused a certain goal conflict, namely supporting the Eastern enlargement and mutually aiming to decrease the German contribution to the EU budget and the burden on Germany because of the common agricultural policy[13].

Despite this conflict in the European policy, that Germany had supported the Eastern enlargement should demonstrate the importance of geostrategic interests in this context. This should be kept in mind, since Turkey’s geostrategic role is one of the most important dimensions in the debates about its accession[14] and that the security dimension in the EU enlargement brought about the willingness of the Union to be an international actor in the global political system. In the second part of this article, this aspect will be demonstrated with a more detailed analysis.

Yet, Fischer’s widely known speech of 2000 at Humboldt University[15] indicated to the necessary deepening in order to have an effective role in the system, and moreover, he stated that the finality of the EU would be achieved with the coming Eastern enlargement. On the other hand, the attacks of 9/11 in 2001, and the international war against terrorism deepened the security dimension and the importance of being an international power, which challenged this perspective in Fischer’s speech.

A brief look at the red-green European policy reveals the following aspects: First, the Schröder-Fischer coalition placed more emphasis on the national interests. Second, this caused a conflict in the goals of the European Policy. Third, the support for the Eastern enlargement has its roots in the geostrategic dimension of the enlargement. The increased importance of international security and stability challenged Fischer’s view on the finality of the enlargement.

Today, this is also shown with the recent accession of Bulgaria and Romania despite the ongoing debates. Another crucial point is that this enlargement took place under the German presidency in the European Council which is led by the new German chancellor Angela Merkel elected in 2005.

The German elections of 2005 proved, in Sloam’s[16] view, a critical turning point with its results such as the fall of Gerhard Schröder’s Red-Green government, the first ‘grand coalition’ between the two Volksparteien (catch-all parties) since the 1960s, and the election of Germany’s first woman and first easterner as chancellor. The election campaign witnessed how the Christian Democrats lost the opportunity to establish a coalition with their preferred partner, the liberal Free Democratic Party. The key questions about the achieved lowest combined score of the Volksparteien since 1949 and the success of the smaller parties constitute an important framework to understand the endogenous developments[17].

The victory of the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) over the ruling Social Democratic party (SPD) proved also that a life after Kohl is possible for Christian Democrats[18]. It should be noted here that the difference in the policy priorities between Kohl and Merkel brought about still ongoing debates on their comparison and on the estimation of the new route of the German foreign policy.

Nevertheless, the economic and political stagnation throughout the second Schröder government (2002–2005) played a defining role in Christian Democrat’s victory[19]. Notable is also the influence of personality in the elections. Sloam compares the three important actors; Schröder, Merkel and Kirchhof. The revival of SPD in the last week of the campaign was due to Schröder himself, “as Germany’s most effective political campaigner in recent times used his political instincts and media skills to capitalise on the mistakes of his opponents”[20].

“Chancellor Candidate Merkel was the first to present herself as a target for the government Parties”[21]. This was mainly a result of her mistakes in two  separate media appearances and of the statements of the Bavarian state premier and leader of the CDU’s sister party in Bavaria, the CSU, Edmund Stoiber, who commented that “the frustrated easterners should not decide the outcome of the elections. Additionally, the nomination of Professor Paul Kirchhof as finance expert proved to be a “spectacular miscalculation”[22].

Despite the relative popularity of Schröder, the poor economic performance under the Red-Green government and the impact of their reform agenda CDU/CSU won a victory over SPD.

The established coalition of the two catch-all parties was, in Sloam’s view,ironically, the product of their failing support in the country[23]. The two major catch-all parties formed the great coalition with Merkel being the head. In January 2007, with the take-over of the EU term-presidency, Merkel has also become the head of the EU for the first six months of 2007.

II. Germany and the Turkish Accession to the EU

Denying Turkey’s affiliation to the EU shall be one of the biggest challenges to the continuity of the German Foreign Policy, stated Schröder in 2002[24] who also declares in 2004 that Turkey is indispensable for the war against terrorism[25].  It is also important to note that the Schröder-Fischer coalition was more active in the European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP) in comparison to its predecessors [26] and that the red-green support for Turkish accession mainly lied in the security dimension of the affairs and on their accentuation on a resolution for the clash of civilizations via the Turkish accession.

The already started emphasis on national interests with Schröder government has been deepened with Angela Merkel. It is a fact that with her the normalisation process has become more obvious.

Consequently, Turkey’s accession to the EU and its impacts on “Germany” has been discussed more widely than before. During the elections of 2006, Turkish membership has become a significant election topic. Merkel as the head of the CDU has been against the Turkish membership, since this would overstrain the EU who was still dealing with the problems of the last enlargement in 2004. Her suggestion was the “privileged partnership”, which aimed to strengthen the ties and cooperation between the EU and Turkey.

Privileged partnership includes only the free movement of goods, services and capital, market liberalisation and further opening of agricultural trade and also bilateral cooperation in military and foreign policy areas. Hakura deals with the definition of the privileged partnership in his article “Partnership is No Privilege” of September 2005[27].  In addition to the Copenhagen Criteria, he names three further conditions fort he successful conclusion of the accession negotiations.

 These are

“i) Turkey’s ‘unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations’ – an indirect reference to Greece and Armenia.

ii) continued support for a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with Union principles, and the ‘normalization’ of relations with

ii) the fulfilment of obligations under the 1963EU–Turkey Association Agreement (‘Ankara Agreement’), including the Additional Protocol extending the Agreement and Customs Union to the 10 new member states, including Greek Cyprus[28]”.

In August 2005, in a letter to the EU's conservative heads of government Merkel said negotiations with Turkey, which are due to start on October 3, should not automatically lead to membership. They should instead lead to a “privileged partnership” and should be "open ended”. Merkel sent her letter to the leaders of France, Italy, Austria, Holland and Greece, as well as to other conservative-led countries.

In Hakura’s view, the privileged partnership would result in the disappearance of the six criteria[29] and in Turkey’s exclusion from attaining the benefits of membership and from the participation in the decision-making process. In addition to the two aspects; integration in economic (without the free movement of labour and with the exception form agricultural benefits) and military realms; the pressure of the EU on human rights, recognition of Greek Cyprus, the Armenian question, minority right issues, and Greek-Turkish territorial disagreements do actually show that the partnership is not that privileged[30].

All the political leaders being against the full membership, are, on the other hand, for Turkey’s inclusion into the EU’ Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP.

“The privileged partnership confers neither privilege nor partnership”, states Hakura[31]. His analysis reveals important aspects of the context of the privileged partnership. 

Here, one must understand the other alternative for the “closest possible relations” with the EU, namely the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP, established in 2003, aims to “develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and cooperative relations [Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Caucasus and Mediterranean states of the Middle East and North Africa]”[32]

This policy provides the neighbouring countries with the prospect of a “stake”[33] and with the EU’s assistance to enhance their capacities to implement parts of the acquis communautaire[34].

In other words, “there are no major conceptual differences between the ENP and the privileged partnership”[35].

The alternative of privileged partnership has never been accepted by the Turkish side since Turkey is already a member of the NATO, the OECD, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Customs Union with the EU guaranteeing free movement of goods, participates in the Sixth EU Framework Programme (research and technological development) and has been involved with EU programmes on student exchange and youth training since 2004.

The privileged partnership is a second-class status within Europe from Turkish point of view. 

As Hakura puts it,

“In essence, this partnership implies that the candidate country is nothing more than a land of merchants and consumers with a strong military, and ignores its maturing democracy, vibrant media, flourishing civil society and its prospective demographic, socio-economic and cultural contributions to Europe.”[36]

Yet the questions if the picture has started to change had been asked after the elections in Germany. The established “great coalition” between the two major parties CDU and SPD-noting that the Foreign Minister is from SPD- had a major role in this. “There is a principle we follow in government: pacta sunt servanda. If a previous government and the EU decided to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey, then it is our duty to follow through on that” Merkel commented[37]. The expectation of continuity in Germany’s policy towards Turkey increased concomitant with Merkel’s orientation in other foreign policy dimensions[38].

The bilateral visits between Erdoğan and Merkel[39] revealed as picture of optimism at first. Despite the claims for support for the membership, Merkel often stated that “Turkey has to fulfil all conditions in these negotiations process”[40]

The diplomatic visits mainly concentrated, according to Merkel, on a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis. This can be viewed as the recognition of Turkey’s strategic importance by Merkel.

Here, one must take Merkel's statements on integration of immigrants into account[41]. The significant population of Turkish immigrants in Germany has always had a determining role in their stance towards Turkey’s belonging to the EU[42].

Another important point is the change in Merkel’s statements about the Christian values of Europe. Although she often pointed to Europe’s common Christian root, she has also started to state that the EU is not a Christian club[43].

2006 was mainly determined by Merkel’s claims about Turkish membership whereas she stated that Germany would not be an obstacle against Turkey’s accession.  On the other hand, one must note that there is not a certain support from Merkel for the EU membership, and the statements are merely vague and focused on the fulfilment of the conditions by Turkey. As Glyptis comments, Angela Merkel acknowledges that Turkey is more than a neighbour but believes that it is less than family[44].

“2007 is going to be different…”, is the common expectation in Europe. With 27 members after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the discussions about the limits of the EU are reanimated. Merkel took over the EU presidency for the first six months of 2007. Her latest comments are focused on the necessity of a maturing process in the EU. This actually points to the decision for further deepening instead of enlarging[45]. In addition, the effective neighbourhood policy is one of Merkel’s priorities as the EU president. Not only the position on the further deepening is crucial here.

The more serious are the accession talks, the more obstacles for the EU membership of Turkey are mentioned[46]. Turkey has refused to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes, until the EU ends its trade embargo on Northern Cyprus. The Cyprus problem resulted in the suspension of accession talks in eight policy areas in November 2006. This called for significant reactions in Turkish public and for the decrease of the confidence in the EU.

Merkel’s reaction to this was her suggestion of a time period of 18 moths to evaluate the whole situation and to see if Turkey fulfils the conditions for the membership. Her use of the EU’s so called “review clause” was significant because it demonstrated that she is distancing herself from the Turkey-friendly course of her foreign minister Steinmeier of the SDP[47]. Additionally, as the now 27-nation bloc's term president, “I would have preferred clearer acknowledgement of [Europe’s] Christian roots,” she declared, while commenting on the European Union constitution. Yet she said in the same interview that “Europe is not a Christian club ... [but] a club of values.”[48]

Last year Merkel was among the EU politicians campaigning for a more explicit reference to Europe's Christian roots.  Some German officials hope French conservative presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy may support their campaign. Sarkozy has also argued against allowing Turkey, to join the EU. This is a view that has strong support among Merkel's conservatives.

According to Merkel there would be no deadline for Turkey over its EU membership talks but the country had to fulfil its responsibilities before the EU could consider resuming the talks[49].

At a press conference after the Weimar Triangle Summit with French President Jacques Chirac and Polish President Lech Kaczynski, Merkel said that the three countries had agreed that the EU Commission should review a report over Turkey's EU membership talks between autumn of 2007 and early 2009[50].

Merkel’s statements starting from the end of 2006 point to that she would seek support from her French and Polish counterparts to set an 18-month deadline for Turkey to open its ports to Cyprus as a condition for resuming full membership talks and her priority as the EU president is the deepening the EU via the ratification of the EU constitution.

In February 2007, her recent comment on the abolishment of the embargo to the Northern Cyprus has been perceived as a very positive development[51]. On the other hand one must take into account that this is not the evidence for a support for Turkish membership. This is an important step that recognizes the political risks with elections in Turkey this year and in the island in 2008.

III. Concluding Remarks

Gerhard Schröder had stressed the national interests and pragmatism in German European Policy, which was interpreted as the normalisation process of Germany. The support for the Eastern enlargement continued despite the economic problems. This was the evidence for the importance of geostrategic profits from enlargement which can be also seen in the whole debate about the Turkish accession. Although one might talk about the accentuation on the national interests in the foreign policy under Schröder, the continuity still existed with respect to the pro-integration EU policy. Yet one must note that it was not always clear which position Germany took in the debate about Turkey because of the long time interval mentioned for a possible accession.

Merkel, the new president of Germany and also of the EU has mainly focused on the deepening of the EU though she often stated how important the ties between Turkey and the EU are. The optimism from her statements should not be interpreted as a change in her position in the debate about Turkish accession. What Merkel still supports is, a significant cooperation between the two parties, recognizing Turkey’s geopolitical role in the EU’s security dimension. Still, this significant cooperation can also be named “privileged partnership”.