One of the most important factors that affect the peace and the stability in the Middle East is the struggle for hegemony. Iraq approved twice that it is one of the most effective parameters of this struggle in the period of 1980-1990. Iran, after 1979 Revolution, tried to be the balancing power in the Middle East and even to spread the Islamic fundamentalism. This aim resulted as a harsh war between the two countries.

    I will try to explain briefly the reasons and results of the war and the effects of this war on Turkish foreign policy and inner politics, which are still big problems. These effects can be summarized as Kurdish nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism and the economic problems.

REASONS OF THE WAR

We can say that the basic reason of this war is the regional hegemony struggle of the 1970s. This struggle had begun when Britain stated in 1968 that it will withdraw from the east of the Suez latest by the end of 1971. The desires of Iran to fill the gap of power in the region were completely against the Iraq’s self-designed regional role. The invasion of three islands, which belonged to Sharjah and Ras Al Kharimah Emirates before, by Iran, is the first step of the struggle. We must also add the view of Ba’ath Party of Iraq that Iran was a tool of the imperialists against the Arab unity under the leadership of Shah. It is a known fact that Shah had always close relations with Israel and USA.[1]

     After the withdrawal statement of Britain, USA under the load of the Vietnam War, started to use a “twin pillar policy” on the Middle East which puts the security of the Gulf region on two bases. One of these bases would be Iran with its military power, and the other Saudi Arabia with its political power. This was a great chance for Iranian government. The policies of Iran were aiming to put Iraq out of the regional politics. This effort resulted in Iraq USSR close relations and paved the way to sign 1972 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.

      Ba’ath Party of Iraq had the aim of protection of the Arab identity. If the Arab identity in the Gulf region would be protected, then Iraq could become the leader of the Arab world. Only rival to Iraq was Iran, which served to USA and Israel with her expansionist policy under the guidelines of the twin pillar policy.[2] So, Iraq protested the invasion of these three islands by Iran and put obstacles on the right of pass of Iran to Abadan oil refinery and Khorramshahr port.

       Border of Shatt-al-Arab is another reason for the struggle of both countries. The transportation on the river of Shatt-al-Arab has been done according to 1937 agreement between both countries, which approved the sovereignty of Iraq on the river and accepted a middle-line in front of Abadan as the border. This border became a problem between both countries after 1971.

       Kurds living in Iraq had the major rights like education in their language, and a certain extent of internal independence. But, there had been differences in the views concerning the application of these rights. Struggles between Ba’ath Party and the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) began. Iran supported Kurds against the Iraqi government. Iran’s aim was to come to a certain point of agreement about Shatt-al-Arab issue. So, in 1975, both countries signed the Algiers Agreement. Iraq gave up its decisive policy on the river because of the huge problems it confronted inside the country with the Kurds.

       This rapprochement between both countries has come to an end with the Iranian Revolution of 1979. (February 6, 1979) Iran, under the leadership of Khomeini, became a fundamentalist country which tried to spread the Islamic fundamentalism all around the Middle East. Ba’ath Party had a strong tradition of viewing itself as the leader of the Arab world and the guide of pan-Arabism. This characteristic of Ba’ath party makes it always very suspicious about any anti Ba’ath policy movements. So; Iranian fundamental religious government under Khomeini was a big “reason” of Saddam’s conspiracies.

        Shi’ites in Iraq supported Khomeini. As a reaction, Ba’ath Party arrested all the Shi’ite

Leaders in October 1979. In late 1979 Iran escalated its anti-Ba’athist campaign by resuming its support for the Iraqi Kurds; it also began providing moral and material support to Shi’ite underground movements in Iraq; and last, the Iranian government initiated terrorist attacks on prominent officials, the most significant of which was the failed attempt to assassinate the Iraqi Deputy Premier, Tariq Aziz, on April 1, 1980.[3]

      Iran and Ba’ath Party regarded Islam as the Arabs’ great cultural heritage; it nonetheless subordinates it to Arab nationalism, while Arab nationalism takes precedence over Islam. In other words, the Iraqi Ba’athists are opposed to the politicisation of religion. So; Iraq tried to prevent the spread of Iranian Islamic Revolution.[4]

      Iraq suppressed the Shi’ite underground organisations and expelled Iranian citizens in the domestic sphere. On the external level, Iraq tried to organise a united Arab front to prevent the export of Iranian revolution and launched a series of verbal attacks on the Islamic regime and supported Iranian separatist groups such as the Iranian Kurds and the Arabs in Khuzestan.[5] On September 17, 1980, Saddam abrogated the 1975 Algiers Agreement. He said that “Shatt-al-Arab River must have its Iraqi-Arab identity restored.”

THE WAR

On September 22, 1980 Iraq invaded Iranian territories. Iraqis captured some villages and the important port of Khorramshahr. Iranians failed to launch any successful counter-offensives. Khuzestan was invaded by Iraqi forces. By 1982, Iranian forces made gradual advances and even forced Iraqi army to withdraw from the border. Iran invaded Iraqi territory. Khomeini and other leaders wanted the removal of Saddam and the payment of reparations to Iran for the war damages in Khuzestan. In 1984, Iraq acquired French-made Exocet missiles to launch attacks on Iranian oil facilities in the Persian Gulf. Iran attacked tankers loaded with Arab oil, and claimed that the profits from these tankers helped Iraq to buy new arms. As a response, Iraq attacked the Iranian oil tankers. A Tanker War started.

      Iranian military gains inside Iraq after 1984 were a major reason for increased superpower involvement in the war. In February 1986, Iranian troops captured the port of Al Faw. By late 1986; Iran launched several attacks to capture Basra. In late May 1987, on Iraq’s northern front a conflict was so intense. This was a joint effort by Iranian units and Iraqi Kurdish rebels. They endangered Iraq’s oil fields near Kirkuk and the northern oil pipeline to Turkey. So; the superpowers became more directly involved because they feared that the fall of Basra might lead to a pro-Iranian Islamic republic in largely Shia-populated southern Iraq.

      The superpowers were also concerned about the intensified tanker war. During 1987, Iran attacked 29 ships and Iraq assaulted 15. Kuwaiti ships were favourite targets because Iran strongly objected to Kuwait’s close relationship with the Baghdad regime. Kuwait turned to the superpowers, partly to protect oil exports but largely to seek an end to the war through superpower intervention. Moscow leased 3 tankers to Kuwait, and by June 1987 USA had re-flagged 22 Kuwaiti tankers. Finally, direct attacks on the superpowers’ ships drew them into the conflict.

      The intervention of the superpowers, especially the USA, resulted with the economic weakness of Iran and reflected as the defeat of Iranian forces in many fronts. The continued usage of chemical weapons and missiles attacks by Iraq against the civilian areas coupled with the superpowers’ support for the Iraqi war efforts proved that Iraq and its supporters had decided to spread the war at any price. Iran accepted the cease-fire on August 20, 1988.

TURKEY AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War on September 22, 1980; immediately brought Turkey face to face with unpleasant political and economic prospects, with the former dominating as the war continued. Turkish national security was in jeopardy. First, the ongoing war could further radicalise the regime in Iran, and this might well upset the regional equilibrium. In such an event, the region would immediately become receptive to Soviet influence. Second, the war could spill over the borders of Iran and Iraq, involving the Arab countries around the Persian Gulf, and could become a war between Iran and the Arab world. In such an event, especially when if the superpowers were to become involved, Turkey could well be plunged into a Middle East war despite its determination to stay out of one. Third, the war could have a negative effect on the demographic and ethnic structure of the region. This would pose a threat to the security of Turkey’s south-eastern areas close to its eastern border. An illustration of this occurred in May 1983 when the Iraqi central government weakened, and the Kurds, emboldened by this situation, infiltrated Turkish territory and terrorised the south-eastern villages.

      Both warring parties shared their borders with Turkey, which provided them with their only overland access to Europe. Therefore Turkey’s stance on the war mattered a great deal. Turkey declared itself neutral in the conflict. But, Ankara’s relations with Baghdad were better than her relations with Tehran. There are two reasons for that. First, Turkey’s Kurdish minority had been up in arms for the past many years in an area contiguous with the Iraqi Kurdish region, and it had been co-operating actively with Baghdad in counter-insurgency. Secondly, as a secular society since 1924, Turkey had much in common with Ba’athist Iraq, and shared Baghdad’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism within its borders.[6]

THE KURDISH PROBLEM

From the Turkish perspective, the renewal of the Kurdish insurgency in south-eastern Turkey is the single most detrimental by-product of the Iran-Iraq War.[7] Kurds in Turkey have always been under the control of central government and any pro-Kurdish movements were not allowed. The war resulted of Iraq’s loss of control of its own border areas following the transfer of Iraqi troops from Kurdish areas in the north to the Iranian front. Kurds had more space and freedom to operate against Turkey. The name of the Kurdish terrorist organisation was PKK. (Workers Party of Kurdistan) PKK was attacking the civilian and military targets and running back to northern Iraq. In countering the Kurdish problem, Iraq received enthusiastic co-operation from Turkey, with which it had in 1978 concluded a secret accord allowing each side to pursue “subversive elements” up to 9 miles inside each other’s territory. In May 1983 Turkish troops infiltrated 18 miles into Iraqi Kurdistan to destroy the bases of its Kurdish guerrillas in the KDP-occupied part. Following this, Tariq Aziz visited Ankara to reinforce mutual security co-operation further. The outcome was the signing of an agreement in October 1984 permitting cross-border operations up to 18 miles into each other’s territory. This permission given to the Turkish armed forces was counter to Saddam’s policy which rejected “the facilitation of the presence of any foreign armies, bases or armed forces in the Arab homeland, under any pretext and guise and for any reasons.”[8]

      PKK and the insurrection of the Kurdish movement as a result of ongoing Iran-Iraq War effected Turkey negatively. The foundations of the regime were effected and the Kurdish question has crept into the international discourse. The Kurdish issue had become an internal and external problem for Turkey. This problem still continues as an obstacle to the Turkish political stability.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

I must also note that the Shi’ite fundamentalism of the Khomeini regime was an obvious danger to the Turkish state, where nearly 10 million inhabitants are of Shi’ite origin.[9] And indeed, soon after his victory Khomeini stated that the Turkish regime rested on the force of bayonets and suggested that Turkey’s leaders were headed for the same fate as the shah. Short after this statement, Turkish military intervened and the coup of September 12, 1980 happened in Turkey.

      So; while Turkey maintained diplomatic relations with both Iran and Iraq during the war, even providing Iran with a commercial outlet to the West, Turkey saw Iraq’s final victory as in its interest, that is, in containing the spread of Iran’s revolutionary impulse.[10]

       Iran was following the Soviet model on the export of its revolution by improving her relations with all the states and supporting the terrorist groups which aim to destruct the regimes of those states. Iran attacked the traditions and the symbols of the Turkish state during the war. (These symbols are mostly related to the Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the secular Turkish republic) Tehran involved in domestic politics of Turkey and protested the preventing of religious students who wore kerchiefs from attending university. In addition, the Khomeini regime provided support to Cemalettin Kaplan, a fundamentalist anti-regime preacher in Germany who had sizeable followers among Turkish workers in Europe.[11]

     The Iranian “model” became the basic reason for Turkish fundamental groups to claim and struggle for an Islamic state. They used arms to fight against the Turkish armed forces under the name of Hezbollah, IBDA-C etc. All of these organisations’ statements show that the Iranian Revolution and the insurgence of the Islamic identity in the Middle East were the reasons of their existence. These statements also include that the Iran-Iraq War resulted with the defeat of Islamic Resistance to the “evil” Iraq and USA. There is an increasing tendency in the Turkish society towards the re-birth of the Islamic Revolution.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

In the beginning of 1980; Turkey had many economic problems. By the introduction of new economic policies on January 24, 1980; Turkey left the import substitution policy and used to get into export markets and an industry which could compete with international markets. But, Turkish industry had limited experience in exporting. But, after the coup of September 12, 1980; a full economic authority was given to new government.

      Both Iran and Iraq, as a result of their international isolation, were forced to rely on Turkey as a major source of needed commodities imported from Turkey itself or from the West. By showing no favour to either party, Turkey has become a major trading partner of both. Iran and Iraq increasingly turned to Turkey to satisfy their import needs. They found Turkish products to be less expensive.

     Throughout the 1980s, the war with Iran gave Iraq an incentive to co-operate fully with Turkey, including in the establishment of commercial exchanges between the two countries. Turkey quickly became one of Baghdad’s main customers. 60% of the oil consumed in Turkey was imported from Iraq. When Turkey saw that “Iraq was threatened with collapse under the battering of the Iranian advance”, the Turkish minister of State, Kamran Inan, publicly warned that “no less than 1,5 million Turks and Turkomans live in the northern regions of Iraq.” Inan, in effect, wanted to assert Turkey’s pre-emptive right in the event that an Iranian advance let to the break-up of Iraq. 

      In 1984-1985 Turkish-Iranian trade amounted to 230 million $ making Turkey Iran’s third most important commercial partner after West Germany and Japan.[12] Iran balanced its trade with Turkey by selling 100.000 b/d of its oil to its neighbour. Despite the irritation caused by the Iraqi strikes in May and June 1985 against Turkish-owned oil tankers carrying Iranian oil, Ankara’s relations with Iraq remained cordial. Turkey and Iraq had a strong interest in maintaining the military co-operation in suppressing Kurdish insurgency. In November 1985 Turkey concluded a contract with Iraq for a second oil pipeline with an annual capacity of 71 million tones. (1.4 million b/d)

     But, we must mention the negative effects of the war to the Turkish economy. Not only did the Iraqi pipeline to the Turkish city Iskenderun stop functioning, the oil tankers were no longer able to enter the Persian Gulf. When, as a consequence, Iran and Iraq stopped shipping oil, Turkey’s reserves went down at an alarming rate.

     Another disadvantage of the war was the increasing threat to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline between Turkey and Iraq. This pipeline had stopped functioning at the beginning of the war. The bombing of it during the war would have meant not only a slowdown or a halt of oil deliveries from Iraq but the loss of transit revenues from the pipeline, of which 690 kilometres passed through Turkey.

      The main reason of the favouring of Turkish goods by Iran and Iraq was the generous credit terms Turkey offered to the both countries. But, by the time Iraqis found themselves increasingly unable to pay for their purchases. By 1988, Iraqi debts to Turkey had reached to 3 billion $. Iraq’s inability to pay has become a potential political problem for the Turkish government. Iraq even started to seek new countries which provide better export credits than Turkey. Iran also had payment problems. The war could no longer provide as much benefit to Turkey as it used to.[13]

     The effects of this economic decline are one of the major factors of the ongoing instability in the Turkish economy. Because of the payment problems of Iraq and Iran, Turkey got credits from western countries and the foreign debts of turkey increased to 65 billion in 1988, from 20 billion dollars in 1980. Effect of the oil transport failures is another declining factor of the Turkish economy.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY

American-Turkish relations improved considerably in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. USA provided all the possible support to the Turkish democratic regime, trying to prevent Turkey to fall under the effect of Islamic fundamentalism. After the Iranian advance on Iraqi territories, USA sent commissions to Turkey about the preparation of Turkish army to a rapid annexation of the oil-rich northern provinces of Iraq (like Kirkuk) to prevent the oil from falling into the Islamic fundamentalist Iranian regime.[14] Turkish authorities denied such scenarios. 

     Following the Iranian Revolution, Turkey felt that it had clearly become the most powerful Muslim nation in the region. After the end of the war, we can see an increasing effect of Turkey in the region with the largest and strongest army and with the secular model to the countries of the region comparing with the Iran’s fundamentalist structure.

CONCLUSION

To make a conclusion we can say that Iran-Iraq War, in general terms, had negative effects on Turkey. The Kurdish nationalism was awakened and the Kurdish terrorists found safe-havens for themselves in the destabilised northern regions of Iraq. The use of military forces against these terrorists and the military operations made by Turkey to Iraq during the war, made the international community suspicious about the Kurdish issue.

     The effect of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey does not have as much importance as the Kurdish nationalism. The only negative effect is the reflection of Islamic Revolution as a model to fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups in Turkey which aim to establish an Islamic state like Iran.

     In the economic area, we can see the negative effect of the delay of oil transportation and the non-payment of debts, on the Turkish economy. These resulted as a decline in Turkish export policies and as an increase on the amount of Turkish foreign debts.

     We can see that being neutral and in the same time trying to gain the maximum advantage does not work effectively as a foreign policy tool. This neutrality has turned into the internal catastrophes of Turkish economic and political policies towards both sides.