Abstract: That paper aimed to demostrate How Gadamer hermenutcially critisiced Historism of Dilthey.

  Key Words: Historicsm, Anti-historicsm, Hermenutics, Human science, Natural science 

  Introduction

  The main goal of this paper is that it consnstructs the relationship between understanding and history, the nature of soical and natural science in term of hermeneutics and historicist camps. The status of the understanding, meaning, and their ontological position have been constructed for centuries in the paractices of the diferent traditions like positivitst, hermeneutic, marxist  schools. This basic matter framework of the historicist and hermeneutic tradition from other theoretical positions. Therefore this scope of this paper is restricted in terms of Dilthey, who is, may be father of it, famous representative of the historicist tradition,  and Gadamer, who is also famous representative of hermeneutic school.

  The existence of philosphical bases of soical science signs the new theoretical debeta on the nature of the conception of social knowledge. This debate was getting wide that includes the nature of conception of all types of knowledge later, especially with the works of Heiddeger. In this paper firstly I will try to construct the classical bases of this matter that includes the relationship between understand and history, the nature of the social and natural science, the distinction between their methodology and objects by the argumentations of some figures that represent different epistemological and ontological traditions. Later on the bases of these argumentations of these traditions I will want to conceptualize the theoretical framework of Dilthey. In this context I will concern the distinct character his conception of knowledge from the epistemologies that precedes him. Then I will construct the nature of Gadamer’s conception of society and nature. And I will concern the distinction of what his conception of knowledge from the old epistemologies and old conception of society and nature. Lastly I will overlap the debate on the nature of the society, nature and their nature of means and object by the argumentations of Dilthey and Gadamer. In this context I will try to construct the weakness and strong sides of their theoretical framework.  

1. A Theoretical framework of Historicism

  History is an area in which all human realize his activities. That area is understood by means of time and scope (which Kant determines these concept as a priory concept of humans experiences). Historicism is forms of a thought which history is made as to that form. Once, Historicism was observed as much as Judaism (according to Popper K.). But predominantly, we saw it in the nineteenth century.

  Historicism was made the clearest definition by Croce. According to him, it defined as ‘the affirmation that life and reality are history alone’ (Thornil, 1991:3). The most significant theorist and historians associated with Historicism are J.G Herder, G.W.H Hegel, Leonard von Ranke, W Dihltey, J. G.Droysen; F.Meinnecke, Croce and R.G. Collingwood. But both of them are very important for historicism. One is Herder who argued against construction of history as a linear progress, stating rather that human history is composed of fundamentally incomparable national cultures or totalities (Thornil, 1991:3). The other is Hegel who was cruel criticized by Popper. The divine willpower sovereign the history of world. We aimed to examine that divine willpower. (Hegel, 1995:35). In the Philosophy of History insist on the historical stiltedness of each individual consciousness as a particular moment within the total progression of all history towards of a final goal. Historicism follows both Herder, in attempting to do justice to objective history in its discontinuity and uniqueness, and Hegel, in attempting to determine general patterns of historical change (Thornil 1991:3).

  When we look at historicist thinkers, Historicist assumption also explained one group of thinkers. For example Iggers, he determined that human experience and cognition are conditioned solely by history. Historical concept determined human nature. According to him ‘experiential totality of history can be easily narrowed to national history (Madison, 1999:272)’. For Droysen, Historian and historical personality both constitute totalities of experience, and that their through interaction the historian may reconstruct the totality of historical personality through and understanding of surviving expression and data. In this conception norms of historical analysis and value are derived from a process of immanent critique. The immanence of this process is underscored by the assumption of the shared human, expressly not natural, quality of history and historian (Thornil 1991:4). When we look at Collingwood, he find a similarities novel and history since they have self-explanation, self-justifying, products of an autonomous or self-authorizing activity; He determined that activity as ‘the a Priory imagination.’ According to him ‘Every serious history, and every serious philosophy, ought to be a history and a philosophy ‘for the occasion ‘, as Goethe Said of genuine poetry, through the occasion of poetry is in the passions, that of history in the conduct of life and in morality’ (Thornil 1991:5).

  Despite of impressive appearance of Historicism, some philosophers criticized historicism. F.Niettzce, F.Rickert, W.Benjamin, K.Löwith, K.Popper, M.Heidegger, E.Husserl, Foucault, Derrida and H.G.Gademer have written influential critiques of historicism. That Critiques focused on relativism, particularism, totality, thought of origin, subjectivism, and objectivism

  When we look at some anti- historicist, for example, Benjamin W. tried to rescue historical materialism from hands of historicism. According to him, subject has to it own desire. History isn’t official parade for historical materialist.  Duty of historical materialist  damaged that monotonous trend, because of historicism as mere reproduction of the oppressive forces of homogeneous (Capitalist) history (Benjamin, 1995:175). Each civilization documents is that document of barbarian at the same time. And Capitalism is like that thing. Thus it was needed to collapse.

  According to Derrida, Historicism seeks to start points. Metaphysical process caught up history as linear trend. But he also saw difference in history. Origin is not clear, cause and effect are not carrying out of history.‘ if either cause or effect can occupy the position of origin, then origin is no longer originary; it is loses its metaphysical privilege. A non-original origin is a ‘concept’ that cannot be comprehended by the former system and thus disrupts it (Derrida, 1990; 182)’.

  For Foucault, we can’t look at history as origin. Like Derrida, he rejected thought of origin. He proposed Genealogy (he take that concept for Nietzsche) ‘Genealogy rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal signification and indefinite teleologies. It opposes itself to the search for ‘origin ’ …why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin (upspring). First, because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities, this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession. This   search is directed to ‘ that which was already there,’ the image of pridomidal truth fully adequate to its nature, and its necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity (Foucault, 1972; 362)’.

  We state Popper as last anti-historicist thinkers; Popper wrote ‘poverty of Historicism’ against to Marx, because Marx believed to establish all society theoretically again. However, Popper didn’t believe that idea, because we haven’t got knowledge that includes means for all society (Popper, 1995; 76-77). According to them, Popper links historicism with theological,’ as utopians’ conception of history. In his critique, Popper asserts a theory of historical causality that concentrates on the deduction of specific historical results from specific conditions, and is not reliant on any claim to totalizing perspectives on historical trends for broad-ranging experiential tendencies (Thornil 1991:6).

  After giving some examples (both Historicist and anti-historicist) we explain Dilthey and Gadamer with that bunch (Dilthey and Gadamer have same tratition (Hermeneutics=the study of the methodological problems of interpretation). But while Dilthey is historicist, Gadamer is anti- historicist. The important of that discussion is that Gadamer rejects the historicist distinction between social and nature world, because he claims that the historicity is the basic character of the both world ontologically.  Understanding of those events is a result of encounter (subject and object, with prejudices of them) and so Absolute understanding is in nowhere. That criticism is one of the most important critics for enlightenment, which assume reason, can be independent from all Prejudices, because of that, reason can reach absolute knowledge, understanding (Dilthey believed them).

  That discussion started With Dilthey’s separation of natural and historical sciences. While natural sciences explain (erklarken), the social sciences understand (verstehen).  Dilthey influenced from Kant (critique of pure reason), because Kant determine natural sciences as Peak of objectivism at the same time like Kant, Dilthey tried to realize objectivity for Human Science. He tires to constructs human science in terms of natural science; because object of Human Science is Humans Who have dimension of both physical and mental. It does mean that the different objects constitute the center of the difference of the both science.  We can investigate Human’s physical dimension as natural science (or positivism) but mental dimension cannot. Thus Dilthey embraced to history. Human individual and societies can only be understood by historically. Here! Here it is!  Dilthey’s Historicism starts here. The aim of historicism is that the ‘historical diversity of human civilizations means that we must think ourselves into their categories in order to understand them (Inwood, 1991:3)’

  However, Gadamer   criticized the argumentations of Dilthey on the construction of society and nature. According to him historical distance is a methodological problem. For Gadamer ‘it is an ontological one science it affects the very nature of that which we try to understand. Our ‘prejudices’ are not an obstacle to knowledge so much as a condition of knowledge, since they make up the fundamental structure of our relationship with our historical tradition (Outhwaite, 1985; 26). For Gadamer, understanding is not same meaning of romantics hermeneutics (Scheilmacher, Dilthey etc.), Similarly, a hermeneutics that regarded understanding as the reconstruction of the original would be more than the recovery of dead meaning (Outhwaite, 1985; 27).

  In this paper firstly I will try to construct Dilthey’s conception of society and nature, then look at the construction of Gadamer on the epistemological and ontological bases of the romantic hermeneutic tradition. After that I will compare the argumentations of two figures that those representatives of different schools.

  Dilthey’s thought and historicim

  As we state above, Hegel and Herder are fathers of Historicism. But Their Historicism Was criticized by two different movements. One of them is Critical philosophy of history (Schleimarcer , Savingny and etc). ‘Where speculative philosophy of history (Hegel, Herder, etc.) assign and overall purpose to human history a whole, critical philosophy of history, investigates the nature of historical knowledge and appropriate methods of historical research. It was associated with the emergence of history as a respectable academic discipline (West, 1996:81).’ For other critics, including the life philosopher, Hegel’s thought is the product of an exclusively theoretical or intellectual consciousness same to enlightenment. ‘Romantics (life philosophers; Kierkegard, Hölderlin etc) defended spontaneity, emotion and individuality against the reductive categories of theoretical reason. Poetry rather than science provides the most adequate path the truth, the most adequate understanding of humanity (West, 1996; 80)’.

  Dilthey who influenced these criticisms, combines elements of both historicism and life philosophy with respect for the achievements of natural science. Historicism and life philosophy come together in the conviction that history is the key to the understanding of human life. Human individuals and societies can only be understood historically. Hence society and humans cannot be understood by methods of natural sciences and positivism. Because natural science and positivism inevitably leaves out or distorts essential features of human existence.

  But Life philosophy and romanticism can denigrate into subjectivism. Because of which Dilthey never underestimates the rationality, objectivity and rigor demonstrated in natural science. Overall, Dilthey seeks to do justice to the concerns of historicist life philosophers and romanticist account of history and ‘human sciences’ (Geisteswissenschaften) capable of reconciling scientific objectivity with an appreciation of the fullness of human life (West, 1996; 82)

  For that, Dilthey admit all knowledge come from experience. So He influenced Locke, Hume and especially Kant. But he criticized them for which they give more important intellectual or cognitive experience. They neglect emotions and will:

  No real blood flows in the veins of knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume and Kant. It is only the diluted juice of reason, mere process of thought. Cognition seems to be developing concepts such as the external world, time, substance and cause from perception, imagination and thought. However, historical and psychological studies of man as a whole led me to explain cognition and its concepts in terms of the powers of man as a willing, feeling, and, imagining (Dilthey, 1999; 17-18).

  This historical dimension of human experience, its ‘historicity’ is also a central aspect of what a positivist approach inevitably fails to capture. Dilthey’s account of human experience suggest that a resolution of contradiction between romanticism, life –philosophy, idealism and positivism. He believes human sciences (a new science) that have Both Objectivity as natural science, and Spiritual as Sciences that investigate structure of mind or life. Dilthey believed that Human have characteristics of both physical and minds. Therefore they must be studied in a different. Defining feature of human is its historicity. Hence Historical knowledge is central to an understanding of the human sciences.

  Dilthey said that ‘we explain nature, but man we must understand.’ What did that sentence say? ‘Dilthey describes two contrasting approaches to the acquisition of knowledge as ‘explanation’ (eklaren) and ‘understanding’ (verstehen). Explanation is primary goal of the natural sciences and involves the formulation of general causal life. …. Explanation however is not by itself adequate model for human sciences, whose object of study is humanity itself. Human beings have a psychical existence and, to that extend, can be studied by the methods of explanatory science. But the human sciences are more concerned with the various expression of mind or sprit. The human sciences deal with actions, utterances, institutions, and artifacts which, unlike events, in the physical worlds., have intrinsic meaning and so call for a different cognitive approach…. Understanding is concerned with the recovery of meanings rather than the identification of causal regularities. It is not concerned with generalization but with the description of the individual in its full complexity and particularity (West,1996;83-84)’.

  Dilthey is most optimistic about the possibility of objectively true or valid interpretation, he believes that trough ‘honest subordination’ to the text and extensive knowledge of the totality in which with occurs ,it is possible for the interpreter to achieve an ever-improving if never perfect understanding…..Dilthey’s faith in the possibility of objectively true or valid interpretation depends on the assumption of a commonly humanity ,underlying to a variety of human language culture and personality. In understanding the personalities of the interpreter and his author do not confront each other as two facts which cannot be compared: both have been formed by a common human nature and this makes common speech and understanding among men possible (West, 1996:86)

  Overall, Dilthey still believes that, although ‘the result reached in interpretation can never have demonstrative certitude’, it is possible for interpreters to overcome their historical situation and achieve valid interpretations (West, 1996; 87). But even this qualified optimism will be substantially undermined by the subsequent development of Hermeneutic theory (Heidegger, especially Gadamer) and philosophy.

  Gadamer’s thought and his criticizing to Dilthey

  While Gadamer made his thought ,he influenced to Heideger. But he interested Language, interpretation and aesthetics more than ontology. However Gadamer still develops an ontological hermeneutics rather than merely epistemological hermeneutics. That is to say, Gadamer is concerned with hermeneutics  , not like Dilthey ,as the characteristics method of the human sciences, but  as the key  to the nature of the truth in understanding and interpretion and , in his opinion relate ,the nature of human ,historical existence  (West,1996;82) Hence understanding is the basic way in which self – consciousness ,historically  existing beings relate to the world. Understanding has a ontological significance.

  Gadamer ‘s aims to demonstrate the limits of methodological science (not only natural science, but also social science, criticism of Dilthey). Because of that .He criticized western metaphysics. He denies the subject that radical epistemological autonomy. Subject related to object as historically. Four interrelated concepts define Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics these are:

  The first of these is ‘effective historical consciousness’, which means that consciousness is at once ‘affected by history’ and ‘open to the effects of history ’. Gadamers philosophical hermeneutics preserves Heiddeger’s central insight in Being and Time that the understanding of oneself and one’s possibilities as a being in the world is temporal and situated historically. (Wright, 1991; 4)  Once again in the same way Gadamer said that There is no claim of definitive knowledge, with the exception of one the acknowledgement of the finitude of human being in itself’. To acknowledge human finitude is to acknowledge that, for us at least, there can be no end to history and thus no guaranteed, transcendentally sanctioned meaning to it. The meaning not only of What is but also of what was is always in question and up renewal. Later in this book Gadamer writes ‘ The special feature of historical experience is that we stand in the midst of an event without knowing what is happening to us before we grasp what has happened in looking backwards. Accordingly, history must be written anew by every new present. (Wright, 1991; 7).’

  In here, Gadamer criticized Dilthey; ‘At any rate, it is clear that Dilthey did not regard that the fact that finite Historical man is tied to a particular time and place as any fundamental impairment of the possibility of knowledge in the human sciences. Historical consciousness was supposed to rise above its own relativity in a way that made objectivity in the human science possible. we may ask how this claim can be justified without implying a concept of absolute. Philosophical knowledge beyond all historical consciousness ’(Gadamer 1996; 223)

  His two concept is Hermeneutical circle. ‘Gadamer’s retains Heiddeger’s concept of the ‘hermeneutical circle’ to express the way understanding is always mediated. Understanding is always circular, but in a non-vicious sense. Anticipation of meaning, pre conception or prejudgments play a constitute role as we use them to project wholes out of the parts of the text or at the work that we are interpreting. Gadamer’s claim that prejudgments play enable to understanding, that is, positively condition it, has been mistaken to mean that he affirms prejudice blindly. But Gadamer does not mean that we must remain uncritical of those prejudices that block or distorts our understanding of text   or artwork. Rather, since we can not get out of the hermeneutical the out of hermeneutical circle of understanding and assume an unprejudiced view from nowhere .we must aim instead at becoming more conscious of our particular hermeneutical situates so that new and more appropriate judgements can play the role of older and less appropriate prejudgments in conditioning our understanding of the text or art work.’(Wright, 1991; 5)

  There is a criticism for Dilthey. Because ‘Traditional hermeneutic theory (Dilthey) postulates a subject who aims to understand an object(a text, a social practice, or whatever) as its in it self .this means that the subject must be as open-minded  and unprejudiced as possible. For Gadamer, by contrast, preconception or prejudices are what make understanding possible in the first place. (Outhwaite, 1985; 25) and understanding always inevitably occurs with in a historically situated inter-subjective life world which itself depends on the achievement of understanding. Gadamer said that ‘There is undoubtedly no understanding that is free of all prejudices’

  The third concept is that of ‘play’, which Gadamer borrows and Transforms from Kant’s aesthetics. Play or Game is used two circular points in Truth and Methods to describe how is philosophical hermeneutics transcends the subjectivism of aesthetics and of modern philosophy in general. Gadamers speaks first of the game we play with art to show how individual subjects most lose themselves to experience the truth claimed by the art work, just as an individual player must in order to become absorbed in the game. And when Gadamer turns to focus upon language as he medium of hermeneutical experience, he grounds language not in the consciousness of an individual subject but in the language game we call dialogue or conversation.

  The ‘fusion of horizons’ is the fourth concept. The understanding of a text or artwork involves a challenge in so far as the truth claimed by the text or at work is at variance with what interpreter believes to be truth about the mother at issue. The interpreting horizons of understanding first excludes the truth claimed by the text or at work .The interpreter opens up to the horizons of other by allowing it to question the interpreters own prejudgments about the matter at issue. What ensues is a dialogue of question and answers where the interpreter not only question The truth claimed by the work but also allows what the interpreter prejudges to be true to be put in to question by the work. The fusion of horizons that ends the dialogue occurs when the interpreter understands differently. This may require altering to interpreter’s prejudgments in line with what has been learned from the text or artwork. But it may also mean reaffirming the original prejudgments for different reasons since they have survived the challenge by another way to judge the matter at issue (Wright, 1991; 5). Else say

  The hermeneutics process, to repeat Gadamer’s metaphor, is not the replacement of the interpreter ‘horizon’ by that of the object of study, but a dialogical processing which the two horizons are fussed together (Outhwaite, 1985; 34).

  Conclusion

  In this section I try to display the weakness and the strong sides of theoretical framework of Dilthey and Gadamer. Here I will mention the basic distinct and similar characters of their works.

  In the domination of the natural science Dilthey wanted to construct the philosophical bases for the cultural field that already not had been constructed as object of theoretical investigation. Therefore his conception of social knowledge is based on the power bases of the philosophical bases of that day natural science. Although he thinks that there are logical similarities of both sciences, they have different objects and methodology. It does mean that his conception of knowledge for both science have no objection of the nature of the enlightenment philosophy. Thus his conception of knowledge includes the absolute understanding, the priority of reason, and the scientific laws etc that are constitutive components of enlightenment science philosophy. I think that only we understand the objection of Gadamer to the old epistemology that includes the argumentations of, in his concept, romantic hermeneutic.

  Gadamerian conception of knowledge is shaped on the bases of the argumentations of the old epistemology. It seems to us the main of his conception of knowledge or ontological hermeneutic reconstructs the misconstruction of the basic categories that constitute the nature of understating and conception of knowledge of the old epistemology. He called his theoretical position as ontological hermeneutic because being is thrown hermeneutically; the temporality constitutes the basic character of being. Therefore he offers hermeneutic as an ontological character for both sciences, not only social science. His conception of knowledge is distinguished Dilthey’s conception dramatically, because he constructs hermeneutic ontologically, not like Dilthey’s conception constructs it methodologically.      

  Being historical, Like Dilthey, For Gadamer is characteristics feature of humans, But at the same time; it is characteristics of all knowledge. Dilthey suggested a new science for Human Sciences .The method of that science is Understand as different from Natural science  (method of which is Explanation). That view is an epistemological revolution, because Former Paradigm (Hegel, Herder, Kant and Comte etc.) suggests that social sciences need to be investigated like natural science. The more Social sciences is similar to natural science, the more it certain science at the same time, that view is thought of Enlightenment. Event of Humans is explained like natural science (positivism) But Dilthey’s new science suggests that Event of humans is nut explained but understood. So Understanding (as method) enter to history of science. Dilthey with understanding believe obtain certain (pure) knowledge like Enlightenment. Different from Dilthey, Gadamer suggest that understanding is finding in every acquisition of knowledge (can be natural science like human science). But no when; understanding obtains certain-pure knowledge, because each act of understanding consists of prejudices. Understanding is an encounter between prejudices of subject and prejudice of object. Therefore Absolute understanding cannot be.

  Although his conception has very critical theoretical significance, it has some problems. The first one is that it’s relevant to the nature of knowledge. I concern if there is no absolute meaning, how we dedicate the truth and wrong knowledge. While he rejects the absolute understanding and knowledge, he fails to construct his conception of knowledge. Second problem that is relevant to the first one signs his distinction between good and bad prejudices. Also if we have no absolute knowledge on the matter, how we decide to the nature of the prejudices. The third problem is relevant to the historical transformation. I think that his conception inadequate for understanding of the dynamic of historical changes or breaks.     

  But, Gadamer’s thought is very important for history of science, because Dilthey willy-nilly is follower of Enlightenment (with he believe to acquisition of pure Knowledge). When Gadamer said that absolute understanding couldn’t be. All ideas of Enlightenment are decay, because enlightenment believes that with reason, human can obtain certain knowledge. And he rejects the dichotomies that are constructed by the philosophy of enlightenment between reason/prejudice, reason/tradition, knowledge/authority, science/ideology etc. He thinks that there is no knowledge without prejudices, and there is no knowledge without tradition and authority. Also he thinks that the authority and tradition not only produce darkness and domination but also produce freedom, reason and non-domination practices. Such this epistemology is distinguished dramatically from the other epistemologies. His epistemological standview, I think, represents the break from the old epistemologies that constitute the enlightenment philosophy.  Also I think that in the lighten of his conception of knowledge, I think, we should rethink the conceptions of science not matter we make distinction as a natural and social science, and reconstructs the identity of science. Of course we shouldn’t repeat the problems of his conception of knowledge.   

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June 2006