The Security Policies of the Turkey-EU Axis in Fighting Global Terror: An Alternative?
Introduction
The expectation that the 21st century would be more peaceful for the people of the world reduced to pessimism with the September 11 tragedy and the ensuing terror attacks. The end of the Cold War brought about the third wave of democracy with the 1990s marking very promising developments for humanity. In fact, the high hopes that the Oslo Accord conveyed for the chronic Israeli-Palestinian question, the democratization process in the Eastern bloc, and the solution of the ethnic-religious strife in the Balkans with the efforts of various countries, Europe and the United States being the foremost, all came forth as auspicious signals that the future of our planet was to be safer and happier. However, what most of us, if not all, overlooked was the emergence of a deep and silent threat that took Islam hostage and began carrying out large-scale, sensational, and vicious operations. The peak of these operations was manifested in New York, Washington, Istanbul, Madrid, and Beslan. A general shock ensued and people wondered “why? for what?” However, it was George Bush’s administration that asked the least number of questions and was soon convinced that they found the answers. “The evils had declared war against the good” and there was a need for an all-out war. The CNN quickly shifted its subtitles from “America Under Attack” to “America At War” and the war against global terror commenced. With hardly any other country’s opposition, the first country that was targeted in the war against global terror was Afghanistan that harbored Usama Bin Ladin. However, targeting Iraq as the second objective, the methods used in this war, and the human rights violations not only endured immediate criticism from many nations but the mistakes committed played into the hands of global terrorists.
The events since September 11 have neither yielded any significant results in the fight against terror nor have Moslems been able to cast aside their shock for what the terrorists have done. As a matter of fact, some important religious scholars in the Islamic world did endeavor to counter the terrorists’ discourse. However, none of them have been able to attract publicity as much as the defenders of terrorism, such as Bin Ladin and Zewahiri. Moslems, pressurized under the popular image/wreckage of “barbaric Moslem”, were hindered from declaring their actual position to the world under the duress, for they did not have enough “bombs” to catch others’ attention. The attempt was to draw the world into a war of hatred through America’s figurative and illusory discourse (the “evil, demonic” bin Ladin and Saddam “who murdered his own people and had chemical weapons”). President Bush’s statement that “you are either on our side or on theirs (the evils)” has been ringing in people’s ears since September 11. On the other end, Bin Ladin is using exactly the same rhetoric. He labels the affair as “a war between believers and infidels” and targets everyone presumed to be on the other camp.
In this section of the book, the dilemma that the world has been delivered to is going to be scrutinized. Moreover, the struggle against the increasing threat of global terror, as well as the question whether the approaches to these struggles will give a new direction to the Turkey-EU association will be examined. As such, the first two parts will analyze the historical development of terror and its expansion strategies. Understanding terror, which constitutes the most important aspect in defeating it, is to be done by looking at its historical process and the strategies devised by terrorists. The third part will cover the strategies forged by states to this day. In this regard, the US model in fighting global terror, as well as the EU and Turkish models will be investigated. Moreover, the third part will try to settle the effects that the improving Turkey-EU relationship can have on the fight against global terror. In the concluding parts of the section, the Turkey-EU partnership in the fight and in thwarting the clash of civilizations will be stressed at along with some noteworthy suggestions.
I) TERROR AND TERRORISM – A SHORT HISTORY
To reach a common definition or to have a common understanding of the historical process? We believe that the primary imperative to grasp this most important security problem dictates the need to know the evolution of terrorism. From its inception until today, terrorism, along with its discourse, will be closely scrutinized in three phases. It is useful to say that there are other ways to analyze terrorist activities and terrorism from the method suggested here. The classification in this study will focus on political, economic, and social processes and relevant terrorist actions and the shifts in terrorism’s discourse.
In this respect, the industrialization of the 19th century, the independence movements of the 20th century and the Cold War, and finally the post-Cold War era will constitute the categories in the study of terror and terrorism. Even though the post-Cold War era started in the 1990s, what has been called global terror truly started with the 21st century. Moreover, terrorist activities used in the 20th century’s independence movements falls under the scope of the Cold War.
19th Century Terrorism (The Terror of Labor Movements)
As stated, terrorism passed through three stages in the past two centuries. The first stage was the armed conflicts that local groups pursued against central authorities in the years following the French Revolution of 1789. In this respect, anti-Czarist groups in Russia and anarchist and Marxist groups in continental Europe during the 19th century can be reckoned as terrorist organizations. Their instruments for coercion consisted of basic bombs and explosives capable of inflicting very limited damage. When looking at their arguments for legitimization, the weak used it against the strong, the oppressed against despotic governments and these groups defended terrorism as a means to realize grand political tasks.
Significant handicaps have been sustained in defining terrorism. Some commentators and especially some state officials labeled terrorists, aiming to degrade them vis-a-vis public opinion, as “lunatic, perverted, cruel, demonic, evil, nihilistic, barbaric”, attributes related to terrorists’ personalities. Meanwhile, studies on terrorists and terrorism mostly in academic circles concentrated on these peoples’ logical setup and why they do those seemingly senseless activities. However, societies and states have not reached a common definition of terror, which have occupied the world on local, regional, and international arenas for over two centuries. We are not to emphasize the reasons for this being so but in order to cope with a problem, concept, or phenomenon, a common ground is needed. It is obvious by now that this common ground is not going to be attained through a common definition.
Some studies do exist to shed light on the questions of who a terrorist is and what terrorism is. It can be said that the academic community is closer to a common definition. In this regard, when examined as a means of coercion and violence, aiming to suppress masses by intimidation, terror can be defined as the deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of innocent civilians for a cause, political or otherwise. This definition was made in line with terror’s qualitative aspect. Meanwhile, terrorism can be characterized as terrorist groups’ legitimization of their reasoning and the advocacy of their activities inferred from their political arguments. For example, while Europe was undergoing industrialization, we can see those who took part in violence and tried to legitimize their indiscriminate use of coercion among ideologists such as Karl Heinzen (1849), Bakunin (1869), and Nechaev (1869). Karl Heinzen made one of the most fundamental defenses of terrorism:
“If killing is a crime, it should be a crime for everybody. If not, killing should be sanctioned for everybody. We do not stand for any killing and coercive behavior but if our adversaries do not share these views and conversely see their actions against us as legitimate, even sacred, we have the right to retaliate in kind. We can all be a Robespierre ourselves. We can and must generate legitimate arguments similar to his defense of violence, even more legitimate. This is our most natural right.”
“What other chances does an unprotected labor group have against government authority in possession of a strong military?” was the argument used quite often throughout the 19th century and survived as the defense of terror attacks until today. A decision must be made by looking at the perpetrators of these attacks and the attacks’ characteristics. There is a method of struggle here that only calculates how close the attacks bring the terrorists to their goals. With this method, the terrorist disregards the legality of his actions, is bent solely on propagating his message, plans merciless attacks, and aims at symbolic targets not caring whether they are innocent civilians or not.
Ideologists such as Bakunin, Karl Heinzen, and Nechaev argued that terrorism could serve as the way of expression for these hopeless people. These thinkers stated that it was the best strategy with such little power to carry out operations against the unreceptive state with its strong military and police forces. It was especially preferable for the operations to be based on armed propaganda, to be striking, sensational, and violent so as to create fear and panic, and to disregard any religious or moral rules. As a result, the ideologists of terrorism have repeatedly forwarded this argument; never in terror operations will as many people die as in the wars initiated by states to serve their political purposes. Anyway, there is no other alternative. Thus, the philosophical arguments in terrorism’s internal consistency are perfected, with terrorists ready to go underground, organize hierarchically and carry out ruthless operations with no remorse. We see that this concept lies in terrorism’s 200 year-old history.
Undergoing industrialization and urbanization during the 19th century, Europe experienced new political, social, and economic problems. Especially with the populations in the cities exceeding hundreds of thousands and the fact that this rapid increase consisted mainly of workers, brought along social crises. Thinking that they were unjustly treated by factory management and that they were used as pariahs working long hours, unable to send their children to school, lacking adequate health-care and even the basic means of livelihood, the new labor class was ready to be manipulated and goaded. It was not hard to mobilize these people who were frustrated with their conditions. Looking at 19th century terrorism as a phenomenon, it was not merely the combat strategy of a group of insane individuals but also a social, economic, and political result of the time. As such, it is imperative to understand that the issue at hand is not a group of adventurous “rouges” who take this road and to take necessary measures accordingly.
It is possible to say that the basic arguments brought forth by ideologists of 19th century terrorism are still valid after 200 years. In this respect, how this method of struggle, imported from the west to the east, finds its place in Islam’s domains is an important question for discussion by political scientists and sociologists. The phenomenon of terrorism, needing close scrutiny, has scorched many nations throughout the 20th century. It is useful to analyze its modus operandi, arguments and strategies for the 20th century.
20th Century Terrorism (Terror During the Cold War)
The local character of terror lasted until the Second World War. Terrorist organizations, usually pressing demands to their governments in parallel with their ideologies in time emerged as independence movements against colonial empires. However, the 20th century did not pass by with terrorist organizations pursuing “innocent” ideals with the “weak fighting strong and despotic tyrannies.” The most remarkable event of the 20th century for terrorists was the advent of the Cold War. During this era, some states saw it fit to use terror as a bargaining chip in international relations.
Consequently, terrorism’s second phase comes about with the Cold War. Terrorist organizations grew rapidly in the second half of the 20th century as the world entered the struggle between the capitalist and democratic Western bloc and the communist and Marxist-Leninist (Stalinist for some) East bloc. In this phase, unable to go to war due to the deterring influence of their respective nuclear arsenals, the two blocs carried the hot war to different platforms. The most effective area, perhaps the only one, which transformed the Cold War into hot wars was the utilization of terrorist organizations and the conflicts in buffer countries such as Vietnam and Afghanistan. The USSR’s support, especially to extreme leftist organizations in the form of logistics, arms, ammunition, training, and propaganda helped terrorist organizations to operative more effectively and internationally. Now, terrorist organizations were able to move between countries and even had access to certain conventional weapons. As a result, they were able to inflict deaths in the hundreds with their operations by shooting down airplanes and conducting high-scale bombing raids.
During the Cold War, we see that terrorist organizations diverted from the basic arguments expressed in the 19th century. Under the endorsement of certain states, especially the USSR, terrorist organizations lost their persuasiveness to such claims that they were innocent groups fighting despots or that theirs was a war of the weak against the strong. Especially in the case of organizations, backed by the USSR and operating in democratic countries, it is quite dubious how reliable these arguments are in the light of the inclusiveness of the respective parties’ political systems.
Ernesto Che Guevara, the legendary terrorist of the 20th century, explains the path to terror and the primacy of being a terrorist;
“Hatred – the unyielding hatred against the enemy – as a factor in a struggle grants a resilience beyond the capacity of man and transforms him into an effective, violent, selective, and cold-blooded killing machine. Our soldiers have to fight accordingly; a people without hatred cannot defeat their cruel enemies.
The war must be taken to where the enemy takes it. It should be carried to his home and his place of recreation. The war must be totalized, denying the enemy even the single instance of peace outside his barracks and even inside them. He must be attacked on sight and must feel like a wild animal being pursued in every step he takes. He will become more vulgar but also show the signs of his downfall then.”
The parallel between Che’s and Heinzen’s discourse, almost a century apart, is noticeable. The rhetoric on the need for a terrorist to be a merciless killing machine fits the past century’s discourse. Indeed, one can see that by omitting the names, Usama bin Laden can perfectly fit into the picture. Therefore, the same or similar problems in different times produce people sharing the same motives.
During the Cold War, the unbalanced economic development in the Middle East, the establishment of Israel, along with a set of social events caused the rapid spread of nationalist terror groups under Gamal Abdul Nasser, followed by socialist-leaning ones. While terror increased with each passing days in the problematic Middle East, its sources and ideology underwent changes. It was nationalism for a while, then Arab socialism, and increasingly religious fanaticism since the 1980s.
We know that the Western bloc developed some mechanisms in order to counter terrorist organizations that appeared in the 20th century. However, the terrorist organizations in question operated mostly on the national arena while it was mostly Israel that dealt with Middle East-centered groups. As such, this country was left to handle Middle Eastern groups. Israel’s strategy in fighting terror, on the other hand, has been far from being inclusive and integrating and has been extremely militaristic and alienating.
In reaction to terror groups emerging in the 20th century, bearing in mind that they were backed by the USSR, the West’s policies mostly centered on disrupting their propaganda and to train specialized security forces against individual criminals. During the Cold War, rather than the US, it was mostly European countries and Turkey, which had a border with the USSR, that were the targets of terror strikes. Thus, during the Cold War, while the US was left out on the social, political, legal, economic, and cultural precautions taken against terrorism, it was a part of the security-centered policies.
21st Century Terrorism (Global Terror)
The third phase of terror and terrorism comes about with the era of globalization. The commencement of this era was sealed with the attacks against the US on September 11 2001. Now, terrorism is a concept that has a new international war strategy, the solidarity of an international civilian initiative (it is estimated that the Al-Qaeda has over five thousand operatives worldwide from a variety of nations) with ever-stronger militants. This is a defiance of the leader of the new world, the leader of the invincible armada. Interesting to ask if Francis Fukuyama, the promulgator of the End of History, rethought his thesis? In a sense, the end of this idea did emerge with Fukuyama’s “The End of American Exceptionalism”, which sought the rise of a new war against global terror.
We live in an age that even to question why we face a problem of global terror is a hard thing to do. For the people who lay claim to have found the truth neither have the time nor the patience to listen to other arguments and causalities. All the debates about terror center on taking sides and any argument brought forth is not examined whether they are reasonable or scientific, but to which side they would serve best. In spite of all these, in order to understand global terror, let us try to see things from the viewpoint of our enemies (assuming that the actors of global terror are our common enemies). With this approach, maybe we will be able to grasp terrorists’ perspective as authors such as Achcar try to lay out and have the chance to take existing ideas used in thwarting global terror a step further.
Acquiring important avenues of propaganda regarding the problems of the Islamic world and the internal and external causes to these problems, the Al-Qaeda organization announced its aims in the Bin Ladin Declaration of Jihad in 1996, immediately after the meeting of its Grand Jury: “To remove American forces from the Arabian peninsula, to topple the Saudi regime, to liberate the holy places of Islam, to support all radical Islamic organizations around the world, and with its faithful youth, to kill Americans ‘invading’ the Saudi kingdom.”
Seeing the increase in its base of support and those who are mesmerized by its rhetoric, the Al-Qaeda rose to prominence among other terrorist organizations. The organization acquired an international character in February 1998. After meeting with several terror groups, Bin Ladin called for attacks on anywhere that the US had an interest. The joint declaration by the leaders of five important organizations, led by the Al-Qaeda, and printed on the London-based Al Quds al-Arabi daily is very important. On the newspaper, Sheik Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Ladin; Ayman al-Zewahiri, leader of the Egyptian Jihad; Abu Yasser Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Sheik Mir Hamza, leader of the Pakistani Jamiyyat-ul Ulama; and Fazlu’l Rahman, leader of the Bangladeshi Jihad Movement decreed under the title of “World Islamic Front” that:
“In order to rid the Al-Aqsa mosque and Mecca from occupation and kick their armies out from the lands of Islam, it is a must for all Moslems to kill – civilian or military – any American and their allies on sight.”
Al-Qaeda claims to be the defender of Moslems all around the world. It promotes its activities through issues such as the Palestinian question and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As in the case of its attacks in Kenya, Al-Qaeda tried to justify its action by arguing for the liberation of Palestinian lands occupied by Israel. From the viewpoint of the terrorist, the target and the means to that target are quite clear. Arguments on behalf of terrorism for the past 200 years have found suitable grounds for producing both leaders and militants in places where problems mount. The means and destructive power of the current organization is much greater and it has been able to lay great fear in the hearts of innocent people around the world. The arguments of global terror are of such kind that they basically leave nobody out. Usama Bin Ladin explains the murder of innocent people as such:
“If enemies are occupying lands belonging to Moslems and using innocent people as shields, this warrants us to attack them. For example, when thugs attack a house and take the children hostage, the children’s father would attack the thugs in kind even if this may harm his children. America and its allies are massacring Moslems in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Iraq. Moslems have a right to retaliate against America. Islamic law states that Moslems cannot live in infidels’ lands for too long. The September 11 attacks did not target women and children. The real targets were America’s economic and military symbols. Americans should not forget that they pay taxes to their governments, elect their presidents while their governments produce weapons that they hand over to Israel, which uses these weapons to slaughter Moslem Palestinian people. The American Congress upholds the American government’s discretion and this evinces that America is responsible for the cruelties committed against Moslems.”
The Al-Qaeda’s final aim is to unite all Moslems under the rule of the Caliphate. Bin Ladin argues that “the sole way for the establishment of the Caliphate is by force.” For that reason, the Al-Qaeda strives to lift the borders by toppling “the decadent regimes in Moslem countries that are under the spell of the West.” Bin Ladin says that immediately afterwards, he dreams of “an Islamic world free from dictatorships that are America’s puppets” where “true Islamic sharia is practiced.” Another one of the Al-Qaeda’s plans is to force the US to increase its military spending, discredit its policies in the eyes of American public opinion, weaken its stock market and its economy, create tension and mistrust between the US and its close allies and deepen the existing ones, forcing Washington to pursue isolationist policies in the middle and long run.
Usama Bin Ladin states his mission as such:
“My mission is only to awaken Moslems. I have to tell them what is good and bad. What does Islam say and what does its enemies want? The Al-Qaeda was formed to conduct jihad against blasphemy and especially to protect Moslem countries from attacks. Jihad is the undeclared sixth commandment of Islam. Any person against Islam fears this commandment. The Al-Qaeda wants to keep this commandment alive and active and to make it a part of Moslems’ daily lives. The Al-Qaeda wants to elevate the word “jihad” to the status of worship. We are not against any Moslem country and do not perceive a war against a Moslem country as jihad. We are for the armed jihad against infidel states who kill Moslem men, women, and children simply because they are Moslem.”
Bin Ladin held that the Al-Qaeda and the organizations under its auspices are engaging in self-defense:
“Our terror is against America. This commendable terror is carried out in order to curb the oppression and the support for Israel, which massacres our children. Don’t you still understand? America and the leading countries of the West label organizations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others as terrorists. How can one’s self-defense be terror? Then what is legitimate?”
The Al-Qaeda’s declaration to legitimize terror perfectly fits with the statements of 19th century ideologist of terrorism, Karl Heinzen and the discourse of the symbol of 20th century terrorism, Che. Terrorists forward the same arguments for years that as murder is a crime everywhere on the world, every state commits it. If legitimacy in killing is in question, these activities by innocent people can be nothing more than the effort to protect themselves, their properties and their lives against stronger governments. Let bourgeois, imperialist, and capitalist America call them “terrorists”,that does not matter. If fighting for what we believe is called “terror”, let us be called “terrorists” is the mindset that has alleviated the terrorist’s conscience and has turned him into a ruthless killing machine.
When looking at the threat capacity of global terror, it is estimated that there are many adherents of the Al-Qaeda in the form of active militants and sympathizers with active militants amounting to over ten thousand. The Al-Qaeda terror group, active in 55 countries, organized in a shape similar to a bunch of grapes, is understood not only as a threat to countries such as the US, Israel, and the UK and Western values, but also as a major menace to Moslem societies and Islamic values. It is seen that these militants conduct very sensational and large-scale attacks by using new techniques. Bearing in mind the communication technologies of our times, these attacks are a major publicity for terrorists.
Why Are Terrorist Organizations So Widespread in the Islamic World?
When evaluating the Islamic geography, several points can be outlined: With the exception of Turkey and Malaysia, it is hard to see an industrialized country where Moslems are a majority. Even though industrialization is incomplete, unqualified and uneducated masses create massive migration and the problem of unhealthy urbanization. It is observed that most of the people living on the Islamic geography lack even the basic needs to continue their lives. Although an important portion of the world’s energy resources are in this geography, these riches have not been used for the well-being of Moslems. These natural resources were used and are still being used either through the local rulers’ dealings with the West or by Westerners directly.
Moreover, the establishment of Israel on Palestinian lands at the center of the Middle East has been a source of considerable political tension. Losing four consecutive wars against Israel, Arabs have missed the opportunity to gain the upper hand in this respect as well. Yet, “Moslem” countries like Iran and Iraq, in pursuit of nuclear weapons, were blockaded, isolated or invaded. The point here is not that everybody should have nuclear weapons but to show the pressure that those in possession of these weapons exert over those who do not, or the distrust between the West and “others.”
Becoming influential in the Middle East following the UK, the US preferred and supported oppressive regimes to democratic ones. In general terms, Moslem societies did have rulers with a notion of democracy, human rights, welfare state, and individual rights and liberties. The biggest exception to this case has been Turkey, which underwent the European Union process. In other words, the common values of Western civilization of industrialization, Enlightenment, urbanization, and modernity were not presented to the Islamic world in a correct manner. As such, the tautology that Moslems and their religious beliefs contradict these values and that they refute these values because of their beliefs is inaccurate.
The ways in which Moslems, constituting a geography with a population of a billion and a half, solve their problems varies. Those who blame the West or the rulers who collaborate with the West for the problems are mostly holding the mirror to others, so to say. Meanwhile, a minority has realized that they have a part in the problems and have thought of ways to overcome them. Moslems, in line with the reasons mentioned above, have been increasingly hostile and hateful towards the West and the government officials whom they perceive as collaborators and this increased tensions.
The spread of terror from the Islamic geography to the rest of the world can be summarized as follows; with the rise of radicals to prominence who have increasingly become inflamed due to a defeatist psychology and their resort to violence, terrorism has presented itself as a way of exit to those looking for the people responsible for the disasters that befell them. None of the reasons stated can be a proof to justify terrorism, but can be illustrative as to why people end up being terrorists.
In this respect, the question “why do Islamic countries harbor terror groups?” can be answered as such: With their rights violated, their lands occupied either directly or indirectly, having been denied development and left out of industrialization, facing double standards, and living in the Middle East and the Islamic world sketched above, convinced these people to resort to terror attacks and as such, organizing the structure to do just that has not proved difficult for terrorist leaders. We see that groups that express themselves through terrorism later move on to North Africa and other Islamic countries. The subject that requires attention is that terror and terrorism have been presented to these desperate peoples as an exit route along with nationalism, ideological and religious beliefs being used to motivate people for the cause. The current reality is not that nationalism, religion or socialism breed terror but their employment as levers by groups that face certain problems. The fundamental issue is the preponderance of sentiments of inequality, injustice, and backwardness and as a result, the piloting of a large segment of people by a certain group into terror activities. In Fred Halliday’s words, terror groups that find shelter in the Islamic world have more to do with economic, social and political bankruptcy than with theological questions. It is not at all a war between Islam and the West. In Achecar’s expression, it is not a “clash of civilizations” but a “clash of barbarisms.” Will victory in this war come about with a bridge of peace between civilizations involving the new values of the world and the positive gains of humanity? These questions will be scrutinized in the following parts.
II) THE FIGHTING STRATEGY OF TERRORISM
Under this heading, we shall analyze how terrorists in general and actors of global terror in particular operate by looking at their strategies.
“We must kill them as much as they kill us so that a balance of terror can be struck. These attacks (September 11) are the moment when the balance of terror between Moslems and Americans is closest to equilibrium. Whatever they do, we will follow suit. Until they stop, we shall kill their children and their innocent ones.”
A common view among experts of terrorist organizations is; terrorists do not conduct random, ordinary, and adventurous activities but carry out carefully planned attacks, large or small. Within the mainstream arguments, the most important of the strategies that terrorists use in achieving their goals is to use their attacks as a means of communication to a wider audience and in line with the element of violence, to develop/diversify/re-organize their targets. In this strategy, while carrying out their plans, terrorists evaluate their adversaries’ reactions and measure their success in line with these reactions and plan their future operations accordingly. Undoubtedly, in terrorists’ list of priorities comes innocent popular masses as much as state forces.
However, when looking from the perspective of security forces that have internalized democracy, in order for them to be effective and successful against terrorism, popular support is a must. In a sense, the conflict between terrorist groups and security forces is a “strategy for acquiring domains.”
As an important part of present-day problems, terrorist organizations use common strategies despite miniscule differences. Terrorist groups’ strategy can be grouped under four headings:
First, terrorists seek to retain the initiative to carry out their operations. In other words, terrorist groups enjoy having the initiative against security forces since the question of where and when they are going to strike is a mystery. Since the initiative to choose the place and the time to carry the attacks, as well as the choice of target, lies at the discretion of terrorists security forces are left to shed light on the attack after it occurs and reach the perpetrators.
Second, terrorist wait for their enemies’ mistakes after their attacks. As stated above, with the initiative to carry out its attacks where and when it pleases, the terrorist group retreats into complete dormancy after the attack. This case is mostly true for global terror. In comparison to classical terror, global terror takes its time in admitting its operations and then anticipates its enemies’ mistakes. The world has witnessed the typical example to this point with the September 11 attacks followed by an upset US making numerous mistakes due to its Pentagon and CIA-based militaristic policies. In a sense, the Bush administration has likened its duty to fight terrorists to a “duel.”
Third, terrorist groups seek to expand to wider areas or at least not get cornered by their enemies. These organizations carry out their activities swiftly at an unexpected time and place. Terrorists use the mistakes committed by states after their own attacks as a means of propaganda. For example, the civilian death toll in the US’s operation in Afghanistan and several human rights violations in Iraq following the invasion have served as invaluable instruments for the Al-Qaeda’s propaganda. The organization builds a substantial amount of its propaganda on what goes on in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine and increases its militants and sympathizers in this propaganda war. It does not take a special intelligence capability to say that more people are inclined to violence than before September 11.
The fourth strategy of terrorist groups is more of an inherent advantage than strategy. Even though based on a hierarchical model, these groups are not complex as the lethargic bureaucracies of states and do not take too much time in reaching decisions. Looking at the Al-Qaeda, the hierarchical setup is completely abandoned. This new strategy makes it hard to pursue the organization on the one hand, and blunts the measures that need to be taken on the other. In response to terrorists’ four strategies, what are state actors doing and what should they do? In this frame, we shall study the question based on the US, EU, and Turkey experiences.
III) METHODS TO FIGHT GLOBAL TERRORISM AND THE LESSONS OF THE PAST
The US Model
Following every terror event, especially those involving large-scale civilian losses, a huge tension mounts and some sections voice their protests. “We condemn terrorist, cursed be their names, there is no excuse for such base attacks.” It is open to debate to what extent this “protest chorus” and the like solve the problem. Truly, terror attacks are vicious, ruthless, and illegitimate. These attacks are carried out precisely because of their character and it is for this reason that terrorists are called terrorists. However, those who have a responsibility to solve the problem need to do better than just joining the “protest chorus” and have to suggest realistic solutions.
For the past 200 years, we see that terror events increase on a daily basis with the multiplication of its destructiveness and brutality. The increase in the degree and the lawlessness of terror attacks after September 11 is alarming. As Fuller’s analysis portrays, terrorist organizations will not hesitate to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons should they acquire them. People are less safe now at home, on the street, in their cars, at work, and on vacation. The rise of protest voices does little to make things safer for people other than temporary psychological satisfaction. Surveys yield that terror is the greatest threat. The opinion polls conducted by the European Commission in 2004 states that 82% of Europeans perceive terror as “the most feared threat.”
A Peculiar US Method In Fighting Terror
Notwithstanding a few exceptions, the September 11 attacks are the first time that the US has witnessed an assault on its home proper. As the leader of the new world, the winner of the Cold War, and the pioneer of globalization, the US has suffered from a severe fury and psychological trauma and still does.
“However, the greatest change will be psychological. No enemy since Peal Harbor had killed Americans on American soil and even that was in faraway Hawaii. Nobody had attacked Washington since the British burned the White House in 1812. This situation created a sense of exceptionalism in US foreign policy: US territory was always safe; it considered the costs and benefits of intervening in foreign countries, but never the prospect of foreign forces invading the US. US interests and those of its allies were damaged at times as a result of US interventions, but never was there a harm inflicted on its own citizens. The Gulf War, in that regard, was antiseptic and created the illusion that the US can shape events without a cost on American lives. That has now changed.”
As Fukuyama asserts, with that psychology, the strategies that the US devised following the September 11 attacks was of utmost importance for public opinion. Thus, declaring war against Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and its allies, especially after the invasion of Iraq, were severely criticized because of their methods in fighting terrorism. With no established boundaries and targets, the militaristic methods were harshly castigated by many countries and civil society groups, but first and foremost by the EU. Significant opposition also rose against the Bush administration by Americans with their deep-rooted civil society and tradition of liberty. These reactions can be summarized as follows:
Lack of Respect for Human Rights: As with the example of the US putting those captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere in custody in Guantanamo for very long durations (some have been under detention for over two years), there is a lack of respect for human rights. The torture and other kinds of treatment in Iraqi prisons coupled with the treatment of illegal immigrants in the US point out to the existence of such a problem.
Use of Excessive Force: The US is not necessarily using the appropriate tools in fighting terror. In fact, military units are the least reliable instruments in stopping terror. Worst of all, an excessive use of force is observed at the present stage of affairs. A city might be bombed for just one militant, killing hundreds of others with the pretext of holding terror at bay. As a result, in pursuing or trying to destroy a single terrorist, a larger terror swamp is created. The costs in human life by the thousands in the anti-terror campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq are clear evidence to this point.
The Violation of the Principle of Legality by State Institutions: Another problem in the fight against terrorism is the weakening of the notion of legality and the negligence for the need to obtain international consent. Especially the invasion of Iraq has caused the US to diverge even with its closest allies. Without securing a mandate from the UN, the US and its cooperators have weakened the idea of justness and legitimacy, the fundamental aspects of fighting terrorism. However, the most powerful of all weapons that a state has in fighting terror must be justness and legitimacy. A campaign disregarding legitimacy in fighting terrorism will start looking increasingly like terrorist organizations.
Contrary to prevalent image, we cannot fight terror by using their weapons, strategy, methods, and principles. We have to understand it, identify it, and find out why it opposes us. Societies with principles based on law, democracy, individual and human rights have the chance to struggle against terrorism if they remain within the limits of these principles. In other words, our boundaries are drawn by the principles to which we adhere. Such attributes do not offend “ruthless-wild-inhumane” terrorists. On the contrary, terrorist groups and their promulgators, experienced in feeling comfortable about such labels, cite endless reasons for why they do things and do not have a bad conscience about it. As mentioned in the brief history of terror, terrorists are devout followers of their causes, killing machines without any emotions.
Fighting terror by imitating its methods is unacceptable in many respects, both to democratic and legitimate governments and to societies and states following the above-mentioned principles. For example, the situation with US soldiers torturing inmates at the Ebu Gureyb prison was received quite harshly by world opinion and has severely damaged the US government’s claim to freedom, democracy, and liberal society. At the same time, every bomb dropped has seriously disturbed world opinion. The standard of being powerful is dictated by being right and just. In this respect, the US has significantly compromised on its own founding principles and this has not brought success in the war against terror. Quite oppositely, our world has become an even more dangerous place after September 11 even though it was expecting to have relative calm and peace with the end of the Cold War. In its most basic sense, terror cannot be fought by competing with terrorists in violence and barbarism. If this competition is made, law runs the risk of turning into a race of barbarism between contenders rather than the protection of the weak.
American military officials, in evaluating the war in Afghanistan, before the first anniversary of September 11, prematurely declared that the war against global terror was almost over. An anonymous statement made by a retired American general in 2002 says as follows:
“They (Al-Qaeda and Bin Ladin) no longer wield the power to carry out operations in Afghanistan. We have also fully annihilated their operational capabilities outside Afghanistan. At the moment, they are only struggling for their own survival. They cannot communicate with their cells anymore. By roaming between caves and earthen houses back and forth, Bin Ladin’s and Zewahiri’s single concern is to survive. They (Al-Qaeda) have been seriously hurt. The only thing they can do is to run away and escape capture. They are in no position to conduct any operation.”
The US, in carrying out its war on global terror, has acted emotionally, reactively, and prematurely, believing that it will obtain tangible results by conducting military operations without identifying the problem first. However, the tide has turned and the method based on military response has caused global public opinion to turn against the US, which was ardently supporting it immediately after September 11. Every incorrect policy works against the US and at the same time swell the ranks of terrorists. The inclination for terror to expand also harms pro-US governments around the world. Today more countries find it hard to side with the US and have a hard time in dealing with pressure from their populace. Misguiding its supporters with every military operation, the Bush administration is losing many of its allies one by one, especially since the Iraq War. On the winning side is terrorists’ fame and reputation. Allegedly running from one cave to another, Bin Ladin, Zewahiri and the like are of much higher interest than they were three years ago. Compared to three years ago, the US President has seriously lost his credibility in keeping true to his word and fulfilling his goals. On the contrary, the threats uttered by terrorist leaders have become more plausible by masses and terror has become a danger for most countries around the globe. Especially one of the most important arguments of global terror, the fact that the US has lost its impartiality and trustworthiness in the Middle East is at an alarming stage. Bernard Lewis summarizes the US’s predicament; “The US is vacillating between two options: to retreat or to stay. Both are unacceptable.”
It can also be said that the US is not doing terribly well in the war of publicity against global terror. Only the individual cases of Bin Ladin and Saddam Hussein have been used. While the question as to why Saddam is a part of this war still remains unanswered, Bin Ladin has been portrayed as a man who looks awkward because of his beard, the way he sits, his lame walking, his ruthlessness, and his sarcastic facial expression. Hating the enemy before going to war may be helpful. However, what matters even more is to know the enemy, his plans, demands and capabilities, as well as to delineate what the threat is and where it emanates from. The biggest dilemma in fighting global terror has been the lack of a common understanding of what this terror is, where it stems from and as such, the steps that need to be taken. This situation is especially caused by the fact that the US is furious about having been attacked in its homeland and its resort to pushing forward with its unilateral policies as well as the ambiguity of other states.
The US’s policy in fighting terror by relying only on military might differs considerably from the policies of European countries, especially those of France and Germany. The reason for this is that the US is still in an emotional state of mind where it views any criticism of its policies as an insult on its honor rather than a contribution to enrich the debate. Another reason lies in Gaddis’s self-criticism; “We view ourselves probably as the greatest of the greatest and accordingly do not feel to urge to work with others.” The thought that the US is left alone foremost by European countries forces the former to make more mistakes and act emotionally while shaping the new world. In the war against global terror after September 11, differences, rather than convergence, have risen. The differences are over the excessive and needless use of force, the violation of law, the failure to protect human rights, questioning Iraq’s relevance in the war on terror, and the US’s endeavor to dictate its policies without debating them.
The policies of the Bush administration, having embarked on the course with catchy mottoes such as “stopping global terror” and “unyielding struggle against terror”, have been analyzed so far. In this respect, without a political objective, it seems almost impossible to have a winner in a war where the enemy is still undefined. As Anonymous puts it, “What is the target? Who is the enemy? What is the standard for a victory? What is the last point to concede?” The answers to these questions are still unclear. Is the war against Islam? For the US President and other officials “absolutely not.” Is the war against Usama Bin Ladin and the Al-Qaeda? Absolutely yes. Then again, how many terrorists have been captured? How close have the objectives been met in Afghanistan and Iraq? And how many cells have been destroyed? These are questions still in need of an answer. What is clearly known is that the threat of terror and the number of terrorists and sympathizers has steadily increased. Especially with regard to the invasion of Iraq and why it has become the main focus on the war on terror, a credible answer is still in dearth.
The US demonstrated serious lobbying skills prior to the war in Afghanistan and secured support from the international community. However, the policies since November 2001 demonstrate the problem with the US’s approach. As a result, the global support for its actions is plummeting ever since. With the handling of the problems from a military point of view, the targets that this view chooses, and the doubts raised regarding later outcomes, the US will become even lonelier and even more susceptible to terrorist attacks.
While lack of experience has been a reason for the US’s troubles in dealing with terrorism, its sole reliance on its military and intelligence organizations is also another problem. Determining the method for fighting terrorism in a condition of panic and fury, military and intelligence officers fail to grasp the social, cultural, legal, and political complexities of terrorism. As Rashid states it, since September 11, the US has failed to move beyond the aim of capturing the Al-Qaeda leadership and its militants whatever the cost. Other issues pertaining to the rise of terror do not attract the US’s attention. As such, it does not seek to devise solutions. Even though the Taliban has been long defeated, the Pentagon and CIA-oriented policies are still applied on the Afghan people and a shift in strategy is not in sight.
It will not be an exaggeration but simply the expression of a fact to suggest that world opinion has overwhelmingly turned against the US and especially the Bush administration since September 11. Displeased with any country that criticizes it, or worse, classifying it as an enemy, the Bush administration’s policies in fighting terror have not only increased the number of potential terrorists, but has also brought the risk of losing allies. Accordingly, the US’s reactionary policies in its fight against terror, based on its exclusive reliance on mere intelligence and coercion, is a cause of worry not only for the US, but also for its allies. The situation runs the risk of turning into a contest between the two sides of the Atlantic.
Another handicap in the US’s fight against terror is the indefinite nature of the enemy and the lack of an ideological basis for the fight. In scrutinizing the situation facing the US, says Özdağ:
“The US’s new foreign policy, in comparison to its past ideological tendencies, faces new ideological, political, military, cultural, and social problems. The first stage of the set of problems is the physical indefiniteness of the target. Since early 19th century, the US believed in an anti-monarchical foreign policy, the center of attention of this policy was the British Empire. The object of the anti-militaristic ideology at the beginning of the 20th century was the Second Reich...During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and pro-Soviet countries were the objects of its ideology. In all these ideological motions, the objects were real, physically visible, with tangible command structures and calculable national forces. Thus, they were a clear-cut target.”
Since sustaining the attacks on September 11, the US has not made a clear definition of an objective and an enemy. Whatever attempt to outline the enemy was abstract, indefinite, and lacking conformity with common principles and causes. For example, it is yet unclear what the Taliban is (a government, tribe or terrorist network) and whether those who are captured are war criminals or terrorists. Furthermore, it is a fact that the whereabouts of Al-Qaeda militants and the profile of the organization is still ambiguous. Moreover, the Bush administration posits Iraq on the first item on the war against terror.
“The second dimension of the problem is exacerbated by the conceptual framework itself. It was possible to say different things about anti-communism but the frame was visible, the USSR...This simplified the formation of anti-Soviet, pro-Soviet, and neutral blocs. However, the same thing cannot be said for terrorism. Everyone has a different idea about terrorism, making alliances hard to forge and even harder to maintain.”
In short, everybody was caught unprepared for the September 11 attacks and with the US taking the initiative in the process of fighting global terror came the quandary of siding with the US or opposing it. For President Bush’s renowned “you are either on our side or on terrorists’ side” hampers any effort to devise alternative policies and even the courage to think of such a thing. Do we live in a world without any alternatives in fighting global terror? For one thing, understanding the mindset of global terror or what it is trying to do does not require deep philosophical inquiries. Bin Ladin and Zerkawi have clearly expressed their wishes. The tactics that global terrorists use are not a secret anymore either, at least within the scope of what has been said so far. The real question here is what sort of a method of struggle will please people across the world and allow for a settlement with minimum losses. “He who possesses a hammer only sees everything else like a nail” as Abraham Maslow once said. Of course, the US does not only have a hammer; however, its insistence on military operations in fighting terrorism, talking about the destructive power of its airplanes, missiles, and bombs make the US increasingly resemble the person in Maslow’s metaphor. Bearing in mind the existence of diverse dynamics in American society, it is quite obvious that the instruments at hand need not be only espionage and coercion.
The US’s dilemma in fighting terrorism has been subjected to intense debate and research. The US’s approach covered here also causes problems and connotes a different importance for Turkey and the EU. For the bulk of the question occurs in the Middle East and the Caucasus, in close proximity to Turkey and the EU.
European Models
The EU: The “Old Continent” or the “Deep-Rooted Continent Learning from Its Experiences”?
The accumulation of European countries’ knowledge in fighting terrorism on the state-level must be understood as the European Union’s common heritage. The events after September 11 have served as a litmus test for the different viewpoints of Europe and the United States. For the first time, the duel of words between the two sides of the Atlantic has reached extreme proportions. The US is blaming Europe for being “old” while Europe censured the US for reincarnating the obsessions of a medieval empire. In fact, the US’s value systems were perceived almost as identical to those of the EU to the point that Samuel P. Huntington once claimed that the US and the EU belonged in a common set of Western values. On the other hand, why do EU countries (with the exception of some) interpret the US’s policies regarding terrorism and its intervention in Iraq differently and punish those nations that support the US in the post-Cold War era?
The answer to that question requires strenuous and detailed study. However, it should suffice to do some brainstorming. The US, established as a constitutional government with the colonists declaring their independence from the British Empire in 1776, has based its domestic and foreign policies in line with notions such as democracy, human rights, and individual liberties, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights in the US, which in time evolved to become international norms. This is the natural outcome of the US’s raison d’étre. At the beginning of the 20th century, there is the US, which mostly furnishes its own prosperity through its own resources on the one hand, and on the other, European empires that exploit the economic means of their colonies.
From its independence until the Second World War, aside from protecting its national interests, we can see that the US reflected its moral principles on its foreign relations and cared for the Bill of Rights that formed the basis of its Constitution. Having been appealed twice for saving Europe from the anguish of world wars, the US increased its leverage in the Old World in the face of Communism and the USSR. Moving outside its continent, seeking markets for its ever-increasing products, and requiring raw material (especially energy resources) in other regions, the US has replaced moral values with a more realist approach in its foreign policy. Even though morals continued to function as a discourse, an interest-based and mostly unilateral policy was implemented. The support for Middle East dictatorships, the prioritization of economic and political interests at the expense of democracy in Latin America and Asia, the US became a double-talking country to many. As in the case of Iraq, repeating its discourse that it desired to deliver democracy to that nation while continuing to support dictatorial regimes, the US has significantly undermined its own credibility. The protection of the national interest is not always the crucial element in foreign policy. To put it more precisely, the idea of solely doing what is best for the national interest may not serve that interest in the long run. The crucial aspect of national interest is credibility. It is not just some bad scenario for a state to continuously fail in foreign policy matters once it has lost its credibility and reliability. The degradation in a super power’s credibility may not be visible for a while. However, the damage will be much greater in the long run.
In short, with its gigantic military budget and its high-tech weaponry, the US has become an irresistible force and believes that it can hold on to global dominance through this massive military strength. Of course, one should not disregard the many academics, politicians, journalists, and other voices in American society who criticize this way of thinking. The emphasis here is the Bush administration’s peculiar political stand.
What Did the Old Continent Learn, and When?
On the other hand, the experienced nations of Europe have forsaken their colonies and derived important lessons from great wars. However, this success came at a rather exorbitant price. Hitler’s Germany and its repercussions, fascism, the losses in the two world wars, racism, inhumane conditions in the colonies, and violation of human rights in the social and economic realms throughout the 19th century are but a few of the examples.
First of all, Europe has assumed the avoidance of another war its most important objective. In that regard, the protection and enhancement of human rights has been aimed at. This idea has found ground during the establishment and development of the EU and in this respect points out to a desired rather than an achieved goal. This success has unfolded in a way as to surprise theorists of regional integration due to its stress on the sharing of and consensus on common principles and the prosperity of everybody involved, rather than simple military deterrence. A shift in paradigms is in question and the notion of others’ loss is our gain is being replaced by others’ gain is also our gain in the relations among European countries. The new vision and ideology of the old continent, contrary to coercive and militaristic interests, is individual and civil society-oriented, democratic and libertarian, culminating in the Copenhagen criteria.
European nations, feeling much more secure with the end of the Cold War, oppose the US’s unilateralist world leadership, which has worked at the expense of conciliation. Europeans also object to the US’s singular leadership at the expense of mutual interdependence and its preference for absolute ascendancy rather than equality. This opposition is due to the difference of the means that the two communities have. Having an enormous military might at its disposal and being the victor of the First and Second World Wars as well as the Cold War, the US makes power-based calculations in its thinking and therefore exacerbates the problem. The divergence of the US’s and the EU’s opinions regarding the war on terror can be explained in the historical and political terms stated above.
The second reason why the experienced continent differs from the US is the different process that it underwent as it witnessed terrorism. Even though Europeans did not agree on a common policy to combat terrorism or formed a common platform and take the initiative, their experiences with the political violence starting in the 1960s is quite important. Fighting Marxist-Leninist and Maoist organizations as well as ethnic and radical groups, Europeans have carried their experiences to the times we live in. For example, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac have opposed the US’s acknowledgment of Iraq as a prior target in the war on terror and have argued that such a connection would decrease public support imperative for fighting terror. They emphasize the need to build a coalition and international cooperation to combat terrorism. Well, the US also attributes importance to international cooperation. However, the discrepancy is that the US wants to carry out the cooperation in a way that will let it do as it pleases. The US’s “whoever’s not on my side is with the enemy” attitude disturbs many countries.
In short, in the first and second phases of terror and terrorism, the US did not feel targeted and accordingly did not deem it necessary to develop any policies. The fight against terror in Germany, the UK, or Turkey was perceived as the internal problems of these countries first and foremost. Sustaining intense and systematic attacks from terrorist groups throughout the Cold War, Turkey and European democracies have learned important lessons in the face of the price they paid. These lessons are as follows; fighting terror is a police matter, but fighting terrorism is a political and ideological matter. In this regard, building their struggle against terror groups on respect for human rights, legality, and the rule of law, highly trained and equipped police units observed transparent and accountable methods only after some serious mistakes. These methods were successfully applied to clear and definite threats, such as the Hizbullah in Turkey, the IRA in the UK, the Red Brigades in Italy, the ETA in Spain, and the RAF in Germany.
In tandem with the security policies developed against terror groups, the ideological foundations of the struggle against terrorism were also laid. In opposition to terrorists’ propaganda, certain political, legal, economic, and cultural measures were taken with successful results. Perhaps European democracies realized that in fighting terrorism, the point is not kill as many people from the opposing side, but to marginalize the fanatics and advocates of murder and to move beyond fighting terror to win the war in the hearts and minds of the people. While this model was the greatest gain by the US’s closest allies during the Cold War, it can be said that nowadays it is significantly overlooked by the US.
The Turkish Model
In a systematic sense, Turkey met terrorist networks for the first time by the end of the 1960s. This was during the Cold War era and the second phase in the historical development of terrorism. In line with the Eastern bloc’s aim of spreading communism and as the forward outpost of NATO and gateway to the Mediterranean, Turkey was one of the most important target countries. It is no secret that the USSR actively supported many terrorist groups in Turkey due to the latter’s special status. As a result, we can observe how rapidly in number and in the propensity of their operations terrorist organizations spread in Turkey in the 1970s. By 1980, Turkey was a country where terror was able to even demoralize security forces and keep the public under fear.
This first era that witnessed the utilization of security-oriented policies in a reflexive manner, without too much concern for causality. Unable to complement its anti-terror policies centering on security concerns with civil initiative and economic, cultural, social, and political reforms, Turkey endeavoured to devise policies exclusively with its security forces in mind. This was because policy-makers held the belief that as the country was fresh in its exposure to terrorism, lacked the economic and political strength and the ideological sophistication on the part of its democracy; Turkey would not be able to withstand terror’s propaganda. Despite all these, we witness the expressing of different opinions even with the rise of a new wave of ethnic terrorism in the 1980s. It was during these times the argument that security forces were not enough to prevail over terrorist groups came about and that other measures had to be taken. Following this second wave of terror, it can be said that with the Hizbullah, Turkey entered the third phase of terror in the 1990s.
The policies against Hizbullah can be defined as the full utilization of Turkey’s past experiences in fighting terrorism. Turkey took advantage of the experiences that it had in fighting terrorism since the 1970s and successfully applied them against the Hizbullah. In the operations conducted against the Hizbullah between 1999 and 2000, the teamwork between different branches of security forces, their technical capabilities, accurate intelligence, and above all, its ability to profile the organization and its members correctly has created this outcome. As a result, the centers and cells of the organization were raided.
We can place Turkey’s gains in fighting against terrorism under two headings:
1- The gains of security forces: Security forces’ strategy in fighting terror aims to take the necessary measures to minimize the influence of terror groups. Police units, specially formed for combating terrorism, have come a long way in their abilities to profile terrorists and work in tandem with each other. Especially with the operations conducted against the Hizbullah in 1999 and 2000, police forces rejuvenated the esteem that people held for them as no harm was laid on civilians. Moreover, the strategy of minimizing separatist terrorists’ area of activity by police and military units in the 1990s can be regarded as a success story. With these operations, terrorist groups’ strongest elements, the initiative and “terror-strikes-first” were taken away from them.
2- Social, economic, legal, and political gains: A second category that can summarize Turkey’s gains in combating terrorism is the gains that fall outside the scope of security forces. As it was mentioned before, different approaches to combat terrorism where debated as the fight ensued into the 1990s. These debates consolidated new outlooks. The greatest change that the country witnessed during these times was that state institutions were much more entrenched and immune to terror and much more vehement in their democratic credentials than the 1970s.
In the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, the increasing attention directed at the rule of law, the primacy of the individual, and adherence to human rights have all had a major impact, thanks to the EU process. Moreover, Turkey, with its industrialization and in due course its urbanization and rise of an urban culture, has witnessed the power of democracy as an art of co-existence. Turkey, where every debate ended up as a clash on the streets in the 1970s, can develop solutions by peaceful and rational deliberation in a democratic way, owing to its numerous national television stations, its newspapers, and high rates of literacy. The developments have not only remained at that, but Turkey has acquired the indispensable elements for a democracy, namely, a large labor class, civil society organizations, and bourgeoisie.
These events have also reflected on Turkey’s experiences in combating terror. Turkey began positing pluralistic, compromising, and society-based projects at the center of its security policies. One indicator for this point is the case of the much-criticized Anti-Terror Code (indeed debatable on certain items), which is at the same time quite liberal and can be said to allow wider freedoms in the age of global terror. The elevation of the threshold of freedom by the developments in Turkey can also be regarded as the sign of the mutual trust between state and society and the abandoning of past fears with the country regaining its self-confidence. This situation came about with the incidents summarized above and with Turkey’s new considerations in fighting terror as well as with Turkey’s internal socio-political, socio-economic, and cultural developments and with the integration to the EU’s values systems.
When formulating its internal security policies, especially those relating to combating terrorism, Turkey has an experience going back 40 years and therefore it is possible to talk about a Turkish model in fighting terror. This model composes of professional and specialized security forces and certain social programs. However, Turkey experienced many hardships in thwarting the terror emanating from Eastern bloc countries during the Cold War and the ethnic-separatist terrorist group, the PKK, due to the political vacuum in Northern Iraq following the First Gulf War. Turkey now struggles not to get harmed by US policies. It is quite clear that Turkey’s internal policies are affected by American decisions. Perceived as a part of these decisions, Turkey indeed suffers from the reactions to those decisions. The truck-bombings in Istanbul on 17 and 20 November 2003 are the most evident indicators to this statement.
As it can be seen from the examples drawn, Turkey is forced to pay the price in its domestic affairs for what the US does in its foreign policy. It will be prudent for the US to view Turkey not only as a partner in its own way of fighting terror but to derive lessons from its experiences. This will not only help Turkey, but also the US, which is still inexperienced in combating terror. However, the Bush administration is not in a condition to listen to either Turkey or Europe.
Turkey cannot formulate its internal security policies independently from the world. International cooperation, especially in the fight against terror following the September 11 attacks has an even more special meaning. Therefore, in creating the new strategies for fighting terror, the incorporation of the Turkish model into the new value system and into the ideological infrastructure is important for Turkey. It is significant to see that Turkey is trying to convince the US for creating fields of mutual understanding and global popular support in the light of its past gains from combating terror. However, it is safe to argue that Turkey has more in common with the EU than with the US. Diverging from the US (the Bush administration) in terms of its experiences and the message that it conveys to the international community, Turkey synthesizes the old with the new.
Fighting global terror is a major problem. While the Bush administration makes mistakes, the EU can hardly do anything other than criticize. The EU and Turkey need to take the initiative in fighting global terror in the 21st century. At least the need to develop realistic policies is an imperative for the Turkey-EU duo. They need to express their common solutions for fighting global terror, what they can offer in that direction for sake of both security and political, cultural, and religious value systems. The first rule in standing strong while fighting global terror and terrorism is to be right and legitimate and continue like that all along. Nations that have once pioneered in justice, equality, rule of law, democracy, human rights, and individual freedoms shall read the future much better. The need for such nations is now direr than ever.
Conclusion
Combating global terror dictates global cooperation. This cooperation is only possible when there is a common ground against terrorist organizations and their methods. In this respect, it is important both to handle police operations against terrorists and to relieve Moslems whose religion is taken hostage. The objectives of global terror are clear. These involve the eruption of a barbaric war, polarization of the world, and to consolidate hatred and animosity all around the globe. The analysis of this chapter pertained to the experiences and requirements in the fight against global terrorism. Four basic topics have been covered.
In the first part, the phases of terror and terrorism were studied. In this framework, terror groups originating from the labor movements of the 19th century assumed the strategy of defeating a powerful actor with limited munitions. As with moral values, terrorists claimed, in line with their “less people die because of what we do than in wars”, that it was only possible to resist those states, which coerced them even when they were perfectly justified, by embracing violence. Even though 20th century arguments weakened, terror attained a much more destructive power. The basic reason was that in the polarizing world of the Cold War era, terrorists were able to secure the support of certain states, directly or indirectly. Abiding by their arguments in this phase, we see terror groups seeking the endorsement of ideologies on the extreme right and left. Furthermore, we see the rise of global terrorism as the third wave of terror, in parallel with the globalization process.
While the third wave of terror, what we call global terrorism, has features in common with the first two phases of terror, it has remarkable differences in its strategies, its substance, and in the types of tools that it uses. These tools are so sensational and grand (New York, Washington, İstanbul, Madrid, Beslan, etc.) that they eliminate the possibility of secret negotiations or compromise between terror and the entities that it has declared war against. The other important difference is global terror’s ability to inflict staggering levels of civilian casualties, rendering the argument that great successes can come about with a small number of deaths. It is understood that with the necessary technical means such as a situation where they acquire WMDs, terrorists will not hesitate to carry out unspeakable massacres. Thus, global terror does not seek to bargain but to either see to the realization of their demands or to end their lives and others in that cause.
Global terror also organizes differently than the first two phases. Global terrorists organizing in independent cells from one another, only meeting under the banner of the Al-Qaeda, make it very hard for them to be pursued and distract security forces to other places.
In the second part, the general operating standards of terror groups were analyzed in relation to state forces, society, and other target groups, along with the strategies they devise for such purposes. It is safe to say that terror groups have the same basic strategies. These are to preserve the notion of “strike first” and thus attack unexpected targets at unexpected times, targeting innocent people, and to keep government forces off guard and force them into panic-stricken reprisals. It is not an overstatement to say that terrorists grow and develop with governments’ wrongdoings. Every blunder is a boon to terrorists. Terrorists’ success in turning the operations against them into crude hand-wrestling constitutes a phase in their war for gaining domains. In this respect, the actors of global terror who deliberately escalate violence turn the tragic scenes and civilian losses resulting from state’s operations to their own advantage. The most striking conclusion of this part of the chapter was that terrorists cannot be challenged in violence.
In the third part, the US, EU, and Turkish models in fighting global terror were stressed at. Policies to combat terror were analyzed under three headings, looking at the current state of the struggle. In this respect;
First, the US’s policies (mostly referred to as the Bush administration in this study) in fighting terror are not very promising. The US, claiming to promote liberty and human rights is undermining these concepts. With its policies, the Bush administration has brought the US far away from its constituent value systems. The events in Ebu Gureyb and Guantanamo, putting the US in a difficult position vis-à-vis the rest of the world, has been such a disgrace to the US’s image and to its value systems that even terrorists were not able to accomplish. In a sense, the US is almost in a race of illegality and illegitimate behaviour with terrorists. In fighting global terror, not only is it the Bush administration that pays the price of its Pentagon-CIA-based policies, but it is also its allies who are harmed. The attacks in Madrid and Istanbul are clear evidence to this point. In the post-September 11 era, US policies are far from making the world a safe place. The only point that experts agree upon (who have a whole set of different ideas about fighting terror) is that since its days of inception, the number of terrorists and the imminence of the threat have only grown. As long as the US insists on its militaristic policies in fighting global terror, the picture is not promising and the Bush administration has closed its ears to all warnings. This policy of fighting terror, the Bush Doctrine, does not solely jeopardize regional security but also global security. It was simply stated in the second part of this section that terrorists cannot be fought by using their rules and brutality for no modern state can fight Global Terror on those grounds. In other words, such a race will not produce any winners.
Second, the experiences of EU countries were scrutinized. EU countries, fighting terror before they had integrated, have now pooled their experiences at a higher level and have abandoned some flawed practices. In this respect, Britain and Spain were criticized during their fight against terror due to their conflicting behaviour with the Union’s principles. While both countries counter-posited that fighting terror was an internal matter, they also took important steps in line with European values and have assembled their experiences under two headings. First, professional police units fought active militants and second, these countries have made economic, political, and cultural reforms and have taken away the base for terrorists’ propaganda. Facing terror, as Europeans did not fall in the trap of delimiting the problem to the security dimension, they have also taken important steps to remedy its causes. Of course, this is not to argue that there are exceptions to this case. Britain’s Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher banned the broadcasts of the speeches of IRA leaders on the media and made the mistake of believing that sending military units to Northern Ireland could solve the problem. However, the end result was not an “old” continent but a continent where members learned from past mistakes.
What the Europeans have realized is that they can learn from, negotiate, and compromise with each other and this is caused by the fact that European states define the relations between themselves as mutual interdependence and cooperation among equals. Another thing that Europeans came to realize was that combating terror is not a bull-fight but a matter of marginalizing the “bull.” As such, they are at an advantageous position in presenting alternatives to the civilized world due to their common European principles, i.e. the Copenhagen criteria. However, Europeans have not been able to transform this advantage into an active foreign policy against global terror. In this study, it has been argued that in spite of their vast experiences, European countries have done little than condemning terror. Europe has to test itself against global problems and assume some responsibilities. Large military budgets are not required for this purpose. Smart policies are needed.
Thirdly, Turkey was analyzed in the light of its many long years of fighting terror. Turkey has been a country that was left alone and severely criticized while it was fighting terror. Not all of these criticisms were wrong, ill-willed or intentional. Turkey did not perceive it that way and took advantage of useful remarks. Starting in the 1960s and speeding up in the 1970s, terror groups from the extreme right and left seriously compromised the peace in the country. The only solution Turkey came up with at that time was to increase security measures and pass tougher laws. The coup of 1980 was the culmination of this process. Turkey, first fighting ethnic terror in the 1980s and the pioneers of the perverted zeal of global terror in the 1990s, enhanced its law enforcement capabilities on the one hand and developed political, economic, social, and legal solutions the like of EU countries. Turkey has successfully combated terror and improved its democratic credentials in the past few years. It can be said that even in the face of the attacks of 17-20 November 2003, the country did not compromise on individual rights and liberties, and the rule of law, constituting the main axis of the struggle. Distancing itself from the Bush Doctrine, Turkey is increasingly closer to its own values and the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey’s long and bitter experiences in fighting terror has helped in two ways; to incorporate popular support in the fight and to establish civilian control over the police forces fighting terror.
Can the EU-Turkey Model Serve as a Solution in Fighting Global Terror?
The Turkey-EU partnership in fighting terrorism must not be kept out as an alternative. In promoting common values against terror, Turkey and the EU are very close to each other. As the earlier parts of this study maintained in detail, cooperation in fighting terror requires a common perspective. The grounds for the EU and Turkey to act together have been laid for a very long time (200 hundred years of common principles and 40 years of fighting terror). Due to many of its characteristics, Turkey can serve Europe as a window to the east (Middle East, Central Asia, Islamic world) and as argued in the first chapters of the book, is vital for Europe for to be able to engage with that part of the world. Thus, fighting global terror is a useful platform to start off for Turkey and the EU.
That the EU-Turkey partnership should assume the initiative in the fight against global terror might seem as a very hard and assertive suggestion at first sight. However, the opportunity to create such an alternative is higher than ever and is necessary.
1) Gaining the support of global opinion in fighting terror is possible only by being ethically sensitive. For fighting terror in the name of preserving basic values (human rights, legitimacy, rule of law, democracy, and pluralism) is an important one. It is only possible to reach a mutual understanding with the current fight not being discriminatory and tension-escalating. The delicate fighting process requires avoiding the victimization of the innocent, a point always exploited by terrorists in their propaganda. It is much more realistic to say that the partnership between the EU and Turkey, much closer in their attitudes regarding terror, can yield much more sound results.
2) One of the biggest mistakes on the part of governments is to imitate terrorists’ actions in fighting them. For example, it is claimed that fighting terrorists cannot always involve adherence to rules since they never abide by rules and carry out ruthless and indiscriminate attacks. As such, the understanding that it is acceptable to use the enemies’ tools every now and then appears on the forefront of the Bush administration’s policies. It is natural that after a big terror massacre tension mounts in society and people demand security policies that are swift and demonstrative of the state’s power. In such times of shock and fury, there might be some who argue for extra-legal action but laws, rules, and democratic institutions as well as the subsequent decision-making mechanisms are the results of long years of toil. These hard times should not involve circumventing traditional institutions and practices. As Koh points out, the policies and rules implemented in such hard times also need to be reflective of the fortitude of democratic traditions. US policies have greatly failed in that regard. The US, postponing its traditional State Department Human Rights Report after the tragic torture incidents at the Ebu Gureyb prison, has implicitly conceded that it has some serious problems in that respect. There is a need for a fresh outlook in this field and the power to meet that need shall succeed in combating global terror.
3) When everyone is in panic, states have the obligation to remain cool-headed, calm, and reasonable. Even before thinking what security measures need to be taken in dire times, we have to consider what the law allows and what it does not and to formulate our policies accordingly. Procedures need to be loyal to the essence of the law not only to render the actions of enforcers legal, but also legitimate. This is important because such an approach is a must in securing the support of different segments of society by revering ethics and morals. The point mentioned in this study about the utilization of governments’ mistakes by terrorist propaganda must be avoided. The EU-Turkey coalition is the most appropriate candidate for that purpose.
4) Fighting global terror must not be based on a military strategy. The aim is not to annihilate terrorists on sight (as this is not possible anyway), it is, with a focused mindset, to carefully select targets, secure public support, and to find them before they can induce any harm and bring them to justice. This can be realized by professional police forces. The most important segment of the actual fight against global terror involves the operation of police forces with such a common approach. Other than cooperation between several countries, this can be created by a common educational anti-terror training institution or curriculum. In this respect, even when they are under the command of different national authorities, different police forces with a similar training on similar topics can at least be more forthcoming in sharing information. The latest example to that came in joint Turkish-EU operations against the DHKP-C (a Turkish extremist/leftist/revolutionary organization) in April 2004 where Turkish, Italian, German, and Belgian police forces successfully worked together.
5) In the war on global terror, realizing the integration of civilizations stressed intensely on the first part of this book has a very important ideological and cultural dimension in winning hearts and minds. The problem with perceiving global terror attacks as mere terror and combating it as such, causes us to overlook other aspects of fighting global terror. The Islam-Christianity chasm can be overcome by the EU-Turkey initiative. As the EU-Turkey initiative will prove invaluable in eschewing religious fanaticism, the world’s biggest problem these days, it will aid the moderates. This way a divide will be crossed and innocent and mesmerized people living in the Islamic world will be shown an exit route, making it impossible for Usama Bin Ladin and the likes to declare a jihad or minimize its appeal even when declared.
6) In fighting global terror, the EU-Turkey initiative is the most likely candidate to save Islam, which is taken hostage by terrorists. Being in a more advantageous position than the US in the Islamic world, this initiative can take steps to solve the Israeli-Palestinian question, eliminating its usage by terrorists in their propaganda. Most importantly, the EU-Turkey partnership can show people living in the Islamic world the path to take. The synergy that this duo can create in the Middle East and in the Islamic world will not be an encumbrance but a platform of compromise and understanding.
To finish off, in this part of the book, the Bush Doctrine was used to denote US policies in fighting global terror and it was argued that these policies did not success so far and does not carry any hopes for the future. On the other hand, it was argued that nation-states in the EU have succeeded in their encounters with terror. Along with this, it was stated that Europeans have not demonstrated the will to create a common platform to fight global terror and have been contented with only criticizing the US’s policies. However, the point was made that now was the time for the EU to assume the responsibility in combating global terror. It is possible for the EU to reach an empathetic understanding with the Islamic world by Turkey, which is an EU candidate. Turkey is an important leverage and partner for the EU due its policy of moving beyond rhetoric and jargon in fighting global terror. It is not optimistic but realistic to project that both parties will profoundly gain from this partnership. For the violence that is gaining ground in the Islamic world has more to do with economic, political, and social questions than religious disputes. This debate platform should not be based on the concepts of alienation and belligerency, but on the reflection of the art of living together on the international realm where peaceful mediums are developed. We believe that this is the EU’s discourse of “united in diversity.”
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ihsan BAL
This article was originally published in March 2005
Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 3-7.
Remembering The Orly Attack
