The period from 1950 to 1960 may be examined in several ways related to modern Turkish history. In this period, which is called Democrat Party or the
a. The Development of Democracy
After the Turkish National Struggle for
According to the result of the election held on 14 May 1950, DP obtained 4,242,833 votes (53,35 %) out of total votes, 7,953,055 and gained 408 seats in parliament. On the other hand, RPP obtained 3,165,095 votes (39,78 %) and gained 69 seats only; the Nation Party (NP) got 240,209 votes (3,02 %) and gained 1 seat in parliament. In addition to these, 9 independent MPs became able to enter parliament. What is important here is that DP got 53,3 % of total votes due to the result caused by the election system, yet the reflection of this result to parliament in terms of the number of deputy was 83,7 %. Although RPP got 39,78 % of total votes and gained 69 seats, it was represented by 14,4 % in parliament. The vote proportion of NP was 3,02 %, but NP was represented by 0,2 % with 1 seat in parliament. These figures suggest that the election system became more effective in the re-structuring of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) than the votes of people. Had this election in 1950 been carried out according to D. Hont system, DP would have gained 270 seats and RPP 210 seats in parliament. As it is seen from the above indicated numbers and proportions, the effect of the election system (majority system) on representation is great from the points of both government and opposition, since the government felt the support of people as a great power whereas the opposition had to admit an opposition perception below its power due to the numerical scarcity in representation.
This result of the 1950 election meant the change of government, and DP came to power on May 22, 1950. At the very same day, one of the first things that the new Assembly carried out was to support the election of Celal Bayar, Ataturkâs close friend, experienced and moderate statesman as the third president of Turkey and Refik Koraltan as the Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly while Menderes was entrusted with the responsibility to form the new government. When Bayar was elected as the President, he resigned from the Chairmanship of DP. This new attitude suggests a new beginning in the history of Turkish democracy, yet Atatürk and İnÃ¶nü, unlike Celal Bayar, continued as the head of their party during their presidency not actually but legally. This new perception in the time of DP strengthened the view that "the President should be neutralâ. Consequently, the general administrative board of DP elected Adnan Menderes on 9 June 1950 as the head of the party in the place of Bayar. Hence this period that lasted from 1950 to the military coup on May 27, 1960 is called not only the period of Democrat Party but also the "Menderes Periodâ due to the fact that Adnan Menderes was elected as the general head of DP and then came to power as the Prime Minister.
The change of the government in 1950 may not be considered the change of hand in government, but the politics started moving away from the state control to the common people in the street. In connection with this new approach, there has been an unanimous consensus among historians that the overwhelming victory of DP in 1950 was a turning point in the modern Turkish politics. Even the supporters of DP regarded this change as "White Revolutionâ.
The characteristics of both the new Assembly and the new Government in which DP had an overwhelming majority were quite different from the previous ones. Upon examining the social status of DP Deputies, it will strike that they had many differences separating from the Kemalist period. The example for this condition is that the average age of DP MPs was younger, and their election districts and supporters had close relations. Moreover, the number of highly educated people among the supporters of DP was lower than that of RPP supporters who dealt with trade and had a good command of knowledge of law. Furthermore, one of the most striking differences between DP and RPP was that the number of DP MPs who came from the bureaucratic or military origin was very low, so that it is clear that the government of DP illustrated the coming of a different mass to power dissimilar from the well-known administrative group in Turkey.
The ideology of DP as well as the views stressed in its propaganda campaign promised generally for the sake of people a much more freedom, the policy of liberal economy and the support for the private sector compared with the public sector. Moreover, DP did not bring much limitation to the religious life and subjects. These policies of DP were admitted by the majority of Turkish people with pleasure. Erik Jan Zürcher states:
In the period of RPP government, the state administration and party organization were so bound up with each other that the party became one of means of state only to inspect and administrate society. With the coming of DP to power, eventually this relation was cut off. Democrats did not trust bureaucracy and army that were inherited from the previous administration, and thus they were struggling too much to take them under control. For this reason, there emerged a new tendency of unification between state and party, particularly at the top of state. In addition, what was different from the Kemalist period was that party controlled bureaucracy.
This statement reflects more clearly the party and state relations in the period of RPP.
Generally, DP was defined as the party of the common people as well as that of the rural region while RPP was considered the party of elite and of the urban people. Unlike the general condition, however, most intellectual supported DP in 1946 as it promised more freedom in society. Even they put pressure indirectly on RPP. As Umit Ãzdağ expresses:
When there was an upraise after World War II to get rid of bourgeoisie and of bureaucratic restriction, there were splits within bureaucracy, because the function of RPP as the political wing of bureaucracy had come to end. Civil bureaucracy enlarged its power against the military bureaucracy and finally excluded the military bureaucracy from the partnership of the government. The majority of officer delegation drew their support from RPP and turned their faces towards DP. The new secret organizations were established within the army to support DP, and if RPP did not become content to transfer power to DP through election, there were conspiracy plans to remove RPP from power.
The change of power took place in 1950 de facto and de jure, but neither DP for power nor RPP for opposition was psychologically and sociologically ready. Due to this main factor, DP felt itself alien to power and desired to reduce the RPPâs influence in bureaucracy and military. In the meanwhile, it also wanted to make rapid changes to reinforce its power. In this way, the Democrats were always distrustful against army because of the close relationship between the previous power, particularly Ismet Pasha and leading officers. After the change of power, the new government made a wide range of changes in administrative structure of army including the Chief of Staff on 6 June 1950. Therefore, the Democrats felt themselves at ease.
When Menderes, the leader of DP, became Prime Minister in 1950, he was 51 years old, and had been member of parliament for 21 years, 16 years of which had been in RPP. He always said that he was discovered by Atatürk. Thus, he had some old principles and behaviors, and it is quite natural for him to show tendencies similar to the perception in RPP. However, there were many differences between DP and RPP in relation to many issues, particularly the followers on who DP was based as well as the perception of policy that it followed. The main principles of DP, which were also called magic principles, are as follows: private enterprise, freedom and anti-communism. There may be different views concerning the social groups on which DP relied, but it is also possible to mention that the movement of DP was generally based on the dominant class such as trade bourgeoisie and senior landlords.
However, in order to make these evaluations complete and detailed, it is necessary to underline the characteristic of DP by which it made people participate in the political struggle. Because the coming of DP to power became possible through a wide range of public support. The methods developed and applied by DP undermined profoundly the bases of the methods of political struggle which had been used in Turkey until that time. Erogul pointed out about the period and issue:
The members of Parliament who were seen by public as untouchable and important persons started to visit people personally; statesmen, politicians and propagandists walked in the muddy roads of the villages to ask for vote. Applying single stage election system made the relationship between power and vote more concrete; from that time on, the results of election were not predicted in advance as in the previous ones, and people became really interested in elections. As a result of the interest the proportion of participation in elections gradually increased and reached 88,88 % in the general election of 1950.
The analysis of Erogul was quite important and interesting for the changes in the political life of Turkey As these views suggest, the Turkish people changed their rulers for the first time in general Turkish history with a perception from bottom to top. Even this new perception brought with it a new shift in opinions, and people realized their power in administration, and their thrust to themselves built up. What is more important is that people came to notice the political activities of power affecting directly their daily lives.
Were the new perceptions that DP brought to society real and just appearance in terms of democracy? The answer of this question changes according to a wide point of view. This question was also discussed by Erogul as follows:
Classically Democracy means a system of government in which people choose their rulers by voting for them in elections. Although the deficiencies of DP at the end of their period, they tried to bring down the democracy-in-appearance, they made people feel the way that would lead to the real democracy. Today our people have power to determine government literally. In any attempt about democracy from now on, it is necessary to take this reality into consideration. For this reason Turkish revolutionists should examine carefully the DP movement and should not ignored it as a anti-revolution. The way towards the real democracy depends not on the denial of democratic path laid by Democratic Party but on understanding of this perception and going beyond it.
Karpat examines and frames the perception of democracy in the period of 1950-54, the first period of DP:
â¦generally everybody accepted that there was a free and democratic atmosphere in Turkey. DP allowed the azan (call to prayer) to be in Arabic in accordance with its liberal view in religion, shortened the period of military service, enforced a liberal amnesty law, made easy the travel of Turkish citizens abroad as well as the travel of foreigners and old Turkish citizens back to Turkey, made a new press law and formed a commission to determine anti-democratic laws and decrees.
Clearly this quotation shows that the restrictions in many fields were removed away and will be done so.
It is an undeniable fact that the most important developments and changes took place in the field of economy during the first period of DP. There were many developments and changes that had been never seen before in Turkey. The figures in the first and last years of the DP period show it clearly. For example:
In 1950, the sugar production was 137,000 ton while it was 643,000 in 1960; the cement production increased from 400,000 ton to 1,750,000 ton. In the same period, the production of electricity went up from 100 to 375 whereas iron manufacturing increased from 100 to 475; the steel production reached 2230 and the copper production grew from 103 to 235. The per person agricultural production in 1950 was 479 kilogram while it was 800 kilogram in 1958. The number of tractors used in agriculture in 1949 3103, and it reached 43872 in 1958. The number of Primary Schools belonged to the Ministry of National Education was 1251 in 1950 while it was 20775 in 1958; there were 27144 teachers in 1950 whereas there were 50905 in 1968; the number of students increased from 1,460,000 to 2,280,000. If the case was considered in terms of the high school education, there were 59 high schools, 18,257 students and 5555 teachers in 1950, yet there 104 high schools, 188,554 students and 7480 teachers in 1958.
This quotation suggests clearly that DP started to develop its production with agriculture. DP supported the private enterprise to increase the agricultural production, gave importance to the mechanization in agriculture and particularly tried to increase the number of tractors and other farm machines. In this period, 40,000 tractors were purchased. The impact of this progress was discerned within a short time, because Turkey had been a wheat-imported country until 1950, yet it became the fourth wheat-exporting country in 1954 in the world.
The peasants earned a great amount of money they have never earned before. It was caused by the suitable season and the high amount of production in agriculture. Moreover, the increased demand for wheat in the world markets as well as the high price due to the Korean War were among the important elements. Because of these developments, the period that continued till 1955 was regarded as the "golden yearsâ of the Menderes government. The government gave priority to build particularly new roads with the intention to make more easy the delivery of the increased agricultural products to the markets. Before 1950, there was the total of 1600 km road, but it reached 7000 km in 1960. In addition to this, the construction of electric powerhouses gained speed, too. These investments were generally carried out by the foreign loan or by the foreign aids. The foreign loan was generally taken from America. Andrew Mango explains it: "The program of the economic development in Turkey after 1950 needed a strong alliance. America was the powerful candidate for it, and thus Menderes considered most necessary the military and financial aids of Americaâ. During the Menderes decade, Turkey received $994.000.000 from America as economic aid. 70 % of this American aid was spent in the modernization of agriculture.
The developments and changes in economy brought about new shifts of perception in social and cultural life in Turkey. Particularly, many people emigrated from the rural areas to the big cities. If the figures are taken into consideration, "the population of four big cities between 1950 and 1960 increased 75 %. The proportion of people, living in cities, went up from 19 % to 26 %26. This means that 1,500,000 people emigrated, and 600,000 of this number emigrated to the big citiesâ.
Moreover, there were also many developments and changes related to education in the Menderes period, and thus new schools were opened:
Due to the fact that the education perception of DP was conservative, secondary schools for the training of Islamic religious personnel and Higher Islamic Institutes were opened, and the religious sources became compulsory. On the other hand, the colleges where the instruction was given in foreign language were opened. The experimental programs started. Both Atatürk and Middle East Technical Universities were established according to the model of American Universities.
The Democratic period is called an era in which the education of technical human power took place for the first time in Turkey, because elite in the traditional sense consisted generally of soldiers and bureaucrats. In parallel to the socio-economic changes, DP governments sent students abroad with the educational purpose to meet the need of technical personnel.
In the view of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Menderes had two important characteristics, which enabled him to initiate the economic development, and this situation made investment and development speedy. He writes that "these two qualities of Adnan Menderes indicated that he was the expected prime Minister in the future. One of these two qualities was that he was not afraid of big numbers, and the other one was that he was very fast to decide about the construction affairs and projects.â The second half of the 1950s led the government continuously to take foreign loan due to the fact that the national product were not much favored, that the agricultural products went down in value throughout the world, that the government promised people a lot and that export lagged behind import. Within this vicious circle, the re-payment of foreign loan gave rise to troubles. Inflation went up enormously. The Dollar- TL parity was 1-2.8 ($/TL), yet it became 1-9.025 ($/TL) in the devaluation of August 1958.
c-Domestic Political Developments
The relationships between the government in power and the opposition party were tense from the first day onward. RPP had been in power for 27 years, and thus it had difficulty in getting used to new conditions after the severe opposition of DP which had continued for 4 years. The administrators of DP saw themselves as the greatest representative of "National Will (Milli İrade)â without rival, the sole power to change country and expected the opposition to act like a small partner of the government as in the previous government of RPP. DP believed that it represented the whole majority and perceived that this condition legalized whatever it saw as necessary. However, RPP believed it had lost a wide range of support throughout the country since 1946.
In the early period, that the promises of DP which started to come true as well as the economic development led RPP to an internal confusion within the party, since RPP did not have any political alternatives. In the period of the first democratic government, there were several arrangements in relation to religious subjects and institutions as the reflection of liberal thought. Thus, the azan (ezan-call to pray) was allowed by a law to be called in Arabic; the number of secondary schools for the training of Islamic religious personnel, which started to be opened in the period of RPP, increased, yet it caused arguments about secularism in society. As a result, DP began to be perceived among some people as a party against secularism. RPP had kept this issue on the agenda since 1950. It is partially right to some degree that DP meddled religion in politics, yet it does not mean that the basic principles of Republic gradually got weak. As Karpat explains, the party program of DP was not different from that of RPP; most members of DP uttered that their own program was the re-interpretation of the RPP program. In practice, however, some differences between two parties occurred in terms of private, historical and political reasons. Like these, moreover, the environment in which parties operate as well as the personalities of leaders gave rise to some differences. Furthermore, a new law called "Atatürk Law" was enforced on 5 July 1951 to put the principles of Atatürk (Secularism was one of the most important principles one) and his statues under the complete protection. In fact, nothing could be expected of DP other than having the characteristics of secularism and revolution, since Celal Bayar, who was among the first founders of DP and was its first leader, had participated in the Turkish National Struggle for Independence and used to be Atatürk's Minister and then later the Prime Minister. Moreover, he was a revolutionist, secularist and moderate statesman. In addition, "Bayar, before forming the party, had given İnÃ¶nü guarantee about the subjects such as secularism, education and foreign policy." Karpat defines the religious and secularist perception of DP as well as their applications to society as one of the principles of the basic freedom and considered it as the occurrence of liberal thought:
Democratic Party regarded the religious freedom as one of the principles of the basic freedom; the words of party suggested that Turkish society was Islamic society, so that people should have practiced their religion in the way they liked and in the language they preferred without meddling religion in the daily politics. According to Democrats, secularism serves the liberty of thought but does not allow religion to be used for the political purposes. The establishment of the multi-party system in Turkey brought about a more liberal interpretation of secularism. This freedom left a large area to religious education and prayer, yet it had a great deal of impact upon the public institutes. It could be said that the religious liberation was the natural result of democracy as well as the effort of adaptation to democracy.
With regard to this view, Zürcher comments that "the revival of Islam was just the traditional culture of people that already existed. Particularly, the partisanship caused competition in society after 1955, and the people of the rural area and tradesmen supported DP whereas most intellectuals, civil and military bureaucrats took side generally with RPP. On the other hand, in the early period of DP, some intellectuals, civil and military bureaucrats supported DP in the hope that restrictions on freedom would be lifted. But the limiting and suppressive policies of DP - restriction on press, the interference of universities directly with politics and the use of radio by DP rather than public - caused many people to withdraw their support from DP. Moreover, DP started losing its popularity in army due to the following reasons. First, the officers had economical difficulties caused by the economical crisis in the country after 1955. Secondly, inflation went up. Thirdly, the gold stock was spent generously, and finally the development model of the country was not proper enough in their views. Particularly, the modernization of Turkish army, the equipment of war and transportation and fleet were given importance after Turkey had entered NATO in 1952. American military personnel trained the Turkish army. The young Turkish officers, who were whether experts in engineering or in communication, were appointed to the most important posts in army. These young generation officers completed some part of their education abroad by taking scholarship from NATO, and thus they had the opportunity to see how far Turkish army and society were behind their western alliances. Today it is a known fact that all the intrigues against the government have been concocted by this environment since 1955.
The British Field-Marshal Harding was appointed to Cyprus as governor in 1955, and in the very same year he visited Turkey on July 4, 1955. The purpose of his visit was to explain Turks not only what kind of a role Britain expected Turkey to play in but also the wide range of principles related to the defense of Middle East. In his own report, Harding classified the purpose of his visit to Turkey under three main titles: to observe the fighting capacity of Turkish army, to reveal his views about the strategic position of Turkey in relation to Middle East and to increase the relationship between Turkish and British military forces. Harding stressed that Turkish soldiers were morally up, dissuasive against their rivals and trusted themselves. Moreover, he also mentioned that he admired the infantry and artillery training that he saw in Erzurum; the team work was good, yet he wrote that the use of tanks and planes was misused. Furthermore, Harding emphasized that the training of Turkish officers in Ankara was effective, but at the same time he wrote in his report that the exercise of army he saw in Erzurum suggested to him that Turks still had a long way to carry out the necessities of modern war. 
There was quite high respect to İnÃ¶nü himself in army rather than his party, because he was the second man of the Turkish National Struggle for Independence and of Turkish Republic as well as a close friend of Atatürk. In addition, there was a wide range of conviction in army that DP was using army for its political purposes. It brought about a kind of reaction among officers against DP. There may be more examples about the discontent of army. It had been known since 1955 that secret committees were established within the army to carry out a military coup which was one of the options for solution in Turkey.
Therefore, these committees approached coup step by step and brought down the Menderes government on May 27, 1960 and then formed a military administration instead. It is known that many people in Turkey and outside predicted that the military coup would take place in Turkey. If the events that either paved the way for the military coup or made it fast are examined briefly, the political life after the election of 1957 became generally tense. While on his way to London for the Cyprus agreements on February 17, 1959, the plane of Menderes crashed near the Gatwick Airport due to the pilot error and fog, and he miraculously escaped this accident with injury. Following this accident Menderes was warmly welcomed by a great crowd when he came back to Turkey, and İnÃ¶nü met him at Ankara train station and shook hand with Menderes. This event might have become a means to soften relations, yet this cordial meeting became the last one between two leaders. The events that brought DP to end were influenced by the tour of the RPP leader, İnÃ¶nü, on 19 April 1959. He took with him other party administrators and journalists and traveled by the party train. His tour was called "Büyük Taarruzâ (Great Offensive). The first stop of the train was Usak, a province in the west of Turkey, where İnÃ¶nü was wounded by a stone thrown by a person at age of sixteen during a demonstration that was supposed to be organized probably by the government. This situation was always kept on the agenda by RPP against DP, and thus the tension became more widespread throughout the country. The incident also gave rise to discontent in army because of their respect towards İnÃ¶nü. Later on, InÃ¶nü went to Izmir and then Istanbul, but his car was attacked in Istanbul by a group of people on his way to the city center from airport. The attempts to mitigate the impact of the opposition in the different places of Anatolia did not become effective but increased the trend for RPP. Finally, soldiers did not obey the orders given by the government against Inonu and his supporters in Yesilhisar near Kayseri. It indicated that DP lost its support in army whereas RPP and army became more close to each other. The formation of Inquiry Commission of Assembly, which consisted of the members of DP only, was protested by RPP in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on April 18. İnÃ¶nü delivered his reaction through these words: "if you keep on going like this, I cannot even rescue you; if the conditions become compulsory, the coup is a legitimate right for peopleâ. While the political atmosphere was becoming gradually tense, university students started demonstrations against the government across the country. During the demonstrations in İstanbul that police and soldiers strove together to quell, two students died. People did not learn the event completely due to restrictions on press, and the rumors went about; particularly, the news of the death of students spread throughout the country. For this reason, the number of protests increased, and thus the government declared martial law as a remedy and banned people from going outside in Ankara and İstanbul on April 28, 1960. Despite it, a crowded group of students in the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University shouted their slogans and called the government to resign. The similar events continued till 27 May 1960 and brought the DP government to end. Menderes said in Eskisehir that he canceled the Inquiry Commission of Assembly, yet nobody heard of it due to the fact that the sound cables were cut off. Thus, Menderes learned the military coup in Eskisehir early in the morning of May 27, 1960.
What would have happened if Menderes had held a general election? This question is answered by Burrows, who was British ambassador to Ankara for four years:
It is necessary to make note of this combination, because it is not seen among students, academicians and officers in other countries. There was a tradition of military and civil service superiority coming from the past. If a general election had been held in the spring of 1960, DP would still have had a wide range of support throughout the country due to its economical program. But they did not want to hold election for not having risk. One of its reasons was Menderes's perception about development. His policies followed more or less a traditional line. His purpose was to make fast the western standard and prosperity in Turkey. In accordance with this purpose, he wanted to build more roads, hydroelectric installations, to construct a new oil refinery in the south-east Anatolia region and to improve the productivity of agricultural. Menderes regarded himself as having a special role in the future development of Turkey and thus he wanted not to miss this opportunity in the hand of anyone else. This attitudes was unfortunately exaggerated by circumstances of a purely accidental nature. For example, many animals were sacrificed for him when he came back to Turkey after the air crash in London.
However, did not Menderes have any knowledge completely about what might happen? "It is seen that he was surrounded by a narrow circle. Those who formed this circle led him gradually to death due to their own personal interests. The warnings of remote circles did not reach him. Menderes was an unfortunate statesmanâ. He did not find loyal friends and mentioned it clearly in his last will written to his son, Yuksel: "never trust anybody around you; never believe that I am guilty apart from personal weakness. After all these events, do not abstain from serving my ideal people and country with your existenceâ.
d-The Foreign Relations of Democratic Party
In his opening speech of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Celal Bayar addressed his views related to the foreign policy: "Turkish foreign policy was generally based upon the collective security system. I am so thankful to the government that Turkey joined NATO through its great efforts, and this organization was the most excellent one of the collective security systems â¦â¦â Ercüment Yavuzalp, who served the foreign affairs in the Menderes period and used to be the private secretary of Menderes, summarizes the foreign policy of the Menderes era:
When Menderes came to power, the main purpose of foreign policy for Menderes remained behind what ith should have been, and thus he believed that it needed the first priority. In order to achieve a substantial economic development, he thought that the security of country should be relied upon strong bases. The purpose of Menderes was to get rid of the state as being the state of a small minority and having a few developed centers but to make it a state which would expand from top to bottom throughout the country and to defeat poverty. For this reason, it was necessary to abandon the most praised past but to accept that our country was undeveloped without being in complex and then to make effort to get rid of this condition. Thus, it was necessary to resolve the question of security in the foreign policy, which was not only a vital priority, but at the same times it needed an urgent action.
The matter underlined even by close bureaucrats of Menderes was that security had priority for the continuation of a good and effective foreign policy. Burrows explained on 18 January 1960 in relation to the past that "Turkey made its preference in terms of foreign policy, and thus it joined NATO to protect its independence and democratic principles and established CENTO (Baghdad Pact). This policy showed that the place of Turkey was in the west. It was also the foreign policy of Atatürkâ. The foreign policy of DP was also criticized by the opposition. After World war II, RPP, like DP, also pursued a similar policy towards the West, yet it accused DP of being "westernized more than the west". It meant that the foreign policy of Turkey became bound up entirely with the west, particularly with the Middle East policies of America. The policymakers of the Turkish foreign affairs considered themselves the representatives of the west in shadow. But the national interests were the most important thing, because the opposition exaggerated this issue enormously.
In the cold war atmosphere, Turkey found itself in the pursuit of an alliance against its expansionist neighbor, the Soviets. Hence it made its official application on August 1, 1950 to join NATO. At the meeting held in September 1950, the issue came to the agenda, yet particularly Norway and Denmark objected vehemently to the membership of Turkey and Greece. Europeans did not want the commitments of NATO to be expanded within a large geographical area. Britain wanted Turkey to remain outside NATO but desired that Turkey should take place actively in a Middle East Defense system which would be formed under the leadership of Britain. The proposal of Turkey was not admitted at the end of the meeting. In response to this, the Korean war prepared a new conjecture for Turkey to join NATO. The DP government decided on 25 July 1950 to send Korea a brigade consisted of 4500 soldiers in accordance with the principles of the UN. The government had not informed the opposition of this issue. Unfortunately, 1200 Turkish soldiers died at the end of the war. This heavy price caused the west at once to reconsider their relation with Turkey. Thus, Pentagon explained with pleasure the strategic importance of Turkey, along with its military contribution. Britain also supported Turkey's NATO membership, and finally Turkey, together with Greece, joined NATO on 28 February 1952 after Scandinavian countries had drawn back their objections. From that date onward, the foreign and defense policies of Turkey have operated in line with the joint defense plan of NATO.
In addition to the NATO membership, Turkey signed bilateral agreements with America, too. However, many of these agreement were not approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly but by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relevant military authorities only. There were 54 agreements signed in this way: three of them were signed before 1950 whereas 31 agreements during the Democratic Party government and 20 agreements after 1960 were approved. According to these agreements, America gained the right to establish military bases in Turkey. The opposition accused the government of making a concession about the national security and sovereignty of the country. That Turkey took place within the western alliance was quite welcomed by Britain. The British Foreign Minister, Antony Eden, dispatched his views about the subject to the British Prime Minister Churchill on May 21, 1952: "Turks are strong alliance, so that Americans can show success in many areas for Turks more than us. That they form a close relationship is very important for us". Although a long time had passed since then, the views of Britain about Turkey were almost the same. It was written to London by Burrows, the British ambassador to Ankara: "The existence of a strong and substantial Turkey is an important strategic interest in general for the west and in particular for Britainâ.
The Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed a friendship and cooperation agreement in February 1953 in Ankara with the support of America. On 9 August 1954, this agreement was transformed into a military pact and named "Balkan Pactâ. The purpose of this pact was open to the American support against the threats coming either from the Soviet-led countries or the Soviets. But this pact lasted very short, because Tito gradually approached Soviet after the death of Stalin in 1953 and eventually wanted to continue an active policy within non-alliance together with Nehru and Nasir. In the very same year, the Turkish Foreign Minister, F. Rustu Zorlu, participated in the meeting of non-alliance countries held in Bandung on April 18-24. But Zorlu defended the policies of the pacts there, so that his views were not welcomed. The Turkish-Greek relation became very tense in 1955 due to the Cyprus issue, and it caused the pact to come to end actively although it continued legally till 1960.
Turkey tended to sign a similar agreement with its south and east neighbors. The Baghdad Pact was established on February 24, 1955. Britain on April 4, Pakistan on September 23 and Iran November 3 joined this pact. In 1958, there was coup in Iraq, and it withdrew from the pact in 1959 and then the Pact was renamed as CENTO, and its headquarter moved to Ankara. The pact continued under the name of CENTO until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. America joined CENTO as observer. This pact also aimed to keep away the Soviet threat from the region. Along with these developments, Menderes planed a visit to Soviet in July not only to soften relations but also to get economic support, yet the coup made it impossible. Some critics argued that the start of a close relationship between Turkey and Soviet or the Turk-American conflict was one of the most important reasons of the coup.
The DP period may be regarded as the one in which Turkey sought alliance in its foreign policy. As it is seen in the examples of Balkan and Baghdad Pacts, however, these attempts did not bring an extra benefit to Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey received the reaction of other countries outside these pacts. Particularly, Middle East Countries considered these attempts suspiciously in terms of their own security. This situation had a negative impact upon the Turkish foreign policy in the long term.
The multi-party system in the Turkish political history continued with the same prime minister for ten years without break. There was no political party other than DP. As seen from this view, this period was the period of change and development in Turkey in terms not only of the multi-party system but also of other reasons. There are three reasons for why DP was disfavored in the public eye: 1) an increasing economic crisis; 2) the disfavor of the government by intellectuals and army; 3) the Pasha lobby or the Pasha factor.
Aydemir explained the most three important personalities of the Democratic Party period: "İnÃ¶nü is rational and realistâ; "Bayar is a professional politician and man of combinationsâ; "Menderes is man of excitement and passionâ. In the general Turkish history, there had been the perception of a one-person-administration in the Turkish society. It was observed that this perception still continued in the Menderes period. In this respect, the ratio of error increases. It is valid for a long period of time. As the staff of British ambassador explained, the one-person-administration brings risk with itself: İnÃ¶nü may be happy with the result for a short time; he may become successful in another round and continue the coalition with regard to the control of soldiers by constitution and civil; he may decrease the interference of soldiers in politics, but he has a special personality and is an old man. If he dies suddenly, we are unable to comment upon what will happen. Although Menderes was known as the supporter of the west, he could be also defined as a hard-working man who struggled a lot to develop his country. In his private talks, Menderes often mentioned a view: "Turks do not have friends other than Turksâ. When Germans wanted Turkey to send them workers in 1958, Adnan Menderes replied: "Let us five years, and then we will ask you to send us workersâ. In the views of Karpat, this period is defined as follows:
If the successes of DP are considered briefly, it brought a new perception to social and personal life with its economic policy, the passion of work and the dynamic structure in spite of all failures. The mechanization of agriculture, the road construction and the investment policy of DP had a great impact upon all the layers of society and brought all the individuals and social groups face to face with both the problems and blessings of modern life. A better life, more freedom and improvement became out of fancy, and there emerged something that may be used by every generation. Turkish economy got rid gradually of its traditional appearances due to some management principles and standards. DP was the first party that met the demands of people with its formation, function and essence, and it always carried out its functions by taking the demands and reactions of people into consideration. Thanks to the economic policy and public opinion, Democrats became able to bring the techniques of the twentieth century and the ideas related to them to a large group of people without any reaction and opposition. Although they made a concession about the basic principles of Turkish Republic, Democrats respected generally revolutions and interpreted revolutionism according to their own perception.
Cihat GÃKTEPE: Assc. Prof. Dr.,
, Department of History Kafkas University
 Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar, Bülent Ãaplı, Demirkırat; Bir Demokrasinin Doğuşu, Milliyet yayınları, İstanbul, 1995, p. 26
 Kemal H. Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi, Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller, Afa Yay. İstanbul, 1996, p. 205
Mete Tunçay "Siyasal Tarih (1950-1960)â Ãağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980, Yay. YÃ¶netmeni Sina Akşin Cem Yay. İstanbul 1997, pp. 175-187
 For the system of elections in the Turkish Political history, see William Hale, "The Role of the Electoral System in Turkish Politicsâ International Journal of Middle east Studies, V: 11 1980, pp. 401-417
 Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti Tarihi ve İdeolojisi, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara 1990 p. 55
 Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "The Dmocratic Party, 1946-1960â, in Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, ed. Metin Heper&Jacob M. Landau, I. B. Tauris, London 1991, pp. 119-133
 Feroz Ahmad, Turkish Experiment in Democracy, London C. Hurst, 1977, p. 38
 Erik Jan Zürcher, Moderleşen Türkiyeânin Tarihi, İletişim, İstanbul 1998, p. 321
Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961. Aspects of Military Politics, D. C., Brooking Institution, Washington 1963, p. 7
 Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye, p. 322
 Ahmad, The Turkish, p. 44
 Ãmit Ãzdağ, Menderes DÃ¶neminde Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul 1997, p.. 21
 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul 1993, p. 221
 Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye, p. 347
 Aydemir, İhtilalin Mantığı, p. 223
 Eroğul, Demokrat Parti, p. 51
 Ibid., p. 182
 The law related to this issue was approved by the Assembly on 16 June 1950. Due to the sensitivity of the subject, RPP did not oppose but voted in favour. Ibid. p. 58, Hikmet Ãzdemir, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, İz yay. İstanbul, 1995, p. 206
 Karpat, Türk Demokrasi, pp. 329-330
Samet Ağaoğlu, Demokrat Partiânin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri, İstanbul 1972, pp. 231-232
 Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1974, p. 3
 William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey, London 1981, p. 104
 Roger Owen, State Power& Politics in Making of the Modern Middle East, Routledge, London 1992, p. 125
 M. E. Yapp, The Near East Since The First World War, Longman, London 1991, p. 313
Andrew Mango, "Turkish Policy In The Middle East Turning Danger to Profitâ in Turkish Foreign Policy New Prospects, Ed. C. H. Dodd, Eothen Press Huntingdon 1992, pp. 55-69
 14 July 1960, FO-371/153675
 George Harris, Troubled Alliance, turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1970, Washington 1972, p. 71
Ãaglar Keyder, "Class and state in the Transformation of Modern Turkeyâ in State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, eds. Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, New York 1988, pp. 191-221
 Toper Akbaba, Demokrat Parti ve 27 Mayıs DÃ¶nemi Türk Eğitimi, Ankara 1998, p. 90-91
 Selim Deringil "İnrtoduction: Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürkâ in Turkish Foreign Policy New Prospects, Ed. C. H. Dodd, Eothen Press Huntingdon 1992, pp. 1-8
 Aydemir, İhtilalin Mantığı, p. 190
 Melek M. Fırat, 1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara 1997, p. 6
 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p.140
 Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye, p. 323
 Ibid., p. 338
 Karpat, Türk Demokrasi, p. 328
 Hamit Ersoy, Turkeyâs Involvement In Western Defence Initiatives In The Middle east In The 1950s, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Durham 1995, p. 136
 Karpat, Türk Demokrasi, p. 229
 Ibid., p. 235
 Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye, p. 340
 Ibid., p. 348
 12 July 1955, FO-371/117732 RK 1197/6
 Burrows âdan Dışişlerine (Ankara-Londra) 6 Ocak 1960, FO-371/160212, RK 1011/1
 For further information, see William Hale, Turlish Politics and Military, Routledge, London 1994, Ãmit Ãzdağ, Menderes dÃ¶neminde
 Metin Toker explained that Ismet Pasha was sure of the possibility of occurence of the coup. Metin Toker, Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşaâli Yılları, Demokrasiden Darbeye 1957-1960, Bilgi Yay. İstanbul İstanbul 1991, p. 353
The examples from outside are given in the telegraph of the British ambassador to Ankara, Burrows, on 22 April 1960. In the telegraph he wrote there was a potentially revolutionary situataion in Turkey. FO-371/153032, RK 1015/10
Moreover, the British Newspaper, The Times dated on 26 April 1960, published a long article with he title "Was Janisarries gaining its old power?â in which the writer explained the impact of Turkish Armyâs power on crisis.
 Erdem Erner, Davulun Sesi (Dışişlerinde 44 Yıl), Bilgi yay. İstanbul 1993, p. 65
 Eroğul, Demokrat Parti, p. 146
 Burrows to FO, 22 April 1960, FO-371/153032, RK 1015/10
 Burrows to FO, 22 April 1960, FO-371/153032, RK 1015/10
 Hale, Turkish Politics, p. 106
 Burrows to FO,9 April 1960, FO-371/153032, RK 1015/11
 The seminar paper given by Sir. Bernard Burrows, the British ambassador to Ankara during the period of 1958-1962 at London Unıversity, School of Oriental and African Studies in 1998.
 Bekir Tünay, Menderes Devri Anıları, İstanbul, p. 382
 C. Arcayürek, Yeni Demokrasi Yeni Arayışlar 1960-1965, Bilgi Yay. Ankara, 1985, p. 41, Hürriyet 1 June 1967
 Ankara to FO, (Eden), 4 Kasım 1952, WK 1022/7
 Ercüment Yavuzalp, Liderlerimiz ve Dış Politika, Bilgi yay. Ankara, 1996, pp. 74-75
 Burrows to Fo, 18. 01. 1960, Fo-371/153039, RK 1022/1
 Nasuh Uslu, Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs, â1. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara, 2000, p. 20
 Ayşegül Sever, "The Compliant Ally? Turkey and the West in the Middle East 1954-58, Middle Eastern Studies, v. 34, No. 2 1998, pp. 73-90
 For the British and American sources about the subject, see B. Kemal Yeşilbursa, İngiltere ve Amerikaânın Ortadoğu Savunma Projeleri ve Türkiye (1950-1954), Ankara, 2000
 For further see Ayşegül Sever, Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu 1945-1958, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul 1997, Bülent Ali Rıza, Turkish Participation In Middle East Defence Projects and Its Impact on Turco-Arab Relations, May 1950-June 1953, (Unpublished PhD. Thesis) Oxford 1982
 Ahmad, Turkish Experiment, p. 391
 Selim Deringil, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürkâ in Clement Dodd (ed), Turkish Foreign Policy, Eothen, Huntington, 1992, pp. 1-8
 Mehmet GÃ¶nlübol ve Diğerleri, Olaylarla Türk Dış politikası, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara 1991993, pp. 235-236
 Eden to Churchill, 21 May 1952, FO-371-101856
 Burrows to FO, 7 December 1959, FO-371/144757, RK 111/11
 Hüseyin Bağcı, Demokrat Parti DÃ¶nemi Dış Politikası, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara 1991, p. 57
 Nurhan İnce, Problems and politics, p. 30, For further for the Baghdad Pact and CENTO see Cihat GÃKTEPE, "The âForgotten Allianceâ? Anglo-Turkish Relations and CENTO, 1959-65, in Seventy-Five years of The Turkish Republic, Sylvia Kedourie, (ed), London 2000, ss. 103-129
 Kemal Girgin, dünyanın dÃ¶rt bucağı bir diplomatın anıları, 1957/1997, Milliyet yay. İstanbul 1998 p. 56
 For the detail see Nur Batur "İngiliz Gizli belgelerinde Menderes-Amerika Kavgası ve 27 Mayısâa Doğruâ, Milliyet, 13-18 February 1989
 Tunçay, Siyasal Tarih, pp. 175-187
 Aydemir, İhtilalin Mantığı, p. 214
 Atilla İlhan "Batıcıâ mi Batılı mı?â, Cumhuriyet 14 December 2001
 Recep Şükrü Apuhan, Ãteki Menderes Eski DP milletvekili Gıyaseddin Emreâden Hatıralar ve 27 Mayıs Olayı, Timaş İstanbul 1996, p. 73
 Ibid p. 74
 Karpat, Türk Demokrasi, pp. 337-338,